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Abstract 
 
The intensity of negotiations, including war and Peace Talks, are driven by the threat of 
identity disintegration.  Sri Lanka negotiates to preserve territorial integrity.  Tamils argue 
for secession to preserve their identity.  How is each to adapt their identity so that they can 
peacefully co-exist within the island? 
 
The current peace process began in 2002.  The principles of Organizational Cybernetics 
show distinction is warranted between External Self-Determination (secession) and Internal 
Self-Determination (a single sovereignty recognised by the international community) as the 
negotiating systems occupy different recursive positions relative to each other.  In each 
context, the systems gravitate differently towards cohesion and autonomy.  Equally vital is 
to distinguish between systems, their embedments and their representatives.  Diagnosis of 
the peace process seeking an internal self-determination solution does not display these 
distinctions.  At the 2002 Peace Talks the only system permitted to negotiate with Sri 
Lanka  (the encompassing system)  was confined to one of the embedded systems  (the 
Tamils as represented by the LTTE).  Structurally this risked the encompassing system 
collapsing to represent its missing embedded systems.  To rectify this Team Syntegrity is 
proposed, whose sequence of design in its multiple cascades enables representation issues 
to be resolved without it being confined to political parties.  
 
Content solutions are matters for Sri Lankans to design.  However, they are considered in 
order to design and propose a ‘process’ solution.  The journey this thesis takes is to arrive 
at designing the ‘how’ of negotiations so that it can accommodate the myriad of ‘what’ 
needs to be negotiated.   
 
A meta-level logic is required to resolve the undecidable proposition of preserving 
territorial integrity or secession.  Working with the levels of recursion - the UN, the State 
and its embedded systems, this thesis proposes a way to absorb residual variety to gain 
agreement to negotiate internal self-determination based on interlocking negotiations xii 
 
involving those seeking cohesion and those seeking autonomy.  This process also opens the 
way to address the solution design of the other interacting crises afflicting Sri Lanka. 
 
The uniqueness and contribution of this research is that it is the first time Organizational 
Cybernetics has been conceptually applied to diagnose and design a peace process 
involving a sovereign State. 
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 Chapter One  1 
 
  Chapter One 
Scoping the Boundaries 
 
 
The ultimate criteria of viability  
must indeed be the capability to survive. 
This is both a physiological and ecological criterion 
- and certainly not a logical one. 
-  Stafford Beer 
 
 
Tropical islands are projected as idyllic places.  Yet, such accolade has to be won back in 
Sri Lanka for it is steeped in crises where the tip that protrudes is the two decades of 
sporadic war and tension, which keeps many a local and tourist overseas.   I am one such 
person and have long wondered of the path that may imbibe hope to solve what so far has 
presented as intractable.  
 
This chapter is presented in three parts: 
•  Part I – To gain a juxtaposition of perspectives and issues, Sri Lanka is viewed from 
different angles. 
•  Part II – Scoping of the boundaries of research and its objective and uniqueness. 
•  Part III – Outline of dissertation from a chapter perspective. 
 
Part I – Juxtaposition of Perspectives 
 
Cursorily to the foreigner Sri Lanka is associated with Ceylon Tea, tropical beaches, 
international cricket and on a much sadder note the ethnically labelled war where the death 
toll is reported at over 65,000 persons.  The Asian Tsunami of December 2004 cost Sri 
Lanka 28,000 lives. To the astute international business community, the major attraction is 
Sri Lanka’s pent-up demand for re-construction of its infrastructure, occasioned by war and 
the tsunami.  To the Sri Lankan masses, the reality is that they are sinking under the weight 
of a multitude of crises. Chapter One  2 
 
In the absence of prescriptive international law to address competing claims concerning 
self-determination in post-colonised times, self help measures reign in Sri Lanka.  Claims 
and counter claims expressed in war have prevailed for over two decades in parts of the 
country
1
 
 and a de facto State has emerged.  The threat of secession sits poised to strike at 
the very core of survival of Sri Lanka’s identity.   
By this is meant, if what fuels secessionist demands is left unquenched, the sovereign State 
identified as Sri Lanka, runs the very real risk of being partitioned into two separate 
sovereign States.  In this regard, the counter contention by those opting for secession, an 
embedded system within the encompassing umbrella of the State, is that it is their survival 
that is threatened. With each perceiving its survival jeopardized the crescendo of war and 
guerrilla/terrorist
2
 
 attacks rather than Peace Talks have so far won the day.  
The downward spiral that snares Sri Lanka has been attributed to the wars, which besides 
the prevailing ethnically labelled war included the ‘Southern Insurrection’ which flared in 
1971 and 1987-1989 and is estimated to have cost 60,000 lives –  mainly educated 
Sinhalese youth from the rural areas.  Over the decades, the manoeuvrings of politics and 
much of the published literature has been consumed by ‘what led to these wars’ and the 
                                                 
1 Country is colloquially used to mean State or nation.  In this thesis, nation means a large group of people 
united by common descent, culture, or language, and living in a particular location.  State (note the capital S) 
is a politically governed territory recognized by international law and usually a member of the United 
Nations.  There are exceptions however, like Taiwan which is not a member of the United Nations or The 
State of Palestine which is usually not considered to have gained State recognition - although approx 100 
State governments have recognized it.   
2 The use of the term guerrilla or terrorist attack is a matter of perspective.  Today, the non-government 
aggressor is generically referred to as terrorist.  In contrast, the non-government aggressor usually refers to 
itself as freedom fighters engaged in guerrilla type attacks.   Another view, expressed is “Fighting for the 
lofty objective of national liberation does not automatically remove the terrorist tag if terror tactics are 
adopted. Likewise, the adoption of terrorist tactics does not automatically disqualify a national liberation 
movement. One can be both a terrorist and freedom fighter. It is not a case of one or the other.  There is a lot 
of hypocrisy and double standards here. A state is allowed to adopt all sorts of underhand methods amounting 
to state terrorism but it is not labelled terrorist. An air force plane can kill innocent civilians by dropping a 
bomb from the air and get away with it by calling it ‘collateral damage.’  But woe unto a non-state actor 
planting a bomb that kills civilians intentionally or unintentionally – it will be automatically labelled 
terrorism and very often does deserve that label. But dropping bombs from an altitude allows greater latitude 
in getting away from the terrorist label. All states gang up in refusing to admit state terrorism.” … It has the 
attributes of a conventional militia when it adopts positional warfare. The LTTE fights like an army when it 
captures or defends territory. The Tigers function as a guerrilla force when launching attacks against security 
force installations or convoys. It is a terrorist outfit whenever it kills innocent civilians through bombs or 
massacres and assassinates political leaders and other civilians.” (Jeyaraj, 2007) Chapter One  3 
 
war waves themselves.  This has bred the tenor that if peace could be restored Sri Lanka 
would emerge out of its crises which detrimentally affects its economic prosperity and 
cultural harmony. 
 
Yet the critical point I want to call attention to in this thesis is that these crises are 
interacting multifariously with each other.  Therefore, design remedies in the absence of 
recognition of such interacting crises are (risk) bound to fail because the interactions in the 
longer term will erode the temporary relief gained from redressing partial problems.  In 
using the term crisis, I mean to say it is more than a problem. 
 
As Beer states:  
 
What counts as crisis is the expectation of loss of control: in other words cybernetic 
breakdown in the institution.  This does not refer to an inability to impose decisions; it 
means that the institution is out of control itself. (Beer, 1994b) 
  
Since 2002, another crisis has begun to emerge, albeit less recognised.  It is that the public 
debt repayment schedule has begun to outstrip government revenue
3
 
.  This meant the 
government was required to debt finance its operational expenditure having opted to 
contain its taxation options although continued sale of public owned assets alleviates some 
of the burden.  When this was officially declared by the then new government in its 2002 
Budget speech, it was also sensibly projected that this trend would continue if the war was 
not ended.  The assertion being, the financial crisis and ‘debt outstripping’ are a tributary 
(effect and sub-cause if you like) consequence of the war.  This has bred a conviction that 
cessation of war would stem Sri Lanka’s debt burden as the war’s massive capital and 
operational expenditure will cease.   
Whilst perfunctorily this tacit assertion makes sense what went unexpressed was the capital 
expenditure programme that would be required to reconstruct the infrastructure (e.g. 
                                                 
3 The point here is not about the usual budget deficit.  Rather, the deficit arises upon payment of the first 
expense item – debt repayment.  Thus all other expenses, like operational expenditure of paying public 
servants, have to be debt financed.  The need to ensure future borrowing capacity means debt repayments 
take priority.  This is because if repayments falter, opportunities will narrow for accessing concessionary 
World Bank, ADB low interest rate soft loans.  Thus, cost of borrowing will increase as the State will need to 
access more expensive funding sources.  Another emerging trend is the tightening of bi-lateral aid by some 
countries in response to Sri Lanka’s human rights violations.   Chapter One  4 
 
network of roads, rail, water supply, electricity stations, schools, administrative buildings, 
hospitals, etc) in the war torn areas.  Even more unexpressed is that this reconstruction 
programme which will inevitably employ newer technology (i.e. follow a replacement 
policy which in insurance terms is described as ‘new for old’) would earn a clamour from 
the non-war torn areas to have their old infrastructure, much starved of maintenance due to 
financial and cultural reasons, replaced.  Bearing in mind, the longevity of infrastructure 
and the need to establish future orientated parity of status between the war torn and non-
war torn communities, makes this expected clamour both a financial and social issue - and 
is discussed further in Chapter Four.  
 
Therefore, the important point is that the capital expenditure debt projection evidences no 
sign of abatement due to the end of war and there is the added debt occasioned by the 
tsunami reconstruction capital expenditure programme.  What can be expected is that the 
prevalence of peace will provide the underpinning environment for a stable business 
climate and thus attract new ventures which will lead to increased employment and 
revenue, which for the government translates to an increased pool to structure its taxation 
streams.  However, it appears no serious study has been published either academically or 
by the government including its bankers and planners, to verify the popularly held ‘peace-
debt reduction’ view or for that matter the scenario that has been portrayed above.  
Undoubtedly, the critical parameters to watch will be the serviceability ratios, meaning the 
government revenue to debt repayments ratio, plus the profile of interest rates, repayment 
schedules and debt longevity. As an insight into foreign debt implications it is pertinent to 
point out that the parity value of the Sri Lanka rupee to the US$ moved from SL Rs55.27 in 
1996 to SL Rs103.96 in 2006
4.  What this means is that foreign loans existing in 1996 and 
being repaid in 2006, the bulk of which is expressed in US$, required an 87%
5
 
 increase in 
Sri Lankan rupees just to keep up with the loan repayment programme.   
                                                 
4 Source: Table 4 of the Special Statistical Appendix – Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2006. 
5 This is calculated on a base of SL Rs55.27.   
SLRs103.96 - SLRs55.27 = SLRs48.69 
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For the masses, solace from the spiralling cost of living and tensions of war is largely 
found by working overseas, mostly in labouring positions like house maids, vehicle drivers 
and fruit pickers, in the oil rich Middle Eastern countries who have opened their labour 
market to employment of Asians.   
 
Whilst economically the absence of persons to ‘work visa’ based immigration is 
contributing to a ‘post box’ economy where the island’s third largest export earner is 
remittances to family at home, the sociological impact is  mounting.  Children are 
increasingly being reared without one or both of their parents (mostly mothers) and 
spreading is the trend of the resident parent (mostly fathers) indulging in gambling, liquor 
consumption and extra-marital sexual relations.  Additionally, there is the psychological 
scarring of those maimed, traumatised and families left behind by the two wars and the 
tsunami and they do so devoid of professionally provided therapeutic care. 
 
Economically, the country has moved from its 1960’s pursuit of self-sufficiency to its 
production capacity being employed to satisfy foreign demand where the chief attractor is 
Sri Lanka’s relatively low cost of labour.  Additionally, the brain drain of professionals to 
the developed world is mounting and significantly, unlike the labouring class, little of their 
income is filtering back to Sri Lanka for most utilize their savings to invest in assets 
overseas where many gain residential/citizenship status.  Furthermore, the erosion of the 
parity value of the Sri Lankan rupee makes some local investments an inflation infested 
proposition.    
 
In politics the mire is just as entangled in instability, corruption and assassinations.  Since 
independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has promulgated three constitutions which have 
transitioned the country from a bi-cameral Parliament under British dominion status (in 
1948) to a unicameral Parliament as a Republic (in 1972) to Presidential-Parliamentary rule 
(in 1978).  It seems almost inevitable that a fourth Constitution is needed to address at the 
very minimum meaningful devolution, as foreshadowed in the 2002 Peace Talks, and 
minimally bridling the power the Executive Presidential system has over the Cabinet and 
the Public Service.  As Dr. N. M. Perera stated, “The whole administration will be under 
his control.  … The Cabinet is his creature.” (Perera, 1979:12)  The consequence of this Chapter One  6 
 
power is explored in Chapter Four but it is impressive to point out here Perera’s depth of 
understanding of constitutional matters.  
 
It is conceivable that the executive and the legislature can develop an unbridgeable 
antagonism.  … The country might well face a situation where a left majority 
legislature has to confront a right-inclined President or vice versa. (Perera 1979:13) 
 
In 2004 such eventuated, when the Executive President dissolved Parliament in a bid to end 
the power struggle with the Prime Minister – on the vital issue of Peace Negotiations.   
 
If the above be the better recognised issues facing Sri Lanka, albeit rarely perceived in their 
interactive role, the crises which sail less unrecognised are:  
 
•  The position of the vernacular languages in an economy hinged on globalisation 
which is employing a dwindling pattern of harnessing its production capacity to 
achieve self-sufficiency. The contention here is that globalisation promotes the use 
of international languages (like English) whereas vernacular languages adequately 
and comfortably cater for trading environments built on self-sufficiency  This 
language gets even more complex in multiracial, multilingual environments.   
 
•  An ineffective public administration corroded by ‘constitutionally approved’ 
political manipulations, seriously deficient in providing a client orientated service 
(particularly to the poor) and oblivious of its strategic importance towards 
regulating the burgeoning private sector which is emerging out of the 
nationalisation era of the 1970’s.   
 
•  Rampant corruption which leaks foreign exchange and feeds the debt spiral.  
Additionally, it erodes the spirit of the people as, unlike in the developed nations 
where corruption prevails in the upper echelons of the business community, most 
people in developing countries encounter corruption in their day to day living – 
example, paying a monthly handout to the garbage collector, paying a bribe to gain 
admission to the better schools, etc. 
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•  Lack of a maintenance culture (of roads, buildings, etc) which not only feeds the 
debt spiral and corruption but reduces the longevity of the asset. The nature of this 
issue is discussed in Chapter Four in the context of parity of status given internal 
self-determination. 
 
•  The dearth of national standards thus requiring a diverse build up of material 
inventory, skill sets and consequential investment.  For example, cooking gas is 
sold in branded portable gas cylinders only. Therefore, to take advantage of price 
movements in this homogenous product, new cylinders must be purchased, which 
in the capital city of Colombo, is even more questionable given that it once had a 
healthy underground gas pipeline network.  Another simple everyday example is 
non-standardization of electrical plugs and sockets for domestic use.  In use are a 
plethora of plugs and sockets based on the UK, USA, European, Australian 
standards
6
 
 which therefore mean adaptors are an added requirement. All this tied-up 
diversity of inventory in a country with a massive public debt portfolio. 
If this deluge of steeped negatives presents as too onerous, it is all the same a picture of the 
atmosphere that drenches those living in Sri Lanka.  The flip side is that there are small 
segments of society who thrive because of it.  A classic example would be funeral 
directors, armament dealers, and equipment (like medical and engineering) suppliers for 
whom the war and ‘post box’ economy is a bonanza.  The important point of this 
realisation is that if the objective is to alter the results being experienced in Sri Lanka, then 
the proposed solution needs to phase in alternative prosperity avenues for those who 
currently benefit from the prevailing status, for otherwise they will inevitably sabotage the 
implementation of the solution.  Whilst ‘spoiler’ recognition is well known, what needs 
attention is designing systems which phase in alternative prosperity avenues, particularly 
                                                 
6   
= A  = B  = C  = D  = E            
= 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 5  = 6  = 7  = 8  = 9  = 10 
Available at: http://www.iec.ch/zone/plugsocket/ps_asia.htm [accessed 18 October 2006] 
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recognising the long lag times with such a transition – namely involving change of skills 
sets and network of business contacts. 
Overall, these are thumbnail sketches to which, in the ensuing chapters, variety and in-
depth explorations will be added.  What is however important to declare is that by this line 
of thinking, I am deliberating on the appropriateness of the traditional boundaries of the 
crises under consideration in the context of Sri Lanka’s socio-political-economic-judicial-
administrative environment. 
 
What I am seeking to declare is not just an increased list of what are the crises in such a 
huge system, but to understand as Beer would say ‘why things happen as they do’.  In other 
words, I am seeking to diagnose the nature of the systemic interactions of these crises and 
the strength of their multifarious connectivity to each other.  Also where relevant to make 
the distinction been systemic crisis and regulatory collapse (Beer 1990:316).  Beer 
describes regulation as the delimitation of acceptable variety (Beer, 1994e:70).   
 
 
Part II – Scoping the Boundaries & Research Aspects 
 
This backdrop marks the opening point for my thesis, extending the boundaries of 
consideration to discern other crises in addition to the threatened secession, war and its 
drain on the country’s debt structure.  To borrow a perspective from Fuenmayor, it is both 
the starting point and what we want to see by moving away from it so that the manner and 
strength of crisis interactions can be apprehended.   
 
Let us now return to appreciate the permutations embedded within the statement ‘crises are 
interacting multifariously with each other’.  Firstly, there is a logic that could consider the 
broad spectrum sketched above as an amalgam and consider it to be one crisis comprising 
interacting components.  On the other hand, there is value in realising the nature of the rise 
and fall of the various crises.  For example, a crisis may have developed as a consequence 
of another crisis and will subside when the crisis that gave birth to it is over.  Another 
permutation is that the embedded crisis could abate and in doing so also abate the crises 
that encompasses it.  Still another permutation, is that a crisis may have been a tributary of Chapter One  9 
 
another crisis but may have taken on a life of its own and continue despite the crisis which 
gave birth to it being over.  The State’s massive debt is such an example.  Additionally, 
there are also crises (either in the singular or plural) that arise independent of another crisis, 
but with which it interacts and thus in that sense they reciprocally affect each other.  The 
Asian Tsunami was such an example.  The principle involved in these considerations is 
what is known as homeostasis and physiological limits.  Chapter Two discusses these 
cybernetic concepts. 
 
The paradox that presents is that given the individual pattern of the rise and fall of the 
various crises there is value in considering them in their own right but they need to be 
situated in the context of their multifarious interactions which in that sense makes for one 
crisis. The paramount importance of this type of deliberations and systemic diagnosis is 
that it is the precursor to gaining a sense of the type of interventions that need to be 
designed and applied.  In particular, it guides the way for concurrent design of remedies.    
 
To propose concurrent remedies due to the interacting nature of the crises, however, is to 
admit of variety explosion and that probably explains the traditional attractiveness to keep 
the crises separate so as not to be overwhelmed by variety and to keep control.  Yet, I 
propose that such control is illusionary due to the systemic interaction of the crises.  
Therefore, intrinsic to this dissertation is a proposal, discussed in Chapter Five, of a way of 
absorbing the variety explosion and giving a better chance to design solutions for 
implementation based on systemic considerations or at least based on a wider spectrum of 
interacting crises.  In this regard, it will be relevant to recall this introduction, especially the 
spectrum that reaches beyond what has climaxed to war and yet which gets addressed 
because of the carnage and expense of war. 
 
1.2.1  Research Objective  
Clearly, an option existed for this thesis to explore an aspect of Sri Lanka – like its threat of 
secession, its debt-intensive economy, its weak constitutional framework or corruption.  
Rather chosen is a broad mental awareness, with sometimes fuzzy boundaries, so as to 
bring into perspective the interplay of crises and appreciate why linear paths (frequently 
aptly described as ‘one  step at a time’) of crisis solution are doomed to failure.  Chapter One  10 
 
Accordingly, narrow segmentation is consciously avoided in order to not only question the 
singularity of crisis and the tributaries of that crisis (e.g. war, rehabilitation, high security 
zones) but to glean the nature of the interactions of the crises once crisis is detected in its 
plurality.  
 
Whilst ‘interacting crises’ may seem like a motherhood statement – we know crises interact 
so what is new - the objective sought is to declare what these crises are and gain an 
understanding of the ways in which these crises interact for otherwise we risk ineffective 
solutions.  Indeed, when we look at the way Sri Lanka handles its interventions it rarely 
exhibits this behaviour and consequently frequently it solves a crisis by propelling another 
aspect into crisis.  The legislative declaration of the Sinhala Only Act is such an example 
from the 1950’s era.  An example in the 2000’s is the MOU (Memorandum of 
Understanding) pertaining to the Cessation of Hostilities resolution being limited to the 
GoSL (Government of Sri Lanka) and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).  
Evidence for these assertions is provided in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
To quote Bhaskar,   
The skills of an applied and a pure scientist are characteristically different. The applied 
scientist must be adept at analysing a situation as a whole, of thinking at several 
different levels at once, recognizing clues, piecing together diverse bits of information 
and assessing the likely outcomes of various courses of action.  The pure scientist, on 
the other hand, deliberately excludes, whereas the applied scientist seeks always to 
accommodate, the effects of intervening levels of reality. (Bhaskar, 1997:120) 
 
It is from this space of applied research where the inter-connectivity of crises is recognised 
that this dissertation is deliberated.  In this regard, particular emphasis is given to gaining 
clarity of understanding in the context of different compositions of embedded systems.  
This embedment concept is presented in Chapter Two and extensively applied in Chapter 
Three, Four and Five.   
 
With this challenge, research was undertaken with the objective of: 
•  Systemically diagnosing some key aspects of what seriously ails Sri Lanka, and  
•  Providing design intervention ‘processes’ that could assist/enable the country to be 
viable and move out of its gnawing crises ridden state.  Chapter One  11 
 
Faced with the threat of secession, an important consideration was whether the research for 
this thesis would consider secession, amongst its array of solutions.  Given that the design 
proposed is an ‘intervention process’ and not a content solution, this question is partially 
circumvented because secession per se is a content solution.  This partial addressing of 
content from a process perspective is evidenced in the diagnosis provided in Chapter Three 
and the intervention process proposal presented in Chapter Five.   
 
Concerning matters of sovereignty threats, Blay states,  
In the framework of conflict resolution, the degree of  legitimacy of a claim for a 
particular form of remedy is considerably enhanced by the absence of alternative forms 
of remedy (Blay, 1984:410). 
 
 
This implies secession is a remedy of last resort in the face of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies.  Indeed, Blay states  
Paragraph 4(b) of Resolution 1 (XXIV) provides that a communication is inadmissible 
“if remedies have not been exhausted unless it appears that such remedies would be 
ineffective or unnecessarily prolonged”.  Where the authors allege that domestic 
remedies have been exhausted or were ineffective they have to establish this 
satisfactorily. (Blay, 1994:405) 
 
In chapter Four however, content does form part of the deliberation and in this sense 
secession is considered particularly from the perspective of the contingency of what if a 
devolved form of governance does not work out.  A scenario considered by some is that 
devolution is a precursor to secession.  In this important sense, employing Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety secession forms part of the consideration of devolution both in terms of 
power sharing and geographical allocation of landmass and its entailments as covered by 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LoS)
7
 
.  This significantly changed 
the geographic coverage of Sri Lanka such that the land to water ratio is now 1:7.5   
A point of clarity is worthy as this early stage of this thesis concerning what is currently 
referred to as ‘Sri Lankan Peace Talks’.  It pertains to reaching agreement on the design 
                                                 
7 LoS is particularly important to islands with wide stretches of uninterrupted oceans.  LoS specifies the type 
of ownership rights pertaining to the use of the ocean and its resources.  Different rights pertain to different 
stretches of water – namely Internal Waters by the shore line (e.g. bays), Territorial Sea covering the ocean 
space up to 12 nautical miles, Contiguous Zone covering up to 24 nautical miles and Exclusive Economic 
Zone covering up to a distance of 200 nautical miles.  (source – Atlas of Sri Lanka) Chapter One  12 
 
and implementation of non-secession in the meaning of international law as it pertains to 
the legal recognition of sovereign countries.  Thus, in this context peace which results from 
secession is not what is called ‘successful Peace Talks’.  So in this sense, ‘Peace Talks’ has 
a narrow meaning and if it results in secession, then the talks themselves would be labelled 
a failure.  Having said this, such failure is a GoSL label and a label used by those who do 
not want secession.  On the other hand, secession would not be considered a failure by the 
LTTE since that is an outcome they are happy with if they cannot reach agreement on what 
they consider is meaningful autonomy.  It is important we understand the meaning of the 
terminology,  as  it is perspective dependent.  For this thesis, the perspective is non-
secessionist and thus the diagnosis and its design charter is autonomy within a context of a 
cohesive Sri Lanka that maintains its territorial boundaries as currently recognised by 
international sovereign law.  However, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, non-secession 
(also called internal self-determination) is done in the context of Meta-Level Negotiations 
chartering its course in the context of the option of external self-determination and the 
criteria of its acceptance, or otherwise, from an international perspective. 
 
1.2.2  Research Framework  
The next obvious step is to determine upon what criteria will such diagnosis and 
intervention be based?  
 
Will it be based upon a comparative study of countries embroiled in crisis (like the 
Northern Ireland conflict, or Israel-Palestine, etc).  Or even a comparative study of 
countries of similar context (being multilingual, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, Asian, 
colonial, etc) but which have governed themselves in a manner that managed to avoid 
being trapped in crises.  Countries like Singapore, Malaysia and India were obvious 
contenders here.  Or, will the criteria be principles based - like the philosophy of statehood 
and national governance, or principles of organization or justice, or ethics, etc. 
 
The option was taken to not pursue the line of comparative country studies because 
exhaustive detail about other countries would present too many difficulties with respect to 
filtering appropriate information and transferring across.  In comparison a principles based 
approach provides its own filter –  namely the principles.  It would have been time Chapter One  13 
 
consuming to get to ‘understand the nuances that made the difference that made the 
difference’ in those countries.  An underlying question would be why compare Sri Lanka to 
those countries and not some other,  including that none are glowing examples of 
governance.   Furthermore, the permutations of their situation may explain their situation, 
but permutations in Sri Lanka being different may explain why Sri Lanka could not have 
traversed the path to the type of solution that the other country did.  Additionally, for the 
study to be a quality comparison it would require a discovery of underlining principles that 
informed the situations in those countries.  Significantly too, these principles would be 
what are required to inform the design of the intervention processes (and content solutions). 
 
Thus, the choice was clearly in favour of studying Sri Lanka based on matters of guiding 
principles. This not only contained the study to the country itself but time wise it allowed 
in-depth exploration so that nuances of perspectives had a better chance of being 
understood. This opened the question to what set of guiding principles would be the choice. 
 
Given the context of country and crises, clearly the minimum requirement was that the 
framework of principles selected needed to be capable of handling the degree of 
complexity associated with large systems (like that of a country as compared to a business 
or family)  and on-going survival where survival itself was threatened, as compared to 
growth or maintenance needs.  This search led to Beer’s remarkable work in Chile in the 
1970’s and his use of the principles of Organizational Cybernetics to address Chile’s 
transition to a socialist State which at the time was plagued by inflation and subsequently 
was detrimentally affected by a US led trade embargo of its export sector.  
 
Here found was not only a framework capable of coping with the complexity at the level of 
country and crises, but it had the benefit of having been actually applied, albeit for a few 
years and fewer long term results.  The Chilean experiment came to an abrupt halt when a 
military coup toppled the government and claimed the life of President Salvador Allende.  
Even so, Beer published invaluable detailed writings, in his book Brain of the Firm, of his 
Chilean application wherein he explains the principles of cybernetics and his Viable 
Systems Model (VSM) and the reasoning and the way it was applied in the Chilean 
context.  
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In selecting this framework, also evaluated were Jay W. Forrester’s Systems Dynamics and 
Peter Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology (SSM).  However, neither was selected.   
Whilst Systems Dynamics focuses on the how the components in a system interact with 
each other and the use of causal loop diagrams would have been very useful, the 
mathematical heart of Systems Dynamics was found unsuitable as war-peace negotiations 
did not readily lend itself to quantitative cardinal measurement, the preferred mode for 
Systems Dynamics.  It is recognised that Systems Dynamics may however be suitable at a 
later stage of research when the parameters involved are better defined.  For example, it 
would be very useful for the economic modelling in the context of public debt-revenue 
structures mentioned earlier.  With SSM’s whose strength is its qualitative strain and 
dialogue with people to gain differences in perspectives on the limitations and hidden 
assumptions of desired ends, it however presented as too unstructured to apply to the 
complexity at the level of a country especially given the layers of government and variables 
that needed to be contended with.   It is considered, however, that SSM would be a very 
useful adjunct for gaining perspectives from a diversity of players influencing the Peace 
Negotiations. 
 
Organizational Cybernetics and in specific Beer’s VSM, however, provided structure to 
cope with the variety of variables and layers of government and yet provided the fluidity to 
keep the qualitative considerations in focus.  Thus, using Organizational Cybernetics, 
which Beer aptly calls the ‘science of effective organization’ I seek to discern how the way 
Sri Lanka is organised (may have) contributed to produce the kind of content crises that 
embroil Sri Lanka.  In particular, attention is focused to discover what was lacking or what 
existed that prevented Sri Lanka from finding a stable state of functioning.  Where did its 
‘check and counter-check’ systems fail, where was its planning constellation and what 
prevented it from preparing to meet the trends?  In doing so, I adopt Maturana’s view 
which recognises that content is influenced by the nature of an organisation and how it is 
structured.  In particular, I hope that the organisational insights gained in this thesis will 
serve as valuable input to the thinking that is currently been applied to designing a fresh 
Constitution for Sri Lanka. 
 
Chapter Two of this thesis discusses the framework in more depth along with the 
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considerations including philosophical matters pertaining to matters of proof as it pertains 
to the notion of hypothesis is also addressed in Chapter Two. 
 
1.2.3  Research Hypothesis 
It would be succinct to state my hypothesis (a proposition intended to explain) at the very 
beginning of this section.  However, let me commence by commenting on validation.  In 
academia not only are we solution orientated, like in the business world, but central to 
solution is explanation which implies understanding how things work.  
 
In conventional terms, there is pure research and applied research.  In pure research the 
quest is to come up with meta-level laws that explain the generative mechanisms that 
explains phenomenon.   In applied research, the objective is to heed the meta-level laws 
and to ascertain if those generative mechanisms as specified in the laws produce the 
outcome intended in the context of the case under consideration.  Thus applied research 
serves to test whether those laws apply in the particular domain used and therefore 
contribute to verifying (or not) the applicability of that law in that particular domain.   
 
As Bhaskar says “Thus meteorology, like engineering, stands to physics and chemistry as 
an applied to a pure science, using the experimentally-established results of the latter.” 
(Bhakser, 1997:119) 
 
In the meanwhile, with hypothesis, where the objective is to validate or falsify a proposed 
statement (called a hypothesis), Maturana makes a useful distinction between a scientist 
and philosopher’ stance, when Maturana says,  
 
Philosophical theories arise when we try to preserve certain explanatory principles that 
we consider valid a priori.  This interest in the preservation of principles and their 
coherence justifies disregarding what may be experience.  Scientific theories, on the 
contrary, arise when we want to preserve the coherences in relation to what we are 
capable of experiencing.  The scientist can, therefore, ignore principles, dissolve then – 
and design a scientific theory. (Maturana & Poerksen, 2004) 
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My interpretation of this statement is that the scientist follows inductive logic whilst the 
philosopher followers deductive logic.  Logic (a branch of philosophy), is the rules by 
which reasoning supporting a conclusion are methodologically validated.   
 
In deductive logic, a main premise is stated wherein it contains a generalised 
statement/general rule, followed by a minor premise which is a statement about what could 
be called a special (or particular) case.  From there based on the reasoning adduced a 
conclusion is reached which states whether the special case conforms to the main premise 
propounded.  It is for this reason, that I contend that this matches Maturana’s view of a 
philosopher’s approach. 
 
In inductive logic, the objective is to infer a general rule based on a variety of special cases, 
which special cases in themselves may be tested one at a time.  It is in this sense that 
Maturana refers to the scientist being more concerned about understanding the special case 
than having it adhere to the major premise – as used in deductive logic. 
 
Now, when stating a hypothesis within the vein of deductive logic, the main premise takes 
on the character of the hypothesis whilst the researched context is the special case – minor 
premise.  The conclusion is about whether the researched context (special case) validates or 
invalidates the major premise.  Note, in the instance of invalidation, this would equally be a 
case not of invalidating the major premise, but of proving that the minor premise does not 
belong within the set covered by the major premise. 
 
Now the question that begs, in a sociological subject area as covered in this thesis is 
whether there is a major premise of the status of a general rule/generalised law which is 
applicable in the social sciences, under which Sri Lanka falls.?  In Chapter Two the theme 
is developed that the only generalised law of this calibre is Ashby’s Law of Requisite 
Variety.   
 
I will however equivalently state here that in the realm of the social sciences, there are 
three outstanding features that do not lend themselves to the deductive form of hypothesis 
proof.  This is because the social sciences, particularly when dealing with grossly 
encompassing systems, like a country, carry: Chapter One  17 
 
(a) A plethora of variables that do not lend themselves to isolation so that their causal 
effects can be determined.  Furthermore, the variables being human driven, run the risk 
that when studied and if known to the human as being studied can occasion the human 
to exercise their free will and (paradoxically) validly not follow their usual pattern of 
behaviour which impacts the study of the variable.  Note, with the natural sciences, 
like meteorology, this deliberate manipulation of variables does not occur, despite 
meteorology containing a surfeit of variables as exhibited in the social sciences. 
 
(b) As Bhaskar observes,  
It is characteristic of open systems that two or more mechanisms, perhaps of 
radically different kinds, combine to produce effects: so that because we do not 
know ex ante which mechanisms will actually be at work (and perhaps have no 
knowledge of their mode of articulation) events are not deductively predictable.  
Most events in open systems must thus be regarded as ‘conjunctures’. It is only 
because of this that it makes sense to talk of a stray bullet or an unhappy childhood 
affecting ‘the course of history’.  And it is only in virtue of this that laboratory 
closures can come to be established.  … For in the generation of an open-systemic 
event several of these predicates may be simultaneously applicable.  (Bhaskar 
1997:120) 
 
(c) As Bhaskar says,  
The importance of experimental activity in natural science, conceived as a specific 
kind of conjunctural occurrence, allows us to stress that the predicates ‘natural’, 
‘social’, ‘human’, ‘physical’, ‘chemical’, aerodynamical’, biological’, ‘economic’, 
etc ought not to be regarded as differentiating distinct kinds of events, but as 
differentiating distinct kinds of mechanisms. (op. cit.) 
 
Bhaskar then marries points (b) and (c) to state ‘For in the generation of an open-systemic 
event several of these predicates may be simultaneously applicable. (op. cit.) 
 
What this means is a hypothesis based on deductive proof is beyond the reach of the 
context of this dissertation.   
 
This leaves us with developing a hypothesis on inductive lines.  However, as the basis of 
induction is to infer a general rule based on a variety of special cases, this too is beyond the 
reach of this dissertation as it does not extend to addressing conflicts as encountered in 
various countries.  Furthermore, there are those considerations pertaining to the social 
sciences which have been mentioned above. Chapter One  18 
 
Given that the aim of this thesis is to cybernetically diagnose the crises in Sri Lanka and 
propose design considerations to absorb critical variety parameters, the way forward is to 
develop a hypothesis based on Peirce’s abductive reasoning, which is the process of 
inference to the best explanation.  Peirce initially called this type of reasoning ‘hypothesis’ 
and later moved to calling it abduction.  On this point, Peirce states “Hypothesis, that is, 
propositions which are assumed with probability, in order to explain or prove something 
else which cannot otherwise be explained or proved.” (Peirce, 1868) 
 
To get a sense of the distinctions Peirce, (in Hoffman, 1997) states, 
... there are but three elementary kinds of reasoning. The first, which I call abduction ... 
consists in examining a mass of facts and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory. In 
this way we gain new ideas; but there is no force in the reasoning. The second kind of 
reasoning is deduction, or necessary reasoning. It is applicable only to an ideal state of 
things, or to a state of things in so far as it may conform to an ideal. It merely gives a 
new aspect to the premisses. ... The third way of reasoning is induction, or experimental 
research. Its procedure is this. Abduction having suggested a theory, we employ 
deduction to deduce from that ideal theory a promiscuous variety of consequences to 
the effect that if we perform certain acts, we shall find ourselves confronted with 
certain experiences. We then proceed to try these experiments, and if the predictions of 
the theory are verified, we have a proportionate confidence that the experiments that 
remain to be tried will confirm the theory. I say that these three are the only elementary 
modes of reasoning there are. 
 
In research there is relationship between hypothesis and purpose.  Accordingly, the 
hypothesis based on abductive reasoning is:-  
 
Using Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety will help Sri Lanka avert secession.  To do this it 
must minimally address: 
a)  the emergent properties of the structurally coupled non-LTTE ethnically based 
parties,  
b)  the viability of devolved (provincial) units  
c)  the protocols of cohesive counter balance that lead to the investment mix in the war 
torn and non-war torn areas.  
 
In abductive reasoning terms the hypothesis is that the conclusion stated a matter of 
probability not certainty and thus Popper’s falsification test is inapplicable here.  Thus the 
main premise pertains to Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, the special case is Sri Lanka’s Chapter One  19 
 
circumstance of the threat of secession, and the conclusion is the best explanation of what 
needs to be addressed which is the purpose that guides this thesis.   
 
1.2.4  Research Uniqueness & Contribution 
To date, as far as I know no research has been published on Sri Lanka which addresses the 
content and organisational composition Sri Lanka from the broad landscape as chosen in 
this thesis.  Neither has a cybernetic framework been applied to study any aspect of Sri 
Lanka.   
 
However, given that this research is in the context of a country, as mentioned earlier the 
outstanding example of employing a cybernetic framework was Professor Dr. Stafford 
Beer’s application in the 1970’s to Chile’s socialist economy.  Since then, cybernetics 
continued to be employed by Beer during his consultancies with various governments but 
most of this material is unpublished.   
 
Using the published literature on the Chilean application, the difference with Sri Lanka is 
that in Chile the means of production were nationalised by the government.  In Chile, 
CORFO had already established many state run enterprises before President Salvador 
Allende’s reign.  They formed the base on which later nationalizations (e.g. copper) were 
done.  In Sri Lanka it is the reverse process (privatization) that is going on.  Consequently, 
the issues of cohesion and autonomy belong to different camps.  In Sri Lanka, private 
enterprise (that seeks autonomy) does not fall under the ownership of the government 
(which seeks cohesion to ensure national needs are met).  Whereas, in Chile both cohesion 
and autonomy streams were owned by the government and it was in an era where self-
sufficiency was not only in vogue but essential due to the embargoes imposed by many 
foreign countries. 
  
In contrast, Sri Lanka has embraced globalisation (i.e. an export oriented economy driven 
to meeting foreign demands) and is governed by two distinct governments -  one, the 
democratically elected Parliament and the other the clandestine dictatorial regime of the 
LTTE.  Such duality did not exist in Chile.  
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Thus the uniqueness of my research is that it is exploring the applicability of VSM in the 
context of an economy that is speedily moving into globalisation and embedded in a 
revived private sector that since 1977 (when the economy was opened) is being nurtured 
under the guidance of multilateral ‘soft lenders’ like the IMF, World Bank and the Asia 
Development Bank (ADB).  Whilst this may seem tame (since merely the ownership of 
production has changed hands), the compelling strain is that it is being done in an 
atmosphere of two antagonistic rulers, a much maligned public administration system and a 
nascent private sector that is yet to understand let alone activate industry regulatory 
measures whether it be imposed or voluntary.  
 
Having acknowledged the outstanding Chilean example, it is pertinent to table four vital 
differences between the context of Chile and Sri Lanka and to pose the question whether at 
the lower levels of recursion we will find the manner of regulation, to promote a balance 
between cohesion and autonomy, exercised differently.  
 
Table 1 - Differences between the Chilean and Sri Lankan Context 
 
Context  Sri Lanka  Chile 
Governed by  A democratically 
elected government 
and 
A clandestine- 
autocratic leader/regime 
Democratically elected 
government 
Production Capacity 
employed to satisfy 
Global (export) needs 
nurtured under the 
guidance of multilateral 
lenders - IMF, World 
Bank and ADB 
 
(Globalisation) 
Local needs due to 
international trade 
embargoes.  
 
(Self-sufficiency was also 
the favoured trend 
amongst ‘developing 
countries’ at that time) 
Means of Production owned 
by  
Private sector 
(moving from 
nationalisation to 
privatisation) 
Government sector 
(moved from private 
ownership to 
nationalisation) 
Focus from the lens of  Peace Process  Economy 
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Equivalently, it must be acknowledged that, besides  both Chile and Sri Lanka being 
steeped in crises, the vexing question for both is its ability to absorb the variety emanating 
from the level of recursion above national government.   
 
To my knowledge there have been two PhD researchers
8 who used cybernetics to diagnose 
their economies –  namely Ukraine (pertaining to its virtual economy) and Switzerland 
(pertaining to its taxation structures).   There is also a very informed cybernetic 
(unpublished) writing on Mexico (pertaining to Economics, Law and Political Science
9
 
).  
Additionally, in recent decades various cyberneticians like Espejo, Espinosa, and 
Schwaninger have published writings on the cybernetic based consultancies they have 
undertaken in Latin American government departments/offices on major projects.  
My thesis being in the field of application research is unique in that it focuses on a war- to-
peace transition.  Additionally it is hoped it will form a valuable contribution given the 
cybernetic insights that this thesis discusses, particularly as a wider boundary has been 
deliberately drawn so that it encompasses other interacting crises as it pertains to the study 
of Sri Lanka.   
 
The contribution of this thesis is twofold.  Firstly, from a Sri Lankan perspective 
Organizational Cybernetics has been employed in a quest to find out ways in which the 
peace process, situated in a much broader landscape, can be assisted.   Having employed a 
principle based enquiry, the mode of deliberations can be translated to other countries.  
 
1.2.5  Thesis Perspective and Audience 
Whilst reality is independent of one’s awareness (this onto-epistemology issue is discussed 
in Chapter Two) one’s cognition informs one of reality and it is from this subset of reality 
that one cogitates based on relevance of purpose.  The acquisition of such knowledge is a 
dynamically iterative process which therefore in the context of this thesis minimally poses 
at least two questions - namely,  
                                                 
8 Dr Marteen Willemsen of Switzerland and Dr Andrey Sergeyev of Ukraine. 
 
9 The Cybernetic State by Javier Livas (unpublished, provided by the author). Chapter One  22 
 
1.  what is the objective of this thesis, and 
2.  from what perspective do I observe? 
 
Having earlier stated the objectives of this thesis let me now address the matter of 
perspective.  As an observer, I select and write based on addressing those objectives which 
means it is the filter I have applied.      
 
Concerning my observations and deliberations thereof, it is pertinent to point out that my 
personal experiences are of a southern Sri Lankan, a Diaspora person, and informed by 
readings of a variety of Sri Lanka protagonist belonging to the various communities.  
Thereby in VSM terms (which selected framework is  explained in Chapter Two), I 
experience and cogitate as a concerned resident belonging to a low level of recursion and 
as informed by my readings, travels and interviews with a wide variety of people and 
institutions.  This combination is then exercised volitionally to think from a meta-level 
perspective and bring to awareness the different autonomous and cohesive ethnic 
considerations that arise based on what level of recursion one chooses to focus upon.   
 
During my years of research and learning I asked myself who is to benefit from this thesis 
in a practical way beyond its academic findings.  Is it the GoSL and/or the Tamils who 
perceive themselves as aggrieved in principle and sometimes in practice or is it Sri Lanka 
in all its hues?   As the research grew to disclose a complexity of interacting crises beyond 
the ethnic conflict it became obvious that the benefit of research needed to extend to the 
latter.  It also became apparent that contextualising the framework of Organizational 
Cybernetics  to the Sri Lankan situation holds the potential to beneficially serve other 
countries faced with the progressive breakdown of the governance of government and 
facing the rare opportunity to re-design its Constitution and thus the principles upon which 
it rests.     
 
Maturana the well know Chilean biologist says  
observing is both the ultimate starting point and the most fundamental question in any 
attempt to understand reality and reason as phenomena of the human domain. Indeed, 
everything said is said by an observer to another observer that could be him or herself. 
(Maturana, 1988:27) 
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In writing this thesis I have been cognizant of addressing three categories of audiences.  
 
•  Those who are cyberneticians and have a peripheral knowledge of Sri Lanka.  They 
therefore require a healthy overview of various Sri Lankan matters as considered 
pertinent to this thesis besides the cybernetic reasoning of the finding.  
 
•  Advisers who are called upon to design ways to address and resolve Sri Lanka’s 
quagmire of crises.  I consider the GoSL’s and the LTTE’s invite to the Royal 
Norwegian Government to facilitate Peace Talks as such an example.   
 
If this thesis is to serve design strategist (most of whom are non-cyberneticians) it 
requires that they come to understand the essentials of Organizational Cybernetics 
so that they are offered the opportunity to employ such thinking and move beyond 
manoeuvring around the personalities that shape the outcomes that beset the island.  
I agree such manoeuvring around the personalities is essential but I contend it is 
insufficient and needs to extend to addressing structural and process issues.   
 
•  Concerned Sri Lankans who ask themselves the bewildering question what are the 
ways to resolve the crises besides meeting it head-on in war and/or side stepping it 
by migrating overseas or learning how to survive, and in some instances thrive, 
within the situation that prevails.   In this sense, these concerned Sri Lankans are 
like a patient who joins the doctor to understand the problem (which in itself 
requires the patient to tell the doctor what is being experienced), to find a modality 
of therapy to heel the ailment and then as Beer would say be the patient who ‘holds 
the nose and gulps the medicine’.   
 
Whilst each may come from a different observation the common thread is how to resolve 
the crises.  I have delved deep across interrelated issues so as to explain the reasoning that 
supports the perspectives I have chosen given the context of Sri Lanka.  In this sense, this 
thesis is very much about discussing the way of applying the principles of Organizational 
Cybernetics to diagnose and propose solution processes.   
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With cyberneticians the evaluation of the thesis hinges on the extent of variety absorption 
demonstrated in the diagnosis and solution proposed.  For the concerned Sri Lankan the 
question is - do the disclosures of this thesis find a resonance sufficient to invite design 
premised upon the lines proposed?  Such resonance is difficult to find, for many argue the 
solution needs to be simple if it is to be implemented.  Yet Sri Lanka’s crises are mired in 
complexity and what is proposed needs to match that complexity.   For advisers the 
question for their evaluation is the strength of the model of Organizational Cybernetics and 
insights gained compared to the framework that they use.  Here there is an entire meta-level 
conversation to be had which moves beyond discussing solution strategies to discussing the 
premises upon which solution strategies are designed.  Using the instance of Peace Talks, it 
is this type of discussion that is worthy of ‘pre-talks’ negotiations amongst the ‘process 
design’ architects belonging to the various protagonist parties.  
 
 
Part III – Outline of Ensuing Chapters 
 
A synopsis is provided to help readers orientate themselves for the detailed territory that is 
covered in the ensuing chapters.   
 
Chapter Two  
This chapter opens by addressing the matter of validation. Given that the fundamental 
content of this thesis belongs to the social sciences where variables proliferate and do not 
lend themselves to isolation where their specific performance can be studied, traditional 
forms of proof, like laboratory testing as used in the hard sciences, is not applicable here.  
Having found that it was too premature if not impossible, to use computer simulation on 
the surfeit of variables, and survey techniques too were inadequate to the task of proof, 
neither of these were employed. 
 
Yet the question of validation remains.  Research shows proof and truth  are long 
established lines of philosophical enquiry and fall within the ambit of ‘what is reality’?  
Coming from a perspective of biology and philosophy two views on the answer to this 
ontological question are provided.  The epistemological views of Maturana (1988) and Chapter One  25 
 
Bhaskar (1998) arrive at the conclusion that a ‘single reality’ whilst it might, and according 
to Bhaskar, does exist, is not accessible to us in its entirety and thus proof in that sense is 
elusive.  This is even more so in the natural sciences given, for example, that the laws or 
generative mechanisms could have exercised themselves but are unperceived as we do not 
recognize them because we do not know them yet or they are absorbed by the counter-
action of other generative mechanisms.    
 
This leads me to propose that usefulness rather than validity is the basis for evaluating the 
findings of this thesis.  This is what Peirce (1878) was getting at when he proposed the 
logic of Abduction -  that of best explanation.  It is proposed that usefulness (best 
explanation) be assessed in terms of Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety. 
 
Part II of this chapter is devoted to introducing the reader to Sri Lanka by providing a 
sketch of its history and current state of governance.  In subsequent chapters, as the need 
arises based on the focus at hand, a more detailed account of relevant aspects of Sri Lanka 
is provided. 
 
Part III provides a literature review and the reasoning that supports the choice of 
Organizational Cybernetics as the framework employed to diagnose and propose solutions.  
An outline of the VSM is also provided in this section.  In the later chapters, a more 
focused discussion takes place on facets of the framework as required to come to terms 
with what is addressed in those chapters. 
 
Chapter Three  
This chapter commences with a joint introduction of the International Meta Level System 
and System-In-Focus, Sri Lanka.  It distinguishes the difference between de-colonization 
and the quest for self-determination occurring in the post-colonization era of today. The 
general principle of self-determination was established with de-colonization.  Today, it is 
balanced against the principle of preservation of territorial integrity.   
 
The significant point found by the research of this thesis is that today’s era of international 
interchange systems requires recognition of a sovereign State to be recognised by a 
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authority able to grant the listing of countries in ISO 3166, which is the mandatory entrée 
to gain membership of many international interoperatability institutions.  Chapter Five will 
utilize this seemingly insignificant procedural process to invoke the critical variety 
absorbing power of the meta-level logic that the UN Charter affords.  It is this practical 
requirement of international interoperatability that makes unilateral and bi-lateral 
recognition of Statehood inadequate. 
 
Post-colonization has no definitive international law that regulates claims and counter-
claims.  Thus the opposing protagonists make their own variety absorbing rules.  
International expectation is that a claimant for secession needs to prove that other avenues 
of resolution have been exhausted.  Therefore a counter-claimant option, besides defending 
the status quo, is to devolve power.  The sting is that failure of devolution, or failure at 
attempts to reach agreement on power sharing, are both precursors to secession.  Thus the 
claimant seeking external self-determination can sabotage the internal self-determination 
process.  It is this complexity of claim and counter-claim that the UN is called upon to 
evaluate with secession claims. 
 
With that prelude Part I of Chapter Three then positions to diagnose the 2002-2006 Peace 
Process based on Organizational Cybernetics employing such concepts as identity, Law of 
Requisite Variety, homeostasis and Law of Cohesion. The argument is also made for a 
concept of Principle based Negotiations of the calibre that lend themselves for use by 
others thereby evidencing equality/fairness. 
 
Recognising Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, the search in this thesis is not about 
designing the solution content of negotiations.  Such content requisite variety is expected to 
be supplied by the various conflicting protagonists by absorbing each  others’  variety.  
Rather, the objective is to design processes capable of accommodating and withstanding 
the content that the negotiating parties wish to address.  These ‘negotiation processes’ need 
to be built underpinned by principles.  The processes themselves are matters for acceptance 
by the negotiating parties, and Chapter Five proposes a process for doing such. 
 
Recognizing the principle of systems being embedded in systems, in the context of peace 
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to other systems.  In VSM terms, whether a system gravitates to seeking cohesion or 
autonomy depends on the position the system occupies within a level of recursion.  Thus 
clarity is needed as to who the systems are,  the composition of their presence at the 
negotiating table and the recursion level to which they belong given that it will influence 
their position on cohesion and autonomy.  The nesting also means the autonomous S1s of 
the system-in-focus become the cohesive system-in-focus for its embedded systems.  It is 
this interlocking attribute that is designed into the ‘process design’ for negotiations – 
presented in Chapter Five. 
 
In the Peace Talks to date none of this has been recognised.  Pattern recognition, taking 
into account the participants at the 2002-2003 Peace Talks and parties referred to in the P-
TOMS and ISGA documents, suggest that the Sinhalese have been left out of the 
negotiation.  Or, worse still that the GoSL is being reduced to representing the Sinhalese 
rather than the clarity of representing Sri Lanka in its capacity as a supervening 
encompassing system. 
 
Part III recognizes there is a fundamental difference in the negotiations that pertains to 
internal self-determination and external self-determination.  With internal self-
determination the identity of the Parent State is being re-architected.  As “corrective action 
cannot in fact be taken in one place without regard to its effect on their proximate 
activities” (Beer, 1994a:105) peer systems must also be included.  It also means the next 
lower level of recursion needs to participate in the negotiations so that the design of the 
negotiations process has a way of overcoming the risk of non-contestable positions posited 
by higher levels of recursion. 
 
With external self-determination, the negotiation is whether the aspiring secessionist fits 
within the identity of the UN which deliberations includes consideration of the Parent 
State.  The identity per se of the UN is not open for negotiation.  Rather, each claimant and 
counter-claimant to secession positions itself to show that its identity adheres to the 
principles of the UN Charter. 
 
The critical contribution of this chapter is that by untangling this amalgam we see that to 
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determination negotiations.  This process flaw needs to be corrected.  From a process 
design perspective it calls for a multi-party negotiations protocol.  Also it needs to address 
what can be done to stimulate sufficient variety so that these multiple systems agree on 
multiparty negotiations.  This poses the question - who has the variety absorbing power to 
influence these multiple systems to participate in multi-party negotiations? That variety 
absorption power has to apply to both the secessionist seeker and Parent State who in each 
case may entail sub groups.  This matter is addressed in Chapter Five. 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Steeped in so many crises from warfare, corruption, a debilitated public service and 
centralised governance structures vested with immense concentration of power, Sri Lanka 
faces the prospect of redesigning its systems of governance.  This expansive need for re-
design, however, appears to travel on the slip stream of the peace initiatives. 
 
The gradual build-up of crises on so many fronts indicates a weak regulatory system and 
the need for re-design prompts an enquiry that extends beyond fixing the known signals of 
crisis.  Here the reference is to addressing a) weak incipient signals, b) signals that may not 
have evidenced themselves but which can be conceptually discerned, and c) signals which 
are beyond the awareness of the designers of the system.   Re-expressed, such design 
considerations concern those evidenced in reality, those conceptually recognized and in 
that sense not materially manifest, and unknown issues.  The latter is undoubtedly the most 
perplexing as it resides outside the system’s design and probably outside of the 
consciousness of the designer of the system.  It concerns stability under unknown 
conditions and is known as Ultrastability. 
 
From an epistemological point of view Part II of this chapter addresses ultrastability as a 
way of designing systems which self-organize themselves rather than limit themselves to 
self-regulation capabilities.  Here Beer’s (1994e) concept of connecting the ‘Feedback 
Adjuster’  process to an ‘Organization Adjuster’ process (refer Figure 12) which is 
connected and standing ready to be informed by a meta-level system, is discussed.  So too 
is McCulloch’s Redundancy of Potential Command which is further expanded in Chapter 
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Using the example of devolution, this chapter addresses each of the three types of signals in 
the context of Sri Lanka.  Within the ‘known’ category of signals is addressed the matter of 
the unit of devolution.  So too is the conceptually recognized signal in terms of the 
consequences of the different criteria upon which devolved units are designated. 
 
Part III considers the important aspect of what it takes to build ultrastability in the context 
of the Constitution of Sri Lanka.  Three examples are used to gain an appreciation of how 
ultrastability capability has been built in the forms of governance of the British, the 
Australians and the Swiss.  As Sri Lanka is likely to continue with a republican (non-
monarchy based) type Constitution, building an ultrastability capability into the Sri Lankan 
system of governance is likely to be via a procedure similar to the Swiss ‘citizen-initiated 
referendum’.  Whilst the relationship between the Executive President and the Parliament 
is a matter for design, if Sri Lanka was to seek to design an ultrastability capability the 
question in the context of the State is - who or what are these entities that function with the 
objective of seeking to modify the Feedback Adjuster?  This cascades to enquire - who or 
what entities perform Feedback Adjuster functionality - the role of adjusting the way the 
Muddy Box works?  It is to these entities that the communication channels need to be 
established between the system-in-focus and the meta-level of recursion.   
 
Chapter Five 
This penultimate chapter addresses what in many ways has been the governing question of 
this thesis - what needs to be done to let requisite variety exercise itself so that the peace 
process is sustained to the point of resolving the conflict and other crises that beset Sri 
Lanka?  
 
Part I  -  Working with the levels of recursion pertaining to the UN, the State and its 
embedded systems, a proposal is made for a way of absorbing residual variety so as to 
address what has so far proved in practice to be an undecidable proposition – preserving 
territorial integrity compared to the right of secession when inequality prevails on 
substantive issues. 
 
The UN level of recursion is selected for two inextricably linked variety absorbing capacity 
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equal rights and self-determination’ is a homeostat which carries equal weight with the 
aspiring secessionist and Parent State.  This is usefully contrasted to the principle of 
‘responsibility to protect’ which although ethically commendable, does not carry equal 
weight due to the way it applies at the level of a set.  Secondly, to the aspiring secessionist, 
if its objective is to participate in its own right (not via proxy) as a Sovereign State in the 
international interchange system, the UN is the only authority that offers the mandatory 
requirement of having a country listed in ISO 3166.  Thus to the aspiring secessionist an 
invaluable reason for UN membership arises which means the UN’s meta-level logic 
becomes attractive to abide by, at least in the lead up to being granted UN membership.     
 
The UN’s cohesive policy however needs to apply to all parties affected by the undecidable 
proposition if its meta-level logic is to exercise its power.  This variety requirement is 
absorbed once the designers of the aspiring secessionist system realize the significance of 
the monopoly that the UN holds on being the source from which ISO 3166 populates its 
listing of countries.  Once this incentive has been recognized by the aspiring secessionist it 
acts as a compelling force to draw in the Parent State to vie for greater compliance with the 
UN’s principle of equal rights so as to preserve its territorial integrity.  Note, this does not 
necessarily mean self-determination as a form of governance.  But it does mean equality on 
substantive matters.   
 
Cybernetically, the critical realization of this exploration of content is that when looking 
for meta-level logic with the capacity to absorb residual variety, you know you have found 
a nugget when the requirement is mandatory and the way of achieving it is via a monopoly.  
The question then becomes -  do the compliance conditions of the monopoly have the 
requisite variety to absorb the particular residual variety that feeds the crisis? 
 
Also addressed is what appears as the UN’s minimum criteria for assessing claims for 
secession.  For the secessionist, the UN principle of equality is minimally three pronged (a) 
evidence of on-going  absence of equality, (b) failure of negotiations to resolve the 
inequality (c) the aspiring secessionist needs to demonstrate that in its manner of 
governance it applies the principle of equal rights in its relationship with its embedded 
systems.   
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Given that to date the peace initiatives and negotiations have not broached the second 
point, the stance taken in this thesis is the UN would direct that option be seriously 
pursued.  This poses the question - can the five permanent members of the UN be involved 
in the dispute resolution given the absence of a formal secession claim?  Also what 
happens if the Parent State and/or secessionist superficially participate and thus effectively 
sabotage internal self-determination negotiations?   
 
Both these matters are addressed.  Paired sets of negotiations involving participation from a 
triadic set of recursion levels are suggested.  Three kinds of negotiations are proposed and 
the recursive levels and systems involved are:-   
 
a)  Meta-Level Negotiations - The objective is to agree on the starting position of the broad 
parameters of internal self-determination negotiations.  The systems represented at 
these negotiations are (a) representation from the aspiring secessionist Tamils (R-1), (b) 
the GoSL representing Sri Lanka the Parent State (R0), and (c) representation by the 5 
permanent members of the UN Security Council (R+1).   
 
b)  Pre-Talks Negotiations - Design of the Process of Negotiations - The objective is to 
negotiate and agree upon the design of the processes that will be employed for Peace 
Talks Negotiations. 
 
c)  Peace Talks Negotiations - There are two interrelated parts to these negotiations and it 
is vital the two parts be exercised and that they interrelate.  The objective of this set of 
negotiation series pertains to content issues and matters of governance – particularly 
addressing the concurrent matters of cohesion and autonomy.  This design plan is 
helped by the inter-linkage of the recursive levels in the context of the systems that are 
positioned to participate in the portfolio of Syntegrations proposed.   
 
Part III proposes a portfolio of Syntegrations for the third type of negotiations – Peace 
Talks.  Whilst there are many permutations that could comprise this portfolio, Figure 21 is 
an informative example which shows the power of linkage of people and in-depth topic 
explorations that the Team Syntegrity protocol affords. 
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Chapter Six 
This final chapter ties together the various strands of this thesis to show the manner in 
which the content coheres and to substantiate the conceptual contribution of the findings.  
 
This is particularly important as this thesis weaves in and out of introducing a working 
understanding of Organizational Cybernetics principles and then applying them to the Sri 
Lankan situation, which itself called for background Sri Lankan material to be conveyed.   
Building  the thesis in this manner, which also touched  on matters of philosophy, 
international law, finance and politics, was required in order to cater for a knowledgeable 
cybernetic readership or an audience conversant with Sri Lankan matters, but not both.   By 
doing so, it also opens the thesis for those who are conversant with neither, but who are 
interested in addressing sovereignty based conflicts.  
 
What can be said in conclusion is that this thesis which began with addressing Sri Lanka’s 
crises ends up with opening to insights useful for sovereignty based conflicts where 
secession is threatened.   
 
Lastly, following in the steps of Beer’s Chilean experience, this thesis has moved away 
from systematic thinking to systemic thinking.  To this widened interconnected system is 
applied Systems Thinking principles, in specific Organizational Cybernetics, to produce 
not only a diagnosis,  but a ‘process design’ solution  for Sri Lankan internal self-
determination Peace Talks.    
 
Next Chapter 
To achieve the required rigour and discipline to set this thesis in motion, a framework 
needs to be developed or selected under which the diagnosis will be performed.  The next 
chapter is devoted to explaining the selected frameworks what will be used in this thesis.  
This is prefaced by a discussion of some fundamental philosophical issues pertaining to 
reality and proof with specific reference to its application in the social sciences where open 
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  Chapter Two  
Ontological & Epistemological Considerations 
 
 
Sapere aude! 
- Kant  
 
 
Research objectives are not set by nature.  They are delineated by humans.  This raises 
various questions which are addressed in this thesis.  The first question is - on what basis 
will the research findings be evaluated?  It is this query that is initially addressed.     
 
Let us first recall, the objective of this thesis is to (a) systemically diagnose key aspects of 
what seriously ails Sri Lanka and (b) provide design intervention ‘processes’ that could 
enable the country to be viable and move out of its crisis ridden state.  The crisis facing Sri 
Lanka is no longer in the singular - meaning the threat of secession.  The State is beset by a 
host of crises that span widespread corruption, relentless brain drain, a massive and 
maladroit public service compounded by the emerging trend of a rapid turnaround of 
governments in power and the government’s negative operational cash flow.  While some 
may argue that these crises are born of the war (tributary) or what caused the war (source), 
the important point is that the research framework be able to withstand the onslaught of 
variety.  The framework needs to be capable of disclosing the systemic interactions which 
in turn need to be respected by the architecture of the ‘process’ solutions proposed. 
 
This chapter is thus presented in three parts:- 
•  Part I –  addresses the matter of proof from the perspective of philosophy and   
the Law of Requisite Variety,  
•  Part II – sketches a background and profile of Sri Lanka, and 
•  Part III –  discusses  the relevance of modelling, the frameworks evaluated and a 
discussion of the chosen methodology - Organization Cybernetics. 
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Part I – Validation & Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety 
 
Returning to the validation question (referenced in 1.2.3) and as part of the ontology 
exposition, there is need to discuss what reality is considered to be.  It is an age old and 
continuing debate in philosophy as to what exists in terms of ‘real’ when contrasted to 
‘apparent’.  There are various philosophical schools which hold vastly different positions 
on what reality is.  For example, Maturana the Chilean biologist initially known for this 
discovery of autopoiesis
10
 
 says,  
I claim that the most central question that humanity faces today is the question of 
reality.  And I claim that this is so, regardless of whether we are aware of it or not, 
because everything that we do as modern human begins, either as individuals, as social 
entities, or as members of some non-social human community, entails an explicit or 
implicit answer to this question as a foundation for the rational arguments that we use 
to justify our actions.  Even nature, as we bring it forth in the course of our lives as 
human beings, depends on our explicit or implicit answer to this question.  Indeed I 
claim that the explicit or implicit answer that each one of us gives to the question of 
reality determines how he or she lives life, as well as his or her acceptance or rejection 
of other human beings in the network of social and non-social systems that he or she 
integrates. (Maturana, 1988:25)   
 
From amongst the many schools of thought concerning reality such as empiricism
11, 
idealism
12, vitalism
13
                                                 
10 The essence of autopoiesis is a process whereby an organization produces itself.  Maturana describes it as 
“A closed network of molecular productions that recursively produces the same network of molecular 
productions that produced it and specifies its boundaries, while remaining open to the flow of matter through 
it is an autopoietic system, and a molecular autopoietic system is a living system.” (Maturana, 2002:8) 
 I want to focus on Bhaskar whose theory has come to be known as 
Critical Realism and Maturana who addresses the question of reality from the perspective 
of the biology of language.  Central to both these views is the consideration of whether 
11 Empiricism - the doctrine that all knowledge of matters derives from experience and that the mind is not 
furnished with a set of concepts in advance of experience(source: Collins English Dictionary, 1994, Harper 
Collins Publication, UK) 
12 “Idealism – Any of a group of philosophical doctrines that share the monistic view that material object and 
the external world do not exist in reality independently of the human mind but are variously creations of the 
mind or constructs of ideas.  (source: Collins English Dictionary, 1994, Harper Collins Publication, UK) 
13 Vitalism - The philosophical doctrine that the phenomena of life cannot be explained in purely mechanical 
terms because there is something immaterial which distinguishes living from inanimate matter.  (source: 
Collins English Dictionary, 1994, Harper Collins Publication, UK) 
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reality is a singular or plural concept.  It is valuable here to point out a distinction between 
reality and truth made by Peirce, the American philosopher well known for his theory of 
Abductive logic. 
 
Truth is the understanding of reality through a self-corrective inquiry process by the 
whole intellectual community across time.  On the other hand, reality is the existence 
independent of human inquiry (Wiener, 1969).  In terms of ontology, there is one 
reality.  In regard to methodology and epistemology, there is more than one approach 
and one source of knowledge. (Yu, 1994) 
 
Ontology is about being, which I understand is about - what is it that we know?  This begs 
the question - how do we know what we know?  That is what epistemology is about.   Like 
so much else that  is reciprocal, so are ontology and epistemology.  Applying the 
epistemological theories of Bhaskar and Maturana, the question then addressed is - what 
ramifications do these two theories of reality hold from the perspective of validation of 
what is diagnosed and proposed in this thesis?  As a response to the ramifications, Ashby’s 
Law of Requisite Variety is proposed as the basis upon which to evaluate the findings of 
this thesis.  
 
2.1.1  Reality from the Perspective of Languaging 
 
Maturana contends that to have  an adequate understanding of social and non-social 
phenomena in human life requires observing, cognition and languaging to be understood in 
biological terms.  Considering the question of reality Maturana arrives at the conclusion 
that the explanatory path of reality takes two forms.  It is either what he calls ‘objectivity-
without-parenthesis’ where a single domain of reality prevails and thus is the ultimate 
source of validation.  Or reality is dependent on the observer’s cognition and thus there are 
as many realities as there are observers.  Maturana calls this type of reality ‘objectivity-in-
parenthesis’ or the path of constitutive objectivity.   
 
Maturana builds his argument for these distinctions of reality based on: 
•  Compelling explanation, when we do not use brutal force, being premised on objective 
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is claimed explicitly or implicitly to be universal and independent.  However, the 
question is – is that claim to validity, based on a privileged access to reality, valid?   
 
This is a significant question for as Maturana says, 
is this attitude about reason and the rational rationally valid?; can we in fact claim 
that it is its connection with reality that gives reason the compelling power that we 
claim it has or should have?  Or, conversely, does reason give us a partial or total 
access to the real so that we can claim for reason the compelling and universal 
validity that we pretend it has when we attempt to force somebody else with a 
rational argument? (Maturana, 1988:26) 
 
•  Observers making distinctions in language explaining their experiences.  This is a 
deceptive process as “we normally collapse the experience upon the explanation of the 
experience in the explanation of the experience.” (Maturana, 1988:27)  So in this sense 
the explanation is secondary to the experience. 
 
•  Explanations being reformulations of a reality which the listener may or may not accept 
based on whether the criterion of acceptability, from the perspective of the listener, is 
satisfied. 
 
The distinction between these two realities is captured in Figure 2. 
 
My interpretation of what Maturana conveys and as pertinent to validation is the way 
filtering works.  In both explanatory paths the listener, because s/he never listens in a 
vacuum, applies some preconceived criteria to evaluate what is being conveyed.  Filtering 
occurs to the extent to which the criteria do not match.  The extent to which the 
preconceived criteria do not match, either implicitly or explicitly, with the criteria put 
forward in the argument, is the extent to which what is conveyed is filtered out.  The effect 
of this filtering is evidenced in the extent to which the argument fails with the listener. 
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The difference between the two paths of explanation lies in whether the listener subscribes 
to a singular or multiple view of reality.  My understanding of what Maturana conveys is 
that when a listener listens from the perspective of ‘objectivity-without-parenthesis’ and 
finds mismatched criteria s/he not only rejects the argument but takes no responsibility for 
the negation which results.  This is because the listener applies rationality based on their 
privileged access to an objective reality.  This rejection can be stated just as well from the 
perspective of the person proposing the argument, which is to say the negation of the 
listener’s response.  For the rest of this discussion, I shall however only address validation 
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both proposer and listener are considered.  Argument gains in effectiveness when it is 
dynamic rather than a monologue. 
 
‘Objectivity-in-parenthesis’ is premised on the recognition of many realities.  When 
arguments are rejected it does not result in the rejection of the other’s reality.  This 
‘multiversa’ arises in recognition that “cognitive abilities as an observer are biological 
phenomenon because they are altered when his or her biology is altered” (Maturana, 
1988:29).  From the perspective of validity, it seems to me that a distinction needs to be 
made between rejection of an argument due to difference in criteria compared to a flaw in 
logic in the way in which mutually agreed upon criteria has been applied.  In other words, 
in this instance rejection of the argument is not due to differences in the criteria used to 
evaluate the argument, but due to a flaw in the logic of the argument.  Such an example is 
easy to see in an accounts bill, where something has been incorrectly added (e.g. 5+3=7 
rather than 8). 
 
The distinction that arises from these two views of reality is significant where hostilities 
prevail.  A way of describing this distinction in the context of Sri Lanka’s hostilities is that 
when each protagonist argues their point from the perspective of ‘objectivity-without-
parenthesis’ each is consumed by not only portraying their reality as objective (e.g. 
referring to documented history as the authoritative account) but by definition of the 
‘universum’ rejects the other’s reality and consequently their argument.  On the other hand, 
when the opposing protagonists operate from a perspective of ‘objectivity-in-parenthesis’ 
the other’s reality does not get rejected even if the other’s argument fails to find agreement.  
In  my view this is a valuable point to remember concerning Peace Negotiations  and 
validates for me why Maturana says the question of reality is so central. 
 
It follows that, in this (objectivity-in-parenthesis) explanatory path, explanations are 
constitutively not reductionist and not transcendental because in it there is no search for 
a single ultimate explanation of anything.  Accordingly, when one observer accepts this 
explanatory path, he or she becomes aware that two observers, who bring forth two 
explanations that exclude each other in front what, for a third observer seems to be the 
same situation, are not giving different explanations for the same situation, but that all 
three are operating in different yet equally legitimate domains of reality, and are 
explaining different aspects of their respective praxes of living.  The observer that 
follows this explanatory path realises that he or she lives in a multiversa, that is, in 
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that in it an explanatory disagreement is an invitation to a responsible reflection of 
coexistence, and not an irresponsible negation of the other. (Maturana, 188:31)  
 
Let us now apply Maturana’s lens to enquire of its relevance to validating this thesis.   
My understanding is that one of the primary questions that arise for the reader evaluating 
this thesis is whether they agree with the criteria upon which the arguments have been 
built.  Such criteria are ubiquitous in this thesis ranging from  a formal methodology 
(disclosed in various sections devoted to epistemological discussions) to interpretations of 
history.   
 
Where the reader agrees with the criteria then validation has been achieved with the writer 
and we are at one in our reality.  
 
Where our criteria differ and consequently we disagree, the reader who operates from 
‘objectivity-without-parenthesis’ has reached the end of the road on that particular point.  
The gravity of the validation consequence/s will depend on the gravity of the point upon 
which disagreement occurs. 
 
With the reader who operates from the perspective of ‘objectivity-in-parenthesis’, 
evaluation of the thesis can still continue.  The reader can suspend their objectivity, and be 
in congruence with their notion of reality, while continuing to evaluate the thesis based on 
the criteria upon which the arguments are premised.  Harnden (1990) refers to this as “it 
(objectivity-in-parenthesis) might be loosely described as a methodological technique 
which suspends consideration of Objectivity for the task at hand.” 
 
As researcher, and writer, I reflect upon the ‘process design solution’ proposed in Chapter 
Five.  I consider it caters to ‘objectivity-in-parenthesis’.  Thus, even if there are points 
where my interpretations of history do not evoke agreement, the ‘process design’ proposed 
is designed to cater for these different realities whether it be in matters of interpretation of 
history or designing ‘content’ solutions. 
 
The other question in terms of evaluation of the thesis is whether what flows from the 
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sections of this thesis.  To get a grip on this, there is value in turning to Bhaskar’s Critical 
Realism to gain an appreciation of unrealised and unexercised realities as it pertains to 
validation. 
 
2.1.2  Reality from the Perspective of Critical Realism 
 
As humans we apprehend reality through the filter of our physiology.  Science over the 
passage of time has extended this reach by the use of various devices like microscopes, and 
telescopes, which has led us to realise there is more to reality that we physiologically 
encounter.  Consequently, whilst we may conceptually accept there is more to reality than 
we experience, as some schools of philosophy do, the question is - how much more is there 
and what can we find out about the workings of that reality?  What is interesting about 
Bhaskar’s philosophical position is that not only does he address the logic of progressive 
revelation of reality, but Bhaskar provides an insight into a world of reality that exists but 
has not exercised itself and a reality that may have exercised itself but may not have been 
realised due to the counteracting effect of something else.  Bhaskar names this greater 
reality the ‘intransitive dimension’ and what we are aware of the ‘transitive dimension’.   
Bhaskar says, “once we constitute an intransitive dimension we can see how changing 
knowledge or unchanging objects is possible.” (Bhaskar, 1998:11) 
 
It is interesting to ask ourselves – why the quest for wanting to know about the workings of 
reality?  Besides curiosity, what purpose does this probe for knowledge serve?  Collier, 
using a political context, explains an answer to this question well. 
He says,      
If history is just ‘one damned thing after another’ then all the politics we need is a 
resolve to do better damned things than were done before.  If, on the other hand, 
societies and their institutions have inner structures which generate and by the same 
token constrain their powers, then we can ask, first of all, what sort of thing can be 
done given existing structures and what cannot; second, what different sort of things 
could be done given different structures; and third, how one sort of structure can be 
transformed into another (Collier, 1994:10). 
 
For those already aware of the severity of the predicament facing Sri Lanka, this quote 
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know more about the workings of reality.  This is what Collier has explained.  What we are 
seeking to come to grips with is an understanding of the inner structure of the ways of 
reality.  Yet detecting the workings of that inner structure is hard to discover.  This is 
because what we encounter under non-experimental conditions is the sum total of the way 
the components of reality worked in conjunction with each other.   
 
Building the argument and commencing with experiments, the initial question is - why 
experiment?  It stands to reason we would not do them if the information required could be 
got without them.  What experiment does however is isolate one mechanism of nature from 
the effects of others, which sets the conditions to find out - what does that mechanism do 
on its own.  Closure is an experimental concept that does not occur generally or naturally.  
This implies that experimentation is based on the ability to relatively isolate a mechanism 
so that it can operate unimpeded in a closed system.  This however is not possible with 
open systems, so called because the generative mechanisms do not lend themselves to be 
isolated; “when triggered, they operate, but in conjunction with other generative 
mechanisms, producing a complexly codetermined outcome.” (Collier, 1994:62)  
 
Bhaskar  distinguishes three layers of reality –  experience, events and mechanisms.  
‘Experience’ as the name implies is what we humans sense (are aware of).  ‘Events’ is the 
rest of what happens but of which we are unaware.  Their existence, however, can be 
inferred from the effects which are experienced.   These effects could be inferred from the 
capability of the structure of its working parts and how it is organized.    
 
Collier explains,  
Things have the powers that they do because of their structure, then, and we can 
investigate the structures that generate the powers, and to an extent predict the powers 
from the structures.  Structures cause powers to be exercised given some inputs, some 
‘efficient cause’, e.g. the match lights when you strike it.  In asking about structure 
generating some power of some entity, we are asking about a mechanism generating an 
event.  … A mechanism, in Bhaskar’s sense, is that to which a law refers. (Collier, 
1994:43, italics in quote)  
 
Nature’s laws operate concurrently and conjointly bringing about a series of events which 
could not have been brought about by a subset of those mechanisms.  Bhaskar distinguishes Chapter Two  42 
 
the activity of what happens as belonging to the three domains of reality as shown in Table 
2 below. 
 
 
Table 2 - Bhaskar’s Domains of Reality 
  Domain of Real  Domain of Actual  Domain of Empirical  
Mechanism  √     
Events  √  √   
Experiences  √  √  √ 
 
Note: for transcendental realism dr ≥  da ≥ de … (i) where dr ≥  da ≥ and de are the 
domains of the real and the actual and the empirical respectively. 
For empitical (empirical) realism dr = da= de … (ii). 
Comment: (ii) is a special case of (i), which depends in general upon antecedent social 
activity, and in which 
(a) for da = de the events are known under epistemically significant descriptions, which 
depends upon skilled perception (and thus a skilled perceiver); 
(b) for dr  = da  an antecedent closure has been obtained, which depends upon skilled 
experimentation (and thus the planned disruption of nature). 
 
                                                       Source: A Realist Theory of Science (Bhaskar, 1997:56) 
 
Bhaskar explains, 
I have argued that the causal structures and generative mechanisms of nature must exist 
and act independently of the conditions that allow men access to them, so that they 
must be assumed to be structured and intransitive, i.e. relatively independent of the 
patterns of events and actions of men alike.  Similarly, I have argued that events must 
occur independently of the experiences in which they are apprehended.  Structures and 
mechanisms then are real and distinct from the patterns of events that they generate: 
just as events are real and distinct from the experiences in which they are apprehended.  
Mechanisms, events and experiences, thus constitute three overlapping domains of 
reality, viz. the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical.  (Bhaskar, 1997:56) 
 
We have now reached the point of understanding the gravity of working with open 
systems, like human sciences, where experimental activity is impossible.  Applying this to 
the context of this thesis we are faced with not only a plethora of variables, but the activity 
of their mechanisms which may well be “unexercised, exercised unrealized and realized 
unperceived (or undetected).” (Bhaskar, 1997:18)  Thus proof in that traditional 
experimental sense is outside of the reach of this thesis in terms of the diagnosis made and 
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Collier’s phrase ‘the methodological primacy of the pathological’ lends support to the 
stance taken in this thesis where a comparative study of sovereign States that work well 
was not undertaken.  Collier explains,  
 
By seeing how something goes wrong, we find out more about the conditions of its 
working properly than we ever would by  observing it working properly.  … 
Mechanisms which are normally disguised by their close interaction with other ones 
break loose and so are actualized, whereas they normally operate unactualized – just as 
the law of gravity operates unactualized in your house until one day the roof falls down 
on your head. (Collier, 1994:165) 
 
What it conveys is the value of a diagnosis especially of what does not work, for the 
mechanisms that otherwise lie dormant have exercised themselves and are being perceived.  
Such a diagnosis of Sri Lanka is provided in the ensuing chapters, particularly Chapter 
Three.  It however displays the difficulty of evaluating the ‘process solution’ proposals for 
whilst the framework applied to design the proposals (in Chapter Five) is declared (in 
Chapter Five) there is no assurance that otherwise dormant mechanisms may be activated.  
 
To address this question and to enquire whether there is another way of evaluating the 
finding of this thesis given the absence of closure that afflicts the social sciences, let us turn 
to Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety.  Beer explains,  
“Variety is the cybernetic measure of complexity.  It is explicitly the possible number 
of states of a system.  The Law says that the variety of a given situation can be 
managed adequately only by control mechanisms having at least as great a capacity to 
generate variety themselves. (Beer, 1994f:231) 
 
2.1.3  Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety and applying it to Evaluate Findings 
 
Gradual build-up of problems which reach crisis proportions is a strong indicator that the 
regulatory systems are weak.  Given the magnitude and interactive nature of the problems 
that afflict Sri Lanka, and consequently the focus of diagnosing and seeking to re-design 
such regulatory processes, one way of evaluating this thesis is from the premise of 
usefulness.   
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In other words, what is proposed is that usefulness of the thesis be evaluated based on the 
findings disclosed pertaining to regulation.  This in turn implies the need to evaluate the 
variety generated and absorbed given the goal of improving intrinsic regulation of systems, 
particularly those operating in crisis.  To do this it is proposed that Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety be applied.  Ashby describing regulation states,  
 
The subject of regulation is very wide in its applications, covering as it does most of the 
activities in physiology, sociology, ecology, economics, and much of the activities in 
almost every branch of science and life.  Further, the types of regulator that exist are 
almost bewildering in their variety. (Ashby, 1999:202) 
 
Variety is the number of possible states of a system.  Ashby says “variety” is a concept 
inseparable from that of “information” (Ashby, 1999:140).  If regulation is to be effective, 
meaning to achieve the purpose or goal it is seeking, then the regulator will require a 
greater variety than the system the regulator is seeking to control.  This was succinctly 
expressed in the famous article titled ‘Every Good Regulator of a System Must be a Model 
of that System’ (Conant and Ashby, (1970).  Beer equates the importance of Ashby’s Law 
of Requisite Variety – variety absorbs variety - to be on par with Newtonian physics. 
 
Beer describing regulation states,  
To maintain regulation – equilibrium between antithetical sub-systems, or stability in 
the whole – there is a certain variety required in the regulator: and this cannot be less 
than the variety the black box of our concern itself proliferates. (Beer, 1994e:89) 
 
As researcher, writer and observer the question I ask myself is - how much more variety 
have I found in my research and how has that contributed to absorbing variety which until 
now has exercised itself to keep Sri Lanka in its crisis ridden state?  This combined sense 
of variety pertains to matching rather than counting the states of variety.  For myself, this 
comparative ‘variety match’ was posed on many fronts, as it pertains to the modelling 
framework employed, interpretations of history and most importantly the ‘process solution’ 
proposed.  The usefulness comparison was made against other conceptual alternatives and 
also compared to the path of history Sri Lanka has walked. 
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Part II – Background and Profile of Sri Lanka 
 
Choosing a framework from which to diagnose a situation and propose solutions requires 
an appreciation of the context in which that framework is to be applied.  Paradoxically, as 
may well be obvious, there is a bi-directional relationship between the preliminary 
awareness of the context and the choice of diagnostic framework selected which 
framework then acts as the lens to filter what is to be taken into consideration from the 
context and the interpretation it is to be given.  Note the context to which the framework is 
applied may be more or less than the preliminary context which was used to select the 
framework. 
 
As a prelude to Part III concerning the selection of a framework capable of generating a 
base from which diagnosis and solutions can be generated, this Part is devoted to outlining 
various facets of Sri Lanka that are pertinent to the research being undertaken in this thesis.  
It shows the preliminary filters I have used both in what I have selected and how I have 
interpreted them.  In later chapters these facets will be synthesised under the aegis of the 
cybernetic framework to reveal their systemic relationships and their implications to the 
way the Sri Lankan system is arranged to regulate itself.  It also serves as an introduction 
for those unfamiliar with Sri Lanka and its experiences. 
   
2.2.1  Race Composition 
 
Sri Lanka is a tropical island in the Indian Ocean whose population is estimated at 18.73 
million people
14
 
.  Its indigenous people, who number a few thousands, are called Veddha 
and they mostly live in the isolated depths of the forest regions of the island. 
The rest of the people of Sri Lanka share an ancestry from other parts of the world – refer 
Figure 3.  India being the island’s closest neighbour (narrowest water crossing point being 
                                                 
14 The 2001 Census on Population and Housing estimates the population at 18.73 million.  This is because the 
national census, previously carried out over 20 years ago, was unable to access people in some parts of the 
North and Eastern Provinces.  The actual enumerated count on the 17 July 2001 was 17.56 million people.  
Source: Preliminary Findings of the Census – 2001 and uses of Census data in Development Planning, 
presented by A.G.W. Nanayakkara, Director General, Department of Census and Statistics. 
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14 nautical miles), was naturally the predominant source of emigrants who crossed to the 
island in the centuries BC.  Besides the immigrants of Indian heritage, other immigrants 
were the East Asian (known as Malays) and Arabic-Indian traders (known as Moors) who 
took up coastal residence.  From 1505 there is the inter-marital progeny stemming from the 
island’s three European colonising powers
15
 
 – viz. Portuguese, Dutch and British. 
With this antiquity of multiracial ancestry, let us now look with more detail at each of the 
races as ethnicity is ascribed as being the major trigger affecting this island’s people.   
 
India being a large country with a diversity of races, her population can broadly be 
classified as originating from Indo-Aryan and Dravidian roots.  Geographically this 
translates into an immigration pattern coming from north-western India and southern India 
respectively.    In Sri Lankan terms, these migrants respectively translate into the two 
predominant races of people in Sri Lanka known as Sinhalese and Tamil. 
 
History records the Sinhalese as descendants of Prince Vijaya of India who came to Sri 
Lanka around 483 BC and under whose later lineage of kingship substantially endorsed 
Buddhism.  For the Tamils of India, the island, particularly its northern reaches, was a 
neighbouring trading territory and thus a natural settlement enclave for its people and 
associated royalty.  Whilst the settlement date of Tamils is a matter of contention among 
historians, history records that the island was simultaneously ruled by Sinhalese and Tamil 
monarchs for many centuries.  Another bone of contention is whether the island was ever 
ruled by a single monarch, pre-British colonization, and if so what jurisdictional power it 
carried in what context.  Certainly, the island came under single rule in 1815 when the 
British defeated the last king in the island, who was the Sinhalese king Sri Wickrama 
Rajasinha, who although himself of South Indian heritage, reigned over the hill country. 
 
                                                 
15 The Portuguese arrived in 1505, the Dutch in the late 1660s and the British commenced island-wide rule in 
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Chronologically the next immigrants into the island were Moors who came from the 
Arabian direction and had a lineage of connection with India.  They were Muslim in 
religion, spoke Tamil and were located primarily in the coastal areas running an export-
import trade.  Whilst the Portuguese and Dutch pre-dated the British as colonial powers in 
Ceylon they never ruled the whole island.  During the British era came the Malays from 
Malaya who were mostly soldiers brought over by the British. 
 
In Sri Lanka, race lineage follows the patriarchal pattern.  Thus, the invasion of European 
powers which saw inter-marriage with the local people (i.e. Sinhalese, Tamil, Malay or 
Moors) carry the race name of Burgher for their progeny of the Portuguese and Dutch and 
are called Eurasian for progeny of British paternity. 
 
The legacy of British colonisation was the civil service, infrastructure development of 
roads, railway and sewerage, and the plantation estates of tea and rubber.  Needing a 
continual labour force for tea plucking and rubber tapping, the British found the island’s 
inhabitants unwilling workers.  Consequently, the British imported labourers from the Chapter Two  48 
 
neighbouring colony (South India) and these people came to be known as Indian Tamils 
(sometimes also known as Estate Tamils).  To make the distinction the existing Tamils 
came to be known as Ceylon Tamils. 
 
With this patchwork of technically non-indigenous races (i.e. Sinhalese, Tamil, Sri Lankan 
Moors, Malay, Burgher and Eurasian) it is pertinent to realise that despite the passage of 
time the Tamils maintained an active connection with their South Indian relations.  
Undoubtedly, this was aided by the relative proximity geographically, a common language 
(albeit different dialects of Tamil), shared religious basis of Hinduism and to a lesser extent 
South Indian Christianity (since European colonisation). 
 
In comparison, the Sinhalese people having a unique language, Sinhala (whose root 
appears to be Sanskrit
16
 
), and fostering Buddhism (which had faded in India) seems to have 
let its north-west Indian connection fade.  Thus developing its race identity within the 
island, they arrived at a unique identity of their own which is primarily distinguished by its 
unique language, alphabetic script and Buddhist religion. 
Interestingly, this combination of uniqueness complemented by their presence since 
antiquity, plus the island’s consistently Sinhalese majority population has led to Sinhalese 
bearing the title of being the indigenous people of Sri Lanka.  Of course, to the Ceylon 
Tamils this is an outrageous accolade for they too (maybe) share an antiquity on the island 
as old as the Sinhalese race. 
 
The twist in this matter is that the Ceylon Tamils have (perceptually) lost, because their 
identity is closely intertwined with the Tamils of India, which over the aeons the Ceylon 
Tamils have nurtured.  Whilst controversy and propaganda surround debates as to which 
race has precedence in antiquity, the uniqueness of race identity is probably an equal if not 
greater culprit in the ethnic conflict Sri Lanka is experiencing. 
 
                                                 
16 The Origin of Sinhala by Asgar Hussein, commenting on “Hela Havula movement's claim that Sinhala 
developed independently on Sri Lankan soil.” Chapter Two  49 
 
Returning to matters of the island’s demographics, militant and sympathetic Tamils, aided 
by their (less than 12%
17
 
) minority community status and militarily inflicted deaths, have 
certainly won the sympathy of many in the international community.  However, from a 
Sinhalese perspective the psychological fear is that the Sinhalese are a minute group in the 
demographics of world races.  Thus concessions to Tamils are seen as erosions against 
what is already a tiny race of people which have no other home than Sri Lanka.  
Furthermore, Tamils have proved their capacity for venting their wrath by the guerrilla type 
warfare the LTTE have inflicted on the Sinhalese community.  Of course, the Tamils argue 
that the recurring history of failed Pacts has given them little option but to take up arms and 
the government’s military demonstrate their wrath too. 
As is obvious by now, each side will assert its own defence from their own perspective and 
this is exactly the stalemate confronting Sri Lanka. 
 
2.2.2  Island-wide Government 
 
Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) came under island-wide governance by the British in 1815.  
‘Communal
18
 
 representation’ was introduced to the Legislative Council in 1833 based on 
nominations by the British governor.  In 1931 universal suffrage (for those over 21 years) 
as proposed by the Donoughmore Commission was introduced thus replacing the system of 
(only English-educated) nominations with elections, and ending communal representation 
in favour of territorial constituencies. 
The Sinhalese race occupied more territorial constituencies and usually was the majority 
population.  The territorial electoral process continued on community preferences probably 
                                                 
17 The 2001 Census enumerated the Tamil population at 9.4% but an additional allowance is made to account 
for the people who could not be accessed in the districts of the North and Eastern Provinces where war 
conditions prevailed. 
 
18 The communities represented were the low country Sinhalese, the up-country Kandyan Sinhalese, Ceylon 
Tamils, Muslims (from 1889), the Burghers and the local British.  – Source: Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism. 
(Wilson, 2000:2) 
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since ‘right wing type’ versus ‘left wing type
19
 
’ politics were yet to significantly evolve in 
Sri Lanka. 
Communal tensions, which had begun to flicker since the 1910s became more vocal and 
entering into the independence era the Tamils recommended what is popularly known as 
the ‘fifty-fifty principle’.  This is where half the seats are reserved for the minority 
communities in a bid to structurally ensure against Sinhalese domination.  However, in 
February 1947 when the British granted independence to Ceylon, the Soulbury Constitution 
was based on the Parliamentary system of a Senate and House of Representatives which 
respectively comprised: 
 
•  30 nominated members (15 each by the Governor General and the House of 
Representatives), and 
•  101 members (95 elected from 89 electoral districts, and 6 nominated by the Governor 
General to represent minority interest). 
 
The first Parliament came into being in September 1947 under the Prime Ministership of 
the Hon. Mr. D. S. Senanayake the leader of the winning United National Party (UNP).  
The second  election returned the UNP but with many more ‘left wing type’ political 
candidates fielded and a drop in the number of independent candidates.  Due to the 1949 
Citizenship Law over 90% of the Indian Tamils were disenfranchise despite having been 
able to vote in the first Parliamentary elections and prior elections as universal suffrage had 
been introduced in 1931.  The term of this Parliament saw language and religion emerge as 
issues and reportedly the UNP annual conference on 18 February 1956
20
 
 resolved that 
Sinhala should be the State language.  This triggered the early days of ethnic tension. 
Today Sri Lankan politics is essentially a choice between the UNP and the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP).  The former favours business and resource ownership by the 
private sector compared to the latter’s welfare driven orientation.  Words like liberal, 
democratic, republican, labour are not used as such in Sri Lanka to describe political 
                                                 
19 The term ‘left wing type’ is used to cover both socialist and communist political parties which are welfare 
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parties.  Like in many other countries the trend over recent decades is that the seat of power 
is won by the leading parties having gone into alliance with smaller political parties. 
 
The third Parliamentary election of April 1956 was won by a coalition of left-wing type 
parties.  They introduced significant legislation and foreign policy, amongst which were:- 
 
•  The Sinhala Only Act on the 15 June 1956 making Sinhala the official Sate language, 
•  The Employees Provident Fund Act (March 1958), 
•  The Transport Act nationalising the bus services on 20 September 1956, 
•  Paddy Lands Act, granting security of tenure to the cultivator, on 19 December 1958. 
•  Non-alignment policy replacing the pro-West policy, and 
•  Established diplomatic relations with the USSR and People’s Republic of China. 
 
The language issue seriously impacted on the Tamil speaking communities (i.e. Ceylon and 
Indian Tamils, Moors and Malays).  The government sensed the folly, entered into a pact
21
 
 
with the primary Tamil party (Federal Party) in 1957 but it proved unpalatable to the 
Sinhalese of the South.  By 27 May 1958 mayhem had broken out and a State of 
Emergency was  declared which continued for ten months.  In. March 1959 the Prime 
Minister was assassinated. 
The fifth Parliament (1960-64) nationalized the schools, insurance, and petroleum imports 
and distribution.   A second Tamil pact
22 was signed and again it was rescinded lacking 
Southern consensus.  The UNP went into the sixth Parliamentary elections having signed 
the third of the Tamil Pacts
23
 
 to achieve communal harmony but once again Southern 
consensus was found lacking when the party formed a government. 
                                                 
21 This is known as the 1957 Bandaranaike – Chelvanayakam Pact.   
22 This is known as the 1961 Bandaranaike – Chelvanayakam Pact.  The first was with Prime Minister Mr. 
SWRD Bandaranaike.  This was with his wife, the Prime Minister, who is also the first woman Prime 
Minister in the World, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. 
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The seventh Parliament, reflecting the nationalistic mood of the nation, abandoned the 
British Monarch as Head of State, abolished the Senate and migrated to a unicameral 
system of Parliament and a replacement Constitution.  Enormous powers were vested in the 
Cabinet of Ministers who ran the ministries which managed the nationalised enterprises.  
Additionally, these Ministers were constitutionally granted the right to appoint, promote, 
transfer and dismiss employees of the public service.  This was however preceded in March 
1971 by the first Southern revolt by unemployed Sinhala youth.  It was led by the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party.  The military forces were called out and many Sinhala 
youth lost their lives. 
 
The reign of the eighth Parliament through a referendum extended its life for 11 years. It 
saw communal rioting and burnings aimed at Tamils.  Additionally in 1981 the second 
Southern youth revolt flared and the military were called in to quell the riots.  In the 
meanwhile, the Indian Peace Keeping  Force (IPKF) was used to counteract the LTTE 
takeover of the northern reaches of the country.  The eighth Parliament also replaced the 
May 1972 Constitution in September 1978.  Some highlights of this new Constitution are: 
 
•  Giving the President (until then the titular head of government) extensive executive 
powers including the right to dissolve Parliament after one year of office, 
•  Extending the Parliamentary term from five to six years, 
•  Changing the electoral process from the ‘individual candidate first past the post’ to a 
‘party candidate proportional representation’ basis and increasing parliamentary seats 
to 196 elected members and 25 nominated National List members, 
•  Devolving governance on certain subject areas to nine provinces and thus creating nine 
provincial governments, and 
•  Reinforcing the right of cabinet and the newly created position of non-cabinet Ministers 
to recruit, promote, transfer and dismiss employees of the public service. 
 
In a bid to address Tamil grievances a provincial layer of governance was introduced in 
November 1987 under the 13
th Amendment to the Constitution.  Despite the provincial 
layer of government much of the public administration continues to be centrally driven as 
are the political parties.  As an aside the private sector, including media channels like 
newspapers, TV and radio are also centrally driven, irrespective of whether it is state or 
privately owned.  In 1989 the 16
th Amendment of the Constitution elevated Tamil to be on Chapter Two  53 
 
par with Sinhala as the official language with English serving as the link language.  In 
October 2001 the 17
th  Amendment to the Constitution introduced the Constitutional 
Council (CC) and various Commissions in an endeavour to nurture impartiality in the 
operational conduct of public entities.   
 
By the twelfth Parliament (2001-2003) for the first time the Executive President and 
political party holding government belonged to the two primary opposing political parties, 
co-habitation problems persisted and culminated with Executive President dissolving 
Parliament.  The election of that government however saw the years of sporadic GoSL 
military and LTTE terrorist attacks replaced by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
bringing about a Ceasefire agreement.  Peace Talks between the GoSL Lanka and the 
LTTE were initiated but the LTTE withdrew after six sessions.    
 
2.2.3  Religion 
 
Sri Lanka no longer has a secular Constitution  –  it enshrines Buddhism.  The main 
religions practised in Sri Lanka, ranked in order of its population as captured by the 2001 
Population Census are Buddhism (76.6%), Islam (8.5%), Hinduism (7.9%), and 
Christianity (6.9%).    
 
For those with deeper understanding of Buddhism let me agree about the classification of 
Buddhism as a philosophy.  However, for the purposes of this section, it will be considered 
a religion.  It is relevant to note that many Buddhist temples have Hindu devalas
24
 
.  
Buddhists in Sri Lanka worship Hindu Gods – amongst the notable being the Kataragama 
gods: which include Lord Ganesh, Vishnu and Krishna.   
The majority of Muslims in Sri Lanka belong to the Sunni sect.   Buddhist are almost 
exclusively Sinhalese, whilst Hindus are Tamils.  Most Christians belong to the Catholic or 
Anglican denomination.  At one stage the Catholic Church was considered by some to be in 
a position to have substantially influenced the prospects for peace given that the majority of 
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their congregation is  Sinhalese and Tamils.   A sense of the island’s demographics 
pertaining to race and religion are provided in Figure 4. 
 
2.2.4  Language 
 
In 1833 the British legislated that English was the language of administration which meant 
that the education system moved to English too in preference to the vernacular languages 
(Sinhala and Tamil) being the medium of instruction.  Implementation of the 1833 
language  policy was carried out by Christian missionary schools, as their medium of 
instruction was English.  This disenfranchised the vernacular speakers.   
 
Consequently more Burghers and Tamils relative to their overall population numbers 
gained employment with the government.  
 
When Sinhala, which is the mother tongue of the Sinhalese, was made into the official 
language of Sri Lanka, massive disturbances unfolded as time passed.  It disenfranchised 
the Tamils from their Sri Lankan (at that time Ceylonese) identity plus eroded their 
position particularly in the government service.  Until then the status quo was that 
Sinhalese ruled (in Parliament) whilst the Tamils governed (via the civil service)
25
 
.   
No other part of the world uses the Sinhala language (12 million users in SL).  Tamil is 
used in India, South Africa, Fiji, Singapore etc by around 90 million users.  Each language 
uses a very different alphabet script (imagine Japanese/Arabic, as compared to the 
essentially common script used by English, French, and German).   
 
More importantly and rarely mentioned is that until 1957 the island’s population was 
largely divided into the rich and the others.  Some of the common attributes of the rich 
were that they all belonged to the upper class, be they Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Malays or 
Burghers.  The critical aspect was also that they all spoke English as their everyday 
language – thus making it effectively their mother tongue.  Accompanying this was the 
reality that all major commercial and government undertakings were transacted in the 
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English language.  Thus to have an inadequate command of the English language was to be 
excluded from the positions of authority. 
 
 
 
A disproportionate number of Tamils (compared to the Sinhalese and Muslims) had 
become proficient in the English language because proselytizing Christian missionaries 
had concentrated their activities in the Tamil heartland … and set up a large number of 
English secondary schools (Wilson, 2000:4) Chapter Two  56 
 
Once the Sinhala Only Act (in 1956) was introduced the island was divided on wealth and 
language grounds.  This made it into an ethnic debacle whilst preserving the rich segment 
as evidenced by the JVP and the LTTE uprisings.  The former was the lower class Sinhala 
educated youth revolting for they found themselves unable to occupy the managerial ranks 
of the commercial and government enterprises.  The same was true for the Tamil educated 
and they were even further disadvantaged due to their lack of command of the Sinhala 
language, particularly compared to their Sinhalese colleagues. 
 
This situation is magnified many fold as the current generation have parents who have had 
no exposure to English which is the life blood of commerce and required for almost any 
high-ranking government position.  This situation is also true of the export workers 
handling jobs in the Middle East etc.  For example, Sri Lankan domestic maids get paid 
less than their Filipino counterparts as they lack a command of the English language.  
Whilst English is declared in the Constitution as the link language (in the 16
th 
Amendment), schools are not adequately staffed to teach the language.  Furthermore 
children’s parents are unable to support their learning because they come from a generation 
that missed out on English. 
 
This position is further exacerbated when viewed at a provincial level (refer Figure 5 below 
in conjunction with Table 5 shown in Chapter Four).  Besides Colombo and to a lesser 
extent Jaffna, English is a non-existent strength in the outstation provinces. Now add this 
deficiency to the devolution argument and we find seven of the nine provinces are 
uneconomic – maybe partially because they do not have the commercial language as used 
by commerce and the middle to upper ranks of the government service.  This is discussed 
in Chapter Four. 
 
The non-rich are aware of their disadvantage and whilst the ethnicity based accusations fly, 
the rich preserve their grip on the economy and enjoy  high social status through their 
command of the English language.  The low castes lose lives to uphold their race identity 
while their race is threatened by their very act of upholding their language which was the 
initial evidence of the controversy.   
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This is a case of a local controller gaining dominance (Sinhala language and to a lesser 
extent Tamil) at the expense of downgrading of English language which works as a 
systemic controller.  Paradoxically, this argument favours employing the English language.  Chapter Two  58 
 
Yet this is certainly a death knell for the island’s races as language is a signature variable 
that distinguishes the races.  This is globalization playing out its cards at a different level of 
recursion by virtue of its economic imperative. 
 
This indeed is about homeostatic balance of critical variables.  How is identity to survive 
when a signature feature of it is to be seconded to a foreign language?  A paper was written 
by Solomons and Moscardini titled ‘Language Homeostasis in Race Relations’ addressing 
this issue.  It is this type of language quandary that that is expected to be voiced by the 
people and for which Chapter Five proposes a negotiation process for designing solutions. 
 
2.2.5  Education 
 
Since the 1980’s Sri Lanka has seen the progressive import of foreign educational systems.  
The schooling system constructed by the island’s Dept of Education is being leached away 
by the middle to upper class family need for their children to be educated in English. 
 
This need for English is being driven by the employment requirements of the private sector 
where large companies conduct their business in  English.  Secondly the medium of 
instruction of many professional qualifications (like medicine, computing) is in English.  
Thirdly and probably the most important is that many parents prefer to see their children 
migrate or at least work overseas when they are professionally qualified.  This way they 
earn a decent salary and are not exposed to corruption and the war-affected economic 
conditions of Sri Lanka.  Consequently, since it is the English speaking overseas countries 
that have the better employment and migration opportunities, the preference is for children 
to be educated in English. 
 
Due to the domestic policy of the teaching medium being limited to the vernacular 
languages (i.e. Sinhala and Tamil) Sri Lanka has spawned a plethora of teaching 
institutions catering for overseas qualification particularly of British, American, Australian 
and Canadian systems of education. 
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These foreign systems of education have set up schools in Sri Lanka, primarily in 
Colombo.  These schools are positioned to feed into their matching foreign universities 
which sometimes have their commencing tertiary undergraduate years conducted in Sri 
Lanka.  These schools are non-government funded.  Being privately funded, they charge 
healthy fees which contrasts sharply to the free education provided in government schools.   
Financially, a mid way expense is the local private schools which were mostly established 
by the Christian missionaries during the British and early independence days of Sri Lanka. 
 
The twofold attraction of foreign schools is that their medium of instruction is English and 
that their school leaving examinations have direct (without conversion needs) acceptance 
into associated foreign universities.  For example, going to an American school opens the 
American university college system to the student. 
 
The economic implications of the commercial reality have eventually made a policy change 
to allow the Sri Lanka schooling system to teach in English.  Overall Sri Lanka is no longer 
self sufficient in its schooling system.  Foreign exchange is being massively drained and 
worse of all there is no authority that is tracking this expense during a time of severe 
pressure on foreign funds as reflected in the escalating currency parity values
26
 
.     
2.2.6  Race & Geographic Spread 
 
This is a sensitive issue in the civil war-ravaged recent history of Sri Lanka.  Like in many 
countries, concentrations of races populate geographic territories, however in Sri Lanka 
over the last 100 years this has increasingly proven a sensitive issue to the well being of 
this island’s people.  Thus it pays us to be aware of the historical build-up of this dynamic.   
 
Whilst the Sinhalese race populates the majority of the island, there is considerable opinion 
supporting the claim that dating back to the kings, the Tamil race was the major population 
group in the Jaffna peninsula and along the upper reaches of the seaboard of the north-west 
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and north-east of the island.  Tamils also had scattered enclaves along the eastern province 
reportedly penetrating as far as the south-eastern coastal regions.   
 
Later the British who introduced the concept of province (a geographically based land 
demarcation) to aid them in their civil administrative processes established two Tamil 
provinces.  The LTTE roughly use this as the demarcation for their territorial claim.   
However, it is important to point out that these two provinces were also home (and 
continue to be home) to Malays, Moors and Batticaloa Burghers, to whom the Tamil-
language was their native tongue. 
 
Thus, in my view there is room for doubt that the British province demarcation was race 
based for it certainly coincides with language contours, which the British regulators 
astutely realised.  This duality would have thus given inclusivity to the Moors, Malays and 
Batticaloa Burghers and may further explain the lack of community agitation by these 
minor communities. 
 
Indeed the LTTE’s claim for their North and Eastern province homeland works off the 
reality that that contiguous territory is Tamil speaking as opposed to Tamil race populated.  
However, Sri Lankan politics of the 21
st century has clearly shown the discontent of the 
Moors and Malays of falling within such a Tamil-language territorial amalgam 
understandably stemming from the essential differences of their culture and religion. 
 
There are those (amongst the Sinhalese) who contend that the best way to overcome the 
demand for cessation is to ensure contiguous landmass is not occupied by any particular 
race.  This is the obverse of the aim of the Tamils astutely realising that it is a facet of the 
UN convention supporting self-governance.  However, it would appear the (Sinhalese) 
government authorities realised the same and when the major Gal Oya water scheme and 
resulting employment opportunities arose due to irrigation, the government encouraged 
Sinhalese farmers to settle in the region thus substantially altering the population 
demographics of the eastern region. The Sinhalese government argued that the re-
settlement was not state-aided colonisation (as claimed by the Tamils) but was resettlement 
of poor farmers, the worst affected being from the South, who being of the Sinhalese 
population were the major beneficiaries of the resettlement.  Chapter Two  61 
 
The dynamics of territorial location continues for the prelude of the 1
st Round of the 2002-
223 Peace Talks saw the LTTE pronounce that their capital city would be Trincomalee and 
not Jaffna. 
 
The Estate Tamils also known as Indian Tamils who were the indentured labour came from 
South India to work in the plantation sector since the British found the Sinhalese race 
unwilling to do such work.  Thus these Tamils occupy the upcountry tea lands and the low 
country rubber and tea plantations. 
 
2.2.7  Employment 
 
Women are the principal foreign exchange earners in this country.  Dr. P Saravanamuttu is 
known to have astutely pointed out it is their labour as tea pluckers, house-maids (working 
primarily in Middle Eastern countries) and sewing girls in the garment/apparel industry that 
underpin this economy.  To this I add they are all non-income taxpayers as their wage scale 
is paltry and it is their sheer numbers that fill the coffers based on the revenue their labour 
produces. Additionally career promotions for these women are almost zilch.   
 
Indeed, there is something inherently ineffective in the industries promoted.  Tea that has 
been the traditional leading export earner is structured for women to not work beyond the 
base level of its employment ranks (as ‘pluckers’ and ‘weeders’ but not as ‘kangani
27
 
 or 
‘field conductor’ of a division).  The garments industry which until recently were Sri 
Lanka’s leading export earner accommodates a sprinkling of senior women supervisors.  
Foreign employment, which is the current leading foreign exchange earner, whose majority 
are house-maids, have no promotions for they are mostly employed in households where 
they are the sole domestic help. 
The largest single employer in Sri Lanka is the government under the multiple banners of 
national, provincial and local government plus government owned enterprises, institutions 
and authorities.  Indeed Sri Lanka’s public administration is the largest in the world in 
relative terms to its population and every salary paid by the government is exempt from 
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income tax.  Under the 1956 Sinhala Only Act all government employees had to be 
proficient in Sinhala.  Consequently this brought about the progressive resignation of the 
Burghers and Tamils who filled the ranks of clerks and professionals like engineers, 
doctors, surveyors, etc.  This made way for the fast recruitment of Sinhalese and speedily 
robbed the public service of its senior echelons of management for they belonged to the 
older generation of upper middle class families who were English-educated.   
  
Under the 1972 Constitution “the administrative system came directly under the control 
and direction of the Cabinet of Ministers, in which was vested the authority for 
appointments, transfers dismissals and disciplinary control of all public officers” 
(Somasundaram, 1997).  In short the public service became politicised, career progress was 
pegged to political patronage and swelling the ranks of the administrative system became 
the easy reward mechanism to fulfil the political favours owed for winning elections.  
Today (2007) in a national government that reportedly has the largest number of Ministers 
in the world; this constitutional practice continues (per the 1978 Constitution) to breed an 
administrative system that is incompetent and ill serves its Sri Lankan population who are 
forced to use its services.  For many government employees’ ethical career satisfaction is a 
rarity.  However, employment is secure and generous with its welfare privileges. 
 
Today, the potential of meeting career aspirations and a rewarding career lives with the big 
companies of the private sector.  E-commerce is the buzz word and thus computing and 
English are the entrée into this world making the Sri Lankan education system ill-equipped 
to cater for these prerequisites due to its vernacular medium of instruction.  Thus for those 
who can afford the price, foreign based education in the English medium is the choice.   
 
For the current generation who cannot financially afford the foreign-based education price 
tag, the youngsters yearn for foreign employment within the semi-skilled professions of 
carpentry, plumbing, electrician or unskilled labouring which in Sri Lanka due to the lack 
of dignity of labour are poorly respected and paid.   Agricultural work falls within the same 
inadequately respected and ill-rewarded category, which in this lush climate of tropical 
vegetation is such a wasted resource and only surpassed by the island’s ocean fishing 
industry and the cultural status its employment is accorded. 
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2.2.8  Economic Resources 
 
In many ways labour is the most utilized resource in Sri Lanka and its attractiveness is 
predicated on its cheapness.  Ocean resources rank as the most under-utilized resource.  
Lland, where ownership exceeded 50 acres, was acquired by the government in the early 
1970’s.  This affected the Sinhalese community more since that community were more 
inclined to hold their assets in land ownership than Muslime and Tamils who were more 
business and rental house ownership orientated.  Since 1980’s much of the 1970’s 
nationalised and government owned assets were sold.   Faced with many unprofitable 
public enterprises and widening budget deficits, governments actively sold state owned 
enterprises under various ownership and management arrangements.  The remaining State 
owned assets are prime assets like railways, water, and land. 
 
Sri Lanka’s island coast runs for 1100 miles and yet neither the kings of old nor the 
colonizing powers nor the various Sri Lankan Parliamentary governments have done much 
to utilize this resource beyond a couple of miles fishing.  In 1994 under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LoS) Sri Lanka gained jurisdiction over an additional 
437,400 square kilometres of ocean, due to ocean coverage extending up to 200 nautical 
miles from the coast (refer Figure 6).  Chapter Two  64 
 
 
 
Yet neither the fishing industry nor any other industry
28
 
 for that matter have positioned 
themselves to access this economic resource despite the world-wide prelude of 
international negotiations for this UN Convention being presided by a Sri Lankan (Mr. 
Shirley Amerasinghe) from 1973 to 1982.   
Until the recent decades Sri Lankan fisher folk were limited to row & sail boats (called 
‘oruwa’).  Now motor boats that go a few miles out into the sea and stay out for 2-3 nights 
are increasing the norm.  Fishing in the extended league of ocean waters demands a 
technological leap and skill set involving engineering and navigational skills which in that 
context are minimal amongst the fisher folk and lack signs of cultivation by the educational 
authorities or business interest.  Governments and bureaucrats contend that  Sri Lanka 
cannot afford the capital expenditure for such high-sea fishing boats and its associated land 
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based infrastructure.  Strangely (possibly affordable) options like leasing (as done for 
aircraft) appears rare and thus no plans are afoot to train people to master sophisticated 
engine run boats with refrigeration which can go out to sea for weeks on end.    For the 
same capital financial reasons, monitoring is remiss.  For example foreign craft that fish 
outside of Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters (i.e. beyond 200 nautical 
miles) who have secured landing rights in Sri Lanka could well be fishing as they 
legitimately pass through Sri Lanka’s EEZ waters. 
 
2.2.9  Product Mix 
 
It is particularly important to examine the product mix of Sri Lanka for it spells some of the 
vital economic characteristics of the island as well as how its labour market is being 
employed.  
 
Prior to colonial rule, the island was known for its food (agriculture, livestock and 
fisheries) self sufficiency and it exports were rice, spices and elephants.  Its commendable 
infrastructure was irrigation systems and its resources were tropical vegetation drenched in 
the sun that made agriculture the predominant industry and occupation. 
 
At the time of independence whilst food self sufficiency continued, growth in the 
agricultural sector was devoted to export revenue earners.  Its revenue was convincing led 
by the tea, rubber and coconut export market, which had been owned, established and 
developed into  commercial scale production by the British.  These products were 
particularly attractive due to their long shelf life, which minimised post harvest losses 
during their long marine journey to the British auction markets. 
 
Labour-wise, the British managers finding the Sinhalese  labour unwilling to work the 
plantations, they imported South Indian Tamils (from their neighbouring British colony) 
and employed them on paltry wages.  Other agricultural produce, like paddy, vegetable and 
spice cultivation was done by Sinhalese people who generally ran their own small acreage.  
The same was true also of the northern areas of the country where the Ceylon Tamils 
cultivated their own agricultural lands in the north.   Chapter Two  66 
 
After independence, the British plantation managers were rapidly replaced by Ceylonese 
managers and the British companies that owned the plantations were converted to 
Ceylonese run publicly listed companies which in the mid 1970’s were nationalised during 
an era of nationalistic fervour.  The significance of the change of ownership was that the 
nation began to develop its management ranks and financially Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) 
retained its profit.  In contrast, during the British era profits were repatriated such that 
Ceylon retained its citizens’ wages and salaries and the cost of infrastructure (e.g. transport 
administration).  Of course, nationalisation meant that profit exclusively fed the 
government coffers.  However, it was not long before losses arose and today this same 
estate sector is being managed by public listed companies where the land is leased (term 99 
years) from the government with renewal every 5 years which was later extended to 50 
year renewals
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. 
Whilst this trend in non-colonial ownership and management was experienced by many a 
post colonial country it is only a very few that astutely changed its product mix – the most 
notable example being Singapore that made itself into the foremost South East Asian 
transport transit hub, financial capital and duty free shipping port. 
 
Sri Lanka’s product mix did however change as the fortunes of the tea, rubber and coconut 
export market ebbed and the island was faced with a growing demand for foreign exchange 
to fund the infrastructure and manufacturing needs of the country.  Thus the employment 
intensive tourism sector was introduced in the 1970’s and with it grew foreign exchange 
needs to fund the hotels building programme and improved transport facilities.  The 
tourism labour market experienced substantially higher wages and employed school leavers 
with multiple languages (e.g. German, English) and creative skills (e.g.  chefs).  This 
however was at the cost of the lower waged agricultural sector. Feeding the tourist market 
during its heyday was the emergence of the semi-precious gem mining and polishing 
industry.  Financially, both these sectors performed better than agriculture because both 
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sold finished products (rather than raw material) and predominately used local resources 
(beach, sun, water, labour and minerals).   
 
Unfortunately, by the mid 1980’s the guerrilla based ethnic war took hold of the country, 
and as experienced world-wide, immediately hit the tourism industry.  With tourism eroded 
and the continued pricing decline for the traditional agricultural exports, the nation was 
introduced to the open economy and Sri Lanka embraced the philosophy of devoting its 
production capacity to export.  
 
The production capacity of Sri Lanka is today (2007) essentially geared towards the export 
sector.  This is largely the consequence of the ‘open economy’ policy, which commenced 
its currency in 1983 under the J. R. Jayawardena era when the UNP government came into 
power under a landslide victory.  
 
2.2.10 Corruption 
 
It is well recognised that corruption is rife in Sri Lanka.   Recent decades have seen 
newspapers flooded with reports of alleged corrupt practices, particularly relating to big 
ticket items.  Yet it is an extreme rarity that any one gets caught and certainly no big-time 
corruption has ever been found guilty.  One of the many studies
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 done on the corruption 
issue in Sri Lanka, categorised corruption into three categories: 
•  Nepotism & Cronyism.  This was constitutionally able to flourish as Ministers of the 
government were vested with the authority to appoint, dismiss, promote and transfer 
public service employees.   This privilege is significant given the government is the 
biggest employer in the country.  Despite the 17
th  Amendment to the Constitution 
(promulgated in 2001) which reduced this power, its effect is yet to be felt as 
operationally little has changed.  
 
•  Small value corruption.  Here the value is small and most people somehow have an 
encounter with it.  It acts very much as a scheduling mechanism to get things done.  For 
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example, to get garbage collected, to get legal cases on top of the hearing list, to admit 
children to the better government schools.    
 
•  Big ticket corruption.  This primarily relates to capital expenditure items and the sale of 
one time nationalized assets.   
 
Public Procurement is the ‘big-ticket’ item where corruption flourishes and will 
continue to do so as we move from the armament deals (which investment required 
national secrecy measures and was therefore rationalised as beyond the purview of 
the Auditor General) to reconstruction of major capital works as peace becomes a 
reality. …Whilst tenders, once received, are opened in public, the guidelines are 
remiss in that thereafter the process is shrouded in opacity, meaning that the 
decisions arrived at in the technical tender evaluation and the tender-awarding 
process are not accessible to the public. Whilst there may be cogent arguments for 
having these processes held in camera (to minimise outside interference, a view 
suggested by JBIC), there is little rationale, short of protecting unjust decisions, for 
not having the documentation of criteria and evaluation accessible, questioned and 
if required litigated upon, after the tenders have been awarded.  Current practice 
also suggests that rarely is the ‘award of tender’ advertised/announced in the 
newspapers, which is a standard requirement specified in the public procedure 
guidelines. (National Integrity Systems, Country Study Report - Sri Lanka, 2003) 
 
 
 
Part III – Models & Organizational Cybernetics (Epistemology)  
 
The objective here is to come to terms with the relevance of working with models and in 
that context choosing an appropriate modelling framework for the research undertaking at 
hand.   
 
2.3.1  Models & Modelling 
 
Better than a model is reality itself.  Yet in diagnosing and designing systems it is models 
that are used, as accessing the whole of reality is plagued by a surfeit of variables and the 
rest of what was discussed in Part I of this chapter.  Models are built to reflect aspects of 
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In this regard, Beer (1994a:84) refers to four features of models.  These are that a model 
compared to reality is ‘scaled-down’ in both size and complexity.  Consequently, there is a 
‘transfer across’ feature so that the scaled-down model has a way of being mapped across 
to reality.   In turn, this requires ‘workability’ so that the scaled-down model has a way of 
in principle working like the real thing.  Lastly, the model needs to be ‘appropriate’ for the 
task at hand.  It is that appropriateness that selects the model and is what is reflected in the 
scaled-down version of the model.   
 
Given the objective of this thesis, this appropriateness relates to control, in the sense of 
regulation rather than what may be referred to as ‘do as you are told’.  The search is to 
design a regulatory system capable of overcoming and avoiding the type of crises that beset 
Sri Lanka.  Likewise, diagnosis pertains to understanding what are the regulatory features 
that have been missing or weak which have contributed to such crises.  
 
Therefore, the search is for a regulatory model.  Based on that regulatory model, the 
relevant variables that pertain to regulation or are affected by regulation are what will be 
filtered when diagnosing the Sri Lankan context.  In other words the Sri Lankan model will 
be modelled using the criteria of the regulatory model. 
 
To this I want to add a view expressed by Harnden concerning models which is premised 
on Maturana’s distinction of objectivity-in-parenthesis. 
 
The model might be described as enabling the orchestration of diverse viewpoints (as 
compared to an objective state of affairs), in a process that brings forth some 
consensually accepted version of reality for a community of observers.  Depending on 
the explanatory rigor with respect to which the model is interpreted and understood, 
consensual reality will be brought forth conjointly with the experiencing of particular 
operational coherences in the course of the orienting of the observers who constitute 
such a community.  Thus, the ‘brute’ domain of the objects we experience as we bump 
into (them) is braided into a coherent fabric with respect to our description and 
explanations of them. (Harnden 1990) 
 
What this means is selecting the model which will be used to develop what will be taken 
into consideration in developing the model of Sri Lanka, is itself a consensual matter.  
Consensually that is initially with me as observer and (in effect) those that developed the 
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whether they come into (co-ordinations of co-ordination)  agreement with the selected 
model of Organizational Cybernetics. 
 
Later, Chapter Five which proposes a ‘process solution’ adopts this very idea of 
‘consensual reality will be brought forth conjointly with the experiencing of particular 
operational coherences in the course of the orienting of the observers who constitute such a 
community’.  It seeks to achieve this by ‘enabling the orchestration of diverse viewpoints’ 
by bringing together in negotiation the various community representatives to diagnose and 
design their solution/s. 
 
2.3.2  Models Evaluated 
 
Given the scope of the study it was obvious that the framework for research needed to 
extend beyond the popular management tools used by management consultants.  Thus tools 
like Strategic Planning, and SWOT Analysis were discounted early in the piece for they did 
not have the robustness to address complex issues spanning the many levels of a nation’s 
government in the context of its socio-economic-judicial-military-political system and 
environment.  
 
The three frameworks considered were: 
•  Systems Dynamics as designed by J. W. Forrester 
•  Soft Systems Methodology designed by P. Checkland 
•  Cybernetics and more specifically Stafford Beer’s Managerial Cybernetics  
 
2.3.2.1  System Dynamics 
 
The essence of System Dynamics as invented in 1956 by Dr. Jay W. Forrester, hinges on 
modelling the systemic relationships amongst critical variables that multifariously interact 
to produce results that in turn could interact with those very results (feedback loop) and 
other variables within a specified complex system.  Such systemic relationships are usually 
depicted diagrammatically showing the positive (where variables move in the same 
direction, either both increasing or both decreasing) and negative (where the variables Chapter Two  71 
 
move in an inverse relationship, one increasing and the other decreasing) directional flow 
relationship amongst the variables.   
 
This systemic modelling of a complex system needs to be quantified and formulated as 
mathematical equations.  These equations are then applied to computer compilers such as 
DYNAMO or STELLA and fed with numerical data to ascertain results which enable the 
researcher to test the validity of the formulas based on the computed results.  Once the 
formulas have been validated, these programmes make excellent simulators as the 
numerical data that feeds the variables can be changed and thus scenarios (including 
changes in variable relationships) can be simulated to determine their effects.  Systems 
Dynamics therefore is a great experimental laboratory where the dynamics of policy effects 
can be computer-simulated involving  a mass of variables, whose permutations of 
interactions would otherwise run the risk of myopic policies wrecking havoc in the real 
world. 
 
Applying the System Dynamics  framework was however not going to work for this 
research due to various reasons.  Firstly, addressing multiple crises will involve a mass of 
variables, whose permutations of interactions will require formulation of equations 
representing the massive array of variable permutations which even if it could be handled 
by the computer, could not be done within the timeframe of this thesis.  Secondly, the 
research would not have access to all the required numerical data.  Thirdly, there was the 
risk that some of the required data may not even be collected by the government (the likely 
repository capturing a country’s figures).  In turn, this meant that the mathematical 
formulation of systemic interaction amongst the variables, which necessities a finer degree 
of granularity than would be required for recognising the pattern of systemic relationships, 
would not be achievable thus making it impossible to use this framework.  Lastly, it 
appeared that some of the Sri Lankan crises, like constitutional matters, did not lend 
themselves nor require the type of mathematics performed by System Dynamics.    
 
Not employing System Dynamics however means that the research lost ease of proof of 
comparing proposals.  Frequently people perceive that something mathematically proven is 
right.  Indeed it is a convincing argument, albeit facile, when different proposals are 
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However, the more knowledgeable will delve into the assumptions underpinning the 
calculations to evaluate the degree to which (in their opinion) they reflect reality.  This 
evaluation in turn is a decisive influence on the acceptability of calculated projections.  
Furthermore, there is more to quantification than numeration and comparative positions can 
be assessed based on qualitative and intuitive perception.    
 
There is room here however to admit that at a later stage once the relationship between 
actors and topics are better acknowledged via the findings of Organizational Cbernetics, 
modelling based on ordinal ranking using Systems Dynamics may well be possible and 
indeed desirable.  In other words, once a qualitative understanding has been achieved a 
quantitative understanding can be built.  There is a reciprocal relationship between 
quantitative and qualitative understanding as the realisations of each can act to correct the 
other.  An example of moving into the quantitative domain of simulation may well be the 
consideration of what are the implications of negotiations with a weakened LTTE?  What I 
am referring to here is - what are the ramifications of dealing with a strong antagonist who 
has substantial influence over its embedded entities, as opposed to weak antagonists?  In 
the later instance I am referring to the ramifications of having to negotiate with multiple 
antagonists who may be splintered when agreements are being negotiated?    
 
This aspect is not addressed in this thesis, but certainly warrants research in terms of 
understanding the physiological limits that apply in the instance of military positioning as 
compared to Peace Talk negotiations.  Using Systems Dynamics it may be possible to 
simulate different gradients of weakness/strengths of the various representatives and 
compare them in the context of different types of peace talk negotiation processes – e.g.  
two-party negotiations compared to (non-alliance) multi-party negotiations.  There is a host 
of permutations here whose ramifications warrant research. 
 
2.3.2.2  Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) 
 
Here too the emphasis is on understanding the systemic relationships.  However, unlike 
System Dynamics that is entrenched in mathematically modelling those relationships, Soft 
Systems Methodology is qualitative in nature and hinges on the revelations obtained from a 
vast array of questions.   These are guided by the mnemonic CATWOE: Chapter Two  73 
 
•  Customers -- who are the victims or beneficiaries of Transformation Process,  
•  Actors -- who would perform the Transformation Process,  
•  Transformation process -- the process of conversion of input to output,  
•  Weltanschauung -- the worldview which makes T meaningful in a context,  
•  Owners -- those who have the power to stop Transformation Process, and  
•  Environment constraints -- elements outside the system which it takes as given.  
The important value of this methodology, developed by Peter Checkland, is that it is 
designed to work with what are called soft problems where the ‘What’ and ‘How’ have a 
large social and political component.  At first glance this makes it very suitable to address 
the Sri Lankan problem situation for it is built to accommodate interpretations and thus is 
highly consultative so that it can build the Weltanschauung.  The problem however in the 
type of research undertaken in this thesis is that I would not have had the access to bring 
these people together to discuss these worldviews as the whole process requires a level of 
communication and collaboration which does not yet exist.  Even if this constraint could 
have been overcome, a more structured way was deemed to be required so as to cope with 
the extent of the problem given its application at the level of a country and its embedments.  
A way was required to evaluate the solutions proposed –  like is there something 
intrinsically missing with a solution as proposed.   Certainly, from the perspective of 
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety it would be appropriate to propose that the variety of 
people consulted would fill the gaps.  Yet, the VSM was found to offer this in-built 
capability within the model itself.  Thus the solutions proposed by the consulted people, 
that the VSM can also employ, lends itself to be diagnosed using the VSM to look for 
essential adequacy in terms of such aspects as monitoring, channel connections, cohesion 
and autonomy.   
 
2.3.2.3  Cybernetics 
 
Here we find the rich framework required to conduct the research ambit as set for Sri 
Lanka.  As a prelude to coming to grips with this framework, let us take a moment to 
indulge in history for cybernetics is a recent science and as Stafford Beer (circa 1989) 
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Cybernetics was named in 1947 following the book written by Norbert Wiener which was 
the product of meetings amongst a small group of renowned scientists.  Besides the US 
mathematician Norbert Wiener, there was the Mexican physician Arturo Rosenbluth, the 
anthropologists Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, Warren McCulloch the US 
neurophysiologist, and Ross Ashby the British psychiatrist.  They came together to discuss 
and learn from each other.  As they learnt of each other’s disciplines they began to realise 
that each of their sciences were concerned about matters of control or what could also be 
called regulation.  As they explored this common territory they came to realise that 
communication (being aware of the other) underpinned this control.   
 
At the time, given the perceived division between the animate and inanimate systems, 
Wiener’s definition of Cybernetics was revolutionary for it bridged the divide and stated “It 
is the  science of communication and control in the animal and the machine.” (Beer, 
1994b:254)  Beer explains “That is to say that cybernetics studies the flow of information 
round a system, and the way in which that information is used by the system as a means of 
controlling itself; it does this for animate and inanimate systems indifferently.” (Beer, 
1994b:254) 
 
Here revealed is the nexus between the cybernetic framework, which studies information 
flow and how it is used for the purpose of controlling itself.  In this sense it relates to the 
research objective of this thesis of diagnosing the Sri Lankan situation, which plagued by 
crises reflects the areas and extent where Sri Lanka is losing (if not lost) its control.  
Therefore, applying such cybernetic thinking calls for the study of the pattern of 
informational flow and how it is used within the Sri Lankan system for that will reveal 
what jeopardises Sri Lanka’s viability.   
 
Indeed when we view the Sri Lankan Constitution we will find the viability of the 
Parliamentary system flawed.  Whilst this constitutional discussion is delayed for Chapter 
Four, let me quote Beer to convey some of the essential characteristics of a viable system, 
 
No rigorous classification has yet been developed, and certainly we are not  here 
concerned with the problems of taxonomy.  But the sort of capability involved may 
certainly be indicated, as for instance in the following list.  Viable systems have the 
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stimuli when the system was designed.  They can learn from repeated experience what 
is the optimal response to that stimulus.  Viable systems grow.  They renew themselves 
– by, for example, self-reproduction.  They are robust against internal breakdown and 
error.  Above all, they continuously adapt to a changing environment, and by this 
means survive – quite possibly in conditions which had not been entirely foreseen by 
their designer. (Beer, 1994b:256) 
 
Here expressed is the kind of viable structural and functional design that nation building 
should aim for.  Indeed, as we pause to ponder, the perspective of viability expressed is 
what biological systems exhibit.  For example, the human body normally operates in 
prescribed ways (breathing in and out) yet at times it adapts breaking away from the 
prescriptive in order to adapt (holding one’s breath) to a stimuli (face immersed under 
water) which lies outside of its normal physiological environment.   
 
So convinced were some scientists of the importance of control (not of bullying or 
coercion, but arranging for the system to regulate itself) that they expansively studied 
nature.  This lead to scientific researchers like Ashby discovering the Law of Requisite 
Variety, McCulloch discovering the Redundancy of Potential Command, biologists 
discovering the principles of autopoiesis (by Maturana & Valera) and the coenetic variable 
(by Sommerhoff).  Additionally, there is Organizational Cybernetics, also sometimes 
known as Managerial Cybernetics, as developed by Prof. Dr. Stafford Beer.   
 
Next discussed is Beer’s Viable Systems Model (VSM) which he based on his study of 
neurophysiology.  Beer says “It suggested that the human nervous system stipulates the 
rules where an organisation is survival-worthy: is regulated, learns, adapts, evolves” (Beer, 
1994e, xi).  Beer also invented a large systems intervention process called Team 
Syntegrity® which is discussed in Chapter Five. 
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2.3.3  Perspectives of the Models Selected - Viable System Model (VSM) 
 
What I seek to convey is the crux of the logic the VSM 
employs given the need to perform multiple diagnoses 
as Sri Lanka is afflicted by multiple crises interacting 
with multiple subject domains.  This is of particular 
importance because the VSM is usually unfolded 
within a single cascade of VSM mappings.  Viewed 
from that multiple  perspective the objective is to 
traverse a territory of explanation so as to address the 
need for VSM diagnosis based on what could be 
described as a ‘multiple horizontal cascade at each 
level of recursion’.  
 
First let me explain from a VSM perspective the issue 
at hand and then re-express it in non-VSM language.  
Then I will move to building a cursory outline of the 
VSM so that the non-VSM audience can join in the 
understanding of what has been described in VSM 
parlance and then return to explore the issue at hand in 
more detail. 
 
Conceptually one would expect the multiple crises that 
warrant multiple diagnoses to aggregate themselves 
into a single theme at the highest level of recursion.  
The problem however is that the single theme splits 
when the VSM moves a level of recursion lower, 
resulting in whatever is the altered system-in-focus 
moving one or more of the (crises) systems into the 
environment as it does not fall within the purview of 
the identity of the selected system-in-focus for that 
particular level of recursion - (refer Figure 7).   Chapter Two  77 
 
Indeed, this was what Schwember alerts to. 
The relevant environment of a given system at a given hierarchy intersects with the 
relevant environment of its metasystem but a) is not wholly contained in it, and b) it 
resolves much more thinly than the ‘meta-environment’.  Some examples will make 
this point plain.  His personal hobby – stamps say – might be very relevant for the 
worker (niveau31
 
 1) but it will be totally irrelevant for all upper niveaus (Schwember, 
1977).   
This being the case, it means that when one moves between levels of recursion, the loss of 
a (crisis) system to the environment due to the chosen purview of the system-in-focus could 
be overcome by mapping that “potentially lost crisis system” as an additional system-in-
focus VSM mapping.  It could also be mapped as homeostats operating in the environment. 
 
Re-expressing this in lay terms the point I am seeking to make is that the multiple crises 
appear at the level of meta-level system.   However, a part of that array of crises
32
 
 fades 
into the background when looked at individually from the perspective of embedded 
systems.    
2.3.3.1  Workings of the VSM  
 
Given that cybernetics is about regulation it implies the existence of a goal, which may be 
defined algorithmically or heuristically.  Whatever that goal may entail, minimally an 
inherent component of that goal is that it includes survival until that goal is achieved.  The 
term viability is used in this sense of survival.  Fail this test of survival and viability is lost, 
the entity ceases to exist and other goals become immaterial.  This goal of course could be 
on-going as is the case with many institutions and in other instances it could be short lived.   
 
It is not the intention here to describe the VSM in detail.  Beer has published many books 
on his invention - explaining it, the rationale upon which it is built and experiences of its 
usage.  Still others have described it on a briefer scale and written of their experience of 
applying it.   
                                                 
31 niveau = recursion 
32 In the context of Sri Lanka, amongst the crises warranting diagnosis are the War/stalemate Peace Talks and 
the ineffectiveness of the public service.  Another is corruption and the detrimental ramifications arising from 
the inadequacy of national standards – like language.    
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Writing with Moscardini, I wrote -  
It stands to reason, the more aggregated a system the more numerous its embedded 
component systems.  Beer’s VSM (Viable System Model) provides a rigour with which 
to distinguish the embedded component systems.  The VSM built on the premise of 
‘every viable system contains and is contained in a viable system’ (Beer, 1984) 
provides such distinction via the concept of recursion, which also specifies the 
necessary and sufficient internal functionality that an entity needs in order to be viable 
given the context of its environment. 
 
Within each recursive entity are systems (S) which perform the following functions so 
that together the requisite variety is produced to interact with its environment in the 
pursuit of achieving the entity’s goals. 
 
•  S1, supported by the other systems, produces what it takes for the system to be 
viable given its external environment.  
•  S2 monitors and dampens detrimental oscillatory movements between and within 
S1 production relationships.  
•  S3 functionality is devoted to addressing ‘internal issues facing it now’ –  e.g. 
negotiating resource bargains between S1 production units and formulating policy 
directives and taking corrective action when not complied with.  
•  S3*, exercised by S3, conducts ad hoc audits of S1 production units.  
•  S4 is devoted to modelling and assessing ‘the entity’s capability to address future 
issues expected from the environment’ so as to better its ability to survive in the 
future. 
•  S5 addresses [normative] meta-level issues (of the next higher level of recursion) 
and  [moderates]  the homeostatic relationship between the current (S3) and the 
future (S4) capability needs of the entity to absorb variety as the entity interacts 
with the environment. 
 
The above is reflected in Figure 1 including bi-directional channels via which each of 
the systems within a recursion is internally connected, and the entity as a whole is 
connected to its environment.  For these channels to be effective they must fully reach 
across to the point of boundary connection; the channel must be capable of transmitting 
the sent information between its points of connection; and the point of receipt at the 
boundary must have the variety at least equivalent to the variety of the information sent 
on the channel and all of this “must be cyclically maintained through time without 
hiatus or lags” (Beer, 1979).  Note, while Maturana (2002) addresses structural 
coupling between entities, Beer gives us insights into the linkage device (channel and 
its attributes) between the entities and within an entity’s own functionality, be it 
composite or simple unity.  
 
Additionally, Beer drives at the tension between cohesion and autonomy.  The former 
works on the vertical axis to unify the recursive levels of systems.  Autonomy is 
invoked by each horizontal production entity and its support functions so as to 
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Therefore, working horizontally and vertically are the nuances of identity which each 
system is seeking to conserve and therein lies the stress when the identity correlates do 
not cohere.  
 
Maturana’s composite unity
33
 
 carries similarities to the recursion levels in the VSM 
while a non-decomposable simple unity is the lowest level of recursion in a VSM.  
Note the embedded entities within a composite unity can also exist in the VSM 
environment.  The structural coupling is analogous to the relationship between what the 
VSM calls the system and the environment.  Disintegration is equivalent to the vital 
loss of viability and adaptation is what S4 is seeking to minimally achieve so that S3 
and other support functions are positioned to support the production requirements of 
S1. (Solomons & Moscardini, 2006a, brackets in quote) 
To this needs to be added the concept of homeostasis given that systems are dynamic and 
seek to adapt as they seek to conserve their identity.  Beer explains,  
 
The point is that a truly viable system does not oscillate to … extremes because it is 
under homeostatic Control in every dimension that is important to its survival.    
(Further he adds) Homeostasis is the tendency of a complex system to run towards an 
equilibrial state.  This happens because the many parts of the complex system absorb 
each other’s capacity to disrupt the whole.  Now the ultimate stable state to which a 
viable system may run (that state where entropy is unity) is finally rigid – and we call 
that death.  If the system is to remain viable, if it is not to die, then we need that extra 
concept of an equilibrium that is not fixed, but is on the move. What causes the 
incipiently stable point to move is the total system’s response to environmental change 
and this kind of adjustment we call adaptation.  The third notion that we need  to 
understand homeostasis is the idea of physiological limit.  It is necessary for a viable 
system to keep moving its stable point but it cannot afford to move it so far or so fast 
that the system itself is blown apart.  It must keep its degree and rate of change within a 
tolerance fixed by its own physiology. (Beer, 1994f:426) 
 
Further exploration of the workings of the VSM is discussed in the later chapters in the 
context of what is being addressed in those chapters. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 As Maturana (1980) says “An entity, distinguished from a background by an observer through an operation 
of distinction that by specifying it as a whole specifies the background from which it is distinguished, 
constitutes a unity.  The operation of distinction, by specifying the conditions of distinction, specifies the 
properties of the entity distinguished as a unity.  An entity, in which an observer does not or cannot 
distinguish components, is a simple unity.   An entity in which an observer describes parts, that he names 
components, by distinguishing them in reference to the entity that they conjointly integrate as a simple unity, 
is a composite unity.” 
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2.3.3.2  Unity of Intertwined Multiplicity  
 
Let us return to explore in more detail the issue of multiple crises and the way it presents 
itself in the VSM in terms of the S1s and the environment from the perspective of recursion 
levels.  The reason I have chosen to address the amalgam of crises, and therefore undertake 
multiple diagnosis which then leads to process design considerations, is because these 
crises are intimately interacting with each other
34
 
.   Consequently, the expectation is that if 
the crises are addressed in isolation or linearly, whilst it may in the short term provide 
relief, in the longer term the solutions are expected to be eroded by the interaction of the 
other crises.  It is for this reason that it has been considered necessary to address the 
amalgam of crises for it is such solution in its ‘unity of intertwined multiplicity’ that 
delineates peace in Sri Lanka. 
von Foerster generically encapsulates this concept of ‘intertwined multiplicity of unity’ 
when he enquired about,  
Developing a system of compositions and indeed, a system of composition for systems.  
What is this problem about?  I have System A, I have a System B, and now I’d like to 
integrate both of these into a System C.  What do the rules consist of that allow a new 
System C to arise, the rules of integration, of composition?  We’ve got all the best 
words for it, but what does the formalism for such problems look like?  Today one 
could also provide the composition problem with another name:  It’s about, for 
example, the problem of the Croats, the Bosnians, the Herzegovinians – one could call 
it the Vance-Owen Problem.  These are the problems that we confront in social theory 
today.  How can one solve this problem?  Or in a different sense it is also the problem 
of autopoiesis:  How can I bring an autopoietic System A into a relationship with 
another autopoietic System B in such a way that a new System C arises, itself an 
autopoietic system. (von Foerster, 2003) 
 
                                                 
34 Take for example, war meant massive military expenditure and when guerrilla attacks succeeded, it 
imposed colossal clean-up and reconstruction expenses, both of which contribute to the bulged of public debt.  
Furthermore the threat, and at times the success, of guerrilla attacks, erodes business confidence which in turn 
lowers the nation’s revenue earning capacity and increases cost due to the imposition of risk premiums and 
risk prevention measures.  In the meanwhile, an ineffective public service and corruption add not only to the 
financial cost but produces a low quality product or service which together saps the spirits of people to expect 
peace let alone work towards it.   
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2.3.3.3  Representing ‘Intertwined Multiplicity of Unity’ in the VSM  
 
Whilst the VSM does not specify the rules for such integration, employing the concept of 
recursion certainly enables such integration mapping to take place.  Given Sri Lanka’s need 
for integrated peace (across the cultural and business terrain which entails improvement of 
their internal support systems), an important component of the VSM mapping is to 
understand the environment in the context of the system-in-focus which together forms 
each of the recursion levels.  What this means is that there is an interrelationship that has to 
be untangled generically and specifically and then ideally re-twined to convey a conceptual 
order that lends itself to the (preliminary) diagnosis –  as suggested by the symptoms 
evidenced. 
 
Table 3 - Situation Positioning of Crises between Levels of Recursion 
 
  Generically  Specifically 
a)    For each level of recursion what is the environment 
that its system-in-focus serves? 
What system should each 
level of recursion portray and 
upon what criteria will that 
be determined? 
b)    What is the relationship between levels of recursion 
– in the context of the environment and its 
embedded system-in-focus 
What ‘crisis systems’ enter 
and leave the system-in-focus 
between levels of recursion? 
c)    What is the logical composition of the system-in-
focus where the (distinctly) autonomous systems are 
conceptually merged? 
At which levels of recursion 
will we begin to see the 
crises as identified above? 
 
 
2.3.3.4  VSM Environment 
 
Whilst these are not questions for linear consideration, as they need to be concurrently 
addressed in their final form, to aid untangling let me first explain my realisations 
concerning that what happens in the environment relative to the recursion levels of the 
system.  To gain a sense of the subtleties, traced is the history of my realisations.  Chapter Two  83 
 
•  As the recursive level moves up a notch the relevant variety of the environment shrinks 
because more of the environment is occupied by the expanded system.  By the same 
logic, it seemed that as we drop a level of recursion, the new system-in-focus reduces 
(less S1s) which means the environment increases. 
 
Conceptually, I was working on  the premise that any system (as identified) was a 
subset of the environment (the whole).  Thus as we increased the terrain covered by the 
system-in-focus  (i.e. encompassing more S1s) it meant less remained in the 
environment. 
 
•  In discussion
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 with the cybernetician Dr. Allenna Leonard, the distinction was made 
concerning the environment between the ‘contractual’ with which the system directly 
interacts and the ‘contextual’ which is the remaining part of the environment.   Indeed, 
one could distinguish further into ‘peripheral’ environment and note the ‘contextual’ as 
that part which is strongly related to the ‘contractual’ environment.  For example, 
‘contractual’ could be the suppliers/customers of the system-in-focus, ‘contextual’ 
could be competitors/potentials, and ‘peripheral’ is the rest of the environment that is 
weakly coupled to the ‘contextual’ environment and (more weakly coupled to) the 
system-in-focus. 
This led to realising that whilst the ‘contextual’ and ‘peripheral’ environment decreased 
as we roll up a notch in recursion, its relevant ‘contractual’ environment increased.  
Both these movements (one decreasing and the other increasing, respectively) arise as a 
consequence of more S1s compared to its previous lower level of recursion. 
 
•  Reading Schwember, realisation dawns that as we roll up a level of recursion, not all 
the lower S1’s are necessarily aggregated into the higher recursion level.  This means, 
some elements of the S1s move into the environment and its associated (the S1 that 
went into the environment) contractual environment shrinks and moves into the 
‘contextual’ or ‘peripheral’ environment.   
 
                                                 
35 Personal communication at Sunderland University in summer of 2004.  I understand the distinction of the 
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I am aware that the matter at stake with the nuances of what is happening in the 
environment as we move up and down recursion levels is not the differing sizes of the 
environment but the variety absorption capability of a recursion level’s system-in-focus.  
However what I am driving at is the variety absorption that is going on within the 
environment and how the system-in-focus manoeuvres variety absorption in the 
environment and consequently how it affects the variety that the system-in-focus is called 
upon to absorb. 
 
Having distinguished the environment in this way (contractual, contextual and peripheral) 
the question is what is the value in such distinction?  What subtly does such sensitivity of 
the environment reveal?   
 
2.3.4  Contextualising the Positional Movement Considerations to Sri Lanka 
 
In the Sri Lanka context, the distinction between the system and environment become 
particularly important when trying to figure out where the LTTE fits in the ‘Sri Lanka’ 
VSM especially since the LTTE controlled terrain geographically is situated within the 
internationally recognised sovereign island called Sri Lanka and some of the infrastructure 
(e.g. roads, telephones, electricity, monetary currency) is provided and owned by the 
GoSL.  However, it is the LTTE and not the GoSL’s jurisdiction that prevails amongst the 
people in that location (partly through fear, plus language in which the service is provided 
and location accessibility) and increasingly the LTTE is running its own civil 
administration system. 
 
The other aspect is to track where the crisis appears in the environment when it exits at a 
level of recursion.  Expectation is that it will be in the contractual realm from where it 
exercises its variety on the system and the system being unable to absorb its variety 
experiences the crisis.  What I am intuiting here, is that the crisis is less likely to enter into 
the contextual or peripheral environment. 
 
Additionally, looking at the Sri Lanka situation there is much evidence to point to variety 
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and the GoSL are dealing with each other via the international diplomatic and financial 
community.  For example, the GoSL worked its foreign policy to encourage proscription of 
the LTTE in USA, UK etc. whilst the LTTE worked to gain ‘freedom fighter’ recognition 
(i.e. not terrorist) amongst some Northern European countries.  In the lead up to the 2002-
2003 Peace Talks, the LTTE’s terms conveyed via the Norwegian facilitators were that the 
LTTE had to be de-proscribed within Sri Lanka before Peace Talks  could  commence.  
Later, during the Donor Funding Campaign hosted by the US, we see the LTTE sidelined 
via its US proscription status.  In response, the LTTE initiates its proscription carriage into 
the Tokyo Donors’ Conference by not attending. 
 
In this sense, the variety manipulation is being orchestrated within and via the environment 
and not just by the GoSL and the LTTE. 
 
In a nutshell what we have is:  
a)  movement of crises between recursion levels and the environment, 
b)  variety absorption within the environment, 
c)  variety absorption via the environment. 
 
Thus the question is - where is all of this to be spotted within the VSM as one moves 
though the levels of recursion?  The answer is trackable when a ‘multiple horizontal 
cascade at each level of recursion’ is mapped.  Whilst single unfolding of systems as they 
cascade though the recursion levels is the more popularly seen VSM, Beer, shows the 
multiple cascade in Diagnosing the System (refer Figure 8) where he indicates 25 models at 
R3.  Working at an average of 5xS1s per model that is 125 VSM models at R-2!  The point 
however is that usually we cascade downward by exploring only one stream of the S1’s 
from each level of recursion.  Of course, if we were working upward we could require the 
other 24 models of R-2 if we were to actually show how the S1s of R-1 and R0 were 
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Beer achieves these in his consultancies and he mentions them when he referred to VSM 
mappings which were hung on the length and width of walls!  The need for this and more is 
Schwember’s point for otherwise it gets lost in the missed mappings of the recursion levels 
movement. 
 
We conceptually understand the integrated logic of mapping the ‘multiple horizontal 
cascade at each level of recursion’ but rarely are called upon to show it.  Yet this seems 
exactly what is needed if the ‘Sri Lanka-VSM’ cascade of lower levels of recursion is to 
span the required multiple diagnoses to address the crises.  From the perspective of this 
thesis such mapping of the ‘multiple horizontal cascade at each level of recursion’ is too 
formidable a mapping to achieve.  However, when reading Part III of Chapter Five, it will 
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pertaining to internal self determination is based on this concept of ‘multiple horizontal and 
vertical cascade at each level of recursion’ – as illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Potential exists for this ‘multiple horizontal cascade at each level of recursion’ to be 
mapped based on the outcomes of the portfolio of Syntegrations that is proposed in Chapter 
Five.  The value of this mapping is that it lends itself to diagnosis of the negotiated 
proposals, including distinctions as they pertain to the recursive levels. 
 
One final note worth mentioning concerns external self-determination, a matter discussed 
in Chapter Three where a distinction is made of the positioning in recursive terms of the 
systems involved, as it pertains to the Parent State and the aspiring secessionist system.  
Here an option is to do a VSM mapping of the aspiring secessionist and have it shown in 
conjunction with a VSM-Sri Lanka mapping.  Realisation of this option arose in discussion 
with cybernetician and social scientist Dr. Paul Stokes
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.  However, the LTTE being a 
clandestine organization makes this a difficult proposition especially entering into mapping 
of lower levels of recursion.  However, the concept itself is splendid especially mapping 
the two VSM’s in the context of a shared environment.  An even more adventurous 
learning would be getting the LTTE to map its perception of the Sri Lanka-VSM and vice 
versa.  Yet a moment’s pause indicates this modelling shows that each of the S4’s of the 
two VSM’s has a choice to engage in an endeavour to better position itself to manage the 
effect of the other’s variety. 
Conclusion 
In closing this chapter it is useful to show the thread of connectivity that links this chapter 
to the others. 
 
The discussion on the perspectives on reality is not only relevant to matters of validation, 
as discussed in Chapter One, it is pertinent to what is discussed throughout this thesis in 
terms of whether it is a solitary view of reality that is presented or whether it belongs to the 
explanatory path which Maturana describes as Objectivity-in-Parenthesis and/or belongs to 
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Bhaskar’s category of the ‘intransitive dimension’.  The nuances here will be returned to in 
Chapter Six, in the context of Team Syntegrity® and the cascading design that is proposed 
in Chapter Five. 
 
In the meanwhile, a valuable point to note is the connection between Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety and Bhaskar’s ‘intransitive dimension’.  My understanding of Bhaskar’s 
insight is that in addition to what we realise, there exist/s mechanism/s that may not have 
exercised itself or that have been exercised but not realised due to countervailing effects, 
and that these are all different states of variety which need to be absorbed in the bid for 
Requisite Variety.  In recognition of this, Chapter Four explores the territory of weak 
signals, in specific three types, in a bid to position Peace Talks to address a broader and 
longer term set of issues. 
 
The continuing profile of Sri Lanka, which began in Chapter One, keeps being added to in 
the chapters that follow.  Borrowing from Kant’s thinking (in Critique of Pure Reason), its 
purpose is not to inspect the figure or its concepts and from this to read off its properties.  
Rather it is to bring out what is necessarily implied in the concepts which admittedly has 
been formed a priori by me.  These implied concepts will be explored in the ensuing 
chapters in the context of the Organisational Cybernetic framework which this chapter has 
reasoned as the most appropriate for meeting the objectives of this thesis.  In specific, it is 
the principles of Organizational Cybernetics, whose working understanding is deepened in 
the chapters ahead, that are used for diagnosis as covered in Chapter Three, interpreting 
signals, particularly those which are weak and conceptual, as addressed in Chapter Four, 
and designing a ‘process’ solution as proposed in Chapter Five. 
 
Next Chapter 
Flowing from Part III, epistemologically the importance of environment is that it provides 
the background from which the system is identified.  In other words, it names the system 
having perceived and ascribed its purpose and in so doing brought into the foreground the 
system’s components/elements.  Indeed, the recognition is reciprocal rather than linear.  
Additionally, there is variety absorption that goes on within the system itself.  The ensuing 
chapters are devoted to understanding these issues more fully. 
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  Chapter Three 
Diagnosis of Peace Talks and a Way Forward  
 
It isn’t that they can’t see the solution. 
 It is that they cannot see the problem. 
- G K Chesterton 
 
 
This Chapter is presented in three parts prefaced by a double introduction – one addressing 
the International Meta Level and the other directed at the System-In-Focus, Sri Lanka. 
 
•  Part I discusses the principles upon which the diagnosis is premised.   
•  Part II
37
•  Part III addresses the need for designing the ‘process’ of Peace Negotiation.  A ‘process 
design solution’ is proposed later in Chapter Five. 
  is devoted to diagnosing the 2002-2003  Peace Talks  and aspects of their 
immediately preceding phase of solicitation that took place to get the parties to the 
negotiation table.  Subsequent facets like the ISGA (Interim Self Governing 
Agreement) proposal and the  P-TOMS (Post tsunami-Operational Management 
Structure) agreement are also diagnosed.   
 
Using the example of Peace Talks, the concept of extended involvement of ethnic groups is 
canvassed in the context of concurrently applying the principles of autonomy and cohesion, 
which Beer (1990) calls the Law of Cohesion.  Diagnosis shows it is this balance between 
autonomy and cohesion that has been lacking in the solution design of content during Peace 
Talks.  The important point here is that autonomy and cohesion co-exist and are not 
alternatives.  It is also not synonymous with the much vocalised concepts of negotiating 
‘core’ and ‘interim’ issues. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 There is a large tract in this Part which is quoted from an article written in 2005 by Solomons (myself) and 
Moscardini which was published in Kybernetes in 2006.  
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Introduction – International Meta Level System 
 
Many view the granting of independence by the British to Ceylon as influenced by 
Mahatma Gandhi’s inspired satyagraha
38
 
 based Indian independence movement that began 
in the early 1900’s.  Whilst the separation of India and ensuing independence of Pakistan 
and India in 1947 was the significant regional precedent in the Asian context, the matter I 
draw attention to is the international significance of decolonization principles that were 
implemented after World War II in 1945 and the different form of self-determination that 
prevails in the post-colonization era of today. 
Based on the cybernetic observation that systems are embedded in other systems, it is 
appropriate to introduce this Chapter from the perspective of external self-determination 
(secession) in the context of the international system, a meta-system which encompasses 
individual States.  In a practical sense this international system, for the purpose of its 
international interchange systems
39, uses the UN (United Nations) State recognition system 
as reflected in ISO 3166
40 as the basis for recognising a State
41
                                                 
38 A Sanskrit word which means peaceful non-violent resistance. 
.  Therefore, unilateral 
declaration of Statehood is inadequate as it precludes entry into the ‘international 
39 Zhao writes “Internet Governance is one of the two hot issues that emerged during the first phase of WSIS, 
requiring further work during the second phase. While Financial Mechanisms is (are) being handled by a 
Task Force (TFFM), Internet Governance is being addressed through a Working Group on Internet 
Governance (WGIG) established by Mr. Koffi Annan, UN Secretary-General.” (Zhao, 2004:1) 
40 ISO 3166, in specific Part I contains the names of countries who are Member States of the UN. 
 
41 The predominant form of State verification used by many of the international interchange systems, like the 
Telecommunication (ITU) and Postal (UPU) authorities, is based on whether the State holds UN State 
Membership.  Certainly, these institutions have clauses that permit other means of gaining membership; yet 
exercising those means are a rarity.  For example, both ITU and UPU constitutionally allow State 
membership if 75% of its membership approves.  Yet it appears neither has permitted it to be exercised.  In 
2005 UNMIK organised for Kosovo to be recognised as an international postal destination.  But this was 
done under a technical co-operation ‘arrangement’ rather than via the grant of membership to either Kosovo 
or UNMIK.  There is also Taiwan who has appropriated to itself a ‘reserved code’ which has become the 
default accepted international dialling code for Taiwan, but it too has not gone the way of gaining ITU 
membership.  It is for this reason that I conclude that in practice UN membership is a mandatory pre-requisite 
for entrée into participating as a fully fledged sovereign State in the international interchange systems.  As 
ISO 3166 is a listing of countries which is based on countries that are UN Member States, ISO 3166 is a 
creditable source that can be used to verify whether a country is a country, as required for membership by the 
constitution of many of the specialised international organisations.  Thus in this thesis, ISO 3166 is used as a 
shorthand way to refer to this monopoly which the UN enjoys. 
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interchange systems’
42
 
  and denies access to a State to directly participate as an equal 
partner in international processes of governance or interoperability. 
Admittedly, in certain instances there is debate as to whether these international 
interchange systems need to work on a State basis.  Such debate is currently taking place 
concerning Top Level Domain names in the context of internet governance
43.  On the other 
hand, there are many significant international interchange systems where State recognition 
is well and  truly entrenched in the manner of its workings.  Amongst these are the 
international financial payments systems
44 and telecommunication systems.  There is also 
for new States, faced with developing their core financial facilities and re-constructing their 
physical infrastructure, the attraction of access to multilateral agencies like the IMF (the 
lender of last resort to a State’s banking system) and World Bank (which affords ‘low 
income’ sovereign States access to consessionary lending rates and terms).  The Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF have an implied reference to UN membership by requiring new 
membership to be consistent with those applied to existing members, which bears its root 
to its original members being those represented at the 1945 United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference
45
 
. 
                                                 
42 This is also sometimes known as the ‘international interoperability systems’ or ‘multilateral interchange 
systems’.  Examples of such are the international telephone code of a country, a country’s postal destination. 
 
43 Zhao says “During the debates on Internet governance, many issues and questions were raised that touched 
upon sovereignty, security, stability, privacy, international coordination, intellectual property rights (IPR), 
who does what, etc.  In my opinion, the debates reflected the reality that Internet governance is not limited to 
technical issues, nor to policy issues only.  It has increasingly included important social, economic, and 
national security issues.  In addition, people were troubled by the fact that there is no consensus on areas of 
responsibility (who should do what).” (Zhao, 2004:2) 
44 International Bank Standards, which enable international financial transactions, issues each country with a 
unique code which is prefixed to the unique numbers allocated to each bank within a country. 
45There are two sections pertaining to IMF membership in their Articles of Association which suggests a 
preference for its prospective member being a UN Member State. 
•  Article II Section 1 Original Members – Original Members are those who were represented at the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference whose governments accepted IMF membership before 31
st December 1945. 
•  Article II Section 2 Other Members - Membership shall be open to other countries at such times and in accordance with such terms 
as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors.  These terms, including the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on principles 
consistent with those applied to other countries that are already members. 
                                                                       Source:  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa02.htm 
The World Bank requires that its Sovereign State members be members of the IMF.  The World Bank makes 
available ‘soft lending’ terms (like lower interest rates than the commercial market) to the less developed 
countries (source: Personal communication in October 2007with Mr Claus Astrup, World Bank, Sri Lanka 
office). 
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If a State deems it necessary to directly participate in the international interchange systems 
(e.g. having a country code for its PSTN telecommunications and internet systems) then bi-
lateral acceptance of declared statehood is also inadequate as it is insufficient in many 
instances to gain direct access to the international interchange systems.  Such acceptance of 
declared statehood could however be influential in the bid for international acceptance, 
particularly if it is by a significant State, regional body or multilateral agency.  Such was 
the influence that India brought to bear in the case of East Pakistan’s (now Bangladesh) 
separation in 1971 from Pakistan who itself had gained independence from the British one 
day prior to India’s independence. 
 
At the meta-level of the international system, this means that acceptance of identity 
requires multilateral recognition.  The international system tacitly requires, by virtue of the 
way the international interchange systems work, that such recognition be accorded by the 
UN.  There are rare exceptions to this UN positioning but this is left for exploration in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Today, evaluation of claims and counter claims for recognition and admittance of a new 
UN State by UN Member States is based on the merits of each case.  This is in sharp 
contrast to the decolonization era following the end of World War II when the general 
principle of self-determination was established.  At the international level the principle of 
‘restoring sovereign rights and self government to those forcibly deprived of them’ was set 
in the Atlantic Charter
46
 
 of 1941 (refer Appendix 1). 
This decolonization era which saw the birth of many new States, amongst whom was 
Ceylon, meant that unlike today the exiting power had little reason to present counter 
claims in terms of retaining governing powers.  The meta-level principle, the right of self-
government of colonized people, had already been agreed upon as part of the peace 
principles that America negotiated with the British Empire in exchange for America’s 
                                                 
46 This agreement was reached as part of British negotiations which solicited American 
participation in World War II.    This peace principle, negotiated by Roosevelt, in many 
ways signalled the end of empires as reflected in Churchill’s quote that he was ‘not going 
to be the First Minister of her Majesty’s government to preside over the demise of the 
British Empire.’  
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participation in World War II.  This principle of ‘colonial peoples having the right to 
govern themselves’ meant that in the prelude to separation the exiting power almost always 
automatically became the third party who facilitated and/or arbitrated in times of 
disagreements amongst the emerging local power groups.  As part of the transition of 
handing over power to the newly independent States, sovereign borders and constitutional 
arrangements were overseen by the exiting colonial master. 
 
In comparison, in today’s post-colonization era such principles and mechanisms are absent. 
 
Particularly absent in the decolonization process was the need to evaluate counter claims 
from the exiting power as the principle of complete exit of the existing power and the 
forfeiture of territory was established by the meta-level international system.  In today’s 
post-colonization era however, neither of these two aspects exists. As Blay points out it is 
fair to say that “existing states do not favour post-colonial self-determination demands 
generally and secession particularly.” (Blay 1984: xix)  Furthermore, as the exiting power 
is not exiting in toto, a new meta-level system needs to be created both to oversee the 
transition negotiations and to replace existing meta-level structural arrangements, based on 
whether it is internal self-determination (e.g. sharing of power within a sovereign State) or 
external self-determination (i.e. secession) that drives the negotiation. 
 
There are those who contend decolonization should have marked the end of calls for self-
determination.  To continue runs the risk of indefinite divisibility and instability 
particularly if cohesion amongst its constituent embedded systems is weak.  However, to 
remedy the ills of inappropriate independence demarcations or rules of governance post-
colonial
47  secession continues and more recently included some Balkan
48  and Soviet
49
 
 
countries. 
                                                 
47 An example is the separation of East Timor (now known as Timor-Leste) from Indonesia in 2003. 
48 Example Yugoslavia separated into Serbia, Montenegrao, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
49 The Soviet Union broke into Armenia. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
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In the absence of internationally agreed principles for self-determination and its attendant 
mechanisms, each claimant and counter claimant resorts to its own self-help measures.  
This often climaxes to violence in the bid to establish a level playing field in preparation 
for Peace Talks.  It is relevant to quote Jennings who in 1963 stated “it seems to me that 
one is driven to accept the position that conquest as a title to territorial acquisition has 
ceased to be part of the law.” (Blay, 1963:56
50
 
)  Such self-help also extends to creation of a 
de-facto state (as is currently the status in a part of Sri Lanka) which can be described as a 
contingency to lend weight to a prospective State’s viability in the event that internal self-
determination proves a failure. 
We find in the prevailing era of post-colonization, “the conflicts arise principally because 
there seems to be no definite international law that regulates claims and counter-claims.  
Thus claim-denial situations are characterized by self-help measures.” (Blay, 1984: xix)  In 
the meanwhile, international expectation is that a claimant for secession needs to prove that 
other avenues of resolution have been exhausted.  Thus an option for the counter-claimant, 
besides defending the status quo, is to devolve power.  Such internal self-determination 
however carries the sting that failure of devolution or failure at attempts to reach agreement 
on power sharing are both precursors to secession.  In other words the claimant seeking 
external self-determination can sabotage the internal self-determination process.  Thus, it is 
this complexity, the UN could have to evaluate as part of the claim, counter-claim 
determination when evaluating secession claims. 
 
The above is a sample of the variety that each claimant and counter-claimant needs to 
absorb given the appearance of the paucity of principles and mechanism by the meta-level 
international system for evaluating self-determination claims. 
 
Introduction – Sri Lanka, the System in Focus 
 
The first order of resolution needs to be addressed within Sri Lanka. The presence of war 
indicates solutions have to date evaded this country.  Today, the threat of secession has 
matured despite decades of ethnocentric negotiations which have traversed the paths of 
                                                 
50 Quoting Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law.  
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‘pre-election political party pacts’, civil war, essential items embargoes, terrorist attacks, 
legislative measures, cessation of hostility agreements and Peace Talks.  Consequently, 
crisis governs Sri Lanka.  The crescendo compels one to enquire whether there is 
something that Sri Lanka does and/or does not do, that keeps Sri Lanka from entering a 
space where solutions can be agreed upon and successfully implemented. 
 
One obvious aberration has been that this ethnically labelled crisis has been approached 
predominately from within the confines of ethnicity, yet the Muslims have been excluded 
from the negotiating table.  I assert that the current three Peace Secretariats
51
 
 (run by 
GoSL, LTTE and Muslims), along with other evidence that will be presented in this 
Chapter, suggest that the Sinhalese have been left out of the negotiation.  Or, worse still 
that the GoSL is being reduced to representing the Sinhalese rather than in its clarity of 
representing Sri Lanka in its capacity as a supervening encompassing system. 
Another aberration is that the LTTE, who in the Peace Talks have positioned themselves as 
the sole representatives of the Tamils, argues for meaningful autonomy in its relations with 
the central government powers of Sri Lanka.  Yet amongst the LTTE’s proposals there is 
no evidence that meaningful autonomy is a principle of governance that applies to its 
embedded systems, be they race or geographically based sub-systems.  By this absence the 
cohesive role of the LTTE is reduced to, or worse still is getting away with, a monopoly of 
exercising the command mode of governance. 
 
 
                                                 
51  Comprises 1) Sri Lankan Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) 2) Peace Secretariat of 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 3) Peace Secretariat for Muslims (PSM).  
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Part I – Diagnosis of 2002-2003 Peace Talks  
 
3.1.1  Introduction to Diagnosis  
 
As was learnt from South Africa, the ‘talks about the talks’ which position the talks are as 
vital as the Peace Talks themselves for it sets the groundwork of principles, processes and 
tenor for the negotiations.  Negotiation is intrinsically a part of these pre-talks. 
 
In recent Sri Lanka history, the diplomatic initiatives which took place with political parties 
achieved the power of application when the opposition party won the December 2001 
general elections and gained the power to pursue Peace Talks.  In the same month the 
LTTE had declared a unilateral ceasefire following their devastating August 2001 strike on 
the co-located Sri Lankan international and military airport.  They conveyed through the 
diplomatic channels that they would engage in Peace Talks if certain conditions were met.  
Amongst them was that the LTTE be formally de-proscribed within Sri Lanka, the talks 
centre on interim (humanitarian) issues, negotiations be exclusively between the GoSL and 
the LTTE, and the LTTE be the sole representative of the Tamils.  The conditions were met 
and constrained actors negotiating prioritised subject domains, continues to hold sway in 
the return to Peace Talks.  After six rounds of Peace Talks which started in Sept 2002, they 
stalled in April 2003.  The Muslims want a formal place at the negotiation table and an 
Eastern Tamil faction (led by a previous LTTE colonel) has convincing appeared. 
 
Given the quest for peace the challenge for the systems which form the various levels of 
recursion is the manner and extent their identities need to adapt so as to survive.  Let us 
first understand this matter of identity which includes, but is not confined to, race identity. 
 
3.1.2  Identity Perspectives 
 
The Tamils have squarely framed their grievances and aspirations based on survival of 
their race whilst suppressing nuances of its subcategories - example, caste or geographical 
terrain or religion, including Hindu sects.  Furthermore, as Peiris (2006) notes  
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“majoritarian democracy established under the Westminster style Constitution, allowed the 
Sinhalese majority to strengthen its Sinhala-Buddhist politics, thereby arousing minority 
fears of discrimination and second class status.”  Consequently, in Sri Lanka the issue of 
identity has become synonymous with race. 
 
Yet in cybernetic terms, identity has a much broader meaning – it refers to systems and the 
basis for their recognition, their identity.  As this thesis will show, survival of identity is 
threatened on many fronts in Sri Lanka.  There is survival of language (the vernacular 
languages of Sinhala and Tamil), of race/s and of the State (discussed here and in the next 
Chapter) all of which this thesis explores using a cybernetic framework and more 
specifically Beer’s VSM. 
 
As Stokes states, 
 
Beer’s VSM is quintessentially a model of identity, the structure of identity and the 
control processes that go to sustain identity.”  (Continuing Stokes says) identities are 
nested within identities within identities.  This is how societies are structured: 
individuals are embedded within organizations, which are in turn recursively embedded 
within structures of the state. (Stokes, 2004) 
 
In VSM terms, these are different layers of recursion. 
 
This Chapter addresses the identity issues in terms of the survival of State in the context of 
the survival of some of its embedded systems, namely the Tamils. This result dynamically 
affects other embedded systems, namely other races and the territorial coverage 
demarcations known as Provinces.  Using Stokes’ work (2004) Solomons and Moscardini 
(2006a:114) explain identity and accompany it with comments pertinent to Sri Lanka in the 
following fashion: 
 
–  Managing sameness and differences 
“By means of identity discrete and separate elements are brought into common or 
shared arrangement one with the other.  Identity is the pattern that connects.  Another 
way to say this is that identity is the mode of integration of otherwise heterogeneous 
elements under the aegis of a single sign complex.  A failure of integration means that 
the identity project has failed or has come unstuck.” [Stokes, 2004] 
 
Certainly, this ‘failure of integration’ is descriptive of Sri Lanka’s schism of racially 
based conflict.  Note the intention of integration is not that differences disappear, but  
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rather that the identity of the meta-level system encompasses the different identities of 
its sub-systems, and in this sense, such is what the Peace Negotiation need to address. 
 
–  Nature of identity  
“Whereas many humans may have identity attributed to them [which raises the question 
of power] all humans have the potential to take on their own self-assigned identity by 
winning recognition from others (Hegel, 1910; Kojève and Queneau, 1980)” [Stokes, 
2004]. 
 
Here lies the lens to understanding the tremendous importance of the 
internationalisation of the conflict and why self-declaration is insufficient for secession.  
Whilst identity can be bestowed upon oneself, it needs to be recognised by others, 
particularly in matters of sovereignty in terms of international diplomatic, finance and 
trading relations.  The same holds true for conserving sovereign identity, for it needs to 
be internationally recognised in continuity, not merely just at the  time of granting 
sovereignty. 
 
It is suggestively posited that the Tamils see themselves as a distinct identity exercising 
their autonomy within Sri Lanka, albeit in war-torn territory.  However, internationally 
they remain unrecognised in their sovereignty.  Conversely, Sri Lanka (under its 
allegedly Sinhalese hegemony caption) is internationally recognised but its internal 
integrated identity is crumbling. 
 
It is also pertinent to point out that international recognition can be de facto achieved if 
the LTTE can directly gain foreign lending from a bi-lateral or multilateral lender via 
the civil administration systems as established and run by the LTTE.  This is 
particularly relevant to note during this time of tsunami reconstruction, for the 
argument could well be launched for direct foreign aid/funding based on humanitarian 
grounds if the GoSL is found to be unfairly discriminating against relief and 
reconstruction in the war-torn Tamil areas. 
 
–  Levels of Identity 
“Separate identities can only be integrated by means of a supervening identity of higher 
logical typing.” [Stokes, 2004] 
 
The question is what will that supervening identity of Sri Lanka be?  By what 
characteristic will it be known  and its coherence sustained?  This is an absolutely 
critical question in terms of distinguishing whether and when the GoSL negotiates as a 
supervening identity (higher level of recursion) or as a peer identity (same level of 
recursion) alongside the LTTE. 
 
If it is the former, then Sri Lanka’s negotiations have been based on asymmetrical 
considerations.  This explains the consternations experienced by other peer systems 
(e.g. Muslim community) that have been excluded from the negotiations with their peer 
system (the LTTE) and to a lesser extent the supervening system (GoSL). 
 
If it is the latter, then neither peer system, during this or any previous Peace Talks, has 
reached the stage of negotiating the design of the supervening identity.  Also there has  
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been no mechanism set in place for the sub-systems to negotiate with their meta-level 
systems. 
 
–  Identity and Control 
“Identity is not some once and for all status or trait of a person but is essentially an 
ongoing process of selection and mapping.  As such, identity involves a process of 
control.  ... Identity sets the standard for what kind of perceptions are expectable from 
us – both for ourselves and for others to whom we communicate with our behaviours.  
It is not behaviours as such that are important.  Rather it is how they are constructed in 
narrative and perceived in understanding.” [Stokes, 2004] 
 
In Sri Lanka despite the sensitivities of race relations there has never been a combined 
ministerial portfolio integrating race, language and religious issues.  Rather the trend 
has been a separate minister in charge of each race, language and religious group.
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These are some of the many facets of identity which guarantee no single answer.  The 
question is -  can the multiple answers accommodate each other to enable continued 
existence of the identity/identities? 
 
Having said this, bear in mind that,  
Any system is a subjective phenomenon, recognized and, in that process, changed by its 
observers –  which include itself.  It is embedded in an environment with which it 
interacts all the time, interchanges which we interpret as modes of learning, of 
adaptation, of evolution. (Beer, 1990) 
 
3.1.3  Principle Based Negotiation 
 
The history of the conflict dating from its embryonic colonial days sits on principles that 
systemically favoured one system over another.  Yet to date no protagonist has articulated 
the principles  upon which they seek a non-violent negotiated settlement, and which 
principles are of the calibre that lend themselves for use by others thereby evidencing 
equality/fairness.  Indeed, it appears the concept of such ‘principle based negotiations’ is an 
idea yet to be popularised, if not conceived.  The experience has been that Peace 
Negotiation have been content orientated (succinctly referred to by the labels ‘core issues’ 
and ‘interim issues’) and focused on who has the right to be represented at the Peace Talks 
including who has the right to be the representative of each participating community. 
 
                                                 
52 The norm has been one minister per main religion – Buddha Sanna (for Buddhism), Hindu Affairs 
(sometimes includes the Tamil language portfolio), Muslim Affairs, Christian Affairs.
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I propose that principles of settlement which have the robustness of being used by others as 
well as oneself deserve to be identified and articulated.  Acceptance of these principles can 
then be negotiated and used iteratively as input to guide the content negotiations. This 
should include rights and form of representation during the various phases and levels of 
negotiations.  Just as importantly, these principles will be the criteria to diagnose content 
negotiations and the results of the diagnosis used to inform remedial input processes so that 
future outcomes are remedied.  This concept, known in Beer’s terms as a Feedback 
Adjuster, will be enhanced in Chapter Four to build in the concept of an Adjuster Organizer 
so that the principles themselves are exposed to correction. 
 
Initially, let us identify the principles articulated by various representative champions in the 
Sri Lankan context.  Accompanying what I have interpreted as principles are their evidence 
and a commentary which is aimed at coming to grips with the variety absorption that needs 
to take place in order to address the diversity of issues. 
 
•  Give priority to resolution of humanitarian issues 
The ravages of war make a compelling case for the negotiations at the Peace Talks 
to give priority to interim resolution on matters of relief, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation - for example lifting trading embargoes, opening transport access 
routes, resettlement of war-displaced persons, return of military occupied land, etc.  
Yet a counter-argument by the GoSL has traditionally been that such relief needs 
to be considered in the context of core issues wherein the matter of power sharing 
is addressed.   Until recently this was viewed as devolution of administrative 
powers rather than decision making powers by the GoSL.  Under the more recent 
GoSL attitude to devolution of decision making powers, matters of Provinces 
having international borrowing powers and rights to running a military are major 
contentious issues.  This was reflected in the debate that took place following the 
ISGA proposal. 
 
•  Right to autonomy 
The Tamils have long campaigned for their right to autonomy.  Given the built-in 
disadvantage occasioned by the Sinhala Only Act, state-aided colonization, etc.  
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Tamil protagonists argue for devolution of decision making so that Tamils have 
the power to protect and nurture their identity.  Their cry has been for autonomy 
and if that fails then they argue ‘eelam’ must be the way out, meaning secession of 
their homeland.  Such autonomy was expressed in the Thimpu Declaration (refer 
Appendix 2) which Peiris (2006) says “continues to retain their relevance and 
validity for conflict resolution in Sri Lanka.” 
 
•  Sole representation of Tamils at Peace Talks 
LTTE officials of recent years have asserted they are the sole representatives of 
the Tamils and such was the condition of their negotiation talks with the GoSL.  
At the Thimpu Talks of 1985, the GoSL negotiated with six organisations
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 that 
represented the Tamils.  Since then, most of those organizations have been 
decimated, reportedly by the LTTE.  However, in 2004 the LTTE experienced a 
split, resulting in the emergence of an Eastern Tamil faction. 
•  Representation of multiple races at formal Peace Talks 
Muslims increasingly state they need to be included as a distinct race at the 
negotiating table.  The P-TOMS agreement (refer Appendix 3) at the level of the 
top tier committee provides an ad-hoc glimpse of Muslim and Tamil equality, with 
maybe the Sinhalese too, via the representation of the GoSL. 
 
•  Monitoring of the implementation of agreements  
This was evidenced by the establishment of the Nordic comprised ‘Sri Lankan 
Monitoring Mission’ (SLMM) to monitor the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
signed in 2002. 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 The organizations represented at the Thimpu Talks were Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front 
(EPRLF), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the 
Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation 
(TELO), and the Parliamentary Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).  
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•  Negotiations being held at neutral venues and with mutually agreed upon 
facilitators 
All formal Peace Talks have been conducted at neutral venues.  There was 
however, the questionable venue of the Washington located Donor Pledging 
Conference.  As the LTTE is a proscribed terrorist organisation in the US, the 
LTTE was not invited and did not attend.  This contributed to the LTTE 
boycotting the Tokyo based Donor Pledging Conference. 
 
In the presence of such enacted principles, although sometimes erratically evidenced, an 
overarching question warrants asking - are there some overarching principles of effective 
organization that can be consistently applied whatever a systems’ level of organizational 
embedment?  For that after all is what the negotiations are seeking to agree upon so that 
principles which favour one group over another are renounced.  From an organizational 
cybernetic viewpoint, the answer is yes and an example of that logic is demonstrated in the 
VSM.  As Beer states, “the VSM attempts to give the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
viability for any system that recognizes its own identity and, in so doing, invites that 
recognition on the part of others.” (1990)  It is these principles which are grounded in 
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety that I now want to identify and frame in the context of 
Sri Lanka’s peace negotiations. They can be used to guide content negotiations, design the 
process of negotiations and diagnose the results of the negotiations including the processes 
employed. 
 
3.1.4  Principles of Effective Organization 
 
Recognising Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, a position I have taken with my thesis is 
that my search is not about designing the content of negotiations.  This is because no single 
person is likely to have the requisite variety to address the plethora of issues surrounding 
this conflict.  Rather, requisite variety is expected to be supplied by the various conflicting 
protagonists by absorbing each others’ variety.  My focus is to design processes capable of 
accommodating and withstanding the content that the negotiating parties would wish to 
address.  These processes need to be built and underpinned by principles, which as 
mentioned earlier are open to negotiation and form the criteria for diagnosis.  One may  
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even go as far as recognising that the processes themselves are matters for acceptance by 
the negotiating parties.  Certainly, it is a position I subscribe to and in this sense should 
form part of the prelude to talks – which some have aptly labelled ‘Talks about Talks’. 
 
Returning to the matter of designing processes let me explain what I mean by way of an 
analogy.  My objective is to design a road capable of carrying vehicular traffic rather than 
designing the vehicles themselves or driving the vehicles.  It does however mean that one 
needs to be aware of the characteristics of the vehicles, (volume, load, usage frequency, 
etc) that will need to use the road or at least the principles under which those vehicles 
operate.  This will indicate the type of road to be built (e.g. highway, arterial road, by-road) 
whilst taking into consideration the environment in which the road will be situated (e.g. 
rain, sun, slope).  The choice of road (and not rail track or water way or electronic 
transmission lines) itself begins to imply the type of traffic the road will be required to 
convey.  Of course, one could have opted to design a meta-transport system which would 
have entailed a wider array of vehicles as well as substitution and cross utilization 
considerations of the transport network. 
 
Having decided against this thesis proposing content solutions the question becomes - 
under what principles will the content agreements generated have a better chance of 
sustainable solutions?   These principles will act to specify what the peace negotiation 
process will/can be called upon to handle.  It is the reasoning, identifying and 
understanding of these principles as informed by Organizational Cybernetics that is next 
presented. 
 
We already know that “systems are nested within other systems” (Beer, 1994e:13) and that 
they dynamically interact with each other.  Using the VSM these systems are represented 
as different levels of recursion and their accompanying environments.  So in this sense, we 
have a plethora of homeostatic balances that need to be maintained within the system-in-
focus and levels of recursion above and below it, as well as its corresponding contractual 
and contextual environments.  Entailed within exercising such dynamic homeostasis is the 
need for channels of communication which (a) reach across to the point of connecting the 
systems, (b) can transmit what is being conveyed between the systems and (c) is capable of 
transduction (to lead across from one to another system and receive the communication  
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with meaning as close as possible to the sense as it was intended).  With the plethora of 
homeostats, variety engineering must be applied to it to find out which carry a greater 
sphere of influence and the parameters under which they operate.  In this regard Beer 
(1994f:445) states, “the first task is to identity the crucial parameters, which (because 
complex systems are richly interactive and internally reverberating) are not always the 
parameters assumed to be critical.” (Brackets in original) 
 
Entailed within the bid for homeostasis is a need to have a process which monitors results 
so that future cycles of input can be adjusted when homeostasis is jeopardized.  What this 
means is that monitoring requires acknowledged criteria, which can be specified as a 
heuristic or predefined algorithm, against which the monitoring function can compare 
results.  The monitoring activity must be linked to a process which informs a system (e.g. 
someone) when results are not to standard.  Importantly, that system or some other needs to 
have been invested with the responsibility to figure out and do what it takes to achieve 
homeostasis – that is influence the next cycle/s of input/s taking into consideration the lag 
time between monitoring results and intervening cycles of activity before implementation 
of rectification.  That correction may also include amending the criteria upon which future 
monitoring is benchmarked.  This monitoring and rectification process implies there must 
be channels of communication adequate to the task of linking these various processes.  In 
the instance of Peace Talks, that monitoring activity needs to be done by a neutral body.  
As is the convention, let us call this amalgam of activities the Error Controlled Feedback 
Process. 
 
We also understand that given that systems are embedded within systems, cohesion and 
autonomy co-exist.  They are not alternatives as they establish the central tenets upon 
which the autonomous systems cohere.  Cohesion is what brings the systems together, and 
that need to bring together arises due to the autonomy of the sub-systems.  In other words, 
to the extent to which the identity of a sub-system shares commonality with its meta-level 
system there is nothing to bring together for it is already there.  Thus, cohesion where it 
exercises itself and is evidenced (recall Bhaskar’s explanation of reality described in 
Chapter Two, Table 2) is an aspect that curtails autonomy of the sub-system.   
  
Chapter Three  105 
 
This is the crucial balance which Beer calls the ‘Law of Cohesion’ that needs to be worked 
out in the Peace Negotiations and which the design of the ‘process of the negotiation’ 
needs to cater for.  But Beer cautions, cohesion when it is exercised curtails autonomy and 
thus needs to be contained, as it erodes the sub-system’s variety and thus the sub-system’s 
ability to respond to its environment and be viable.   There are two points being made here: 
 
a)  At the level of content, the negotiation has to minimally address the integration of 
autonomy and cohesion that the Provinces and State exercise in the context of 
subject domains (e.g. defence, education, health, finance, etc) and functionality 
(e.g. planning, implementation, administration).  In doing so, it needs to bear in 
mind perspectives of race, religion and language which to date have cast a 
sensitive sphere of influence in the portrayal of the identity of Sri Lanka. 
 
b)  At the level of the process of negotiating content the question is who (in terms of 
stakeholders) gets to design that balance of autonomy and cohesion.  The design 
framework needs to also be invested with a dynamic quality capable of meeting 
future needs.  Undoubtedly, that balance of autonomy and cohesion will differ 
based on each context, meaning subject domains and levels of recursion. 
 
What this means is that we need to be clear who the systems are, the composition of their 
presence at the negotiating table and the recursion level to which they belong given that it 
will influence their position on cohesion and autonomy.  It also means in VSM parlance, 
that a system does not only belong to one classification.  Thus the autonomous S1 of the 
system-in-focus becomes the cohesive system-in-focus for its embedded systems.  This 
vital importance will be exercised in the search for gaining a change in the thinking that 
contributes towards the engagement process of the Peace Negotiation and is considered 
further in Part III of this Chapter. 
 
Whilst it is clear that a Province is an embedded system within the system ‘State’ what is 
less clear is the embedment status of each of the races relative to the Provinces.  From a 
requisite variety viewpoint, this is a particularly important consideration given that to date 
Peace Negotiations have been conducted on a race basis.  However, in terms of the design 
of the balance of autonomy and cohesion it is likely to be expressed in the State’s  
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Constitution in geographical Provincial terms where habitation of a Province is not the 
exclusive preserve of any race, even if it may be so now in certain instances.  This is a 
particularly significant point if devolution of power is based on geographical terrain.  The 
Sinhalese and Tamils have provincial enclaves where they overwhelmingly predominate 
compared to the Muslims who in citizenship numbers dominate no single Province.  In 
contrast, there is the Johan Galtung proposal which shares common elements with the 
Belgian model, where devolution of power is based on race terms and entails non-
contiguous land mass. 
 
3.1.5   Distinction on Cohesion and Dominating Autonomy 
 
I want now to consider more thoughtfully from a VSM perspective the workings of 
cohesion and autonomy given the principle of systems being embedded in systems. As is 
the convention, the system being worked upon is anchored and is called the system-in-
focus or R0.  The recursion levels above and below the R0 are called the meta-level 
systems (identified by R+x) and embedded systems (identified by R-x), respectively.  The 
higher the x number the further removed is its relative recursive position from the system-
in-focus (R0). 
 
The system-in-focus ideally is the product of its embedded systems.  I say ideally because 
sometimes the system-in-focus is skewed by the identity of a dominant embedded system.  
This is very much the case in Sri Lanka where the Sinhalese enacted and implemented 
legislation that favoured it and are perceived as dominating Sri Lanka’s national identity.  
When the ideal is achieved however, we would say the system-in-focus evidences cohesive 
strength whilst respecting the autonomous powers of its embedded systems which keeps 
both the system-in-focus and its embedded systems viable. 
 
Whatever the identity, which is an exhibition of the cohesion of its autonomous embedded 
systems, the question is -  who is responsible to work out the manner in which such 
cohesion is be achieved and what that cohesion is to be?  As cohesion and autonomy co-
exist the same set of questions concurrently applies to autonomy.  Furthermore, recognising 
that viable systems are embedded within viable systems, an autonomous system is the same  
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system that is called upon to seek cohesion with its embedded autonomous systems.  It is 
vital to realize this for it explains why any system cannot sustain longevity by autonomy or 
cohesion alone.  So valuable and so strong is the applicability of the Law of Cohesion, that 
autonomy can be employed by a system to determine the degree and context of cohesion 
that a system seeks with its meta-level system.  This perspective will be returned to in Part 
III of this Chapter.  In the meanwhile let us remember that no system belongs exclusively 
to one system which is why context applies. 
 
Now I want to more fully explore the question of determining the degree, context and 
content of cohesion.  Naturally, this must involve coming to grips with autonomy - why a 
system needs autonomy - its relevance to identity and link to cohesion.  This requires that 
we address the avenues for building cohesion and figure out the responsibility matrix 
which determines the manner in which variety will need to be amplified and attenuated in 
the bid to balance cohesion and autonomy. 
 
Beer explains,  
the components of S1, themselves viable systems, need all the variety they can generate 
in order to function effectively on their individual horizontal slices of the total 
organization.  This is because the management does not deploy requisite variety in 
relation to the process it manages, nor does the process deploy requisite variety in 
relation to the environment in which it subsists.  Thus much juggling (amplification and 
attenuation) of variety is needed – and any central intervention on the vertical axis 
inhibits the process.  Ideally, then, the central axis would not absorb any component 
variety in S1 at all.  If it does not, however, S1 might break apart.  It follows that 
central intervention should absorb as much horizontal variety as is needed to supply 
requisite variety to the closure of the identity we recognize, and no more. (Beer, 1990) 
 
The concept here is that a system needs all the autonomy it can get so that it is 
unconstrained in exercising its variety in the best way it knows how so as to survive in its 
environment.  This autonomy is to be restrained by cohesive requirements only to the 
extent warranted for the closure of identity of the meta-level system to which it belongs 
and within which it is embedded. 
 
Whilst the cohesion required for closure of identity can be imposed by centralised 
command, the VSM informs us that there are five other vertical variety absorbers through 
which such cohesion can be achieved.   These are via S2 protocols, S3 resource bargains,  
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S1 squiggly line negotiations between S1 systems, S3* ad hoc audits and variety absorption 
within the environment.  There is a distinction between responsibility for designing the 
terms of cohesion and applying it.  In this regard, S2 and S3* do not design the terms of 
cohesion; rather they apply it according to the terms designed by S3. 
 
Having identified the avenues via which cohesion can be implemented, the VSM 
automatically reveals the answer to the responsibility matrix question, viz:- 
 
•  S3 is the common system involved with four of the vertical variety absorbing 
channels, viz. addressing S2 protocols, S3* ad-hoc audits, for initiating commands 
and resource bargains with S1 systems.  Here Beer cautions “hierarchical control, 
whereby instructions are passed down the line, is not the only dimension of control” 
(Beer, 1994a:105).  Continuing, he states “corrective action cannot in fact be taken 
in one place without regard to its effect on their proximate activities” (Beer, 
1994a:105). 
 
•  Squiggly line negotiations are S1 to S1 joint agreements although they may be 
initiated by a S1 system or even S3.  These negotiations can be multilateral besides 
the more common bilateral negotiations. 
 
•  Absorption of vertical variety within the environment.  Its effect is experienced via 
the S1 and S4 homeostats that connect with the environment. 
 
Given the prevalence of S3’s role in matters of cohesion it behoves us to come to grips 
with the way it can employ its fulcrum position to integrate the working of the autonomous 
S1s to achieve internal stability of the organization.  Firstly, let us realise that S3 has no 
direct connection with the environment.  Rather it relies on S1 and S4 which have direct 
connection with the environment.  Through the  S1s it receives individual divisional 
perspectives and via S4 it receives a perspective of the organization as a whole including 
its future probability prospects.  In this way, S3 is provided the opportunity to work out the 
status of homeostasis of the system’s coherence having additionally taken into 
consideration:  
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•  filtered information provided by the corporate level S2 (based on established 
protocols), 
 
•  S3* (based on antithetical modes of control designed as required by S3 to absorb 
the heuristic variety unabsorbed by the pre-established S2 control protocols), and 
 
•  algedonic signals from S1 that pass through it. 
 
This brings us to enquire who performs this S3 role, particularly when it pertains to matters 
of designing the principles (the what) and the mechanisms (the how) by which issues 
pertaining to autonomy and cohesion are balanced?  Ideally it is logically performed by S1s 
when they come together to perform their function in their S3 role.  This should be done 
having discussed and understood the issues facing each of the S1s and being informed by 
S4’s input of matters of future orientation.  As Beer says, 
 
they (S1) may be regulators of local  homeostasis, but S3 is the only competent 
regulator of organic homeostasis, since it alone has a S4 input.  What we have so far 
(S1 and S2) created, it follows, is a way of handling divisional control, and a way of 
handling interdivisional interaction –  on the assumption that the divisions between 
them know all there is to know about the adaptation and growth of the total organism.  
This they do not. (Beer, 1990a:178 – brackets and italics in source) 
 
This lack of variety is reduced by the variety pumped in by S3* (audit ganglion) findings 
which are instigated by S3 and made available to it.  Also, S3 is exposed to the variety 
contained in the S1’s ascending algedonic signalling which is sent via S3. 
 
It is this enriched systemic view of the enterprise that S3 affords to its S1s.  In saying this, 
the important point is that a dual role is played by the S1 Management Unit in that they are 
called upon to perform S3 functionality.  S3 should not be some add-on independent 
feature.  Rather it is an intrinsic but different role played by the S1s who in their collective 
perform S3 functionality.  The S1 Management Units exercise their individual autonomy to 
negotiate but decide in their amalgam the parameters upon which they will constrain their 
autonomy for the benefit of the whole.  S1s through their Management Units decide upon 
the manner in which they will constrain their autonomy for the benefit of some other 
embedded system or for the benefit of its meta-level system.  The meaning and exercise of 
cohesion and the constraints imposed will apply differently to each of the S1s based on 
their variety handling abilities in the context of the environment with which each interacts.  
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The value of this manner of building the balance of cohesion and autonomy is that not only 
is it consultative but it is dynamic.  Thus the process of working out the parameters of 
cohesion is provided with the avenue to be iteratively and dynamically negotiated amongst 
the S1s based on the effect the cohesion proposals have on their autonomy and viability.  In 
other words, the various S1s bring their own variety into the negotiation process and by so 
doing absorb each others’ variety as needs be to produce the cohesive balance.  Thus they 
exercise their autonomy in determining the manner in which they will cohere. 
 
That however is the ideal.  It is stymied by two age-old problems of the relationship 
between embedded systems belonging to a meta-level system. 
 
Firstly, there is the One/Two interface.  This has to do with recognizing that there are 
other autonomous divisions than my own, and that they have rights as well.  Especially, 
these others have the right not to be undermined by me, however pure my own motives 
are.  Secondly, there is the One/Three interface.  This has to do with recognizing that 
my own autonomous division is part of a corporation, and that it too has rights.  
Especially, sad as it seems, the corporation has the right to inhibit and if necessary to 
liquidate my autonomous division.  The first component is about interdivisional 
collaboration; the second is about corporate synergy. (Beer, 1990a:179) 
 
In Beer’s quote above we find a generic cybernetic explanation of the self-determination 
issue as faced in post-colonization.  It also explains the history of the relationship between 
the GoSL and the Tamils.  It is this vertical and horizontal variety balance that is being 
addressed at the Peace Negotiations and, to the extent that such variety absorption occurs 
peace will prevail. 
 
3.1.6  Effective Organizational Principles to Design, Diagnose and Remedy 
 
It is these principles discussed above that will be used to diagnose the 2002-2006 Peace 
initiatives.  These same principles will later be used as the minimum requirements that the 
‘design of the negotiation processes’ will need to cater for. 
 
Summing up, these principles underpinned by Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety are: 
•  Balancing autonomy and cohesion,  
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•  Establishing and sustaining the three aspects of the channels of communication, 
•  Error control feedback systems which require monitoring and correction processes 
which include criteria specification, 
•  Homeostasis, and 
•  Embedment of systems within other systems which thus entails recognition of 
multiple stakeholders. 
 
In the context of the various subject domains what constitutes homeostasis, its parameters 
and physiological thresholds is a matter for content negotiations to work out.  The same 
holds for the expression of the balance between autonomy and cohesion.  Design of the 
negotiation processes, their phases and timing, need to cater for all these principles, and be 
built premised on these principles.  Likewise diagnosis is based on these principles.  Such 
diagnosis can be applied both in the case of the results of negotiations and the negotiation 
processes.  In turn, the results of the diagnosis as well as the same effective organizational 
principles will inform the proposals for remedy. 
 
3.1.7  Contextualising the Principles for Sri Lankan Negotiations 
 
Having established the principles and their scope of application, the next question is - how 
are they to be applied in the context of Peace Negotiations?  This requires that we identify 
the various systems involved.  In particular, the level of recursion to which they belong 
plus who performs the functionality of the Management Unit of each system as that is the 
system that is called upon to represent the system at the Peace Negotiation. 
 
3.1.7.1  Relevance of Recursive Positioning 
 
First let’s understand why identifying this recursive positioning is valuable.  It is important 
because of the underpinning principle of balancing cohesion and autonomy.  In this regard, 
we already know that an embedded system will seek autonomy and a supervening system 
will seek to create an “identity which is the mode of integration of otherwise heterogeneous 
elements under the aegis of a single sign complex” (Stokes, 2004). 
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In VSM terms, whether a system gravitates to seeking cohesion or autonomy depends on 
the position the system occupies within a level of recursion.  Thus the design and 
implementation of peace negotiation processes need/s to be aware, when bringing together 
negotiating systems, which systems are predisposed to negotiate which part of the equation 
and to ensure sufficient variety is pumped in by each side of the equation so that requisite 
variety is given a chance to be achieved.  Another way of looking at this is that this 
predisposition is indicated by the context of ‘relationship/s with whom?’  By ‘context of 
relationship/s’ is meant that the negotiation could be with peer systems (squiggly line) or 
with supervening-embedded system/s (S3-S1 vertical line). 
 
Of the six vertical channels, identity negotiation may take place using four of the vertical 
channels – three within the system and one in the environment.  The two excluded channels 
are the anti-oscillation channel and audit ganglion channel which involve S2 and S3* 
respectively.  The S3* audit ganglion channel is excluded because it is an investigative 
enquiry (e.g. a Presidential Enquiry or Public Accounts Committee) rather than a 
negotiation.  The environmental channel is hugely important because the environment has 
the ability to attribute identity to the system as evidenced in the matter of sovereign 
recognition which is a prerequisite for entry to directly participate in the ‘sovereign based’ 
international interchange systems.  Such attribution of identity by the environment will be 
conveyed via the link into S1 and S4.  The three vertical channels within the system are the 
squiggly line channel, the command channel, and the resource bargaining channel.  
 
Let’s be clear on what the three channels within the system entail.  The squiggly line 
channel is where negotiations are peer-to-peer based and could go beyond bilateral peer-to-
peer negotiations to involving multilateral peer negotiations.  The command channel is 
where the supervening system imposes its requirements on the subsumed system/s.  The 
‘resource bargaining channel’ is where the supervening system negotiates with one or more 
of its subsumed systems. 
 
I want to make a distinction in the context of these channels between negotiations of an 
operational nature and Peace Negotiation which pertain to the very identity of the system: 
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•  Identity imposed down the command channel runs the risk of a subsumed system 
opting to leave when the viability of the subsumed system is threatened. 
I have included this channel for it certainly can issue commands pertaining to 
identity.  The flip side is that the command channel by definition is not the product 
of negotiations. 
 
•  Peer-to peer squiggly line negotiations require the inclusion or the creation of the 
supervening system.  This is to ensure integration of the embedded peer systems 
coheres under the aegis of a single sign complex. 
 
•  Negotiations between the supervening system and an embedded system require that 
the supervening system involve all its other subsumed systems.  This is because the 
new agreements reached, which give expression to the identity of the supervening 
system to which the embedded systems belong, will affect the other peer systems in 
their relationship with peers and with the supervening system.  This comprehensive 
involvement pumps the variety to help reduce the dominance of a peer system 
where it dominates the identity of the supervening system. 
 
In the absence of representation from the full composition of embedded systems, 
the Management Unit of the supervening system stands the risk of collapsing to 
represent the missing S1 and by so doing muddies its cohesive-supervening role.  
This aspect of negotiations pertaining to identity is singled out for diagnosis in the 
next part of this Chapter and its variety nuances need to be distinguished from the 
more regular type of operational resource bargaining between S3 and its S1s’. 
 
What the above discloses in VSM terms is that when the Law of Cohesion is being 
addressed based on peer-to-peer negotiation, the supervening system needs to be included 
(or created) in the negotiations.  When the negotiation is between the supervening system 
and an embedded system then the supervening system needs to comprise representation of 
the full composition of subsumed systems so that the influence of dominant embedded 
systems is better positioned to be neutralised. 
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When negotiations are between the supervening system and embedded systems, the 
negotiation is carried out between S3 of the supervening system and Management Unit of 
S1 (embedded system).  Included within S3 is its access to S4 thinking and the identity 
closure provided by S5 which includes S5 addressing the homeostasis between S3-S4 
thinking. 
 
The other crucial point to recognise is that the autonomous S1 Management Unit becomes 
S3 at the next lower level of recursion which in that context is responsible for cohesion 
across its spectrum of autonomous embedded systems.  It is this duality that offers the 
opportunity for exercising ‘principle based negotiations which application will be discussed 
further in Part III of this Chapter. 
 
3.1.7.2  Distinguishing Systems Involved and their Management 
 
Let us now identify the systems which are actively involved in the quest for Sri Lankan 
peace.  Given that the crisis afflicts the State as a whole and the conflict is argued from a 
race perspective, clearly Sri Lanka is one of the systems as are the individual races which 
comprise the State’s population and are thus embedded systems within the country.  There 
is also political party involvement which is classed at a lower level of recursion. However, 
when they win an election and form government they also belong to a higher level of 
recursion.  It is important to realise however that the political party and its term in 
government are two different systems that do not collapse into each other and that each 
operates under different constitutional rules. 
 
The LTTE are classed as representing the Tamils in negotiations.  There is a question as to 
whether the militarised-political LTTE system is embedded within the system Sri Lanka or 
whether they belong to the environment.  This question arises because in many ways the 
LTTE is effectively outside the reach of the jurisdiction of Sri Lanka.  It is also the system 
that governs a parallel de facto state in the Northern Province and to a lesser extent in the 
Eastern Province
54
                                                 
54 The trend in June 2007 is that the GoSL is increasingly winning back control of the Eastern Province. 
However, it is too early to know the GoSL ability to sustain that control and restore civilian (not military) 
governance, including that it lasts in the long term. 
.  On the other hand, the Tamils living in both regions continue to live 
within the internationally recognised sovereign terrain known as Sri Lanka, are Sri Lankan  
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citizens, and the GoSL continues to supply essential goods and services, albeit sometimes 
subject to supply embargoes. 
This LTTE muddiness reduces when distinguished based on functionality.  The LTTE, in 
their capacity of representing the Tamils, are considered to be the S1 Management Unit 
relating to S1 of the Tamil race of people who are an embedded race within the system Sri 
Lanka.  This stance accords with the 2002 de-proscribed status of the LTTE within Sri 
Lanka.  In other matters of functionality - like for example its international fund raising 
activities, and international quasi-diplomatic manoeuvres - the LTTE is situated within the 
environment. 
 
This dual presence of the LTTE within the system and being in the environment is akin to 
the diaspora
55
 
 that exists in the environment whilst a domestic population is contained 
within each S1 race.  Generically it also accords with the reality of a system belonging to 
multiple systems, for example a person who has dual citizenship.  So in this sense, both the 
diaspora and LTTE are recognised as having the direct capability to absorb vertical variety 
in the environment and are not constrained by the rules of governance that apply to the 
system Sri Lanka.  In turn, like all other variety in the environment, the system is exposed 
to the vertical variety absorption achieved by the diaspora, Sri Lankan political parties who 
have an international presence and the LTTE, via the homeostats that link the environment 
to the system. 
The more difficult question to answer is - who performs the S1 Management function for 
the logical amalgam of the majority Sinhalese and minority Muslim races of people?  The 
same question could be posed for the other even more minor races, like the Burghers, 
Veddhas, etc.  However, as they comprise very minor numbers, this is not considered until 
Chapter Five.  As Sri Lankan politics are essentially race based, it is reasonable to propose 
that this role is played by the political parties and in particular the dominant political 
parties as it applies to the Sinhalese and Muslims.  The point, however, is there is no 
unifying political system that plays this role.  For the Sinhalese it would be reasonable to 
                                                 
55 This diaspora pertains to each of the races.  Included within this diaspora are those who continue to hold 
permanent foreign residency with Sri Lankan citizenship, those holding dual citizenship (i.e. Sri Lankan 
citizenship and citizenship of another country) and even those who hold exclusive non-Sri Lankan citizenship 
but who in their actions take an active stance on the Sri Lankan conflict/peace quest.  This latter group is akin 
to the Jewish or Armenian diaspora who do not hold Israeli or Armenian citizenship but who take an active 
role in the resolution of their hereditary country.  
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state it as being the reigning party in government, the main opposition party and the next 
opposition party with the next highest number of seats in parliament.  For the Muslims it 
would be the two main Muslim parties, one of whom is usually in government and the 
other in opposition. 
 
For the system Sri Lanka, S3 functionality is performed by the national Parliament and 
more specifically the GoSL which comprises the winning political parties.  Here we see 
how the GoSL very easily gets tainted as representing the majority race.  Politics in Sri 
Lanka is largely race orientated irrespective of whether left or right wing political groups 
win the elections. 
 
For the system of political parties, its S1 Management Unit is its governing body.  There is 
also the system of Provinces with their Management Unit of provincial government. 
 
3.1.7.3  Recursive Positioning of the Systems 
 
Whilst threat of secession is argued on race lines, the most controversial issues are land 
based territorial issues and their associated waters under the convention of the Law of the 
Sea.  So far most of the canvassed resolutions based on devolved power have been 
expressed in terms of autonomy that will accrue to Provinces.  The question thus becomes - 
what cohesive-autonomous role do the Provinces play and where does that fit in the 
recursive model especially given the underpinning sectarian current that pervades 
provincial power sharing models? 
 
Based on the premise that Sri Lanka occupies R0 the question is - what recursive position 
do the Provinces occupy in their relationship to the races?  Do the individual Provinces 
belong to R-1 or are they below the recursion level of race making Provinces R-2 with race 
being R-1?  Or is the amalgam of Provinces an S1 on the same level of recursion as the 
amalgam of races or some hybrid thereof?  Does the level of recursion to which Provinces 
belong make a difference in the context of Peace Negotiations compared to the resolution 
of the quest for peace?  From the perspective of the design of the peace process, this is of 
relevance in understanding who earns the right of representation - is it Province based, race  
Chapter Three  117 
 
based or some hybrid thereof?  In positioning these systems in the recursive model, it can 
be perceived from three perspectives: 
 
•  Currently as it pertains to the negotiations at the Peace Talks, 
•  Ideally what the design of the process of Peace Talks would seek to achieve, and 
•  What the Peace Talks agree upon in terms of devolution of power. 
 
To prepare for the diagnosis as covered in Part II of this Chapter, the positioning is 
addressed from the perspective of the current status as demonstrated at the Peace Talks.  
Discussed next is the reasoning which supports the recursive positioning. 
 
Given that people populate Provinces, it means that both race in their amalgam and 
Provinces in their totality cannot as systems belong to the same level of recursion because 
the lower level of recursion of either of these systems will require the other system to be 
higher.  Furthermore, in Sri Lanka this does not make sense as neither all the Provinces nor 
all the races cohere in this manner as evidenced by the need for Peace Talks. 
 
The permutations that remain are that R-1 are the Provinces which then cascades into  
R-2 being the different races within each Province or it is vice versa.  The other 
permutation is that we have a hybrid where we have a race occupy R-1 which cascades into 
a Province based R-2.  This means concurrently having a Province at R-1 which cascades 
into a race based R-2. 
 
Bear in mind that any system is a subjective phenomenon (Beer, 1990:316) and that at 
these high logical levels of systems it is difficult to identify all the elements that the VSM 
requires.  Indeed some elements may be missing which explains why the system’s viability 
is threatened.  For example, whilst the various races are easily identifiable their S1 
Management Unit is not necessarily confined to one system.  Given that politics in Sri 
Lanka is largely ethnic, and sometimes religion, based, a political party frequently finds 
itself representing a particular race and in this as an S1 Management Unit for that race.  
However, this role may be occupied by one or more political parties or religious apex 
bodies.  
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Returning to the permutation, one option based on R0 being the State is for R-1 to be the 
individual Provinces which cascades based on race (R-2) within each Province.  This 
mapping has merit for it reflects the concept of devolution of power to Provinces as 
promulgated in the 13th Amendment of the Constitution.  However, I agree with many 
others who contend that such devolution of power has not been meaningfully achieved by 
the Constitution because the devolved power is more administrative than financial and 
scarcely results in any policy decision making.  Also, the lower level of recursion is not 
race based.  Importantly too, the conflict-torn Northern and Eastern Provinces have been 
defunct in their 13th Amendment devolved capacity almost from its onset.  The expectation 
however, is that if meaningful autonomy based on ‘non-ethnic provincial’ grounds, is 
agreed upon then we could see the provincial structure appear as the layer of recursion 
immediately below the system Sri Lanka. 
 
Another permutation is for each of the races to form R-1 and the layer below to be 
Province based (R-2).  With the Tamils this makes sense both in terms of the sole 
representation concept argued by the LTTE and the distinction that R-2 will reflect the 
reality of the provincial distribution of Tamils –  Estate Tamils in the tea and rubber 
plantations, Eastern Tamils, Northern Tamils and the Colombo Tamils.  It could also work 
for the Muslims given their logical composition unified by religion with R-2 showing the 
distinction between Eastern Province agrarian farmers and the business-traders of the 
Southern and Western Provinces.  The Sinhalese race, however, is currently less structured 
to reflect sub-systems based on Provinces.  As a sub-group they present more as 
distinguished on religious grounds (Buddhist, Christians) or as rural/city dwelling although 
there is the distinction between Kandyan and Low Country Sinhalese. 
 
This brings us to the hybrid permutation of R-1 comprising a S1 of the Tamil race which at 
R-2 cascades to Provinces wherein the systems that evidence themselves are Colombo 
Tamuls,  Eastern Tamils, Estate Tamils (represented by Thondaman’s CWC party) and 
Northern Tamils (represented by LTTE and TNA party).  The rest of the S1s at R0 would 
be each of the functioning Provinces (R-1) with their R-2 being the race of Sinhalese, 
Muslims, and the tiny minority communities like the Burghers and Veddhas. 
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It needs to be admitted that the Provinces have a peculiar race based recursion cascade as 
like R0 they are Sinhala dominated.  This trend is changing in the context of the Peace 
Talks.  The absence of the Muslims at the Peace Talks is giving distinction to the Muslims 
as a distinct group in the Eastern Province that is not to be lumped in with the Tamil race of 
people, albeit that the Muslims in Sri Lanka are categorised as a Tamil speaking people.  
The other difficulty is whilst the Tamils are evidenced as a definitive race with autonomous 
status courtesy of the LTTE-run de facto state the functioning Provinces do not have that 
hallmark for they are run (essentially)  by central government than by provincial 
governments.  What this means is that there is little discernable difference between the S1 
Management Unit of the S1 Provinces at R-1, and the S1 Management Unit of the S1 
Sinhalese race at R-2.  They both are represented by the Sinhalese political parties.  Note 
that the representation is stated in the plural.  As Sri Lankan politics is essentially race 
based, the political parties can be considered to be a lower level of recursion (R-3) 
embedded within the race groups (R-2) with the political party who wins at the elections 
serving in S3 functionality in R0. 
 
In view of this and the emphasis of race in Peace Negotiation the scales are tipped that 
Provinces are a level of recursion below race.  Yet opting out of the hybrid composition 
within a recursion level is a very close call.  In this sense as the diagnosis to follow reveals, 
it reflects some of the problems experienced with selection of stakeholder involvement in 
formal negotiations. 
 
Having established the concept of principle based negotiations, I propose a set of the 
necessary and sufficient principles (borrowed from the VSM) to achieve the goal of 
viability, the systems involved and their recursive positioning.  The preparatory work has 
been laid to undertake the diagnosis. 
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Part II – Diagnosis of 2002-2006 Peace Negotiations  
 
The 2002 Peace Talks were a significant watershed in stakeholder recognition.  They mark 
not only the era of a sole representative for the Tamil race of people but that the only 
stakeholder provided with the formal channel to negotiate at the Peace Talks with the 
GoSL were the Tamil race of people
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.  Additionally, given the effects of war which did 
not exist in the early decades of Tamil demands, negotiation content at Peace Talks was 
prioritised to address interim issues of relief and rehabilitation.  These trends continued into 
the Peace Talks that commenced in 2002 and to the extent that the GoSL’s wish to address 
core issues was heard it was limited to articulation of autonomous requirements as 
evidenced in the ISGA proposal. 
These combined considerations prompt the enquiry - who performs the cohesive role and is 
there a shared understanding of the identity of that supervening system?  From a design 
perspective, this is a critical question so that autonomy is balanced.  It also needs more than 
the glib answer that the GoSL is the representative of that supervening system, Sri Lanka.  
The question is not whether Sri Lanka is the supervening system, for the answer is yes.  
The question is - who is representing that supervening system and is that representative 
seen as such by its embedded systems?  There is a subtlety implied here, where a system is 
seen by the supervening system as embedded but where that embedded system does not 
identify itself as being embedded within that supervening system. 
 
With these opening considerations I have chosen to commence the diagnosis focusing on 
the principle of the balance between cohesion-autonomy in the context of various important 
events that have taken place.  The principle of Error Controlled Feedback processes is then 
addressed, followed by diagnostic findings pertaining to variety absorption in the context 
of different levels of recursion. 
 
                                                 
56 Until then the perception was that the Muslims were included by virtue of them being Tamil speaking.  
Later, political leaders like Late Hon. Mr. M H M Ashraff clearly delineated themselves as Muslims, who 
whilst being Tamil speaking, were a race distinctly different to the Tamils.  
Chapter Three  121 
 
3.2.1  Evidence of Cohesion-Autonomy 
 
The search for the supervening system is because that is the system charged with the 
responsibility of bringing the autonomous parts together –  to cohere, to form a whole 
which is a different logical system than its individual parts.  Let us now apply the 
‘cohesion-autonomy balance’ consideration to the acid test of LTTE representation so that 
our thinking is exposed to what is a very difficult and sensitive terrain.  The demand for 
prioritisation of humanitarian relief is evidence that autonomy is being heard and exercised 
at the Peace Talks.  However, negotiations pertaining to cohesion are less conspicuous and 
thus the diagnosis will need to address the cohesive consideration from a functional and 
structural perspective rather than content. 
 
As mentioned previously, the question is - does the LTTE in its negotiating capacity belong 
to the same level of recursion as that of the GoSL?  Having posed this question, let us be 
clear as to why it arises. 
 
The reasoning has already been given that R0 is Sri Lanka.  Comprising R-1 are the various 
races with the political systems who won elections being their S1 Management Units, given 
that the political parties are by and large race based.  Further it was said that the 
Management Unit was shared between the political party that formed government, and the 
main opposition party.  In this regard the LTTE, holding the overt status of representing the 
Tamils, was also recognised as the S1 Management Unit of the Tamil race of people. 
 
The GoSL was recognised as the Management Unit of the system Sri Lanka (R0).  
However, the problem is that Sri Lanka is dominated by the Sinhalese by virtue of their 
+70% population resulting in a heavy skew of representation by Sinhalese politicians.  
Such skew would not have mattered if the GoSL’s decisions were seen as not favouring a 
particular race.  However, the Sinhala Only Act and enshrining Buddhism in the 
Constitution has cast a most definite shadow on such neutrality.  The GoSL carries the aura 
of being Sinhalese and it is the implication of this variety that poses the question of the 
relationship between the GoSL and LTTE.  Given the low priority accorded to content as it 
pertains to cohesive matters, the answer to the question is more difficult to discern.   This  
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prioritisation is the product of the LTTE’s demand that interim relief and rehabilitation 
issues be given greater priority.  Stated differently, the GoSL lacked the requisite variety to 
absorb this LTTE demand in the sense of equally placing cohesive issues on the agenda 
too. 
 
Let us for a moment see this representation question without the advantage of VSM 
insights.  Is the LTTE in their negotiating capacity a peer system on par with the GoSL or 
an embedded system within Sri Lanka?  Is the GoSL in its negotiation with the LTTE a 
supervening system or a peer system on par with the LTTE?  Thus we have the status of 
GoSL as a supervening system or peer system and the LTTE as a peer system or embedded 
system.  The categorisation of the positioning need not be necessarily mutually reciprocal.  
The way each system looks at the other may be different.  From a peace negotiation’s 
design perspective, if a particular positioning cannot be enforced (i.e. resoundingly answer 
this question) then the design of the negotiation’s process needs to be able to absorb the 
variety posed by the different perspectives.  The basis of diagnosis needs to be similarly 
accommodative.  
 
The LTTE may see itself as a peer system on par with the GoSL, who amongst its array of 
options seeks statehood for its represented people and territory if meaningful power sharing 
as an embedded system is not achieved.  Yet the GoSL being a state actor very likely sees 
itself as a supervening system involved with negotiating with one of its race-based 
embedded systems. 
 
Taking the latter argument, Sri Lanka as represented by the GoSL belongs to a higher level 
of recursion compared to its embedded race of Tamils and thus entails the lower level of 
recursion occupied by the LTTE who represent the Tamils.  Therefore, the demand for 
autonomy by the Tamils as articulated by its LTTE representative is consistent with what 
the VSM holds, as is the cohesive pursuit by the GoSL who represents the whole of Sri 
Lanka.  Consequently, GoSL in its S3 role is responsible for achieving cohesion across the 
spectrum of its embedded systems as evidenced by its communities – based on Province, 
race, religion, language, gender, etc. 
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The important point that the recursive principle of the VSM lets us realise is that the LTTE 
in relation to the sub-systems it represents is called on to play the cohesive role.  If it takes 
on a geographical terrain it will include not only sub-systems of different Tamil 
communities (e.g. Eastern Tamils, Northern Tamils, etc) but also Muslims, Sinhalese and 
Burghers as already required by the population demographics of the Eastern Province.  
Interestingly, whilst geographical terrain has been considered, such entailment of 
communities has not surfaced.  Or, to the extent it surfaced it was rejected by the Muslims 
who refused to have the LTTE represent them, making the distinction that the Muslims are 
not Tamils. Prior to that rejection, the Muslims held the ambiguous status as equivalent to 
the Tamil race of people due to their use of the Tamil language. 
 
Returning to the point of GoSL-LTTE negotiations, the question of relationships arises 
regarding the singularity of representation of a race.  The GoSL in its S3 capacity runs the 
risk of being skewed in its negotiation by representing the view of its dominant S1 
(Sinhalese community).  This influences S3’s perception or at the very minimum can be 
construed as doing so.  Such a GoSL S3 perception is difficult to dispel (i.e. absorb variety) 
in the absence of active representation by other S1s.  There is also the risk that other S1s 
may not concur with the agreements being reached between the LTTE and the GoSL.  
Indeed, I go a step further to posit, as mentioned earlier in this Chapter, that the GoSL runs 
the risk of collapsing to represent the missing embedded S1s – namely, representing the 
Sinhalese. 
 
This may present as an elusive point and thus is worthy of explication for not only is it a 
very sensitive issue in Sri Lanka but it also carries many implications in terms of requisite 
variety made available during negotiations.  In Sri Lanka election victory and most 
Parliamentary decision making is premised on simple majority principles.  The GoSL by 
default is seen as dominated by the +70% Sinhalese community irrespective of whether it 
is left or right wing politics that wins the day.  The GoSL has the reputation, which is well 
propagated by the Tamils as an explanation for their grievances  -  that the GoSL is 
essentially Sinhalese orientated and favoured in its thinking.  So here we glimpse the LTTE 
reasoning for the perspective that the LTTE holds that their negotiation with the GoSL is as 
a peer-to-peer system – between the race groups Sinhalese and Tamils. 
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Clearly, the GoSL would refute this on the grounds that it is a State actor, but the point that 
persists is the perception of the dominance of the GoSL’s Sinhalese orientation.  This 
perception is given credence by the Muslims (a different S1 from that of the Sinhalese and 
Tamils) making overtures to be accorded formal negotiation rights at the Peace Talks.  In 
observing this reality, it may be fair to assert that what propels the Muslim demand for a 
seat at the negotiating table is that the GoSL may arrive at agreements with the Tamils at 
the expense of Muslims, which is to imply the Sinhalese bias inbuilt into the GoSL.  It is 
this reinforcement that calls attention to the ‘Sinhalese-ness’ of the GoSL.  This theme will 
be returned to later in this Chapter to help design a solution that does not trap the GoSL 
into this bind when in its S3 role it is seeking to find the balance of vertical and horizontal 
integration. 
 
Such questions and perceptions entail coming to grips with the variety of interpretations.  
Who does the LTTE represent and who does the GoSL represent?  What difference does 
the interpretation make given the premise that the negotiations must address the ‘cohesion-
autonomy balance’ as it pertains to the future governance framework of Sri Lanka?  To 
arrive at answers to this complex set of questions, I shall found it on the evidence indicated 
by the position occupied by the GoSL and the LTTE in context of the a) war itself, b) 
2002-2003 and 2006 Peace Negotiations, c) ISGA proposal, d) P-TOMS agreement and e) 
the array of Peace Secretariats. 
 
As a VSM prelude, let me recall there is a permutation of interpretation that the LTTE is a 
system in the environment (that interacts with the system-in-focus, namely Sri Lanka) and 
the negotiations address the circumstances under which the LTTE will join the system 
comprising Sri Lanka.  This is because the LTTE officialdom sits in the grey area where 
for all intents and purposes it operates outside the jurisdiction exercised by the GoSL.  This 
however is a first layer of distinction and applies much less to its population.  The deeper 
point is that the LTTE is negotiating on behalf of Tamils who belong to the system of Sri 
Lanka or at the very minimum the negotiation conducted by the LTTE concerns the future 
of Tamils within Sri Lanka.  In stating this, I am not implying that the deeper point 
overshadows the first.  Rather they co-exist but apply with different force based on the 
context. 
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Let me now discuss interpretations of the position of the LTTE and the GoSL in their 
negotiations role and where required extend the discussion to include other races and the 
nuances as they apply to the Provinces. 
 
a)  War:  The GoSL and the LTTE in their military encounters conduct themselves as 
supervening system warring with an embedded system or as peer-to-peer systems 
where each acts in its autonomous capacity.  It is fair to also state that it is the gross 
inadequacy of the balance of cohesion that evidences itself in war. 
 
b)  Peace Talks: The evidence here is very grey.  Given that the GoSL is negotiating with 
only the LTTE, one impression is that it is a peer-to-peer negotiation where the system-
in-focus (Sri Lanka) is negotiating with its contractual environment (LTTE).  This is 
the position taken by the LTTE.  However, it needs to be borne in mind that this 
singularity of representation was a condition of the LTTE for Peace Talks.  This 
singularity consequently poses the question - who indeed is the GoSL representing, the 
hegemonic Sinhalese or are the Muslims also included?  Additionally, the peer-to-peer 
relationship prompts enquiry of the existence of the supervening system which 
minimally is a logical system under whose banner the peer-to-peer systems cohere. 
 
In comparison, the GoSL by virtue of its historical island-wide democratic election 
process sees itself as negotiating with an embedded system –  the Tamils who are 
represented by the LTTE.  Thus in VSM terms, the Peace Talks are a negotiation 
between the S3 (GoSL) and the management Unit of S1, the Tamils. 
 
The crucial political difficulty is - how does the GoSL, built on democratic principles, 
dynamically inform itself of the position of the other S1 systems (like the Sinhalese and 
Muslims) when it is engaged in negotiations with the LTTE?  This same question could 
be posed of the LTTE, but one could argue that their autocratic manner of governance 
circumvents the requirement. 
 
Yet the question deserves answering especially as reality is perceived differently in 
each camp.  Each evidences their flaw of inadequate recognition of the sub-systems 
which are embedded within the systems they represent.  For the LTTE, it appeared in  
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the form of the Eastern Tamils under the leadership known as the Karuna-faction.  For 
the GoSL the cry emanates from the Muslim group which itself has the discernable sub-
systems of Eastern Muslims and other  Muslims.  This sub-system clamour for a 
channel of communication so that they can be part of the bargaining process being 
conducted by S3 accords with the VSM and is exactly Beer’s point of balancing 
cohesion and autonomy. 
 
From a meta-level perspective there is also the question - how does the meta-system 
above the sovereign system of Sri Lanka convey its position in the dynamics of the 
negotiation?  During the 2002-2003 and 2006 Peace Talks there has been no formal 
channel for this meta-level system to participate, except via the default all embracing 
environment.  There is also the question of - who is the level of recursion above the 
system ‘Sri Lanka’?  Is it India, or the Indian sub-continent (as represented in SAARC) 
where India, like Sri Lanka is a sub-system?  Either way, India’s voice is important 
because of the overtones that Sri Lankan negotiations carry for India both in its Tamil 
Nadu politics (the critical Indo-Aryan-Dravidian divide) and its internal conflicts (e.g. 
Kashmir).  These overtones are particularly relevant in terms of neutrality given the 
advocacy that India be invited once again to mediate/facilitate the Sri Lankan 
negotiations.   
 
From a variety perspective, it is pertinent to note the mediator/facilitator distinction 
between post-colonial self-determination and the decolonization era. In the latter, this 
third party role was played by the exiting power which in the instance of Sri Lanka had 
150 years of understanding and influencing, if not controlling, local politics.  In the 
post-colonization era, the third party (e.g. Norway and previously India) rarely has such 
longevity of involvement and thus critically lacks the nuances of understanding and 
influence especially across the spectrum of local power blocs. 
 
c)  ISGA:  Here is an outstanding unilateral initiative by the LTTE.  It states the 
autonomous powers under which it will operate and in doing so discloses vital elements 
of embedded systems.  This offered the opportunity for cohesive considerations to be 
introduced to balance the equation.  This will be addressed in Part III, but let us return 
to the ISGA diagnosis.  
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The ISGA (refer Appendix 4) starts its preamble with ‘equality of all persons’.  Clause 
2.3.a states ‘the number of members of the ISGA will be determined to ensure an 
absolute majority of the LTTE appointees in the ISGA’ until elections are held (within 
5 years – refer clause 3).  From an embedment viewpoint the ISGA confirms the LTTE 
expected ideal of control over eight districts and recognises the Muslim community as 
not falling under its representation – refer clause 1.  However, neither the Sinhalese nor 
the Burghers are mentioned.  In Clause 2 the GoSL, besides the LTTE, is specified as 
having a right to membership in the composition of the ISGA with the Muslims of the 
NorthEast having membership rights also.  Note the (NorthEast) sub-system 
recognition within the Muslim community. 
 
However, like the Peace Talks, the enquiry is - who is the GoSL representing?  Given 
that the LTTE (representing the Tamils) and the Muslims have specific representation, 
it is fair to assume the GoSL represents the Sinhalese (majority race in the Ampara 
district) and the Burghers (a minor race in the Batticaloa district). 
 
In this sense, the ISGA gives a clearer signal that the GoSL (presumably representing 
the Sinhalese and Burghers) is a peer-to-peer system and not just with the Tamils (as 
represented by the LTTE) but with the Muslims too, specifically the community in the 
NorthEast.  Another indicator is that the ISGA in clause 12 allocates to the LTTE 
(holding absolute ISGA membership majority) external financial powers - powers more 
usually vested at State level and enjoyed by the GoSL.  Clause 11 however, does have a 
reference that indicates the supervening power of the GoSL in that it is holder of the 
Consolidated Fund.  
 
The drizzled nature of recognition of supervening, embedded and peer-to-peer systems 
makes the ISGA a tremendously useful document upon which to base negotiations.  
The LTTE by its own initiative has recognized the principle of embedment of systems, 
in this instance, race communities and districts.  This emerging pattern offers the scope 
to take negotiations forward by inviting the LTTE to articulate the manner in which as 
an autonomous system it coheres with Sri Lanka.  In particular, it presents an 
opportunity to launch the concept of the need to ‘balance cohesion and autonomy’ and  
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to move away from the age-old antinomy of prioritisation of core issues versus 
humanitarian relief. 
 
In the absence of seizing such an opportunity, the ISGA remains an articulation devoid 
of a framework which addresses ‘balancing cohesion and autonomy’. 
 
d)  P-TOMS: Many hold the real power of P-TOMS’s (refer Appendix 3) three layered 
Committee structure rested at the Regional Committee.  Given that the majority 
membership at that level rested with the LTTE, the net effect was that the NorthEast 
tsunami relief would be LTTE determined and controlled.  P-TOMS was contested in 
the Supreme Court.  The court issued an interim injunction restraining  three key 
operational clauses pertaining to the Regional Committee.  The most severe was the 
suspension of the Regional Fund where the proposal was for a multi-lateral agency to 
be the custodian of the funds rather than the Consolidated Fund.  This effectively lamed 
P-TOMS into non-existence. 
 
The vital cybernetic point of relevance is that P-TOMS’s High Level Committee 
composition demonstrates the trend of the GoSL representing non-Tamils and non-
Muslims (namely, the Sinhalese and the tiny minority communities).  These groups 
were also affected by the tsunami in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.  Clause 5(c)
57
 
 
states the High Committee shall comprise one representative each from the GoSL, the 
LTTE and the Muslims.  Clause 6(c) regarding the Regional Committee states the 
equivalent membership mix to be 2:5:3 comprising the GoSL, the LTTE, and the 
Muslims.  Clause 8 regarding the District Committee contents itself with working with 
the pre-existing District Committee structure and stating that Muslims and gender be 
adequately represented. 
As in the ISGA, the evidence suggests that P-TOMS too follows the trend of 
positioning the GoSL to represent the Sinhalese, given that the Tamils and the Muslims 
are positioned to represent themselves. 
                                                 
57 This clause has an interesting twist for its pattern harks back to the 50:50 representation advocated by the 
Late G.G. Ponnambalam.  This was 50% of parliament’s seats were to be allocated to the Sinhalese and the 
balance 50% to be shared by the minority races.  The P-TOMS clause allocates 50% to the Tamils and the 
balance to the Sinhalese (20%) and Muslims (30%).  
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e)  Peace Secretariats:  The existence of three Peace Secretariats - by the GoSL, the LTTE 
and the Muslims - clearly indicates the trend of the GoSL approaching the status of a 
peer-to-peer system representing those groups not represented by the other two Peace 
Secretariats.  Admittedly, the Muslim Peace Secretariat is a fledgling but the principle 
in terms of who the GoSL represents is what is being alerted to here.  
 
The gravity of this diagnosis of the ISGA, P-TOMS and the three Peace Secretariats is that 
there is now a very clear trend that the GoSL is being positioned as representing the 
Sinhalese.  The contentious issue that has consumed the intellectual and political minds is 
whether the LTTE has the right to solely represent the Tamils and whether the Muslims 
warrant a place at the negotiating table.  Unnoticed is what this diagnosis is showing - the 
very discernable tilting of the negotiations to take on a peer-to-peer appearance wherein the 
GoSL is both a peer and a supervening system.  The peer status arises due to the GoSL by 
default representing the Sinhalese who are the obvious embedded missing major system in 
the negotiation.  The other specific systems represent the Tamils and the Muslims.  This 
assertion is given further credence by the previously mentioned fact that composition of the 
GoSL is dominated by the Sinhalese. 
 
As mentioned earlier, an argument can be mounted that the GoSL represents the Tamils 
who do not want to be represented by the LTTE (examples being the TULF, Karuna 
faction, EPDP, moderate Tamil intellectuals).  However their numbers are comparatively 
small.  Also giving the GoSL a supervening character is its stance as a state actor - 
defending its borders as evidenced by the war, and in financial matters its exclusive right to 
raise public debt and its power to allocate funds to Provinces. 
 
In Part III of this Chapter, based on Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, I seek not to 
validate or invalidate an interpretation.  My objective is to design negotiation processes 
capable of absorbing the varied interpretations with the objective of achieving a desired 
goal  -  sustained peace via the balancing of cohesion and autonomy.  In this sense, 
interpretations which need to be catered for are that for some it is clear the GoSL by 
necessity negotiates at the Peace Talks as a supervening system as the LTTE is not a state 
actor and represents an embedded system, the Tamils.  Others contend the LTTE is 
conducting peer-to-peer negotiations with the GoSL as the GoSL represent the Sinhalese  
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who are a peer system like the Tamils.  Still others, especially based on the terms of 
representation at the 2002-2003 Peace Talks, would contend it is a mixture wherein the 
GoSL sees itself as negotiating with an embedded system but the LTTE sees itself as 
negotiating with a peer system. 
 
3.2.2  Monitoring and Error Controlled Feedback Processes 
 
Referring to the discussion in Chapter Two concerning the cybernetic rationale and the way 
the monitoring and error controlled feedback process works, the extent and manner it has 
been applied to the agreements reached is diagnosed here. 
 
In 2003 when the LTTE suspended their participation in the Peace Talks, they attributed 
that decision to what they called the lack of ‘existential relief’ –  meaning agreements 
reached were not fulfilled within their expectations.  On various counts this is significant 
because the criteria upon which implementation of agreements could be evaluated was in 
many instances vague. 
 
There is little evidence to suggest that interim timeframes and deliverables were specified 
as part of the agreements reached.  In a sense, this benefited both sides.  It kept the door 
open to decline participation at any time based on inadequate implementation.  It also kept 
the door open to non-accountability, especially for the GoSL with its widely known 
ineffective and inefficient civil administrative system. 
 
Had there been such interim timeframes and deliverables which were being monitored, a 
mechanism would have been in place to alert the negotiation series of the need for 
corrective action.  Instead the Peace Talks collapsed.  Having said this, it is not expected 
that all agreements will have specific monitoring agreements and error controlled feedback 
processes in place.  However, those agreements that are considered to be more sensitive, 
which is a matter for the parties to agree upon, need specific monitoring and error 
controlled feedback processes in place.  An example of this is seen in the MOU pertaining 
to the Cessation of Hostilities. 
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This was the solitary agreement accompanied by a formal monitoring system.  The GoSL 
and the LTTE commendably agreed on the composition and charter of a neutral monitoring 
body, the SLMM.  The SLMM had access to monitor results, i.e. the three aspects of the 
channels of communication were open to them.  However there was very little in place 
beyond reporting and advocacy to initiate corrective processes. 
 
In other words, whilst the MOU on the Cessation of Hostilities was invested with a 
feedback process it had no accompanying error control process.  Like many other 
agreements it suffered lack of clarity of the tolerance limits (which could have been stated 
heuristically if it was politically incorrect to state algorithmically) of the critical variables 
that constituted the agreement. 
 
Overall, what we find is that agreements become toothless in the absence of S2 and S3* 
processes to monitor and facilitate remedies.  It is almost inevitable that the negotiation 
process will fatally break down once one side or the other interprets the vague agreements 
as not being fulfilled.  The other high probability of failure is the disregard of agreements 
where they continue in name only.  Such is the case with the homeostasis agreement 
pertaining to the Cessation of Hostilities.  It has now (June 2007) reached the stage where 
the SLMM itself is increasingly abandoning its monitoring as the agreement is being 
flagrantly abused by all sides (the GoSL, LTTE and Karuna faction).  The experience here 
is a telling example of the price paid in the absence of error control processes. 
 
3.2.3  Different Levels of Recursion & Variety Absorption 
 
Assessing and building capability for peace in a war-torn system is a S4 activity.  As such 
both the GoSL and the LTTE individually signalled to the environment, specifically to the 
Royal Norwegian government, their willingness for Norwegian diplomats to facilitate 
peace initiatives.  The arduous phase of soliciting warring parties to enter into Peace Talks 
minimally entailed reaching agreement on such matters as a) who was willing to meet with 
whom in a bid to resolve the conflict, b) the subject content of negotiations, c) the pre-
conditions by each of the parties and compliance thereof, d) when and where they would 
meet and e) the negotiation protocol when the parties meet.  
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Pre-election agreements suffer the intrinsic risk that they may be abrogated when a political 
party in their capacity as government fails to win adequate support for the formal approval 
of the agreement.  In saying this it is also appropriate to recognise that the usual 
circumstances of a pre-election agreement is that Party A has succeeded in convincing 
Party B of a particular stance/position/requirement.  It also usually implies that Party A has 
not succeeded in convincing others of their position.  Thus what Party B is undertaking is 
the task of convincing the necessary others of Party A’s position and maybe even the 
benefit it holds to others to accede to Party A’s wish and for it to come to pass. 
 
Applying the recursive concept of the VSM, the attribute of pre-election agreements is that 
for one of the parties (in our case Party B), the negotiated agreement compared to the 
formal approval (and implementation thereof) is done by two different levels of recursion.  
So a political party (e.g. R-2) as a product of negotiations enters into a pre-election 
agreement but its formal approval and implementation can only done by a higher level of 
recursion (e.g. the State level R0).  “Thus while the components appear to be the same, 
they operate with different purposes and therefore functionality and relationships given that 
they pertain to different logical systems” (Solomons and Moscardini, 2006a:119). 
 
The question becomes - what variety considerations need to be addressed so that risk of 
post-election abrogation is minimised?  This is particularly relevant for Tamil strategists 
given Sri Lanka’s chequered history of abrogation of pre-election agreements
58
 
.  The Peace 
Talks with their path to suspension, the ISGA proposal and 2004 proroguing of Parliament 
are an unusual and complex example of the failure of what grew from a pre-election 
agreement between the UNP and the LTTE as facilitated by the Norwegian government.  
Recognising the different levels of recursion, what was agreed upon is diagnosed from a 
variety absorption perspective. 
Operating (presumably) from the imperative to end hostilities, it appears diplomatic 
initiatives were premised on those engaged in warfare entering into Peace Talks.  What this 
meant was that the only structural coupling recognised and therefore approached was the 
                                                 
58 Examples of this are the Chelvanayagam-Bandaranaike Pact of 1957 and Chelvanayagam-Senenayake Pact 
of 1965.  
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LTTE and the GoSL.  In the latter category were included the Executive President, parties 
in government and potential contenders, notably opposition political parties.   
 
Positioning for ending two party hostilities is different to negotiating for peace as the 
structural coupling of the latter involves a multi-partisan approach.  What sealed the Peace 
Talks into a two party negotiation was the LTTE condition which was accepted by the 
UNP political party and subsequently by the GoSL when they won election, that the LTTE 
was the sole representative of the Tamils.  Locking only two parties into the negotiation 
process -  
 
indicates those who designed the negotiations process lacked recognition or were 
hampered in their ability to gain consensus amongst the primary protagonists that the 
relationship between structurally coupled systems change as the systems themselves 
adapt.  Consequently, those systems initially excluded could not participate in the Peace 
Negotiation despite the evolving (un/favourable) effect on their relationships 
(Solomons and Moscardini, 2006a:118).  
 
Given the emphasis on war disengagement this excluded the embedded system of Muslims 
and the Sinhalese (if one accepts the GoSL as representing the State and not the hegemony 
accused Sinhalese) from the Peace Talks.  The other flaw stemmed from static recognition 
of warring parties.  The MOU on the Cessation of Hostilities made no allowance for the 
emergence of new war entrants.  It had no dynamic feature built into its parameters of 
agreement and thus is restricted in its ability to absorb the variety of dissident Tamil 
factions (e.g. the warring Karuna-led group) and the emerging militant Muslim groups.  
From a variety engineering perspective, I would argue the emergence of such groups was 
inevitable due to a) embedded systems having no formal communication channel to 
participate at the Peace Talks, b) precedence that a group’s right to participation at the 
Peace Talks was based on them taking up arms, c) embedded systems having no formal 
channel to negotiate at the Peace Talks  made war a very likely channel to air their 
grievances, and d) a way to overcome the power of a monolith was to find a way for it to 
fracture.  
 
The Peace Talks themselves were based on asymmetrical considerations on multiple fronts.  
This initially arose as a condition of the LTTE’s requirement that interim relief be given 
priority over core issues.  As the architecture of the Peace Talks only permitted warring  
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participants, the subject was constrained to that which mattered to the warring participants.  
Consequently, the grievances of the Muslims and Eastern Tamils (as the LTTE are 
perceived as more associated with the Northern Tamils) could not be voiced.  Neither could 
propositions put forward by LTTE and GoSL be contested by embedded systems.  Thus 
both content and decision making at the ne gotiations table was asymmetrically based.   
 
Whilst a case could be made for asymmetrical decision making, it is vital that it be based 
on symmetrical considerations - after having considered the whole (e.g. its effect on the 
various structural couplings and their relationships).  To do less –  
 
forbids deficiencies being seen and therefore considered in the decision making 
process.  ‘Symmetrical consideration’ entails the recognition of much more variety, the 
absorption of which calls upon substantial design considerations.  On the other hand, 
decisions based on asymmetrical considerations certainly attenuate variety but if 
significant variety is ignored then the system will eventually evidence the fault as has 
been the history of failed talks. (Solomons and Moscardini, 2006:120)  
   
The obvious question to ponder is - was there opportunity to remedy these architectural 
process design flaws?  Examination of the resources drawn into the Peace Talks shows 
evidence is lacking to indicate a presence of S4 functionality whilst the Peace Talks were 
in progress.  Certainly, on all sides the ‘soliciting phase of Peace Talks’ was a System 4 
activity.  Thereafter, whilst for the LTTE the soliciting phase and Peace Talks remained at 
the same level of recursion, for the other side it moved to different logical systems.  The 
transition was from a level of recursion pertaining to the ‘political parties’ to that of the 
State with representation by the GoSL.  On all fronts it appears the focus was on S1 activity 
(involving the negotiating team and support from the respective Peace Secretariats) and S3 
activity.  For the system Sri Lanka it involved the Prime Minister and cabinet, and to a 
much lesser extent Parliament and lacked the formal involvement of the Executive 
President’s S5 homeostatic function.   
 
As Solomons & Moscardini comment - 
Once Peace Talks began, it appears the bulk of the players who prepared for the Peace 
Talks (S4 activity) were sucked into the Peace Talks itself (S1 activity), leaving a S4 
vacuum.  Furthermore, lacking S4, the necessary flanking requirements of 
administrative systems, monitoring and corrective protocols could not be caught here 
either.  Neither could anything be done about positioning to accommodate the emergent 
relationships of other systems.  The absence of S4 also aided S5 functionality, with its  
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constitutional  backing, to easily crash into S3.  Lacking skilled and devoted 
functionality to future positioning it was inevitable that design process deficiencies 
were unlikely to be remedied.  Even if the Norwegians or any other stakeholder had 
realised such (which in itself there is little evidence to suggest), the GoSL was not in a 
position to address it.  Note, an outstanding exception to such S4 functionality was 
formulating an international forum for aid pledges (in Oslo, Washington and Tokyo), 
albeit that this later proved to be a breaking point for the LTTE as they were not 
permitted to participate in the Washington forum, due to their US terrorist proscription 
status. (Solomons & Moscardini, 2006a:119) 
 
Lastly the combination of an SLFP Executive President and a UNF led Parliament meant 
the constitutional power vested in the Executive President to dissolve Parliament after one 
year had a high likelihood of being exercised given that the Prime Minister’s initiative of 
Peace Talks had never been endorsed by the Executive President.  This translates to the 
intensely complex peace process under this particular initiative having a life span to gain 
resolution of something over one year!  As it was, the Talks were suspended by the LTTE 
within a year of commencement.  The UNF government lasted a little over two years 
before peace related controversial initiatives caused the Executive President to exercise her 
power to dissolve Parliament. 
 
The Presidential move shows the fundamental flaw that accompanied negotiations from the 
outset.  This was predominately due to the co-habitation Constitution relationship between 
Prime Minister and Executive President (discussed further in Chapter Four).  Essentially, a 
pre-election agreement between political parties which win elections but which do not earn 
the President’s endorsement seriously lacks the variety absorbing capability to carry the 
peace process through.  This is a critical insight that needs to be factored into the various 
phases of negotiations. 
 
3.2.4  Applying VSM Thinking to Majority Based Decision Making 
 
I now move to creatively apply the VSM to gain an appreciation of what happened in Sri 
Lanka in the context of two examples.  They bear useful learning for framing constitutional 
matters particularly in terms of addressing the pitfall of majority based decision making.  
First, historically, what happened shortly after independence and secondly, what was 
articulated under the ISGA proposal.  
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a)  The Independence Example 
 
Based on Sri Lanka (previously Ceylon) as the system-in-focus and various races being 
the S1s, the GoSL along with its public service comprises S3 arising from its legislative 
and executive capacity.  This S3 is resourced by the S1s.  Elected politicians and 
bureaucrats simultaneously come from and belong to the S1 race groups.  The argument 
of the Tamils has been that the GoSL has been dominated by the thinking of the S1-
Sinhalese race which has exercised its decision making power to favour the Sinhalese.  
The argument put forward is that this has resulted in the GoSL enacting legislation like 
the Sinhala Only Act and exercising executive decisions such as what has come to be 
referred to by the Tamils as ‘state-aided colonization’.  Sinhalese were reportedly 
favoured to occupy what has been regarded as traditional Tamil homelands and by so 
doing changed the race-based population mix of those areas. 
 
This example serves to show how an S1 exercised its autonomy to dominate (via its 
numerical majority) the identity and workings of the system-in-focus at the expense of 
other S1s (the Tamils, the Muslims, etc).  Such decision making by S3 has been 
possible because the Constitution states the decision making process is based on the 
majority vote.  This meant that the S1 with the numerical advantage, particularly when 
its counterweight is very low, is favourably positioned to win because of the way the 
system has been designed.   This is what the ‘50-50 representation rule’ (50% for the 
Sinhalese and 50% for all the other communities combined) sought to overcome.  
Whilst this option was not chosen, a similar result was achieved via Section 29 (2) of 
the 1948 Constitution which made void any discriminatory or privileged legislation 
based on ‘community’ or ‘religion’.  Cybernetically this anti-discriminatory provision 
is a brilliant example of recognising homeostasis (across the races) to the detail of 
recognising its critical variables (e.g. community, religion) and the physiological limits 
(e.g. no discriminatory or privileged legislation) within which they need to be 
contained. 
 
The objective of this clause however, was not carried forward into any of the later 
Constitutions.  Decision making powers therefore by design became vested in the S1 
which had the numerical majority.  Thus balancing cohesion and autonomy was not  
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achieved as the dominant S1 exercised its power the way it so wished within the 
system-in-focus. 
 
This squeezed the minor S1s into not being able to exercise their autonomy for the 
benefit of their ideals.  The various minor S1s reacted differently.  The S1 of Burghers 
mostly migrated overseas, the S1 of Tamils chose to stay and fight.  Both the S1 of 
Tamils and Sinhalese sought the endorsement of the S1 of Muslims.  The Tamils 
sought the Muslims to enlarge their territorial claims based on a Tamil-speaking 
population.  The Sinhalese gave benefits, like employment and business deals, to the 
Muslims to prove that minority communities were not disadvantaged (O’Sullivan, 
1999).  Consultations and actions to build cohesive strength across the communities 
were not employed.  The best that was achieved was bi-lateral positioning (in VSM 
parlance, squiggly line resource bargains) and even some of these eventually were 
abused – for example the 24 hour Muslim condition to exit the Tamil dominated district 
of Jaffna. 
 
b)  ISGA proposal where the system-in-focus is a Province and its embedded systems 
(S1s) are the various races. 
 
By compelling the ISGA, to have the LTTE hold absolute majority in the ISGA, a S3 
system, the same flaw was built in as was the case with the Constitution of Sri Lanka.  
This LTTE power is however mitigated by clause 8 pertaining to ‘protection of all 
communities’.  But this applies only to religion and culture, which makes education and 
the economic fronts of business and employment noticeable absentees.  Stated 
differently, these absentee domains are the loopholes where cohesive restraint will not 
apply to the privileged reign of autonomy as designed by the absolute majority position 
bestowed on the LTTE. 
 
The other question with the ISGA is -  how will the LTTE absolute majority be 
exercised in terms of the lower level of recursion, namely sub-groups of the Tamil 
community?  Here, I refer to the nuances of the Eastern and Northern Tamils, 
particularly as the LTTE carries a Northern Tamil signature.  The breakaway Karuna 
faction intimates this is a very real problem which needs addressing.  Within such a  
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sub-system Clause 8 carries no weight as their religion and culture only slightly differ. 
The question becomes - what are the critical variables and their physiological limits in 
the instance of sub-races? 
 
The area where the ISGA is also reticent is the manner it coheres with the meta-level 
system of Sri Lanka.  In what domains will it restrain its claim to autonomy?  It also 
makes no mention of the manner of its relationship with other peer systems like other 
districts or Provinces of Sri Lanka. 
 
The above two examples illustrate design is conspicuously weak to address the supervening 
system requirement to attain coherence amongst the aspiring autonomous systems.  This 
supervening requirement needs to be effective and cannot be sustained by ‘command 
imposed’ design.  Without it we traverse the path to separation. 
 
3.2.5  Relevance of Diagnosis 
 
The value of this diagnosis is that it shows flaws that require remedy if peace is to have a 
chance to prevail in a non-partitioned Sri Lanka.  From a design perspective, this is 
addressed in Part III of this Chapter. 
 
On the other hand, the diagnosis shows the application of the principles of effective 
organization, borrowed from the VSM, which can be employed by the UN to evaluate 
claims and counter-claims when secession demands are being evaluated.  This is of 
particular importance as from Blay’s thesis was learnt that post-colonial secession claims 
as evaluated by the UN consider a) the results of remedies pursued at the national or 
regional level and b) the evidence of viability of the entity claiming secession. 
 
What this means is that secession is considered by the UN when other avenues of peace 
have failed.  In turn this means that when a claimant finds itself failing to achieve internal 
self-determination it has the option to develop and pilot external self-determination 
prospects though creating a de-facto State.  As it succeeds with the sturdiness of its de facto 
State it will then be in the interest of the claimant to position itself to withdraw pursuing  
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internal self-determination options.  This withdrawal could be staged by sabotaging the 
peace process by the type of demands it negotiates or the principles it adopts. 
 
It is this internal solution process that the UN needs to evaluate in terms of whether the 
process of internal self-determination was a genuine failure or one that was sabotaged.  My 
proposition is that such diagnosis is possible based on the principles of effective 
organization as articulated here.  These principles and diagnoses must be applied equally to 
the counter-claimant i.e. show that restrained autonomy was for cohesive purpose. 
 
For this reason, I contend that the LTTE demand for stakeholder exclusivity, both in terms 
of sole representative of Tamils and sole race represented, sabotages the means for gaining 
peace agreements across the spectrum of race embedded systems.  I would go further to 
state that if a peace process is premised on exclusivity being given to autonomy or cohesive 
demands, then the architecture of the peace process itself has failed.  Consequently, 
argument based on the results of such a peace process is weak in terms of using it to 
evaluate claims and counter-claims.  Equally, I contend that the proroguing of Parliament 
sabotaged the peace effort and served the argument to return to war.  The latter point 
however is more contentious as it falls within national constitutional law. 
 
3.2.6  A Sample of the Process Requirements Specification  
 
Based on the principle of balancing the cohesive needs of the State and the autonomous 
needs  of its embedded systems, Peace Negotiation must include the supervening and 
embedded systems.  Therefore, the talks must involve multi-party participation so that 
protagonists are positioned to negotiate their case bilaterally and multilaterally and thereby 
absorb each others’ variety. 
 
Given that the existing constitutional structure of Sri Lanka results in the composition of 
the GoSL being overly Sinhalese represented, it is unwise to place the GoSL as the sole 
negotiating system with an embedded system.  This is because the GoSL runs the risk of 
being construed as representing the Sinhalese, a peer-system like the Tamil community.  If  
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that happens, due to according the Tamil race negotiating exclusivity, three obvious 
permutations arise: 
 
1.  The supervening system is lost to the process and consequently cohesive 
considerations are ignored, 
2.  The supervening system is perceived as representing its dominant embedded 
system, or 
3.  The supervening system collapses to represent the missing embedded systems. 
 
Therefore, a supervening system will need to be, at least logically, created to bring the 
cohesive balance into the peer-to-peer negotiations whose focus would otherwise centre on 
their autonomous demands.  That supervening system will seek to a) facilitate negotiations 
across its spectrum of embedded systems and b) negotiate the parameters of cohesion based 
on understanding Sri Lanka’s requirements as a whole and informed by the requirements of 
its higher level of recursion. 
 
Whilst decisions may be asymmetrically taken both in terms of who makes them and to 
whom they pertain, the content of deliberations needs to be symmetrically considered 
across the immediately embedded spectrum of systems.  The critical objective is to avoid 
decisions which are blind to, and not prepared for, their detrimental impact on other 
systems. 
 
The design of the process also needs to be capable of simultaneously handling core and 
relief issues so that the old antinomy of prioritization of core and relief issues is overcome.  
The process needs to be iterative and dynamic in its manner of working so that possible 
decisions are informed and contemplated iteratively in the sense of being able to revisit 
formulations towards decisions. 
 
Part III addresses the process design considerations pertaining to the above. There are other 
diagnostic matters that warrant design consideration and negotiated agreement during the 
phase of Pre-Talks.  This includes matters like establishing monitoring and feedback 
processes for what are considered to be the critical homeostats to achieve peace.  The 
design remedy of those is left for another occasion.    
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Part III – A Way Forward with Designing ‘Processes’ for Peace Talks 
 
Given the price that war extracts in humanitarian and economic terms, Peace Talks are an 
attractive option.  Such Peace Talks can play a pivotal role in negotiating internal self-
determination and, in the event of failing to reach such agreement it serves to substantiate 
the claim for external self-determination.   
 
The LTTE currently evidences a three pronged simultaneous strategy: 
 
1.  War
59
2.  Peace Talks to negotiate interim relief measures and secure autonomous decision 
making and implementation rights for Tamils, and 
 to propel leveraged Peace Talks and cordon off territory,  
3.  Operation of a de facto State to cater for the contingency of substantiating to the 
international community and the UN the viability of their secession claim if the 
demand for Tamil autonomous decision making and implementation rights remain 
unquenched.  This prong of the strategy  involving a militarily controlled and 
administratively governed pilot
60
 
 territory also serves the contingency of figuring 
out what it takes to design and govern a civic administration system should de jure 
internal self-determination result.  At this stage though, the pilot carries more of a 
flavour of secession as the civic administration system carries its own military 
apparatus.  Very importantly, it also carries a legal system which appears 
independent of the Parent State (e.g. appeal process is within itself). 
Viewed from the perspective of the system Sri Lanka (R0), it is the variety posed by this 
simultaneously implemented three-pronged strategy which minimally needs to be absorbed 
in the bid to restore peace.  In this regard, preserving territorial integrity is amongst its most 
jeopardized variables in the quest to adapt whilst conserving identity.  Thus secession is 
what the GoSL representing Sri Lanka deliberately seeks to avoid and continuation of the 
                                                 
59 This is a reciprocal war with the GoSL and it is a moot point as to whom or what instigated the offensive. 
60 Reference to ‘pilot’ is because subsequent roll-out may extend to a wider territory.  Also the pilot provides 
practical experience to support the conceptual content used in negotiations.  
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current Sinhala-dominated centre driven State is what the LTTE on behalf of the Tamils 
finds totally unacceptable. 
 
In sailing thus between Scylla and Charybdis, the cybernetic considerations pertaining to 
designing a process for Peace Talks is to address how such to be designed.  Factored into 
this design is the aspect that whilst only internal or external self-determination can prevail 
at any one moment, they can be pursued conjointly.  Recursively what this means is that 
secession involves the meta-level system the UN, the system-in-focus Sri Lanka (R0) and 
from R-1 the embedded Tamil system.  In contrast, internal self determination includes 
dealing with R0 and all its embedded systems (R-1) and in turn its array of embedded 
systems (R-2). 
 
3.3.1  Applying Principle Based Negotiation to Design a Process 
 
Part I established the argument for ‘principle based negotiation’ of the calibre which lent 
itself for use by others as much as by oneself, thus evidencing the principle of equality.  
These principles were identified as those which are the minimum requirements for viability 
of a system.  Amongst these is the principle of balancing cohesion and autonomy which 
implies there exists a relationship between embedded systems, each of which seeks to 
maximise its autonomy, whilst the supervening system seeks cohesion which integrates the 
otherwise heterogenous systems. 
 
Implicit in the design being proposed is the need for multiple stakeholder representation.  
Clearly, multiracial representation is not a new idea but I explore here the cybernetic 
thinking so that it can be positioned to address what the LTTE has to date repudiated, what 
the Muslims clamour for, and the Sinhalese have been ambivalent towards. 
 
What is sought  is the unambiguous representation of the supervening system and 
representation from the whole array of its embedded systems.  Yet the reality is that in Sri 
Lanka that principle has been steadfastly rejected, particularly since the onset of the LTTE 
claiming themselves as the sole representative of the Tamils.  At the Peace Talks this also  
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translated into the Tamils being the sole embedded system permitted to negotiate with the 
GoSL. 
 
In other words, during the phase of positioning for Peace Talks there was a variety that was 
not absorbed when multiple stakeholder involvement was canvassed. 
 
3.3.2  Multiple Stakeholder Negotiations across Three Layers of Recursion 
 
This residual variety needs to be absorbed in the bid to gain agreement on multiple 
stakeholder negotiations.  To achieve this I propose using the principle of recursion to give 
recognition to the embedded systems (R-1) and likewise to each of its embedded systems 
(R-2).  For the system of the Tamils, those embedded systems can be based on racial 
subcategories, such as the Northern Tamils, Eastern Tamils, and Hill Country Tamils.  It 
could also for instance be based on religion – Hindu, Christian.  What is important is that 
the chosen sub-system and the entity that will represent it in negotiations is discernable and 
agreed upon both in terms of the chosen category and its representative.  The same 
recursive principle applies equally to the Sinhalese and the Muslims.  For the Muslims this 
embedded system is likely to be the Eastern Muslims, Southern Muslims, Up Country 
Muslims and Other Muslims.  For the Sinhalese it could be based geographically or based 
on religion.  If the latter is chosen, then the representative could be religious rather than a 
political body. 
 
In addressing the need for requisite variety, there is also the matter of the clarity of 
recognition of who represents Sri Lanka, in its capacity as the supervening system.  Here 
the residual variety that needs to be absorbed is the assertion that the GoSL is dominated by 
Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonic thinking and thus represents the Sinhala community.  There is 
also the risk that the GoSL collapses to represent the missing communities when Tamils are 
the only community formally permitted negotiation rights at the Peace Talks.  Once again, 
employing the principle of recursion offers the opportunity to create clarity of 
representation of the supervening system, Sri Lanka. 
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Given this charter, the question becomes - how is such a design to be architected?  One 
way of achieving this is to enable the whole array of embedded systems of the level of 
recursion below that supervening system to be represented.  Based on the premise that 
recursion level pertains to race (rather than say, Province) and the Peace Talks need to 
accommodate the multiple races, this minimally must include the Sinhalese, the Tamils and 
the Muslims
61
 
. 
The value of the negotiating process allowing representation by each of the major race 
communities is that it allows each to discuss their context and the autonomy they seek.  By 
doing so each gains an appreciation of their peer systems and through the process of 
interaction they can exercise their autonomy and jostle to define the manner in which they 
agree to cohere. 
 
By being given the platform of negotiation the embedded entities exercise their autonomy 
to define the rules of cohesion and therefore shape the identity of the meta-level system to 
which they choose to belong.  Additionally, by all embedded systems (all S1s of R0) being 
represented at the Peace Talks, variety is pumped in to avoid the supervening system (R0) 
collapsing to represent the missing embedded systems.  As a result, the supervening entity 
is positioned to negotiate for its cohesive needs and to facilitate the negotiations of the 
embedded systems as they multilaterally negotiate their autonomous requirements.  
 
Providing a formal negotiation process and entailed communication channels for the 
embedded entities within each race community (R-2) overcomes the problem  of non-
contestable proposals. 
 
(Currently)  there is no formal avenue for those represented (e.g. embedded 
communities or Provinces) to be consulted, the  negotiation proposals are non-
contestable.  This is demonstrated by the Tamil Karuna faction’s non-acceptance of the 
ISGA proposal as put forward by the LTTE.  To overcome this flaw, a solution is to 
also enable negotiations at a lower level of recursion so as to use it as a process for 
vocalising acceptance or amendments which then also enables verification (i.e. that 
                                                 
61 This categorization is borrowed from the Dept of Statistics.  Included within the Tamils are Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Indian Tamils and included within the Muslims are Sri Lankan Moors and Malays.  Available at: 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/census2001/five_per/colombo.pdf  (accessed 18
th December 2006).  Another 
option is to have Tamil representation from Northern Tamils, Eastern Tamils, and Hill Country Tamils with 
Muslim representation being Eastern Muslims, Southern Muslims, etc.  
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consultation and agreement has been reached) to take place.  This solution path has the 
advantage of continuing discussion rather than rejection which is what has happened 
with the ISGA proposal. (Solomons & Moscardini, 2006a:121) 
 
3.3.3  Internal Self-Determination Negotiations 
 
What this means is that to achieve peace based on internal self determination, Peace Talks 
negotiations are conducted between three layers of recursion where each recursion level 
feeds into and is fed from its neighbouring level of recursion.  The first tier of negotiations 
is seeking the balance between cohesion and autonomy as required by R0 and R-1 where 
Sri Lanka is the supervening system negotiating cohesive requirements and the embedded 
race systems are negotiating for their autonomous requirements. 
 
The second tier of negotiations is between each race community system (R-1) and their 
array of embedded systems (R-2).  The critical point in the second tier of negotiations is 
that R-1 is now cast in the role of the supervening system seeking cohesion across its 
unique spectrum of embedded systems compared to its earlier role with R0 when its focus 
was negotiating autonomy. 
 
Currently, in the absence of placing the Tamil embedded autonomous system (Tamils as 
represented by the LTTE) in its dual role as cohesive systems (e.g. to embedded Tamil sub-
systems) what happens is the LTTE can get away with negotiating autonomous demands 
whilst ignoring the imposition on peer systems which is what cohesion seeks to address.  
To the extent consensus is not gained among the peer systems in acceding to Tamil 
demands, it accuses the GoSL of being unable to gain ‘Southern’ consensus (effectively the 
Sinhalese).  In other words, the GoSL is burdened with the sole responsibility of gaining 
consensus rather than positioning peer systems to discuss, understand and hopefully absorb 
each others’ variety.  This should aid agreements on cohesive restraints which integrate the 
otherwise heterogenous systems.  It is pertinent to acknowledge that building integration in 
conflict situations calls for high orders of variety engineering.  Attenuating entire systems 
from negotiations may be reducing the encompassing system’s variety-absorbing capacity.  
Such variety engineering needs to also factor in timing of negotiations and the  
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cohesiveness of each of the peer systems compared to each other.  This will be further 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
Due to the non-recognition of the third layer of embedded systems the way is open for the 
second layer of embedment to impose dictatorial command on its sub-systems (i.e. third 
layer of recursion) whilst negotiating autonomy (devolution of power) in its relationships 
with its supervening system.  This makes for non-consistent application of the principle 
where S1 of R0 negotiates for meaningful autonomous powers but that same system does 
not grant its embedded systems such autonomy.  This is a particularly important point 
given the dictatorial style of governance the LTTE adopts which gave it the power to 
consolidate the Tamil voice and leverage to negotiate with the GoSL.  Yet sustained peace 
is unlikely to take root under a command mode of governance.  Deprived of voice, revolt is 
invited by sub-systems as already indicated by the Karuna faction of Eastern Tamils.  In 
other words, the LTTE lacks experience in building cohesion across its heterogenous sub-
systems except by exercising dictatorial command or using the dominance of one of its 
embedded systems.  For example Northern Tamil hegemony, which ironically is the same 
disease they accuse the Sinhalese of perpetrating on Sri Lanka. 
 
It must be acknowledged that a two tier system of negotiations does not automatically 
confer consistency of principles.  However, what the Pre-Talks can negotiate is that the 
manner in which cohesion is enacted between R-1 and R-2 is in principle the same manner 
in which cohesion will be invoked between R-0 and R-1. 
 
Let me explicate using two examples.  If more autonomy (constitutionally known as 
devolution of power) is the rule of the relationship between R-1 and R-2 then that same 
rule is available for use between R-0 and R-1.  Likewise, if meaningful non-discriminatory 
provisions override majority based decision making then that same rule is what needs to be 
carried forward in relationships between R0 and R-1.  It is this type of interlocking 
transposition rules that will act to circumvent or at least reduce the hypocrisy that prevails 
where devolution of power and dictatorial command exists between neighbouring levels of 
recursion.  
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Applying this type of interlocking, what we may find is that the system Sri Lanka will not 
be able to get away with its discriminatory legislation pertaining to religion or Presidential 
immunity.  If it does, it opens the way for the Tamils to do likewise and negotiate the same 
in terms in its relationships with its supervening system, its peer systems and its embedded 
systems.  Similarly, the ISGA proposal will not be able to get away with its majority 
ensured power base and therefore control, for that same privilege would then be available 
to the dominating Sinhalese in their relationship with the system Sri Lanka (as the Tamils 
convincingly argue currently prevails). 
 
It is vital to realise the remedy lies in the amalgam of the design.  Namely, enabling 
negotiations across the full spectrum of S1 embedded systems, involving paired sets of 
Peace Negotiation linking neighbouring layers of recursion (refer Figure 9) and 
interlocking the reciprocity of principles applied.  
Set Two: Peace Talks between each R-1 system and all its embedded systems (R-2)
Sri Lanka (R0)
Other minor ethnic 
communities (R-1)
Sinhalese (R-1)
Muslims (R-1)
Tamils (R-1)
Southern Province Sinhalese (R-2)
Eastern Province Sinhalese (R-2) 
etc …(R-2)
Northern Province Tamils (R-2)
Western Province Tamils (R-2)
Estate Tamils  (R-2)
etc …(R-2) Eastern Province Muslims (R-2)
Southern Province Muslims (R-2)
Veddhas (R-2)
etc …(R-2)
Burghers (R-2) 
Set One: Peace Talks between R0 and all its embedded systems (R-1)
Key
etc …(-R2)
Figure 9 – Two sets of Peace Talks between Three Layers of Recursion
 
3.3.4  System Representation 
 
Having identified the systems and multiplicity of roles that the systems are called upon to 
play, the question is – who will represent those systems?  As discussed in Part II, the GoSL 
in its representative capacity of Sri Lanka needs to be represented in such a manner as to 
avoid the pitfall of the GoSL being synonymous with the Sinhalese.  Also the GoSL must  
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encapsulate each of the major embedded systems so that it does not collapse to representing 
missing embedded systems.  In Part I it was discussed that S1 Management Units play a 
dual S3 function.  Thus, it means that GoSL in its S3 role for R0 must be represented by 
the Management Unit of each of its embedded S1 systems. 
 
In Part II it was proposed that each of these S1 Management Units of the embedded race 
systems could be represented by the governing, and maybe opposition, political parties due 
to the heavy emphasis of Sri Lankan politics being race based.  For the sub-race systems, 
an option is for the representative/s to be drawn from the provincial political systems. 
 
Whilst the Muslims, specifically the Moors, have asked for representation at the Peace 
Talks, such requirement is rarely vocalised by the Sinhalese.  This implies that the 
Sinhalese, besides the Tamils in the guise of the LTTE, will also need to be convinced of 
the value of Sinhalese participation.  This poses the critical question - who will represent 
the Sinhalese - for it cannot be the putative GoSL?  Or if it is, then the GoSL should not 
play the supervening role.  Due to ramifications for secession, the latter permutation is very 
unlikely to be agreed to by the Sinhalese which means the Sinhalese will need to find a 
representative of its own which is not the GoSL nor carries the aura of being the GoSL.  It 
is evident the Muslims already understand the value of their race being directly represented 
at the Peace Talks.  By virtue of race based political parties, one of (or a combination of) 
the two prime Muslim political parties is the obvious candidate to represent the Muslims. 
 
Overall, it is the principle of representation that needs agreement at the ‘Talks about the 
Talks’.  It would also help if the representation is by multiple entities if such is the 
preference of one or more of the systems.  This is a factor built into the negotiations 
process which is discussed further in Chapter Five. 
 
3.3.5  Large Group Interventions 
 
It is one thing to advocate balancing of cohesive and autonomous needs based on 
multilateral negotiations and the need for a broader spectrum of issues to be considered.  It 
is quite another to enquire whether the ‘traditional agenda driven meeting format’ is  
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adequate to the task of absorbing variety both in terms of multiple stakeholder involvement 
and the breadth of content issues that need to be addressed. 
 
It also opens the question -  is the current design of Peace Talks, which so far has been 
predominately top-down driven, adequate to the task, particularly given the variety 
inherently existing in the complexity of severe conflict? 
 
This question pertaining to the variety absorption capability of the chosen negotiation 
format is a significant ‘negotiation process design’ issue.  Clearly, the call is for processes 
capable of handling large group interventions both in terms of protagonists involved in 
negotiations and the number of subject domains as it pertains to content. 
 
There is also need to build a Feedback Adjuster process as part of the monitoring process.  
The process also needs to include an Adjuster Organizer so that the rules under which the 
negotiations are conducted are themselves exposed to correction. 
 
These considerations are addressed in Chapter Four and Five.  
 
3.3.6  External Self-Determination (Secession) Negotiations 
 
The projected view by the secessionists is that if Peace Talks fail and/or the intensity of 
war does not resolve the conflict then the option of secession will be escalated to the UN.  
Occasionally, there is the whisper of the need for UN peacekeeping forces. 
 
In VSM terms, these are algedonic signals breaking through to even higher levels of 
recursion seeking resolution by lower levels of recursion to conserve their identity.  Here 
we see a change in the recursion levels and the composition of the systems involved.  The 
aggrieved system rises to be on par with the Parent State as it presents its case to the UN 
meta-level system to become a State.  By doing so, it also frees itself of association with 
the parent’s embedded systems.  Additionally, the response to the algedonic signal is called 
upon to address a different set of content issues compared to internal self-determination,  
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the most contentious of which pertains to delineation and defence of sovereign territorial 
borders.  
 
We need to gain an understanding of the UN position on secession rights and defence of 
territorial integrity.  This will then be tied to addressing the matter of interlocking of 
reciprocity of principles as discussed in the proposal outlined in Section  3.3.3  -. titled 
Internal Self-Determination Negotiations. 
 
Let us also recall here that unilateral declaration of Statehood as well as bi-lateral 
acceptance is inadequate to participate in the international exchange systems.  Of course, 
this does not preclude such matters as name, flag, anthem and language being unilaterally 
declared and even accorded bi-lateral acceptance.  However UN recognition of such 
Statehood is required, as it is predominately the gateway into almost all of the international 
interchange systems, when a State seeks entry into the interoperability systems in its own 
right rather than on a proxy status.  According such multilateral recognition of the identity 
of Statehood is a matter for UN Member States to decide.  Had there been or should there 
become at least two international interchange systems then the UN would not carry this 
weight of authority and power pertaining to matters of secession (Recall Stokes on Nature 
of Identity discussed in Part I). 
 
Blay concludes that “international law neither recognizes nor prohibits self determination
62
 
 
as a right in the post-colonial context, and that the law is in this sense ‘neutral’”. (Blay, 
1984: iii)  Consequently claimant and counter-claimant influenced by the strategies of 
States that un/successfully ceded after decolonization, design their own self help measures 
in pursuit of their position on secession. 
If the "process of dissolution of the state" remains without any legal restrictions, then 
secession as included by the right of self-determination is also without legal restriction.  
In the absence of restriction on the "dissolution of the state" only the power of a 
government or the power of a secessionist movement governs the process (Basic et al., 
1997). 
 
                                                 
62 In much of Blay’s thesis he uses the term ‘self-determination’ to cover both internal and external self-
determination.  Nevertheless, it is fair to assert without too much fear of contradiction that internal self-
determination is a matter for domestic not international law.  
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So in this sense, acts of war, Peace Talks, de-facto State are all self-help measures that each 
protagonist adopts based on their interpretation of how the international community will 
respond to their claims. 
 
3.3.7  Change in Recursion Levels and Systems  
 
When an embedded system takes its secession claim to the UN, the recursion question that 
arises is whether the claimant system in its negotiating capacity is an embedded system of 
the Parent State or a system on par with the parent.  As stated earlier I contend it is the 
latter.  It is recognized de jure the claimant system is an embedded system within the 
Parent State but the distinction being drawn here is its status in negotiations.  
 
As would be expected, the distinguishing feature between internal and external self-
determination is that in the former the aggrieved system is embedded within the Parent 
State  whereas in the latter each belongs to the other’s environment.  Therefore, with 
external self-determination each system is responsible to manage its own embedded 
systems in terms of balancing its cohesion and autonomy.  Each system does not need to 
bring its embedded systems into resolution across the other system as is the case with 
internal self-determination.  Flowing from the Parent State and prospective State being on 
par with each other, it also avoids the confusion of representation in those instances where 
internal self-determination negotiations were not carried out across the full spectrum of 
embedded entities. 
 
This distinction between the composition of systems engaged in negotiations in external 
and internal self-determination is vital.  In internal self-determination the creation and 
acknowledgment of the rules of governance of the supervening system by its embedded 
systems is essential.  In external self-determination it is exactly that supervening system 
that is dissipated as a consequence of creating two supervening systems.  This distinction 
appears to have gone unrecognized in the Sri Lankan peace initiatives.  The relationship as 
it pertains to external self-determination has been recognised, but it has been applied in the 
context of internal self-determination.  To date what has been recognized is the relationship  
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as it pertains to external self-determination but it has been applied in the context of internal 
self-determination initiatives. 
 
3.3.8  Change in Issues 
 
With internal self-determination a fundamental issue is the balance between cohesion and 
autonomy within the State.  The question thus is - what are the rules of governance so that 
the various systems, like races and Provinces, can co-exist?  How can they conserve their 
identities whilst encompassed under the identity of one overarching identity that integrates 
otherwise heterogeneous elements?  Whilst the balance between cohesion and autonomy is 
still an issue between States, in secession negotiations the emphasis is on who gets what in 
assets and liabilities and the governance rules that pertain to the sharing of resources that 
do not lend themselves to division (e.g. rivers that run across territorial borders). 
 
Having  gone to the UN for resolution it is found that the UN’s manner of resolving 
contentious secession issues is primarily via its ‘recognition according’ system.  Such 
issues as debt allocation, war reparation and natural resource sharing are not in themselves 
matters that the UN addresses. 
 
Yet for debt-swollen States like Sri Lanka, debt allocation is significant.  To not allocate 
debt is to transfer asset infrastructure without its corresponding liability.  For the exiting 
embedded system this makes secession an extremely attractive alternative to internal self-
determination.  If debt is not apportioned, the Parent State carries the burden of debt 
relating to assets that are longer theirs. 
 
The question becomes - on what basis is debt to be allocated?  This question needs to 
extend to debts associated with fighting the war and to prevention efforts.  These debts 
pertain to both sides, to the supervening system and its exiting embedded system. 
 
The added difficulty of debt sharing is - who is responsible in the event of non-payment by 
the new State given that the initial debt was taken out by the Parent State?  This question of 
repayment guarantee is essentially the same issue encountered when devolved systems of  
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governance under internal self-determination seek international debt raising rights.  An 
option under secession is for debts to be re-allocated under new lending relationships.  
Thus the new State arisen out of secession organises its own finance and pays off the 
Parent State and the Parent State re-organises its debt portfolio.  Such matters are bi-lateral 
agreements that need to be achieved between the Parent State and prospective new State 
rather than matters which the UN addresses. 
 
The UN, however, in its recognition deliberations must address two very contentious 
issues.  What are the altered territorial borders under separation, and how are areas of 
mixed population demographic to be governed?  This should not surprise us for these are 
the very two questions that also confronted internal self-determination and so they appear 
at a higher level of recursion in pursuit of resolution. 
 
Certainly the border question needs clarification so that the UN can delineate the territorial 
borders of the parent and new State.  This in turns opens the question of - on what basis are 
those borders determined and what happens to those people bearing a different identity to 
that covered by the overall identity of each State? 
 
This is where international law is neutral.  It neither states nor denies prescriptive rights 
regarding secession.  Yet, these are matters for the UN Member States to deliberate upon 
both in terms of the benefit the chosen solution will bring to them in their individual 
capacity as a Member State, for their region and globally.  Claimants wanting secession 
and counter-claimants opposing secession will undoubtedly politically lobby the UN 
Member States to gain support for their view.  As Blay pragmatically recognises – 
 
Separatist demands founded on territorial claims have international dimensions, which 
necessitate the search for international, regional or global solutions.  Political, and most 
of all, strategic considerations play a significant role in these conflicts.  This is 
underscored by intervention of state third party claimants who seek advantages.  The 
rejection of separatism in these cases is therefore not just a refusal to settle an internal 
issue with the beneficiary group in the parent state.  The repudiation is usually a 
strategic or political defensive action against the state third party.  It is a function of 
definite strategic interest or threats. (Blay, 1984:276) 
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3.3.9  Design Considerations for the Prescriptive Basis for Secession  
 
In the absence of prescriptive rights on post-decolonization secession, war and sabotaging 
internal self-determination Peace Talks are self-help measures frequently employed by the 
protagonists to avert or precipitate secession as pertinent to each protagonist’s position.  
The events in Sri Lanka and many other conflict-torn States evidence this pattern.  Given 
the violation of human rights the question becomes - can international law rise to the 
occasion and prescribe the basis upon which such secession rights can be exercised?  It is 
this basis of prescriptive rights that I seek to address next. 
 
As international law would have to cover a plethora of permutations that give rise to 
conflict, one way to design the prescriptive basis for secession rights is to study the patterns 
of conflicts to date and at least cater for known types.   This pattern could be looked at 
from a content point of view and/or a process point of view.  Blay, coming from a legal 
angle in his PhD thesis, extensively addressed the pattern of post-decolonization secession 
attempts from a content perspective as evidenced in the secession decisions taken by the 
UN.  Blay – 
 
addresses the issue as to whether self-determination exists as lex lata  beyond the 
context of decolonization and concludes that it does not exist.  … (Blay concludes) that 
in view of the persistence of competing claims usually accompanied by conflicts of 
international dimensions, and in view of the relationship between human rights and 
self-determination, it is desirable to recognize the right, at least in cases that involve 
gross deprivation of human rights (e.g. genocide). (Blay, 1984:iv – last brackets in 
quote are in the source) 
 
Another way, either individually or in conjunction with content considerations, is to design 
the prescriptive basis on ‘process’ pattern recognition.  I concur with Blay –  
 
In supporting a case for post-colonial self-determination, one must admit it entails the 
risk of opening a Pandora’s box, particularly in plural societies.  However, the 
awareness of this risk only heightens the need to draw a proper balance between the 
rights of the individual and his subgroup in the community and the requirements of the 
existing unified state system which provides the vehicle for the realization of the 
interests and goals of the community at large.  Support for post-colonial self-
determination entails other specific problems.  For instance, what condition must 
precede a claim to make it admissible, what criteria must be used to ascertain these  
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conditions, who must decide on the existence of these conditions and who would be the 
admitting authority?  Would attempts to regulate the right not conflict with the norms 
of non-intervention? (Blay, 1984:199) 
 
To the extent that Blay addresses these very valuable questions, he again invokes pattern 
recognition as evidenced by the instances of post-decolonization secession claims decided 
upon by the UN. 
 
Given our interest in process, I want to propose answers to those five questions Blay raised 
and consider the UN Charter as it pertains to secession considerations.  Basic et al. describe 
them as: 
 
Article (1) UN Charter establishes the principles and purposes of the UN.  Paragraph 1 
of the Article states one of the purposes to be "to maintain international peace and 
security".  Paragraph 2 of the Article states another of the purposes to be the 
development of "friendly relations among nations".  This is to be based on the principle 
of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples".  The Preamble has previously 
related these two purposes in obliging the Member States to "live together in peace 
with one another as good neighbors".  Article (55) uses the same language as Article 
1(2), and adds to it an argument about how to realize the principle of "equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples". It seeks to create "conditions of stability and well-
being" that are necessary to the realization of the purpose of "friendly relations among 
nations" based on the principle of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 
(Basic et al, 1994:421) 
 
To me Blay’s questions pertain to matters of process (not content) worthy of answering 
from a cybernetic perspective of what ought (legally, de lege ferenda) to be some of the 
criteria for assessing secession claims.  By opting for ‘ought’ I am not seeking to base it on 
precedence of what worked or did not work in the past with secession claims, although the 
proposed process needs to be able to accommodate that too.  Rather, I am seeking some 
overarching principles to cover a wider spectrum of secession claims than experienced to 
date. 
 
As might be expected, for the same reasons as discussed in Part I of this Chapter I once 
again resort to the Principles of Effective Organization.  It is these principles, grounded in 
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, that I propose for adoption by the UN as part of its 
‘process’ prescriptions.  Vital to this is balancing autonomy and cohesion within levels of  
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recursion.  Equally vital is the issue of homeostasis and error control feedback systems 
which require monitoring and therefore necessitate criteria specification. 
 
To test whether these principles of Effective Organization stand up to the requirements of 
secession claims, they should be applied to a wide sample of secession claims experienced 
to date.  Whilst this is not undertaken in this thesis it warrants research in its own right.  A 
preliminary test is conducted using the example of the Sri Lankan conflict.  However, let us 
understand the issues generically. 
 
3.3.9.1  Consequence of the Inherent Conflict of Principles  
 
Let us first come to grips with the inherent conflict between the right of self- determination, 
which the oppressed seek to exercise, and the territorial integrity which the Parent State 
seeks to maintain and therefore defends.  Self-government is particularly contentious when 
exercised in secession as opposed to internal self-determination because the Parent State 
loses a part of its geographical land and associated ocean.  It is this aspect of secession that 
causes Parent State s to go to war to defend their territorial borders.  On the other hand, the 
prospective State, steeped in its people’s history and perception of inequality, gathers its 
force to fight for territory so that it can present itself to the multinational community with 
its reasons for secession and a territory with which to secede.  Since acquiesce of the Parent 
State is unlikely for reason already mentioned, the prospective State’s territory has to be 
acquired by war and maintained by establishing its own ‘de facto’ civic administration 
system. 
 
It is this quandary that the international community has to resolve, not just in the case of 
individual conflicts as it has done to date (which Blay examined in his thesis), but as a 
matter of principle.  In other words, the quest is to absorb the variety of each of these 
conflicting principles so that equal rights are respected and peace prevails.  Additionally, 
caution must be exercised if the international solution is to revert the seeking of a 
resolution to a lower level of recursion, meaning back to the Parent State and the embedded 
system seeking separation.  
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Basic et al., propose a way of resolving this quandary at the UN level of recursion.  They 
very usefully propose –  
“International law must confirm the right of secession as it does the preservation of 
territorial integrity, but consider the relationship between the two in reference to the 
prospect for internal democratization including respect for human and minority rights.” 
(Basic et al., 1997:432) 
This couches the cohesive terms, internal democratization and respect for human and 
minority rights, and the consequences if they are flouted, namely secession or preservation 
of territorial integrity. 
In other words, the cohesive requirement of the UN international community is - each State 
has all the autonomy it wants so long as it demonstrates equality and respect for human 
rights.  Abide by this rule and the UN will uphold a member State’s entire sovereign 
territorial domain.  Fail in this consistently and flagrantly and the door opens for secession.  
Likewise, those seeking secession must abide by the same cohesive requirement.  They 
must show that their bid for secession has demonstrated respect for human rights, and that 
their form of governance, both in enactment and implementation, evidences the principle of 
equality across its heterogenous embedded systems. 
There is more detailed research required in this area.  For example, what Basic et al. do not 
address is what happens when neither side adheres to such internal democratization and 
respect for human and minority rights.  The value of this proposal is that it holds a certain 
tension capable of absorbing the variety of the attractiveness of war, both in terms of the 
argument of defending borders and acquiring territory.  The same holds for promoting 
internal democratization.  It behoves us to reflect whether there is more to consider given 
that both the Parent State and its aggrieved embedded system need to transition from an 
autocratic form of governance which unduly dis/favours segments of its community.  
What is significant in Basic et al.’s proposal is that it gains its force by working between 
the recursion levels applying interlocking reciprocal principles. This is much like my 
process based proposal concerning internal self-determination.  It squarely places the onus 
of resolution on internal self-determination and is elevated for UN resolution in the event 
of failure of internal self-determination which has respected certain international cohesive  
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considerations.  By this clarity in terms of the process and conditions of dissolution of 
State, the UN lends its cohesive strength to support agreement on internal self-
determination.  In this sense, the UN employs a non-interventionist position leaving 
resolution to the internal affairs of a State. 
 
Now I want to address the issue of non-intervention and Buchheit’s reasoning.  In my 
opinion, like Basic et al., Buchheit outlines the elements of balancing cohesion and 
autonomy.  Buchheit’s view is –  
 
the basic world community policy is one founded on a principle of ‘maximization of 
international harmony coupled with a minimization of individual human suffering’ and 
this principle amounts to a doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of a State, 
unless, by its treatment of its own subjects the State transgresses a collective sense of 
the minimum requirements of human dignity and social order. (Blay, 1984:288) 
 
Concerning intervention, it is interesting to note the thinking that surrounded the bid for 
Aaland Islands to be annexed to Sweden which was successfully disputed by Finland.  This 
was in 1921 in the time of the League of Nations, the forerunner to the UN.  Here -   
 
The Commission of Jurists noted that its opinion did not prejudge the issue as to 
whether a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power to the detriment of a 
section of the population of a State which could give rise to an international dispute 
was necessarily confined to domestic jurisdiction.  The Commission of Rapporteurs on 
the other hand was quite unequivocal.  It noted that the right of a minority to separate 
from its parent community could be permitted as a “last resort when the State lacks 
either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees to protect 
the rights of the disaffected minority”. (Blay, 1984:171) 
 
Here we see the Commission of Jurists keep the door open for unresolved domestic 
disputes to be escalated to an international forum for resolution.  And we have the 
Commission of Rapporteurs clearly state that separation is a last resort when a domestic 
solution has proved ineffective in reaching agreement and/or application.  
 
Cybernetically I concur with the Jurists’ opinion for it is consistent with the view that 
undecidable propositions need to move to higher levels of recursion to gain and absorb 
variety so that solutions become possible.  I agree too with the Commission of Rapporteurs 
for cybernetically I interpret their position as being that cohesive requirements by a higher 
level of recursion should be applied only when autonomy as exercised by systems  
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belonging to the lower levels of recursion lack the requisite variety to resolve their own 
conflicts.   
 
Marrying what these two learned bodies said is that before secession is considered the 
meta-level system needs to discern for itself whether adequate process has been applied by 
the lower levels of recursion to resolve the conflict.  If the process is found inadequate then 
the meta-level system will re-direct that due process be followed by the lower levels of 
recursion.  If the process has been adequate, then the meta-level system will consider the 
secession claim and reach a decision.  The due process that I am proposing is the Principles 
of Effective Organization which include monitoring and error control feedback processes.  
Basic et al.’s proposal hinges on the cohesive restraint of abiding by equality and respect 
for human rights.  Buccheit describes failure to abide by these principles as ‘transgresses a 
collective sense of the minimum requirements of human dignity and social order’ 
 
The UN’s form of intervention is one of approval or disapproval of secession claims.  It 
leaves, for example, the manner of governance and way in which equality is to be 
implemented up to the claimant or counter-claimant to determine.  The UN stands in 
judgement as to whether these matters have been successfully resolved and on that basis 
recognises or denies the secession claim. 
 
This therefore means that the issues discussed in internal self-determination remain and in 
this sense internal self-determination is pivotal to taking a case to the UN for secession.  
What I am proposing is that the UN needs to ascertain - was internal self-determination 
given a chance to work or did it fail because the peace conversation was sabotaged or the 
process itself flawed?  Were agreements made, was implementation monitored against 
established criteria, and were there procedures in place to correct errors to review criteria?  
Were the rules of governance based on the application of consistent principles across the 
layers of recursion? 
 
3.3.9.2  Territorial Integrity with a Different Twist 
 
Whilst much of what has been discussed in this section has been legally couched, the 
cybernetic relevance is its variety exposition.  In this regard, the question is - what happens  
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if internal self-determination does not resolve the conflict and the Parent State obstructs 
democratization and/or violates human rights?  According to Basic et al.’s proposal the 
path to secession has been established.  The question is - over what geographical terrain?  
This is our old contentious territorial integrity question with a different twist.   
Let us briefly look at three obvious permutations and the ramifications they pose.  Grant 
secession based on land - 
1.  Historically occupied by the aggrieved group but which has since been settled with 
people from other communities. 
 
Given the multifaceted nature of the community and irrespective of whether it resulted 
from a change in population demographics due to state-aided colonization, the question 
remains how are minority groups to be protected?  Not surprisingly, this is the same 
question facing internal self-determination negotiations and agreements. 
2.  Currently controlled by the secessionist (de-facto state). 
 
The problem here is that to acquire this territory the secessionist has to essentially wage 
war (especially where the Parent State is perceived to have orchestrated a change in 
population demographics) which is exactly what the international mandate is seeking to 
avoid and which is reinforced by the penalty of losing the right of secession.   
3.  Hybrid of both – controlled territory and historically occupied lands. 
 
To the extent the secessionist does not acquire and control the full complement of 
territory it desires or requires to achieve viability, the secessionist will probably rely on 
the arguments which support its historically occupied territories.  This re-opens the 
question how are minority groups to be protected. 
Furthermore, whatever the basis for land allocation to the secessionist, there is the 
overriding question of what happens to the aggrieved community who for whatever reason 
opted to live in the Parent State.  For those who opt to live in the Parent State , like with 
internal self-determination, the need for minority protection rights continue and the  
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question is - how will the Parent State protect the remaining community’s minority rights 
which group would have become a numerically even more minor community?  Here there 
is also the permutation that the Parent State could require that all those of the secessionist 
community leave the Parent State and vice versa.  For those others who migrate at the time 
of secession there will also be the question of how citizenship and physical migration 
between the parent and new State will be handled. 
 
3.3.9.3  Jostling for a Decision 
 
War is a signal which amplifies the call to listen and given that the UN has a preference for 
evidence of viability it is almost inevitable that the secessionist will have engaged in war so 
as to control and administer its own territory.  In turn, the Parent State would have invoked 
its rights to defend its territory.  Whilst there is the permutation of a non-war history, such 
is a rare find
63
From a cybernetic viewpoint, let me conclude this discussion on external self-
determination from the perspective of homeostasis (discussed in Chapter Two).  Such 
homeostasis has four permutations  –  a) one to one relationship, b) one to many 
relationships, c) many to one relationship, and d) many to many relationships. 
.  Thus whilst there maybe political and strategic jostling to rationalize war 
to the international community, a more useful indicator for the UN’s secession 
deliberations is to evaluate minority protection legislation and implementation as evidenced 
by the claimant’s de-facto governance record and the counter-claimant’s constitutional 
amendments and actions.  Such minority protection legislation and implementation 
capability is paramount for the new State if future balkanization is to be avoided. 
The UN recognizes that peaceful relationships need to work across all these homeostats.  
For example, State to State, Region to State, etc.  It also recognizes that the critical 
variables for peaceful relations are human rights and minority protection.  When deciding 
upon secession claims the UN Member States are called upon to deliberate on the actions 
and constitutional architecture of who has abided by and/or exceeded the physiological 
limits of those variables.  Awareness of those physiological limits however is heuristically 
                                                 
63 Exceptions were India’s ‘satyagraha’ based independence movement as led by Mahatma Gandhi against 
Britain.  The other is The Dalai Lama’s quest to free Tibet from China by non-violent means.  
Chapter Three  162 
 
rather than algorithmically determined by the UN Member States at the time of considering 
secession claims.  Recognizing the principle of cohesion and autonomy, the UN also allows 
each State to run its own internal affairs and therefore intervenes only when internal self-
determination has proved to be a failure and when physiological limits of critical variables 
have been consistently exceeded.  To this I would add for the reasons argued earlier, that 
the other Principles of Effective Organization need to be present to warrant the success or 
otherwise of secession. 
 
3.3.10 Negotiating A Way Forward  
 
The guiding objective is long term peace in Sri Lanka.  For that reason war is not 
considered a solution as victory can lead to retaliation unless supported by a civilian code 
of equality of rights.  War appears to serve a purpose in propelling the quest for equality or, 
in its absence the severance of association. 
 
To establish that case for severance or not, internal self-determination is an option.  This 
Chapter has argued that to date, negotiations to agree on such internal self-determination 
has not been designed to work.  Quite apart from anything else, the cybernetic insight of 
this Chapter is that the negotiations process itself has been flawed on multiple fronts.  In 
the meanwhile, it acknowledges that internal self-determination negotiations can draw 
strength from the meta-level position of the UN which recognises both preserving 
territorial integrity of existing States and secession as rights.  The former means the 
secessionist needs to find a solution within the ensemble that comprises the Parent State, 
whilst the latter means the Parent State has to find a way of accommodating equality to 
avoid secession. 
 
Given this tension, internal self-determination lies in the pivotal position.  If internal self-
determination negotiations are successful, then the problem is solved and no further 
recourse is required.  If self-determination is unsuccessful it opens the doorway to negotiate 
secession.  This means internal self-determination will be orchestrated so as to concurrently 
position for the contingency of resolution being declared by the meta-level  system.   
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Initially that was India, the dominant regional power, and now that meta-level recursive 
layer has risen to the UN.  The question is - how can this tension be employed in the quest 
for peace? 
 
First let us, recognise there is a fundamental difference in the negotiations that pertain to 
internal self-determination and external self-determination.  The distinction is of critical 
relevance in designing the negotiation process particularly in terms of a) avoiding 
collapsing the representation issue, and b) design considerations as they pertain to 
balancing cohesion and autonomy.   
 
With internal self-determination the very identity of the Parent State is being re-architected.  
This translates to the need to design and balance the cohesive needs of the Parent State and 
the autonomous demands of its embedded systems.  These requirements co-exist and for 
the reasons discussed in Part II of this Chapter this requires that the Parent State and all its 
embedded S1s via its representatives be directly involved in the negotiation of re-
architecting the identity of the Parent State and its rules of governance.  As “corrective 
action cannot in fact be taken in one place without regard to its effect on their proximate 
activities” (Beer, 1994a p105) the next level of recursion below must also have an avenue 
to have input into the negotiation process so that the design of the process has a way of 
overcoming the risk of non-contestable positions. 
 
With external self-determination, the negotiation is about whether the State/s identities 
(secessionist and amended Parent State if secession is granted) fit within the identity of the 
UN.  The identity per se of the UN is not open for negotiation.  Rather, each claimant and 
counter-claimant to secession positions itself to show that its identity adheres to the 
principles of UN Charter.  In this sense it politically, economically, strategically negotiates 
with the UN Member States (System Ones) who in their deliberations apply the cohesive 
principles of the UN Charter and decide on the merits or otherwise of the secession claim.  
Here we have a fundamental shift where the secession claimant, who was an embedded 
system in the case of internal self determination, presents itself via its representative as on 
par with the Parent State and by doing so disassociates itself from the other embedded 
systems in the Parent State. 
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By untangling this amalgam we see that to date what applies to external self-determination 
has been applied to internal self-determination negotiations.  This process flaw needs to be 
corrected on both fronts.  Firstly, the array of embedded systems via their representatives 
must participate in the negotiations and this needs to be done for the two pairs of recursion 
levels - namely, between the Parent State and its array of embedded systems.  The other 
pair is between each of those embedded systems and its embedded systems.  Additionally, 
cohesion considerations must accompany the negotiations pertaining to autonomy which 
latter element has to date enjoyed exclusivity not only in negotiations but even in the ISGA 
proposal put forward by the LTTE. 
 
This cybernetic realisation now opens two design issues.  Now that there are clearly more 
than two parties to the negotiation which includes negotiating the design and balancing of 
cohesion and autonomy, what is the format of that negotiation process?  This need for 
multi-party negotiations is addressed in Chapter Five.  The other question is - what can be 
done to stimulate sufficient variety so that these multiple systems agree on multiparty 
negotiations particularly given the exclusivity of negotiations accorded to the Tamils and 
more recently to the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamils? 
 
To address this, my proposal is to invoke the UN position which recognises territorial 
integrity and secession rights.  By way of background it is useful to recall some salient 
points of Sri Lanka history and then progress to discussing the proposal.   
 
Over recent decades, the LTTE is alleged to have consolidated its position by eliminating 
most of the other parties who represented the Tamils.  This domination worked for the 
Tamils to establish a de facto functioning civil administrative system (over certain of its 
desired territories) which presents as a useful self help measure towards positioning for 
secession.  This along with its history of armed revolt strengthened the Tamil position as 
represented by the LTTE’s negotiations with the GoSL which began as initiatives towards 
pre-talks facilitated by certain diplomatic countries between political parties and the LTTE.  
This consolidated strength worked to also negotiate the conditions of Peace Talks 
negotiations with the GoSL.  The latter in the instance of the 2002-2003  Peace Talks 
included the LTTE as sole representative of the Tamils, the Tamils as being the only party 
negotiating with the GoSL and that the Peace Talks be contained to addressing the demand  
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for autonomous rights for Tamils with the prelude being interim relief issues pertaining to 
matters of rehabilitation and reconstruction.  In the meanwhile, the GoSL’s preference was 
for negotiations to have extended beyond the LTTE and the content of negotiations to also 
address core issues as to the way the conflict itself was to be resolved.  Neither of these 
conditions were accepted which indicates the variety absorbing power of the LTTE 
compared to the GoSL at that time.  
 
The valuable question worth asking is -  what incentives worked (i.e. cybernetically 
described as absorbed the variety preference for war) to bring about the Peace Talks 
negotiations of 2002.  The press attributed it to the stalemate of war at the time when 
neither the GoSL nor the LTTE could sustain its victories.  I concur and importantly add 
that the LTTE championing the Tamil cause needed the Peace Talks to bring attention to its 
de-facto civil administration an intrinsic element of internal self-determination.  Should it 
fail, as it did, then these concurrently contributed towards the mosaic of elements 
considered as required to build the case for external self-determination.  For the GoSL the 
additional incentive was that Peace Talks gave a chance to abate the erosion of business 
confidence generated by guerrilla warfare, popularly known as terrorism.  The Peace Talks 
themselves were nurtured by what came to be known as the ‘peace dividend’ where the 
international community pledged funding based on progress towards peace.  However, 
Peace Talks stalled which importantly is not necessarily a disadvantage in the contingency 
game plan of Tamils who clamour for self-determination, specifically secession. 
 
In the meanwhile, the LTTE’s consolidation has been fractured, the strategy of war has 
returned, human rights violations keep climbing and equality of rights is lost in the new 
cycle of crises that are evolving.  The LTTE has restated its strategy to seek secession 
whilst for the GoSL territorial integrity is paramount.  The international community, 
primarily the major donors, using economic incentives and calling for respect for human 
rights have been urging a return to Peace Talks.  The trend is now changing with the 
international community as they shift to use economic disincentives (withdrawing aid) to 
goad the return to Peace Talks. 
 
The question that arises is – what variety can the international community contribute to 
give weight to the resolution of the conflict.  So far the economic carrot alone has been  
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inadequate.  Rather the old strategy has returned - negotiate from the strengthen position 
that war affords but since both sides pursue strength the greater likelihood is that entrance 
to talks is via stalemate military conditions.  An option is to enquire what variety can be 
attenuated or amplified by whom else in a bid to re-generate a return to Peace Talks.   
 
Recalling the premise that unilateral declaration of secession is inadequate
64
 
 and the UN 
treats secession as a ‘last resort’ it means the claimant to secession needs to show to the 
satisfaction of the UN Security Council that, amongst other matters, that internal self-
determination failed.   
In the instance of Sri Lanka, to the extent that it happened, I contend it included the failure 
of process as detailed in Part II of this Chapter.  For example, the LTTE limited the 
negotiations agenda to autonomous considerations giving no place for cohesive 
requirements and therefore the balancing of autonomy and cohesion, which are intrinsic 
aspects of internal self-determination.  Given that the very identity of Sri Lanka required 
re-crafting, the exclusion of representatives of embedded systems was another fundamental 
flaw.   
 
For these reasons and others as explained in Part II of this Chapter, I hold that the case to 
invoke the ‘last resort’ of secession is grossly premature.  However, if the physiological 
limit in terms of the intensity of war was to precipitate genocide then the case for secession 
would be quick to strengthen.  There is potential for many corrections to the design of the 
process of internal self-determination negotiations which may result in resolution of the 
conflict. 
 
The point however is the need to get agreement from the opposing protagonist, those 
seeking territorial integrity and secession, to return to peaceful negotiations.  This poses the 
question, who has the variety absorbing power, and that variety absorption power has to 
apply to both the secessionist seeker and Parent State who in each case may entail sub 
groups.  Based on the exposition detailed in this Chapter, that is the meta-level UN system 
                                                 
64 From a permutation perspective let me be precise and recognize that if the secessionist is joining an 
existing State, then such secession could require bi-lateral acceptance.  An example of this is if the Tamils of 
Sri Lanka were seeking secession and rather than forming its own State it opted to join India.   
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and in that sense key UN Member States, like UK, China, India, and USA who have a 
strong diplomatic presence in Sri Lanka.   
 
They can encourage the return to Peace Talks  on the basis that they will support UN 
deliberations of territorial integrity and secession if intransigency pervades internal self-
determination negotiations which have been based on effective processes that have been 
properly conducted.  There are two vital elements being advocated here. 
 
Firstly, the international community that actively encourages the return to Peace Talks does 
not pre-empt its support of territorial integrity nor secession.  If it backs only one of the 
choices it takes away the incentive for the claimant or counter-claimant to participate in 
internal self-determination negotiations.  As Basic et al. says –  
if the international community accepts the position that self-determination means self-
government within the state, but not independence through secession, this too will 
provoke internal and international conflict.  Giving governments a free hand to act 
against sub-national groups by denying them the right to secede gives governments 
opportunities to refuse … democratization and to violate the human rights of the sub-
national group.  (These scholars then explain), a people who seek self-determination 
should also have to respect and develop the highest standards (of) human and minority 
rights.  Similar to the above logic, if they do not then they should remain in the state 
and be obligated to do so. This implies that self-determination cannot bestow an 
immediate and unconditional right to secede.  If a people has (have) a right to secede 
without having to observe human rights while they are in the state or trying to get, then 
equally, there is no pressure on them to do so, and any overtures for internal 
improvement through democratization including respect for human rights can be easily 
rejected. (Basic, et al. 1997) 
The other vital element is that those properly conducted processes are equally applied to all 
sides and are based on principles –  of which proposed are the Effective Principles of 
Organisation.  The way in which those principles themselves are applied in designing the 
process of Peace Negotiation is itself a matter for negotiation.  In other words, the design of 
the ‘Peace Talks’ process is a matter for negotiation itself.  This will involve process 
designers from the multiple systems embedded within the three layers of recursion.  
Indeed, the very identity of the layers of recursion and its embedded systems including who 
represents them is open to negotiation and agreement.  However, these aspects are not 
negotiated in isolation, rather it is iterative and re-visited so that it dovetails across a 
spectrum of related issues.   
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As a final point it is pertinent to know the manner in which the UN admits new States into 
their membership.  Evaluation of a secession claim and counter-claim requires that 
agreement be reached by the majority of all member States of the UN to admit a new 
member State.  Concurrently this means the decision entails changes to the  territorial 
boundaries of the UN State from which it is seceding.  However, prior to this simple 
majority decision, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (i.e. US, UK, 
China, Russia and France) must not vote against recognition of the new member State.  
This veto power (a nay vote) of the five permanent members applies to substantive (not 
procedural) matters, which means that for a particular substantive resolution to be passed 
they must either vote in favour of or abstain from voting on that resolution. 
 
The critical value of knowing of this UN membership process, which is a substantive 
matter, is that it shows another arena in which the quest for secession or preserving 
territorial integrity is fought.  It specifically shows the variables (five permanent members) 
of the homeostatic balance between a State and UN Member States as a set, and the manner 
in which the physiological limits (veto power) of those variables work.   
 
Thus, a non-violent strategic way to handle the claim for secession in Sri Lanka is for each 
protagonist to position their claim and counter-claim with each of the five permanent 
members.  What this means for the Sri Lankan government, presumably the Foreign 
Ministry, is that it must work, to ensure that at least one of the five permanent members 
will exercise its veto power to preserve the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, meaning to 
prevent a change in the territorial borders of Sri Lanka and thus block the secession claim.  
For the Tamils, it means they must cultivate the five permanent members to either vote in 
favour of or abstain from voting on the resolution for secession.   
 
At this juncture, variety considerations indicate the strongest wicket for Tamil secessionist 
claims is if they can add a genocide stream to their claim.  Such becomes a higher 
probability in times of intense war.  However, the question is if such genocide accusation 
will carry affirmative weight with the five permanent members.  Here I refer to China 
given its internal human rights record who may  be  less moved by accusation of war 
atrocities of the Sri Lankan military given the counter-claim argument of defence of 
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka’s island-wide identity.  However, there is the risk that such  
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may not be the case, which therefore needs to be factored into the military offensive against 
the LTTE’s attack and in this sense, if aware of such variety absorption considerations; it 
may serve to reduce the intensity of atrocities.  If opposing protagonists become aware of 
these variety considerations and their physiological limits, the potential exists for each to 
absorb the other’s variety and not allow the interaction to explode. 
 
Returning to the point of influencing the opposing protagonist to engage in internal self 
determination talks, so far the international community has used finance as the carrot 
(making funds available) and a stick (denying funds) to attract the protagonist to talks.  
Proscription, based on terrorism and human rights violations, too has been exercised.  Both 
have helped with sporadic effect, given that options exist to circumvent them.  For 
example, the peace dividend (substantial opening of AID funds) did not need to come from 
the international lending community it would be funded by Tamils themselves.  Likewise 
some developed countries using the stick of denying funds to the GoSL adduced to human 
rights violations, could be overcome by relying on funding from other sources like China, 
Japan and the Middle East.  
 
The strength of the variety absorption capability of the UN proposal as discussed here is 
that it is pitched at identity recognition which no one else, in that vein, can bestow.  Such 
recognition lies at the heart of viability which pertains both to Sri Lanka and its embedded 
aggrieved system - the Tamil race. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By way of a connective summary, the findings of this chapter are particularly relevant to 
Chapter Five.  In the context of Sri Lankan Peace Talks, worked out is a coherent rationale 
based on the application of the VSM that each of the race groups (and not provinces) is a 
system which belongs to R-1.  It also concluded that the LTTE besides being a system in 
the environment, in their involvement in internal self-determination negotiations exercise 
an additional functionality  as  one of the representatives  of the Tamils.   Similar 
representation (Management Unit of S1) is played by the political parties for the other race  
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groups although in Chapter Five representation is extended beyond political groups having 
recognised the principle of Redundancy of Potential Command.   
 
This chapter also proposes the concept of principle based negotiations.  These principles, 
specifically those borrowed from Organizational Cybernetics, are proposed as also suitable 
to diagnose the output of Peace Talks and to form the basis upon which to design the 
process of negotiations.  
 
Recognising the principle of cohesion and autonomy this chapter makes the distinction of 
the relative recursive positioning of representation by the GoSL and the LTTE in the 
context of external self-determination as compared to internal self-determination.  This 
distinction relevant to keeping negotiation contingencies open is employed in the ‘process 
design’ of internal self-determination negotiations which is addressed in Chapter Five.   
 
 
Next Chapter 
 
The next Chapter is devoted to diagnosing three critical aspects pertinent to internal self-
determination. 
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  Chapter Four 
Designing Systems & Their Relationships  
 
 
Interdependence is and ought to be as much  
the ideal of man as self-sufficiency.  
Man is a social being.  
- Mohandas Gandhi 
 
 
Gradual build-up of crisis is a strong indicator of a weak regulatory system which prompts 
the need for system re-design.  Besides addressing the issues which led to the crisis, the re-
design of the system needs to cater for weak signals.  In this sense there are three types of 
weak signals, namely 1) where the signal is weakly evidenced in terms of it being incipient, 
2) a signal which may not have evidenced itself but which can be conceptually discerned, 
3) a signal which is beyond the awareness of the designers of the system.   
 
The objective is to design a system which addresses known issues which may or may not 
have evidenced themselves, and for the design of the system to have the capability to 
address unknown issues.  Let us think of these issues as matters pertaining to content which 
makes the latter requirement perplexing as it seeks to solve content questions which lie 
beyond the contingencies that the system has been designed to cope with.  Yet employing 
structure and processes that connect systems, opportunities are offered to design systems 
with ultrastable capabilities.   
 
Sri Lanka is steeped in many crises amongst which are rampant corruption, a public 
administration system whose independence has been severely denuded, a political system 
where cohabitation between the Executive President and the Prime Minister resulted in the 
proroguing of Parliament and a war which evidences the intensity of race conflict.  These 
are all crises which threaten the viability of Sri Lanka in one way or the other.  Frequently 
these are interconnected crises.  Resolution requires that these matters be settled across that 
broad spectrum as otherwise the overall system runs the risk of solutions being dislodged 
by other interconnected crises.    
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Working with the concept of viability as presented in Beer’s VSM and paying particular 
attention to the aspect of homeostasis and ultrastability, this chapter is presented in three 
parts and seeks to address: 
 
1.  Internal self determination, in particular devolution based on a provincial structure 
and matters pertaining to viability and ramifications thereof. 
2.  The relevance of viability, homeostasis and ultrastability considerations in the 
context of devolution. 
3.  The application of the principles of viability, homeostasis and ultrastability to 
evaluate or design internal self-determination proposals.  
 
 
Part I – Diagnosis of 2002-2003 Peace Talks 
 
4.1.1  Devolution Considerations 
 
One interpretation of the war is that it indicates the unacceptability of secession from the 
point of view of the GoSL.  Equally, it also shows non-acceptance by the LTTE of the 
current governance architecture of Sri Lanka.  A ray of hope emerged at the Oslo Peace 
Talks in December 2002
65
 
 when the concept of a federal structure of governance was 
tabled as an agenda item for discussion and appeared to gain acceptance.  Unfortunately, 
shortly afterwards the LTTE suspended their participation in peace talk negotiations with 
the GoSL.  Whilst meaningful devolved governance has not been achieved in Sri Lanka, 
there have been three notable occasions when it was tabled. These were: 
                                                 
65 Both the GoSL and LTTE Peace Secretariat state “Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, 
the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of 
historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. 
The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities.” – Available at:  
http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/peace2005/Insidepage/PressRelease/RNG/RNG5thDec.asp and 
http://www.ltteps.org/?view=406&folder=5 (accessed 25 April 2007).  
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a)  In the mid 1920’s at the time of the Donoughmore Commission when the Kandyan 
leadership recommended a geographically based federal structure comprising the 
up-country, the low-country and the north & east.  These three segments 
corresponded to majorities being Kandyan Sinhalese, low-country Sinhalese and 
Tamils respectively. 
 
The passage of time has seen the distinction between Kandyan and low-country 
Sinhalese largely evaporate on the political front. They have coalesced into being 
Sinhalese. 
 
b)  In the mid 1950’s when after independence Tamil leadership advocated federalism 
as a solution to the inequalities being experienced by the Tamils.  By the 1990’s this 
had matured to the threat of secession. 
 
c)  In 1989 under pressure from India following the Indo-Lanka Accord the 13
th 
Amendment to the Constitution was promulgated with the intent of devolving 
power to the provinces. 
 
However, as Premaratne (2003) states “As the present governing structure stands 
the central government is all powerful and all powers including those devolved 
could be exercised by the center.”   
 
Prior to the commencement of British rule historians are not unanimous as to whether the 
island, today known as Sri Lanka, was ever governed by a single ruler.  During the British 
period of island-wide colonization (1815–1948) it was administered on the basis of five, 
later extended to nine, provinces
66
                                                 
66 “Under these (Colebrook) reforms (of 1933), the country was divided into five provinces … with the 
provinces increasing to 9 in 1889.” (Leitan, in Arjuna’s Atlas of Sri Lanka, 1997:185) 
.  This provincial concept, based on nine provinces, 
formed the geographical unit upon which the 13
th  amendment to the Constitution was 
architected.  The federal structure as mentioned in the 2002 Oslo Declaration has, in the 
public press and civilian forums, been primary discussed on the basis of a provincial 
structure, with specific emphasis on whether the Northern and Eastern provinces should be  
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amalgamated.  In this regard, asymmetrical devolution, fiscal equalisation and the 
borrowing powers of provinces have begun to be discussed.   
 
What appears absent from the devolution conversation is the concept of viability and in this 
context what constitutes each province’s comparative identity.  It is this deliberation that I 
want to discuss in this chapter. 
 
The important distinction between the kind of devolution sought to avert secession and 
what has been attempted to date is that the unit of devolution needs to be viable, as distinct 
from administrative.  Minimally, this means the unit of devolution needs to be vested with 
the power to make its own decisions pertaining to its devolved subject areas and have a 
healthy financial capability to raise revenue compared to its expenditure responsibilities.  
Devolution of legislative and executive powers in the absence of devolved  revenue 
generating powers handicaps devolution.  Thus, devolution if it is to be meaningful and 
move beyond the administrative domain, must also address the issue of finance, especially 
given the need for capital injections to cater for regional development needs and 
consequent public debt borrowings.  
 
Since 1815 the extent to which there has been a devolved sense of governance has been 
limited to that devolved layer having administrative and implementation powers.  It is well 
known that the 13
th  amendment’s devolution of certain subject domains to provincial 
control (stated in List I) was subordinated to central control by virtue of the Concurrent 
List (List III) which vested the function of planning at both the provincial and national 
level.  Additionally, Article 154G (5) (a) vested Parliament with the power to make laws 
pertaining to any matter set out in List III.  Thus, both legislative and executive power was 
effectively vested in the centre.   
 
What is less well known is that the provinces raise less that a fifth
67
                                                 
67 Source: Lahiri, A. (2001) Capacity Building for Fiscal Devolution in Sri Lanka 
 of their expenses from 
their own revenue and the rest (80%) depends upon transfers from the Central government.  
Of this expense as much as 90% is recurrent expenses (Gunawardena, 2005), which means 
the provinces themselves have had a minuscule hand in development work.  Even less  
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realised is that the negotiations for allocation of provincial funds is formally conducted 
between the Finance Commission and each of the Provincial Governors (an appointee of 
the President) rather than by a Chief/Provincial Minister who is an elected representative of 
the people of the province.  In practice, the primary negotiator is the provincial Chief 
Secretary, the senior provincial public officer. 
 
In this sense, devolution to the provinces is remiss for it enjoys neither planning powers, 
nor the semblance of financial independence and a weak channel for the elected 
representatives to negotiate funding requirements.  Lahiri’s view is that –  
 
Provincial political leaders being relatively junior to national leaders of the same party 
had to play a muted role in their negotiations with the Centre.  Second, the Provincial 
bureaucracy with relatively junior AIS (All Island Service) officers could not negotiate 
with senior AIS officers of the Central bureaucracy. (Lahiri, 2001:v) 
 
 
4.1.1.1  Current Provincial Profile  
 
In most cases there is little to distinguish one province from another.  For example, the 
major distinction between the Uva and Sabaragamuwa provinces is their geographical 
locations.  Provincial issues rarely get an airing as provincial elections tend to be held on 
the same day, if not within a few months of each other (refer Table 4).  Such ‘common day’ 
provincial elections are economically rationalised but what it also means is that individual 
provincial signals are suppressed as the elections campaigns are effectively nationally 
mounted by the various political parties.  Consequently, the opportunity is reduced for 
politicians and voters to send signals via provincial elections to the central government.  To 
get a comparative pattern of political elections in Sri Lanka refer Figure 10.  
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Table 4 - Timing of Provincial Elections 
Province  1988  1993  1999  2004 
Western   2nd June  17th May  6th April  10th July 
North Western  28th April  17th May  25th Jan  24th April 
Northern  2nd June   
             dissolved 22 June 1990  Eastern  19th Nov 
Southern  9th June  17th May  10th June  10th July 
Sabaragamuwa  28th April  17th May  6th April  10th July 
Uva  28th April  17th May  6th April  10th July 
Central  2nd June  17th May  6th April  10th July 
North Central  28th April  17th May  6th April  10th July 
 
 
Having acknowledged these aspects of provincial identity, it is important to realise that the 
provinces do portray three types of race distinction in terms of identity and consequentially 
a language and religious identity.  They can be clustered into those which have a clear 
provincial race majority (i.e. Sinhalese or Tamils) and those which exhibit a reasonably 
balanced mix of races (refer Table 5).   
 
Given the importance of the export sector in generating employment, it is pertinent to point 
out that the corporate sector conducts its business in the English language and these 
commercial companies are overwhelmingly headquartered in the Western province, 
specifically in Colombo.  In terms of language competence the only district where over 
30% of its population is competent in English is Colombo.  The public service sector 
primarily conducts its affairs in Sinhala with English being used by its top echelons of 
management.  It is relevant to point out that in terms of revenue collection considerations 
the commercial sector is the major contributor to the tax coffers, particularly in the Western 
province. 
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Besides the provinces’ financial dependency on the centre, Lahiri (2001) points out the top 
echelons of provincial public service are seconded from the centre’s island-wide public 
service which means the provincial public service lacks independence from the centre. 
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     Table 5 - Provincial Composition Profiles 
Province  Race
♠ 
 
Language
♣  GDP
♦ 
(in 2003, Rs mn)  
Gap Funding
♥ 
(in 2003, Rs mn)  
Western Province 
(Colombo, Gampaha, 
Kalutara) 
Relatively 
balanced race 
mix 
88:35:8    Rs. 771,899 
  3:32:65 
  Rs. 8,382,435 
  95:5 = 61:39 
Northern Province* 
(Jaffna, Killinochhi, 
Mannar, Vavuniya, 
Mullaitivu) 
Predominately 
Tamils 
5:90:12    Rs. 42,558 
  29:7:64 
 
 
 
  Rs. 5,987,393 
  93:7 = .0:100  Eastern Province* 
(Batticaloa, Ampara, 
Trincomalee) 
Relatively 
balanced race 
mix 
39:11:5    Rs. 85,835 
  41:24:35 
Southern Province 
(Galle, Matara, 
Hambantota) 
Predominately 
Sinhalese 
90:3:15    Rs. 152,593 
  36:22:42 
  Rs. 5,857,805 
  86:14 = 10:90 
Sabaragamuwa 
Province 
(Ratnapura, Kegalle) 
Predominately 
Sinhalese 
82:10:13    Rs. 94,188 
  29:28:43 
  Rs. 4,045,126 
  86:14 = 8:92 
Uva Province 
(Badulla, Moneragala) 
Predominately 
Sinhalese 
75:15:7    Rs. 68,223 
  50:12:38 
  Rs. 3,362,506 
  86:14 = 7:93 
Central Province 
(Kandy, Matale, 
Nuwara Eliya) 
Predominately 
Sinhalese 
40:15:5    Rs. 138892 
  32:18:50 
  Rs. 5,778,754 
  91:9 = 12:88 
North Central Province 
(Anuradhapura, 
Polonnaruwa) 
Predominately 
Sinhalese 
85:8:8    Rs. 61,583 
  42:8:50  
  Rs. 3,279,184 
  88:12 = 7:93 
North Western Province 
(Kurunagala, Puttalam) 
Predominately 
Sinhalese 
80:15:12    Rs. 146,998 
  26:31:43 
  Rs. 5,637,003 
  91:9 = 9:91 
Notes: 
*  Province administered by central govt since 1990.  War prevails and some figures 
unavailable
  
♠  Race ratio - Sinhalese : Tamil : Muslim (source:2001 Census Report)  
♣  Language (written) ratio –  Sinhalese : Tamil : English (estimated from:  2001 
Census Report) 
♦  GDP ratio –  Agriculture : Industry : Services (source: Annexure 18, Finance 
Commission – 2004 Annual Report) 
♥  Gap Funding ratio –  Recurrent Expenditure : Capital Expenditure = Provincial 
Revenue : Gap Filled by Centre (source: Table 31, Finance Commission –  2004 
Annual Report) 
 
Overall, the well known irony of the 13
th amendment which was designed to alleviate 
Tamil grievances saw the Northern and Eastern Provinces with their historical Tamil 
dominance function for approximately 18 months.  Thus, whatever potential the 13
th  
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amendment carried in terms of activating a devolved system of governance and distinct 
provincial identities did not materialise. 
 
Since Solomons & Moscardini (2006b) have written on the systemic erosion concerning 
the public service and the prevailing system of governance, I will not delve into it here.  
Briefly, the Executive President is vested with the constitutional right to run all ministries 
of government and to dissolve Parliament anytime after one year of it being in office.  In 
turn -  
 
the Parliament structurally maimed the PAS through its (Ministerial) right to appoint 
the top echelons of the Public Service and thereby effectively transferred development 
planning to Ministers. Additionally, the latest appointments of Commissioners by the 
(Executive) President, bring into the question the independence of the various 
(Independent) Commissions, whose charter is to ensure the fairness of appointments of 
all other government employees. (Solomons & Moscardini, 2006b) 
 
 
4.1.1.2  Meaningful Devolution 
 
The challenge in designing devolution propositions is the need to provide sufficient 
autonomy to avert secession whilst being sufficiently cohesive so as to ensure the island-
wide territorial integrity of the State.   
 
In a bid to address Tamil grievances, a number of devolution proposals have been proposed 
and critiqued by various parties.  None have been accepted.  As the time for proposal 
negotiations, decisions and promulgation has not come to pass, I now want to use the 
example of devolution based on a territorial structure, in specific based on a provincial 
structure as compared to the 2007 SLFP proposal based on a district-centric approach 
which covers a smaller geographic unit than a province.  The option of consociational
68
 
 
arrangements is briefly considered as an alternative or as a hybrid to a territorially based 
federal structure.  
Watts explaining the notion of federation says it is a –  
combination of shared-rule for some purposes and regional self-rule for others within a 
single political system so that neither is subordinate to the other.  Federations have 
                                                 
68 “A consocietal arrangement - the use of ethnic groups, nationalities and communities as the constituencies 
for representation.” Hyden (2006?)  
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varied and continue to vary in many ways: in the character and significance of the 
underlying economic and social diversities; in the number of constituent units and the 
degree of symmetry or asymmetry in their size, resources and constitutional status; in 
the scope of the allocation of legislative, executive and expenditure responsibilities; in 
the allocation of taxation power and resource; in the character of federal government 
institutions and the degree of regional input to federal policy making; in the procedures 
for resolving conflicts and facilitating collaboration between interdependent 
governments; in the procedures for formal and informal adaptation and change. (Watts, 
1999:1) 
 
 
With the objective of assessing the viability of the State and provinces I seek here to 
consider the parity of status between provinces and consequently financial implications and 
in this regard the effect of language.  I have chosen the provincial based federation for two 
reasons. One, to draw a distinction between provincial demarcations based on 
administrative versus decision making based devolution and two, to address the strongly 
contentious debate on whether the Northern and Eastern provinces should be merged. 
 
The prefix ‘meaningful’ is used to denote that the type of devolution sought in a bid to 
avert secession is of the calibre where the devolved units are vested with decision making 
powers pertaining to policy and development planning.  When the functionality of decision 
making (compared to functions like implementation or monitoring) is devolved it opens 
Pandora’s Box.  To make it meaningful requires that it be accompanied by access to 
resources, primarily finance besides what is encompassed within the province – meaning 
people, land, water, etc.  Pertaining to both, decision making powers and finance, is the 
question to which subject domains will it apply. 
 
In the absence of a detailed devolution proposal, let us now consider the ramifications of 
some aspects of devolution which have been voiced since the 2002 Oslo Declaration.  For 
our purposes those aspects are:    
 
•  Provinces as they are now with the option of merging the Northern and Eastern thus 
making eight Provinces. 
•  Provinces granted exclusivity of decision making over their subject domains – 
essentially as described in List II.  Inbuilt here is the need to void the Parliamentary  
Chapter Four  181 
 
and Presidential powers that can easily (as distinct from under emergency times) 
override provincial powers. 
•  Asymmetrical powers where additional functionality, subject domains and financial 
powers are granted to the war-afflicted Northern Province and Eastern Province. 
•  Responsibility by the Centre for fiscal equalisation to achieve parity of status across 
the various provinces through provincially based revenue raising capabilities. 
•  Colombo, with capital city status, being an entity distinct from the Western 
Province. 
 
 
4.1.1.3  Contingency Considerations of Devolution 
 
Before discussing the ramifications, let us first be clear on what is being sought with 
devolution in the context of the short term and longer term.  In the short term the objective 
is to gain agreement between the Tamils who claim an aggrieved experience and want 
autonomy, and others (predominately although not exclusively Sinhalese) who want an 
island-wide Sri Lanka.  In the medium to longer term the objective, I expect, is to build and 
sustain a harmonious State where multi-racial, multi-lingual, multi-cultural  and  multi-
religious plurality prevails and parity of status is achieved across the provinces.  The more 
difficult question however is, what is the longer term objective in the event that such 
harmony is not achieved and chronic crisis prevails
69
 
?   
This contingency issue warrants consideration on many fronts and its response requires 
incorporation into the design of the federal based proposal.  There are four obvious 
responses to the contingency question which I want to address here.   
 
Design a federal system so that if in the longer term the racial/cultural crisis prevails the 
contingency exists: 
 
 
                                                 
69 There is also the case of lack of parity across the spectrum of provinces.  Whilst this situation warrants 
addressing it is not addressed in this thesis both for space reasons and because it is not grievous so long as 
harmony prevails.  However, to the extent that such provincial disparity contributes to the crisis, it is 
addressed in this thesis. 
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a)  To permit secession of those parties grossly aggrieved by the crisis.   
This is likely to be the stance taken by those who favour secession – like the Tamils 
and those who believe that secession is a pragmatic solution rather than continuing to 
suffer bloodshed and economic degradation.  
 
This contingency secession option re-opens the contentious question of what 
geographical terrain is to secede and associated issues as discussed in Chapter Three. 
  
b)  To not permit secession and persevere with further redesign of the system.  
This is the likely position to be taken by those who advocate that Sri Lankan statehood 
be island-wide.   
 
c)  To neither permit nor not permit secession and in that sense not cater for the 
contingency.   
This stance is likely to be taken by those who advocate ‘one step at a time’ and who 
wish to not complicate matters further, especially given the complexity involved with 
getting agreement amongst the differing protagonist. 
 
As likely as this option is, the reality is that there is always a contingency position, 
however vague, in-built into a design.  The question is - what conscious purpose is the 
contingency aimed at.   
 
d)  For the federal system to handle the situation based on the type of crisis that 
evidences itself at the time. 
The likely advocates of this stance are strategists who seek to build ultrastable systems.  
However, much will depend upon the metasystemic capability of the entity chosen to 
guide the ultrastability process when required.   
 
Whilst to some this longer term contingency question may seem unusual, there is much 
evidence to indicate it is already a part of negotiating strategy.   
 
For example, one interpretation of the Tamils’ demand to merge the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces, apart and in addition to their historical homeland argument, is that the response  
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to the contingency of failure is built into the architecture of the federal design.  Stated 
conversely, Sinhalese resistance to such a merger of those provinces is for that very reason 
– the contingency of secession.   
 
Serving contingency considerations but aiming for a different outcome and therefore 
architected differently is the 2007 SLFP proposition for district-centric devolution.  By this 
is meant, if the contingency of facing secession was to return, the loss of territory could be 
contained by an amalgam of small sized districts containing homogenous Tamil 
populations.  What is even more revealing is that by opting for district rather than the larger 
provincial unit of devolution, the whole issue of viability is (probably) voided on the 
premise of districts being too small to financially sustain themselves.  Included here are 
district equality and thus the ramifications of fiscal equalization (discussed below) and 
provincial borrowing rights, particularly foreign borrowings, and associated central 
government guarantees.  In saying this, it is acknowledged that some districts, like 
Colombo and potentially Jaffna in  decades to come, exhibit qualities of viability.  
However, the point is that some appear comparatively excessively weak due to their 
inherent poor infrastructure, like Moneragala, Ampara, Mannar, etc 
What this indicates is that the unit of devolution based on territorial contours is vital to the 
federal design.  Edrisinha expressed this importance as –  
The unit of devolution is THE most difficult issue to deal with in any negotiated 
settlement. This is because since the 1970s, nearly all Tamil political parties have 
called for the merger of the northern and eastern provinces. People may disagree on the 
historical justification for a Tamil homeland or the reasons for the change in the 
demographic composition in the east in the past hundred odd years, but whether we like 
it or not THE first “article of faith” of the Tamil political parties is the merger of the 
two provinces. A solution that can have a chance of success must address this issue and 
not avoid it, as the SLFP proposals have done. The merger was probably the most 
discussed aspect of both the Indo-Lanka Accord and the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. The Thimpu Principles of 1985, subscribed to by all Tamil parties, 
referred to a merger as did the Oslo Declaration of 2002. The founder of the SLMC, 
M.H.M Ashraff recognized that the merger was the pith and substance of Tamil 
aspirations during the Premadasa All Party Conference in the early 1990s and worked 
closely with Tamil parties represented at the conference to devise mechanisms to 
protect the rights of the Muslim people within a merged north and east. Mangala 
Moonesinghe realized the complexities involved as he spearheaded his select 
committee in 1992, when he asked a group of academics to devise a structure for the 
north east that “recognized and did not recognize the merger at the same time.” The  
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merger was confronted and addressed by those responsible for the Constitution Bill 
2000. (Edrisinha, 2007, capitals in original) 
Yet as erudite as this ensemble of thinking is, I wonder at their position in the context of 
concurrently building a ‘fail safe’ contingency plan into the federal design, especially given 
the yarning gap that separates the differing protagonists.  My sense is that Mangala 
Moonesinghe sensed it.  In my opinion there is an equally vital part to be played by 
processes in designing a contingency for the longer term question posed.  This is addressed 
in Part II and III of this chapter. 
At this juncture, I will leave this contingency question and now paint a likely scenario 
based on a federal structure comprising nine provinces as is the case in 2007.  
 
4.1.1.4  Evolution of a Provincial based Federal Scenario 
 
The purpose of this scenario discussion is primarily to gain an awareness of the sensitive 
variables and a heuristic sense of their physiological limits.  It is a scenario discussion, 
because no formal proposal has to date been tabled for acceptance. To the extent that 
proposals have been made they have not been detailed to the point of disclosing legislative 
and executive allocations as they pertain to functionality, subject domains and revenue 
raising avenues.   
  
Working on a province based federal structure, the opening financial and resource position 
is that the –  
 
Provinces are not equally developed in terms of infrastructure, resources and economic 
opportunities and they cannot therefore hope to overcome inter-regional disparities by 
their own efforts and resources.  This is a typical underdevelopment phenomenon. 
(Waidyasekera, 2000:26)  
 
We also already know that the difference between provincial revenue and expenditure 
results in a financial deficit of over 80% for the seven provinces that currently function 
(refer Table 6 and Figure 11 – Provincial Finances).  This deficit gets worse when the 
Western province is excluded for we find that the remaining six provinces earn between  
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8% - 15% of their expenditure from their own provincial revenue raising ability.  The rest 
is contributed by central government funds
70
 
.    
To date, the primary discussion has centred on the merger of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces, and the notion of asymmetrical devolution.  This is taken to mean that the 
provinces clamouring for meaningful devolution (effectively the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces) will need to be granted additional
71
                                                 
70 The funding is based on recommendations made by the Finance Commission and approved by the 
President (Article 154R (7)), and comprises:  
 subject domains, decision making powers 
pertaining to policy and development planning, accompanied by additional revenue raising 
powers which may extend to permitting foreign and domestically funded public debt.  In 
this latter context, whilst recognising that monetary policy (i.e. managing domestic 
currency and interest rates, and foreign exchange rates) is a central government 
responsibility Welikala opinions that “the centre must not guarantee any regional debt.  
This allows lenders to calculate their risks better, and to promote prudent regional fiscal 
management.” (2003)  It is also acknowledged that once agreement has been reached on 
meaningful devolution, what was once referred to as the ‘peace dividend’ will flow, and 
funds will be made available for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war-torn areas 
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.  
1.  Block Grants to cover recurrent expenditure like salaries and rent.  
2.  Criteria based grants to achieve balanced regional development 
3.  Matching Grants which act as an incentive for provinces to generate their own new sources of 
revenue 
4.  Province Specific Development Grants for national projects like integrated rural development, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction.  
 
71 This will mean that the centre’s ability to impose decisions on such provinces will be curtailed.  As 
planning is currently a List III concurrent function and the centre is the predominant source of funds, 
development work is primarily decided upon by the centre.  
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Table 6 - Provincial Finances 
 
What this sketch begins to show is a meaningfully funded reconstruction programme which 
hopefully will not just ‘replace with old equivalents’ but ‘replace with new’ what was 
damaged and blown apart in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.  Few would disagree with 
such ‘updated’ replacement.  However, what I want to address is the imbalance that will 
result if the Sinhala dominated and mixed populated provinces do not keep up.  This is 
particularly relevant as some of the non-war affected provincial economic infrastructure is 
old and has been dismally maintained.  This maintenance is not just visually obvious, but it 
is substantiated by the provincial recurrent expenditure profile which itself comprises 90% 
of provincial expenditure of which 79% of recurrent expenditure is consumed by 
emoluments.  In other words, only a meagre 11% of recurrent provincial expenditure is 
spent on maintenance and 10% of total provincial expenditure is spent on capital 
development. (Gunawardena, 2005) 
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The other socio-economic component to add to this scenario is the effect of: 
•  Diaspora funds being channelled from the war effort to reconstruction and 
rehabilitation,  
•  The hard working nature of Tamils which the war has enhanced and is thus well 
positioned to be employed in economic rebuilding.   
•  The revenue from foreign investments (like cargo ships
72
 
) that the LTTE owns. 
Having said this, the point I am driving at is not that these advantages, the benefits of 
which may take one to two decades to materialise, must be removed.  Rather they must be 
recognised in terms of inter-provincial economic parity in the context of the gap between 
revenue and expenditure as it applies to the various provinces.   
                                                 
72 “These ventures range from running ocean liners to maintaining restaurants. The LTTE, which was using 
chartered ships for transporting its arms and other goods, acquired its own fleet during 1985-86.” 
(Manoharan, 2004)  
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Before contrasting the provincial position and addressing its fiscal equalisation 
implications, let me refer to the helpful example of what happened with the reconstruction 
that followed World War II.  Germany and Japan were two war ravaged countries that 
required massive reconstruction.  By the 1970’s both these countries had re-joined the 
league of leading developed economies and besides other reasons, their prosperity was 
ascribed to the infrastructure and industry that they were forced to build anew compared to 
those countries who continued with their old infrastructure and industry.  Whilst such 
reconstruction initially was a penalty due to the capital outlay, given time it reaped its 
reward as it helped Germany and Japan to leap frog its competitors due to their newer and 
better planned facilities.  In the instance of the Sri Lankan ‘meaningfully asymmetrically 
devolved’ provinces, they would be positioned to do likewise, and without being stymied 
by ‘war reparations’ which Japan and Germany were required to pay and endure. 
 
Let us now return to Sri Lanka’s remaining six provinces which demographically are either 
Sinhalese dominated or of a fairly evenly balanced race mix.  The Western and Central 
Provinces belong to the latter category.  The Western Province, housing the hub of political 
and commercial activity, is the highest revenue earner and is able to self-fund 60% of its 
total expenditure – refer Table 6.  It is also the only province where about a fifth of its 
inhabitants have English language competency which in this era of globalisation and 
private sector led business enterprises is particularly important.  All the other provinces are 
Sinhala language orientated and their economic activity is mainly agricultural and related 
to industries catering for domestic demand.  In terms of future prospects, the Southern 
Province is the next most promising with an express highway, international airport and 
harbour planned which will attract industry that will benefit from such significant 
infrastructure.  
 
What this amalgam means from a financial perspective is that the wealthier provinces will 
initially be the Western and Southern Provinces which given time will be joined by the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces due to war-torn reconstruction.  The remaining will be the 
poor cousins, four of which are currently Sinhalese dominated provinces and the Central 
Province, a mixed race based province which historically prior to the colonial plantations 
was Sinhala dominated. 
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Should Colombo be exempt, as proposed in the 2007 Vitharana Report 
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, from belonging 
to the Western Province, for example on the grounds of it being the capital city and 
financial hub of the State, then that province too would fall into serious deficit financing as 
currently experienced by other non-meaningfully devolved provinces.  Thus, once the 
Northern and Eastern provinces are merged and running well, they will become the major 
subsidizer to what are perceived as the Sinhalese dominated provinces.    
If that happens in the longer term and the inter-provincial gap is too wide the question is 
what ramifications arise?  Will it spawn a cry for secession on the grounds of provincial 
parity being used to drain Tamil prosperity to support Sinhalese dominated provinces who 
do not do what it takes to fend for themselves?   
 
From the point of view of Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, this is an important 
consideration which prompts many questions. For example, what is the extent of the inter-
provincial financial gap beyond which tensions will incite seriously detrimental racial 
tensions?  Cybernetically this is a physiological limits question which feeds off the 
homeostasis question of which combination of provinces are more susceptible to produce 
this effect.  Underpinning this question is system viability and what is it that substantively 
distinguishes one system, in our instance province, from another.  This last question is 
important and will be addressed epistemologically in Part II and diagnostically in Sri 
Lankan terms in Part III.  In the meanwhile, a distinction pertaining to system is that the 
provinces that were delineated during colonial times were for administrative purposes 
rather than for viability which is what the devolved unit under meaningful devolution seeks 
to achieve.  
 
It is well recognised the type of internal self-determination now sought is of the calibre 
where the devolved unit is not merely endowed with autonomous administrative powers 
but vested with power to decide its own policies, and design and implement its own 
development plans.  This consequently requires access to finance and resources.  It is such 
autonomy that gives credence to the devolved unit to pursue viability.  What is less 
                                                 
73 The 2007 Vitharana Report proposes that “Colombo and its environs shall form the Capital Territory which 
shall be a part of the Western Province.  However, law and order in the Capital Territory shall be a matter for 
the Central Government.” – The Morning Leader, 2007  
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recognised however is that the  embedded systems, within the meta-level Sri Lanka as 
managed by the central government, are migrating from an ensemble of race based systems 
to an ensemble of geographically based systems.  I say ‘race based systems’ because those 
are really the systems (as argued in Chapter Three) that are negotiating the transition and 
where the primary arguments are based on race considerations. 
 
If this description of the transition is correct, the critical question is what is the composition 
of the identity of those individual embedded systems called provinces?  It is those 
embedded systems, called by whatever name, that seek to adapt and survive in the context 
of the dynamic environment with which they interact.  For each province, that interaction 
minimally involves its embedded systems, other peer provinces, the encompassing meta-
level system Sri Lanka within which it is embedded, and the milieu within which all this is 
encompassed.  This identity question will be returned to later (Part III) with the realisation 
that the provinces need to distinguish themselves beyond their obvious geographic 
uniqueness.   
 
A point of clarity is warranted concerning inter-provincial disparity given the economic 
and social issues which evidenced themselves in the JVP uprising and Tamil grievances 
which led to the war.  These are joint issues that need to be addressed in the devolution 
considerations.  What I am alerting to here however is the feeding of inter-provincial 
disparity that may grow out of the design of the composition of the provinces, which is 
different from what led to the JVP and Tamil revolts but with which it interacts. 
 
 
4.1.1.5  Relevance of Inter-Provincial Gap  
 
Let us return to understanding the inter-provincial gap financially and pose the question 
what can be done to narrow the gap?  This will lead us to Kangu’s (2005) apt distinction 
between constitutional theory, and constitutional architecture and design in a bid to address 
the question posed. 
 
Broadly, the provincial financial position can be viewed from three perspectives - 1) from 
within the province, 2) the relationship amongst provinces, and 3) the relationship between 
centre and the provinces, both individually and collectively.  These are discussed,  
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generically and then contextualised to Sri Lanka, with the objective of understanding the 
types of issues associated with achieving regional parity.   
 
a)  Within the province  
 
Like any organization pursuing a purpose, the relationship between input and output 
needs to be managed which in the context of finance relates to revenue and 
expenditure.  The characteristic of developing economies is that their expenditure 
pattern heavily exceeds their revenue stream.  This is all the more so in regional 
economies where their revenue generating capability is not commensurate with their 
legislated subject domain responsibilities as specified in the State’s Constitution.  In a 
federal structure, the gap between a region’s revenue and expenditure is referred to as 
‘horizontal imbalance’ or ‘horizontal fiscal imbalance’ which leads to the question of 
gap financing.   
 
Provincial expenditure may be recurrent or one-off streams.  Recurrent expenditure 
covers such expenses as wages, debt repayments, maintenance, pensions, welfare 
payments, etc.  Capital expenditure is mainly incurred for acquisition, construction and 
improvement of assets.   
 
Under a devolved structure of governance the embedded systems must at the very least 
be individually viable where their identity is called upon to adapt and survive in the 
dynamic environment in which they exist.  Expectation is that devolved units should be 
constitutionally structured so as to be able to absorb a healthy portion of their recurrent 
expenditure from their self-generated revenue.  Whilst what constitutes healthy is most 
likely to be expressed as a heuristic rather than an algorithm, it would be reasonable to 
suggest that less than 70% of revenue to recurrent expenditure is a serious signal that 
viability of the province is questionable and suffers the risk of dominance by the centre.  
Capital expenditure is not included in this percentage. 
 
The speed and quality with which a province can implement its development growth 
plan is amongst other matters linked to the province’s capital raising ability.  This in  
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turn is linked, like any other lending, to the province’s recurrent revenue and collateral 
base to support its debt portfolio.  
 
There are various sources of provincial revenue which primarily consist of taxes of 
various types (like licenses, rates, fees), profits from provincial run enterprises, grants 
of various descriptions from the centre, and borrowings.  There is also the lesser known 
category of revenue from the lease or sale of assets owned by the province. This makes 
allocation of asset ownership an important consideration at the time of negotiating the 
transition into meaningful devolution.  This is particularly relevant where historically 
the State has transitioned though nationalization and subsequent privatization, as is the 
case in Sri Lanka. 
 
The other critical consideration is the provincial government’s borrowing rights both in 
the domestic and international market and in this context the guarantee afforded by the 
central government in its sovereign capacity.  In Sri Lanka, whilst the 13
th Amendment 
to the Constitution grants borrowing powers to the provinces subject to Parliamentary 
approval, the enabling legislation has not been passed and consequently to date (2007) 
no provincial borrowings have occurred. 
 
Provincial borrowing powers are of particular importance when the economic disparity 
between provinces is wide for it gives those provinces in need of major capital works 
programmes the ability to fund its development programmes without being dependent 
on the centre.  On the other hand, guarantee of provincial loans by the centre eases the 
loan terms (especially for the less financially endowed provinces) and may open the 
avenue for ‘international soft loans’ (e.g. lower interest rates, initial grace periods of 
non-repayment) as is available for the sovereign State.   
 
Sovereign guaranteed provincial loans carry the advantage of provinces having access 
to capital without directly burdening the central coffers.  The risk to the central 
government, however, is not just what happens in times of default but what happens if 
secession tensions arise and non-repayments are used as a point of leverage to negotiate 
separation.  Certainly, these are risks which sophisticated bankers can design into the 
basic interest rates to reflect different scenarios through which a loan may evolve.   
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Even negotiable could be terms of guarantee where secession itself will transfer the 
loan to the seceded province so that the central government is not burdened with a debt 
from which it has gained little value. 
 
However, it is the constitutional principles and the architectural design of borrowing 
rights and guarantees that need to be addressed, particularly in the instance of 
devolution where asymmetrical rights and responsibilities are given to provinces. 
 
b)  Relationship between the centre and the provinces. 
 
The monetary imbalance resulting from the revenue raising ability between levels of 
government is referred to as a ‘vertical imbalance’ or ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’.  Most 
federal structures vest the lucrative taxation streams (like income tax, consumer tax, 
company tax) in the centre.  This means that when expenditure is heavily decentralized 
without comparable revenue raising powers the regions are heavily dependent on the 
centre funding their needs.   
 
Consequently, the process by which the centre allocates funds to the regions is vitally 
important.  Equally important is the subject domain allocations for they demarcate the 
capabilities of both expenditure responsibilities and revenue earning capability. 
 
In the context of Sri Lanka, much has been  published about these two aspects as 
occasioned by the 13
th Amendment which vested the lucrative revenue streams with the 
centre.  The point I want to add is that whilst privatization which began in 1977 has 
sold much of the nationalised industrial base, infrastructure (like water, rail) and some 
other assets (like banking) have not been sold - amongst which is prime agricultural 
land situated in the provinces.  The other point is that less than 1% of provincial 
revenue is collected from the North and East  due to the dissolution of those two 
provinces. Thus their expenditure is +99% funded by the central government.  This 
compares to an overall funding figure by the centre of the other provinces of 80% 
(Refer Table 31 of the Finance Commission’s 2004 Annual Report).   
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What is even more disconcerting to find is that 90% of provincial expenditure is 
recurrent expenditure which means the functioning provinces are not exercising their 
decision making capability to develop their province which in turn impacts on its future 
revenue raising base.  It is also possible to say the central tier of government is directly 
deciding and spending on provincial capital development projects.  Unfortunately, I 
have not found published government accounts which itemises this type of expenditure. 
 
Overall, when it is said that it is rare to find federal structures where the centre funds 
such enormously large percentages of provincial expenditure, the point being 
highlighted is not the generosity of the centre but rather the failure of the design of 
fiscal devolution.   
 
c)  Relationship amongst the provinces 
 
Besides an individual province’s dependency on the centre for deficit financing, there is 
also the matter of the pattern of dependency across the spectrum of provinces.  Stated 
differently this is about studying the pattern of regional disparity and what can be done 
to reduce yawning disparities to achieve regional parity of a minimum standard. 
 
Without too much fear of disagreement we would expect the constitutional principle of 
regional equality to be accepted.  The question is how is this to be architected and 
designed.   
 
One popular way of bridging the gap is through the process of the centre filling the 
provincial deficit and the extent of the vertical imbalance reflects the dependency 
gradient.  As discussed above, in Sri Lanka the enormity of the provincial deficits, 
which has been predominately consumed by recurrent expenditure with no interest or 
capital repayment component, indicates devolution has not taken root and what has 
been achieved is a devolved administrative system which has been extended to include 
implementation. 
 
Another architectural design for financing regional deficits to nurture regional parity is 
where the wealthier provinces effectively contribute towards the financially poorer  
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provinces and those with greater need for capital works programmes.  Such 
redistribution in federal literature is called fiscal equalisation and is done by the centre 
where all regions contribute to a central pool according to a certain formula and the 
central government allocates funds based on a different formula.  For example, in 
Australia, all states charge a consumer tax of 10% GST on certain goods and services.  
This money is collected by the federal government and –  
 
The GST revenue pool is distributed among all states on the basis of 
recommendations by the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC).  The CGC’s 
recommendations are based on principles of horizontal fiscal equalization, which it 
describes as follows: “each State should be given the capacity to provide the 
average standard of State-type public services, assuming that it does so at an 
average level of operational efficiency and makes an average effort to raise revenue 
from its own sources.” (Le Goff, 2005) 
 
Whilst authors such as Bird (2004) have written about “assessing differentials in 
expenditure needs in determining equalization transfers” there is an additional way of 
contributing towards regional equality.  It occurs as a once off event with long lasting 
effect and is via what constitutes the devolved units themselves and the extent of parity 
they inherently possess when compared to each other.  To the extent this regional parity 
is naturally achieved is the extent dependency on on-going equalisation mechanisms is 
reduced.  On the other hand, when gross regional imbalances prevail particularly in 
tension associated situations, it is vital that an effective equalisation process is 
designed; else it stands the risk of contributing to future secession threats, if not 
secession itself.   
 
This opens the inter-regional parity question to two temporal spheres - one, at the time 
of identifying the devolved units and two, on an on-going basis.  There is already much 
published literature pertaining to both temporal spheres concerning shared-rule and 
self-rule and the allocation of subject domains as it pertains to matters of legislative, 
executive and financial powers and responsibilities (Keating 2007, Vaillancourt & Bird 
2004, Watts 1999, Welikala 2003a, 2003b).   
 
What I want to focus on is the matter of the delineation of the unit of devolution which 
is essentially a one-off occurrence at the time of establishing the devolution  
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arrangement.  This is because thereafter it is difficult to alter, due to constitutional 
safeguards and the intrinsic protection that institutionalization affords.  Keating 
comments that drawing the units is important and is based upon three rival principles 
which he identifies as drawn upon 1) historic borders, 2) functional boundaries based 
on efficiency considerations, and 3) ethnic criteria to give self-government to those 
demanding it.  “In practice, given these competing criteria, any drawing of borders will 
always be a compromise.  Even the most carefully drawn ethnic boundaries will often 
give the titular group a majority within its own territory, but will require guarantees for 
members of the group outside the territory and of other groups within it.” (Keating, 
2007) 
 
To discuss the delineation of the unit of devolution I now want to move from generic 
considerations to addressing the Sri Lankan situation and tie it to the intrinsic revenue 
generating ability of each province with reference to language.   
 
4.1.1.6  Delineation of the Unit of Devolution 
 
This is the question that Sri Lanka currently grapples with and so far the proposals put 
forward demarcating the devolved units have been based on historical experiences.  The 
GoSL architected a form of devolved administrative governance based on District Councils 
and moved to the larger unit of provinces accompanied by the devolved unit enjoying 
implementation powers.  The Tamils have moved from their demand of a provincial 
architecture to the merger of provinces accompanied by what they call autonomy which 
presumably includes healthy revenue raising powers.  The Sinhalese have resisted such a 
merger on the grounds that the Eastern province is multi-ethnic, and the fear of devolution 
being a precursor to secession.  There are leading Sri Lankan journalist like Ladduwahetty 
who create and reflect opinion who add –  
 
If India is to prevent reverting back to its natural state that had prevailed throughout the 
millennia, the centre has to be strong.  Realising this need, India started out with a 
strong centre, but regional influences resulting from coalition formations of ruling 
governments have progressively asserted their powers causing central power to 
gradually erode. Under these circumstances, India has to face the challenge of keeping 
these centrifugal tendencies at bay and function as a global power. If India fails to meet 
this challenge it would cease to be a global power and each of the sub-regions would 
emerge as independent economically powerful states. Since such developments could  
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impact adversely on Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity it is vital that …Sri Lankan is 
structured in a way that it is better equipped to withstand the effects of possible 
developments in India. The District as the peripheral unit lends itself better for this 
purpose. (Ladduwahetty, 2007) 
 
In the meanwhile, research is scant on evaluating the viability of devolved units both in 
terms of 1) the devolved units sustaining themselves whilst belonging to the territorial 
integrity of Sri Lanka and, 2) in terms of assessing relative parity across the spectrum of 
devolved units, including the ramifications particularly those pertaining to the sensitivity of 
the revival of the threat of secession, which aversion is the raison d’être of meaningful 
devolution.  
 
Using the metric of finance, it is astonishing to find no published literature is available 
which assesses the scenario considerations of the various devolution proposals.  Even more 
bewildering is that the Finance Commission has not been called upon to contribute (by for 
example the President’s Office or the GoSL’s Peace Secretariat)  with input towards 
developing financial profiles of the provinces (or districts), including their resource 
capabilities and their development visions/plans.  This was ascertained during a meeting 
with the Chairman of the Finance Commission in 2007.  Certainly, the Finance 
Commission has commissioned various studies (by Salgado, Lahiri) on how to improve the 
current functioning of the Finance Commission and its work with the provinces and the 
GoSL.   
 
The Finance Commission has avoided taking the initiative to contribute towards scenario 
projections in the context of the various devolution proposals being considered.  The 
rationale for this stance appears to be that if such scenario projections were undertaken, it 
would taint the neutrality of the Finance Commission as the projections would be 
selectively targeted and labelled as biased by one political party or another.   
 
It is worthwhile to digress a moment to understand the lack of what in VSM language is 
referred to as S4 thinking.   
 
The emasculation of the public service in terms of its independence, its skill base and 
consequently its effectiveness began with the 1972 Constitution and was reinforced in the  
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1978 Constitution which vested the whole of the public service under the political control 
of Ministers.  Article 55(1) vested power in the Cabinet of Ministers to appoint, transfer, 
dismiss and take disciplinary control of public officers and states that all public officers 
hold office at pleasure.  Pertaining to officers below the rank of Head of Department, this 
power could be delegated to the Public Services Commission (Article 55 (3)) or a Minister 
(Article 55 (3)) but Cabinet was also given the power to vary, alter or rescind such 
delegation and appointments, etc made under such delegated authority (Article 59).  Two 
decades later in 2001, the 17
th Amendment to the Constitution introduced the Independent 
Commissions, amongst which was the Public Service Commission whose decisions could 
not be overturned by Cabinet.  However, this Commission and others are yet to prove their 
effectiveness because subsequent events have destroyed the independence of the 
appointment process of the Commissioners themselves.  The dismal state of the public 
service, albeit held together by a sprinkling of skilled and independent officers, is well 
known.  I want to refer however to two points.   
 
Firstly, the frequency of elections is increasing and the party holding government is 
showing a pronounced tendency to change with each election. This in turn triggers changes 
in the composition of the public service.  Secondly, senior ranking public servants who 
strive for neutrality, as mentioned in the example above, tend to steer clear of scenario 
deliberations due to the political slant that the scenario studies may infer.  Consequently, 
their concern is more about efficiency (better coping within the current rules) rather than 
effectiveness (considering the options for changing the rules) as they opt to establish their 
neutrality, given the absence of clear procedures that secure independence of the public 
service.  
 
What this indicates is that there remains only a sliver of public servants who exercise S4 
thinking of the type which requires deliberating upon policy scenario options.  Thus the 
longer term perspective to counter  balance short term political thinking, due to the 
politicians’ need to win elections, has moved from the public service to others - probably 
civilians and academics.  
 
Let us now return to viability considerations of devolution.  
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Despite the absence of detailed breakdown of figures particularly at the district level, 
valuable patterns can be discerned based on physically observable profiles of the provinces 
and the province based financial allocations by the GoSL.  Viewed from the perspective of 
parity across the spectrum of devolved units, let us now return to scenario deliberations and 
consider the options based on 1) merger of Northern and Eastern provinces 2) provinces 3) 
districts. 
 
So far the path of devolution in Sri Lanka, whilst it is a far cry from meaningful 
proportions, has gained concrete experience with enacting and implementing legislative, 
executive and financial devolution.  The next step in the evolution of devolution in Sri 
Lanka is to design and implement a way to achieve meaningful autonomy whilst each 
devolved unit still coheres to preserve the territorial integrity of the island.  In principle this 
incorporates the fundamental requirement put forward by the Tamils (autonomy) and the 
Sinhalese (cohesiveness which preserves territorial integrity) and thus forms the phase 
space within which a solution lies.   
 
For this reason, territorial integrity must be preserved and ensured.  Thus foreign affairs, 
foreign lending, monetary policy and defence services (but not police) are the exclusive 
preserve of the centre.  In this sense, the subject domains are essentially consistent with the 
13
th  Amendment.  Included too is centre exclusivity of foreign currency issued debt 
instruments, due to exchange rates risks
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.  Overriding powers by the centre are curtailed 
and so too the sweeping powers of planning so that devolution is given effect. 
Equally, meaningful financial devolution needs to accompany the subject domain 
responsibilities that are allocated to the devolved units.  Therefore, in recognition of such 
and for our purposes here the district based devolution proposal, in addition to the other 
two proposals, is premised on the accompaniment of financial devolution.  Consistent with 
the 13
th Amendment borrowing powers (Ninth Schedule, List 1 (35)) are also devolved 
subject to Parliamentary approval of the extent and terms of borrowing. This latter 
requirement is chosen to be consistent with monetary policy as vested in the centre.  
 
                                                 
74 Today, even the GoSL does not issue such debt instruments although since February 2007, up to 5% of 
domestic Treasury Bonds are available for purchase by foreign buyers.    
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In this regard, the starting position for all the provinces is as reflected in Table 5 above.  
Whilst the centre generates 94% of revenue compared to the provinces
75 the difficulty is 
that this is an already heavily debt ridden State, (total public debt in 2005 was 93.9% of 
GDP
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) with a massive need for infrastructure development throughout the State.  The 
important pattern to highlight is that provincial revenue is around 10% of expenditure 
(excluding the Western Province whose revenue is 60%).  This is grossly insufficient to 
absorb even its recurrent expenditure, which is around 90% of expenditure and of which 
90% is spent on emoluments.  Embedded here are two critical points.  Firstly, maintenance 
of assets secures a very low status for a mere 10% of recurrent expenditure is devoted to it.  
Secondly, very little capital development is being driven by the provinces as only 10% of 
the provincial expenditure is devoted to it. 
So far parity of status amongst the provinces has not been an issue because those wanting 
devolved power, namely the Tamils, have scarcely functioned in a devolved provincial 
council setting.  To the extent it existed it lasted less than two years. Furthermore, the 
financial parity is close amongst the active provinces if one was to exclude the revenue 
generation occasioned by the capital city, Colombo, in the Western Province.  
 
This pattern can however be expected to dramatically change if meaningful devolution is 
instituted and the Tamils, heavily resident in the war-torn areas, enter into active politics at 
the level of devolved units, whatever their size.  As mentioned previously, it is sensible to 
predict that devolved units containing war-torn areas will benefit from the peace dividend 
of aid (loans and grants) to replace what was destroyed or damaged by the war.  Given 
time, this will reap benefits of revenue generation and will breed a widening disparity if 
devolved units containing non-war torn areas do not keep pace with development. 
 
This poses various questions like the inherent viability of the devolved units, and is there a 
juncture when the pattern and severity of disparity could threaten the territorial integrity of 
the island – which is the ‘contingency choice’ question posed earlier?  The former question 
                                                 
75 In 2003 the Central government raised 94.82% of revenue compared to provincial revenue of 2.64% and 
2.54% by Local government.  (Finance Commission, 2004 Annual Report, p63). 
76 Contained in Central Bank 2006 Annual Report, (Table 6 - Trends in Key Variables)  
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is addressed in Part III of this chapter, and the latter question is addressed next in the 
context of the three types of devolution units proposed and referred to above.  
 
a)  Merged Northeast Province 
In the decades ahead if the once war-torn merged provinces of the North and the East 
surge ahead and maintain a gaping disparity compared to all the other provinces it may 
cause two types of problems.   
 
Firstly, resentment from the Sinhalese dominated provinces that the Tamil dominated 
provinces have been given preference in development matters.  Sinhalese may interpret 
this as a resurgence of  what prevailed during British colonialism when the Tamils 
enjoyed a relatively higher percentage of English educated people
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  and therefore 
gained a higher percentage of employment with the government that ran its affairs in 
English.  Thus, by deliberate design or unforeseen systemic interrelationships history 
shows a pattern of oscillation - initially favouring the Tamils during governance by the 
British, and subsequently favouring the Sinhalese triggered by monolingual vernacular 
language preference, and (prospectively) returning to favouring the Tamils due to aid 
allocation preferences to reconstruct the damage occasioned by war.  
In turn, this may trigger a second problem, given that prosperity in the merged 
Northeast province means the population in those provinces will be required to 
subsidize
78
 
  the gaping revenue shortfalls experienced by the Sinhala dominated 
provinces.  Here the interpretation of the merged Northeast province is that rather than 
incur the wrath of the Sinhalese, they opt for secession and thus cease the draining of 
their resources required by equalization to subsidize the ill disciplined and disorganised 
provinces that have not attended to their socio-economic ills.  From a Sinhalese 
perspective, the venom in this result is not only secession but the large slice of land that 
had been architected into design of the devolved unit. 
                                                 
77 This was due to, according to Wilson (2000), more Christian Missionary Schools being run in Jaffna as 
more Tamils converted from Hinduism to Christianity.   
 
78 It is inconsequential if the centre collects revenue and allocates it to the devolved units, or if it is a province 
generated pool of funds. The point remains that the source of the bulk of the revenue can be traced back to the 
prosperous devolved units.   
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This is what I mean by the contingency choice that is architected into the design of the 
devolution project.  In this regard, the point I wish to make is whether the gaping 
provincial disparity is the result of the way in which the provinces have been 
architected and in this regard the part played by what might be described as 
‘sympathetic lending’ which gives preference to development of the once war-torn 
areas.   
 
It is valuable to point out that there are some provincial permutations of gaping 
disparities that lend themselves to breeding threats of secession whilst others do not.  
For example, if the prosperous province is a province where the races are fairly evenly 
distributed in population numbers (as currently seen in the Western and Central 
provinces), then it may not incur the type of interpretations and repercussions discussed 
above.  On the other hand, if the prosperous province is a Sinhalese dominated province 
(e.g. Southern province), then the Tamils could be expected to argue for secession on 
the grounds of the majority exercising their power to keep the minority Tamils as an 
under-privileged community.  So here again we find the architecture in place for the 
threat of secession to affect a large slice of the island.  
 
I use the word ‘gaping’ to convey the heuristic that the disparity is large but it is 
unknown how large that disparity needs to be and for what period it needs to evidence 
itself before it triggers secession threats.  Additionally, what we find is that the 
physiological limits of the variables that comprise the homeostatic relationships are 
different.  In other words the homeostatic balance between mixed provinces (Western 
and Central) and the Tamil dominated provinces are different to the homeostatic 
relationship between the Tamil dominated provinces and the Sinhalese dominated 
provinces.  As to what constitutes gaping disparity is a matter for discussion after the 
relevant cybernetic thinking and language has been established in Part II of this chapter.  
Also, addressed in Part III is what constitutes parity of status.  
 
This exposition besides being beneficial towards evaluating the attractiveness of the 
various devolution proposals is  also useful to enquire how the downside can be 
alleviated.  One way of overcoming this gaping disparity is to ensure Colombo is 
included within the Western province rather than kept separate as is done in other  
Chapter Four  203 
 
countries, like Australia where Canberra the capital city is not part of a devolved unit.  
This is because Colombo, unlike Canberra or for that matter Ottawa in Canada, is the 
hub of commercial activity with a substantial revenue generating base and currently 
enjoys the best infrastructure in the island.  The other is to ensure that at least one 
Sinhala dominated province, like the Southern province, keeps abreast of the prosperity 
as experienced by the Tamil dominated provinces. 
  
Whilst a merged Northern and Eastern province has been premised on historical 
grounds and its associated secession contingency, there is an expectation that the larger 
contiguous area improves the viability of the devolved unit.  If this last point is valid, 
then the question arises should the Sinhalese dominated provinces also consider 
mergers and if so should it extend to merging with evenly balanced mixed race 
provinces or be contained to mergers only with Sinhalese dominated provinces.  By 
way of illustration, an example could be an amalgamation of the Uva, Sabaragamuwa 
and even the Southern provinces.  This opens the underpinning issue of the identity of 
the devolved units both at the time of devolution and in their long term future, 
particularly with regard to their racial mix. 
 
b)  Province 
Much of what was discussed in the Merged Provinces applies here too.  However, it is 
the permutations of the provincial combinations that introduce different results 
compared to the Northeast merger devolution proposal. 
 
Keeping the two war-torn provinces separate holds the probability that neither will hold 
the dominant position when disparity is compared to the Sinhalese dominated and 
mixed race provinces.  It is likely that the Eastern Province will remain an evenly 
mixed race province.  Therefore, even if it holds a dominant position in prosperity 
terms, it does not pose quite the same Sinhalese interpretations as would be accorded to 
a merged North-Eastern province.  Furthermore, if the contingency of secession 
threatens again, the architecture of the provinces does not automatically lend itself to 
the loss of the Eastern province.  
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What we are finding is that the architecture of the devolved units lends itself to 
structuring the way the contingency will apply if devolution fails.  Many have intuited 
this.  What has been done here is to explicate its threads, which helps in evaluating 
proposals and just as importantly in designing remedies.  Furthermore, the value of 
traversing decades into the future is that it helps discern possible patterns which 
otherwise would be too imperceptible to detect.  Later, when in real time it also helps 
detect symptoms which may lead to that pattern detection or better still acts as feedback 
to change the pattern of inputs so as to avert its ills.  
 
An important point warranting consideration is the identity and viability of the 
composition of each of the provinces.  This is particularly relevant given that the 
provincial unit is a legacy of an administrative system, as introduced during colonial 
times.   
 
c)  District based Devolved units 
 
Having arrived at much smaller units of devolution, the obvious question is their 
viability.  Certainly, some show clear signs of being able to sustain themselves, such as 
Colombo, Jaffna, Galle, and Kalutara.  Others may well struggle which raises the 
question of the allocation mechanism for fiscal equalisation or allocations by the centre 
to fill the shortfalls in revenue to match expenditure, particularly to meet development 
requirements.   
 
The question thus becomes what are the ramifications that arise if gaping disparities 
separate the districts.  Like before, it depends on the permutations and combinations of 
the relationship between districts.  Theoretically the permutation given 24 districts is 
6.20448E+23 and it doubles if bi-directionality is computed too.  However, this variety 
for the purpose of comparing gaping disparity tensions can be dramatically reduced by 
categorising the provinces based on their race mix, where the majority is Sinhalese or 
Tamil, or relatively evenly mixed with the three races.  Thus based on a district 
belonging to one of the three types of categories its disparity is contrasted in terms of 
the tension associated with contiguous landmass districts dominated by Tamils (since 
the threat of secession is the sensitive outcome that needs to be managed).  The  
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objective is to gain insights into the relationship between the gaping disparity of 
devolved units, in this instance districts, and its effect on stirring up secession threats. 
 
Let me illustrate this point by working with a realistic permutation.  Jaffna and Mannar 
(selected due to their proximity to trade with India, and benefit from the prospective 
Sethu Samudra Canal) and Colombo (being the commercial hub) and Hambantota (due 
to the new international airport and service and industrial sea port) might become the 
really prosperous districts.  Galle, Kalutara, Gampaha and Batticaloa might become the 
second tier of prosperous districts with the rest belonging to a distinctly lower third tier. 
The probability is that this permutation of tensions would be containable.  This is likely 
because each of the communities has a stronghold district of prosperity and is a 
contributing benefactor of equalisation proceeds to the less prosperous districts some of 
which contain its own community.  Additionally, no long stretch of contiguous 
landmass falls within Tamil hands (refer Map 5.1) particularly if Trincomalee holds 
itself as belonging to the ‘evenly mixed race’ district.  These contrasts to the situation 
which would arise based on the provincial or merged ‘Northeast’ architecture. 
 
On the other hand, if the contiguous coastal districts between Mannar and Batticaloa 
(moving in clockwise  north to east direction) are developed to achieve a gaping 
disparity compared to the other districts, then Sinhalese-Tamil tensions would arise and 
may not be relieved even if Colombo achieves comparable prosperity.  This tension is 
strengthened because the contiguous landmass lends itself to secession.  Such testing 
should be continued for other permutations to gauge which  are the sensitive 
permutations which lend themselves to tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamil 
communities and particularly those which are accompanied by a contiguous Tamil 
homeland landmass. 
 
Once again, we see how the architecture of the devolved units lends itself to the 
‘contingency’ choice.  For this reason this needs to be addressed at the time of 
architecting the devolution solution.  Having stated this, the district-centric devolution 
proposal due to the larger number of units, automatically generates a greater number of 
permutations.  This in turn means these permutations could be managed (e.g. in the way  
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capital infrastructure and investment projects are deployed) to produce mixes that 
alleviate gaping disparity tensions between the districts.   
 
Such considerations can be used by the Finance Commission and Parliament to 
influence the allocation amount of gap financing between the districts.  This will 
require a much more sophisticated ‘parity of status’ understanding than is currently 
practiced in Sri Lanka.  Furthermore, it is an expertise the Finance Commission will 
need to develop itself as countries like Australia and Germany who are considered to be 
well practiced in the federal model of governance do not face the sensitivity of 
secession threats.  In this regard, ‘parity of status’ refers to a minimum set of per capital 
standards, pertaining to such matters as infrastructure of transport, health, education, 
etc. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the Tamil grievances have not been heavily based 
on gross evidences of economic disparity.  It is a much more principle based challenge 
where they perceive Tamils to be treated as lesser citizens.  Here I refer to such matters 
as the injustice of Tamil culture in terms of language
79, religion
80, citizenship
81
 
 being 
perceived as subordinated to Sinhalese dominance.  This has meant that the Tamils 
have had to work that much harder to earn their place in the economic and professional 
spheres of prosperity.    As is popularly hoped, devolution will need to accomplish 
cultural parity and what that entails is a matter for negotiated agreement.  
The vital point for our discussion here in the district-centric proposal, however, is 
whether districts constitute viable entities.  This is a matter that will be taken up again 
in Part III of this chapter and then addressed by way of process considerations in 
                                                 
79 Referenced here is the 1956 Sinhala Only Act.  Subsequently amended in 1987 by the 13
th Amendment to 
the Constitution where parity of status was accorded to both vernacular languages. 
 
80 The Constitution (Article 9) accords Buddhism the foremost place. 
 
81 Referenced here are The Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 and The Indian and Pakistani Residents 
(Citizenship) Act No. 3 of 1949.  To understand the ‘stateless’ issue that resulted to Indian Tamils in Ceylon 
reference needs to be made to Articles 5 and 8 of the Indian Republican Constitution of 1949.  When these 
Acts including its voter implications (under Parliamentary Elections Amendment Act of 1949) were legally 
challenged pursuant to S29 (2) the Supreme Court of Ceylon and later the Privy Council in Britain both held 
the Citizenship and Franchise Acts are intra vires of the Ceylon legislature. Negotiations to resolve the 
stateless issue were finally resolved by the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of October 1964 which is also popularly 
known as the Sirima-Shastri Agreement. (Ladduwahetty, 1999)  
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Chapter Five.  Such viability considerations warrant serious financial modelling based 
on zero-based budgeting where the usual incremental adjustment to historical figures is 
avoided.  This is because a fundamental shift is expected as a consequence of harmony 
being established and this applies island-wide, and not just to the war-torn areas.  Such 
modelling will help to gauge the type of economic viability that district-centric 
devolution exhibits and of course needs to be premised on meaningful financial 
devolution. 
 
4.1.1.7  Asymmetrical Devolution 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Peace Talks  of 2002-2003 with the GoSL were 
conducted on an asymmetrical basis where the only representation of a race was accorded 
to the Tamils.  Amongst the ideas considered during this period was the idea of 
asymmetrical devolution where the devolved units under a federal structure would be 
vested with asymmetrical powers.  Thus, based on the devolution unit being a province, the 
idea was that the Northern and Eastern Provinces would be vested with additional subject 
domains and/or functional powers.   
 
An example of such asymmetrical functional power was to assign additional borrowing 
powers to particular provinces, namely the Northern and Eastern provinces, so that those 
provinces faced with reconstruction of war-torn areas would have a more direct means of 
negotiating their financial requirements with lenders.  In turn, this opened deliberations of 
whether provincial debt should be guarantee by the central government and consequently 
touched on the sensitive issue of what happens if the devolution project fails and results in 
secession or the threat of secession.  Here then is another aspect which requires a policy on 
the ‘contingency choice’ if the architected peace plan fails in implementation.  It is 
pertinent to point out that defaults on repayments can be orchestrated as part of the ploys to 
achieve secession. 
 
The point I want to cover, however, is a different one.  It is to understand the ramification 
of filling the expenditure gap.  Asymmetrical devolution means devolved units are not all 
vested with the same powers and responsibilities.  For our purposes, using the example of 
war-torn devolved units being granted extra financial borrowing powers let me refer to  
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them as the ‘meaningfully asymmetrically devolved units’ and refer to those without the 
extra financial powers as the ‘other devolved units’ 
 
One way of achieving parity between the meaningfully asymmetrically devolved units, 
who enjoy extra borrowing rights, and the other units is for the central government to 
allocate extra funds for those ‘other devolved units’ to meet their expenditure-revenue gap.  
This however risks incurring the disapproval of the ‘meaningfully asymmetrically devolved 
units’ on the grounds of the central government giving preference to Sinhalese dominated 
provinces.  This situation does not occur now, because there is no Tamil dominated 
province to make the distinction.  Neither does any province exercise its borrowing rights, 
due in part to the lack of enabling legislation as mentioned earlier.   
 
Thus meaningful asymmetrical devolution appears to be structurally flawed. Whilst in the 
short term it opens the flow of capital funds for development, in the longer term it positions 
some provinces to leap ahead of others.  If the central government allocates funds to those 
provinces which do not have as liberal public debt borrowing rights, the central 
government runs the risk of retrospectively being accused of preferential treatment of the 
Sinhalese majority.  It is this kind of flawed design that causes the top tier of government to 
favour the majority and miss segments (like the Muslims) which results in the GoSL being 
perceived as representing and favouring the Sinhalese. 
 
Another point of distinction concerns fiscal equalisation being used to achieve parity of 
devolved units.  Whilst much has been written about the tier of government that has 
revenue raising rights, the more important concern is the source from which the revenue is 
being raised, particularly in the context of asymmetrical devolution.  I say this because if 
prosperity is skewed then taxation will be likewise skewed but will naturally be employed 
in favour of the less prosperous regions.  The problem is if the region is dominated by 
either of the sparring races, Sinhalese or Tamil. 
 
What this means is, and this is a critical point, under asymmetrical devolution if there are 
only two types of devolved units when categorised in terms of their rights and 
responsibilities, the central government risks being considered biased towards one group or  
Chapter Four  209 
 
the other.  This bias however can be reduced if not avoided when there are more than two 
types of devolved units.   
 
4.1.1.8  Relevance of Exploration of Variety 
 
Overall, the relevance of the exploration of variety exposed by this type of thinking 
spanning longer timeframes is that what are otherwise subtle patterns in the short term 
become discernable.  This is particularly useful given the lag time it takes for revenue 
streams to outstrip development capital expenditure, especially repayment of long term 
loans.  This equally applies to the time it takes to develop skill set competencies.   
 
These conceptualised patterns serve to indicate the sensitive homeostatic relationships, 
their variables and the monitoring processes required to develop a sense of the 
physiological limits and what it takes to steer clear of those limits.  So in this sense, the 
contribution that this type of conceptualization makes is that it helps to evaluate proposals.  
Equally, once a proposal is accepted and implemented it serves to signal sensitivities 
needing particular management. 
 
Much more research needs to be done in this area in terms of not only financial scenario 
projections but assessment of ramifications and importantly alternative solutions.  One of 
the most obvious is consideration of the number of provinces and their geographical 
delineation.  This is particularly so because the current provincial contours were designed 
for administrative purposes, not viability.    
 
4.1.1.9  Challenge of Designing Internal Self-Determination 
 
The Peace Talks will need to address various issues.  Some will pertain to the dismantling 
of the war machinery of the various sides; others will bear on matters of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction, whilst others will appertain to the future architecture of the manner of 
governance.  This chapter has so far considered the last from the perspective of signals, 
namely  
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•  Strong signals – need to design the basis of fiscal equalization  
•  Weak signals – viability of the devolved units, and contingency implications that 
arise from the architecture of the unit of devolution. 
•  Unknown signal – By definition this signal is conceptually unknown but which 
once exercised calls upon the system to address. 
 
The question I want to address now is - how can managerial cybernetics help in designing 
devolved units of viable systems that, whilst being autonomous in their own right, cohere 
to conserve the island-wide identity of Sri Lanka?   Thus, the next matter discussed is 
epistemological considerations.  
 
 
Part II – Epistemological Considerations 
 
The journey taken here is to arrive at the concept of ultrastability and its design 
considerations
82
 
. 
A primary concept in management cybernetics is that enterprises are dynamic survival 
systems and thus are called upon to adapt in their bid for continued existence in their 
environment. This notion of ‘adapt’ is thus about change and raises questions about 
how adaptive can a system be before it has changed to being something else.  Maturana 
(2002), the famous Chilean biologist, distinguishes between what he calls ‘adaptive 
change’ and ‘disintegrative change’. The difference is that adaptive change conserves 
the class of identity to which the system belongs, whilst disintegrative change results in 
the loss of identity of the original system and something else arises in its place.  A 
classic example of this distinction is life and death. 
 
Identity is what distinguishes one system from another and consists of components and 
the relationship between those components.  A variable is a way of observing any one 
of those components or relationships.   Thus there is also what could be termed a 
‘composite variable’ which is an amalgam comprising a configuration of components 
and/or the relationships between those components which contribute towards the 
identity of that system. 
 
With this understanding of enterprises being dynamic and seeking to conserve their 
identity as they adapt to survive, we can progress to the cybernetic meaning of 
                                                 
82 What follows is a large tract quoted from an article written in 2006 by Solomons (myself) and Moscardini 
which was published in Organisational Transformation & Social Change (Solomons & Moscardini, 
2006b:52).  
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homeostasis.  Usually one refers to the workings of homeostasis, as a ‘homeostatic 
loop’ which depicts that it is a relationship between minimally two systems or two 
components (which themselves could be systems in their own right) that belong to a 
larger system.  Beer (1981:402) describes it as, ‘homeostasis is the capability of a 
system to hold its critical variables within physiological limits in the face of unexpected 
disturbance or perturbation’. So here is conveyed the notion that homeostasis is the 
relationship between something (e.g. the enterprise) which holds its critical variables 
within physiological limits in the face of unexpected disturbance from something else 
(e.g. the environment within which the enterprise is embedded and interacting). 
 
The question thus arises -  what are these critical variables and how are they 
determined? The critical variables are those components and relationships that 
contribute to form the distinguishing identity of that dynamic system in the context of 
the environment with which it is interacting.  These variables have to be kept within a 
certain functional range (e.g. upper and lower limit) to ensure the enterprise preserves 
its identity in the context of its relationship with the environment in which it lives. It is 
up to the enterprise (e.g. the designer of the system) to determine what these critical 
variables are, based on its identity.    
 
Thus homeostasis lies at the very heart of viability - the continuous survival of the 
system’s identity in the face of unexpected disturbance or perturbation.  The identity of 
a dynamic system is expressed in the context of a dynamic environment with which it is 
reciprocally and dynamically interacting thus constituting a discrete circular dynamic.  
Therefore a system’s identity cannot be defined separately from its environment, and 
vice versa.  This means that the critical variables are a dynamic and comprise those 
variables at a moment in time that if absent or operating beyond their physiological 
limit, jeopardize the survival of the identity of that system. 
 
For instance, a country may determine that amongst its array of critical variables are its 
sovereign status, its location (which by definition includes its extent), its currency, its 
mix of races and languages, but not for example, religion - although some countries 
also determine a particular religion to be amongst their critical variables.  Countries that 
have what is known as non-secular Constitutions single out certain religions as under 
the protection of the state
83
 
, implying that a particular religion (as compared to other 
religions that prevail in that country) is a critical variable.  
In the above context we have classed as a ‘variable’ what may be considered an 
invariant. Such an example of an invariant in the case of the identity of a country is 
location.  In other words, a variable that ‘must’ exist is an invariant.  This classification 
allows us to look within and express the physiological limits that comprise that 
‘invariant’.    Therefore, whilst recognizing that location must exist as a component 
identifying a country, the physiological limits are that ‘location’ covers a defined 
longitude and latitude.  In the context of this paper it is also pertinent to point out that 
                                                 
83 For instance, the Norwegian Constitution states the Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official 
religion of the State. The 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan established Islam as the state 
religion. In contrast, the Columbian Constitution of 1991 abolished the previous Constitution’s provision 
where the Catholic Church was the state church.  
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‘Ordinarily the word nation is used synonymously with country or state; however, it 
does imply more than just a territory delineated by boundaries.’ (Hattotuwa, 2003) 
 
Returning to the concept of critical variables, such variables can be a configuration of 
components and their relationships, which was referred to above as a composite 
variable.  Thus in a multi-race, multi-lingual, multi-religious country a composite 
variable could be the ‘relationship between various races and languages and religions’ 
which composite variable has a relationship with the critical variable called location 
and in turn this latter relationship may be a critical variable.  The permutations of 
homeostatic loops are manifold in the example quoted - meaning (loss of) homeostasis 
(due to conflict) between races, between each race and each language, between each 
race and each religion, etc.  Note too, these homeostats are bi-directional and will 
perform to different criteria of stability because each of those components could be 
systems in their own right. 
 
A system therefore seeks to design its manner of workings (e.g. transfer functions) to 
enable its critical variables to be held within their physiological range in its reciprocal 
interactive relationship with its environment.  Its transfer functions will also need to 
figure out the way to return a system to homeostasis should its physiological range of 
critical variables be jeopardized.  Therefore, the system ideally monitors a sample of 
the output and takes corrective action when such output evidences itself to be outside 
the range of acceptable measure.   Beer calls this corrective process a ‘Feedback 
Adjuster’ which seeks to influence the operation of the transfer function having taken 
into consideration lag time effects given that the time interval between the monitoring 
and corrective process may be longer than the speed and frequency of the input cycle. 
 
In other words, the Feedback Adjuster is a self-regulator that enables the system to 
make its own adjustments within the capability of the designed transfer functions of the 
system.  Embedded within what has been stated here is the system’s ability to recognize 
the perturbation which is a separate activity compared to the response the Feedback 
Adjuster influences from the array of transfer functions that comprises the design of the 
system. Therefore, the design of a system needs to minimally address three aspects:- 
 
•  Perturbation recognition;  
•  Response (which includes selection of the appropriate transfer function based on 
the performance characteristic of the perturbation) to stabilize the system in the 
event of a trend indicating the potential for perturbation or perturbation itself; and  
•  Communications that are entailed with recognition of perturbations, and discerning 
the appropriate response required and then implementing it.   
 
Notwithstanding these design considerations, there is the permutation (refer Table 7) 
that whilst a system may be able to recognize the perturbation, it may not have an 
effective response within its design of transfer functions.  It could also happen the other 
way around, where an effective response exists but the perturbation was not recognized 
until it was too late to respond effectively.  The Asian Tsunami was such an example.
84
                                                 
84 The wave travelling from Indonesia raised no alerting mechanisms in Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, etc.   Had 
it done so, the coping mechanism (transfer function) was available for people, namely to move in-shore and 
to higher ground. 
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The other permutation is that perturbation and adequate responses are both outside the 
scope of what the system has been designed to recognize or cater for. 
 
In other words, we are faced with a fundamental question of what happens in the 
absence of design to cater for a particular contingency.  One could argue that the scope 
of design needs to be more comprehensive, which in itself poses questions of cost and 
the probability of a particular event occurring.  Yet the permutation remains there will 
be perturbations to a system to which it has no known way of responding - meaning the 
design of the system has no process or mechanism in place which enables it to 
recognize and/or respond in a way that minimally conserves the identity of the system.  
When the system can cope in such circumstances it is evidencing ultrastability. Beer 
(1981:403) describes ultrastability as ‘the capacity of a system to return to an 
equilibrial state after perturbation by unknown or unanalysed forces (against the 
intervention of which the system was therefore not explicitly designed)’. 
 
Table 7 - Perturbation Permutations Patterns 
Recognizable perturbation  Transfer function available 
Yes  Yes 
No  Yes 
Yes  No 
No  No 
 
Note the brackets in the quote are Beer’s not the authors’ of this article and here lies the 
vital clue that distinguishes, for our purposes, homeostasis from ultrastability.  Both are 
about change and returning the system to a stable state after a perturbation.  
Ultrastability is in the context where the system was ‘not explicitly designed’ to cater 
for the perturbation.  In comparison, homeostasis is in the context of design whose 
transfer functions have the capability to ‘hold the system’s critical variables within 
physiological limits in the face of unexpected disturbance or perturbation’.  Please note 
that homeostasis is not the only objective that design considers.  Depending on the 
system, its design could include catering to achieve profitability, resource optimization, 
racial harmony, aesthetic appeal, etc.  The extent to which the system succeeds in 
achieving such goals is a demonstration of the quality of the design. 
 
Given that ultrastability is about survival responses outside the scope of a system’s 
design, there are at least two important questions that arise.   Firstly, how will the 
system know it has to change if what is afflicting it is non-recognizable because such 
recognition is outside the design of the system?  Secondly, what is the system’s ability 
to adapt if the appropriate response is outside its design capability?   
 
Beer was seeking a way for enterprises to invoke ultrastability should it be needed.  As 
all enterprises are systems embedded within systems, he looked for a self-
organizational solution.  He concluded that the ‘realization that change is required’ can 
be fed from the organizational landscape formulated at the metasystemic level - refer 2.  
By ‘meta’ is meant ‘over and beyond’ which provides the meta-system with a broader 
perception and higher order of language in logic than the system which is encompassed 
by the meta system.   Specifically, Beer advocates the concept of an ‘Adjuster  
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Organizer’ learning device so that the design and the appropriateness of the Feedback 
Adjuster can be continuously monitored and adjusted. 
 
Beer (1979:66) notes the role of Adjuster Organizer is frequently played by 
management, when he says, ‘If management were not ultrastable …no enterprise would 
last a thousand days. The managerial consequences are familiar to managers in the fact 
that they know what it is like to circumvent the advanced techniques of control for 
which they have expensively paid.’  Beer (1979:70) also importantly cautions that the 
task of management (in its role as Adjuster Organizer) is not to specify the workings of 
the transfer function but rather ‘to design these Feedback Adjusters, and to determine 
the performance characteristics to which indeed they adjust’.    Note however the 
transfer function as contained within the Muddy Box (in Figure 12) needs to be figured 
out by someone and may be heuristically or algorithmically stated.    
 
Beer (1979:69) further states ‘the managerial task of creating an Adjuster Organizer 
cannot be accomplished as a developmental activity at its own perceptual and logical 
level, without a metasystemic input.  This input operates, not as a set of commands, but 
as the derivation of an organizational landscape.  This will precondition, though not 
determine, the work of the Adjuster Organizer in continuously monitoring the design of 
the Feedback Adjuster’.  Figure 12 shows the Adjuster Organizer being fed with input 
from both its meta system (Organizational Landscape) and from within its own system 
(output from comparator B) and the linkage between the Adjuster Organizer and 
Feedback Adjuster.  
There are other design architectural concepts that can be employed to position a system 
to invoke ultrastability. One proposed by Fred Emery
85
In summary, salient points as discussed here of the design (or diagnosis) of a system in 
the context of homeostasis and ultrastability are: 
 is ‘redundancy of parts and 
redundancy of functions’.    Another is agility, a change concept popularized in the 
manufacturing sector and which suggests itself for use in matters of governance, 
particularly in the context of the governance of a country.   
•  What are the purpose and identity of the system?   
  This is a question based on the context (background) in which that system is 
being identified.    
•  What are the system’s components, and relationships between those 
components?   
•  What are its critical variables and the physiological limits within which those 
variables need to be maintained? 
  At times, these physiological limits may be heuristically rather than 
algorithmically stated. 
                                                 
85 Recognized social scientist in the field of Organizational Development, particularly in the development of 
theory around participative work design structures.  
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•  What is the capability of the monitoring process to recognize the performance 
of those variables and what is the lag time between performance and realization 
by the monitoring process? 
•  How comprehensive is the capability of transfer functions in restoring various 
physiological limits should they be disturbed? 
•  What is the capability of feedback loops that feed the activation of the 
appropriate transfer function to cope with deviations - in terms of returning the 
system to homeostasis?  
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•  What is the capability of the system to implement the transfer function? 
•  What is the system’s capability to invoke ultrastability based on its meta-level 
system/s having connection and frequency to provide the feedback that 
influences the feedback function and in turn the transfer functions? 
•  Wherever there is a connection between components or systems, what is the 
quality of the communication channel that connects one to the other in terms of 
its reach, it capacity to convey and its ability to transduce between what is being 
conveyed and what is being received. 
Let us now progress to applying the concepts of homeostasis and ultrastability in the 
context of Sri Lanka. (Solomons & Moscardini, 2006b:52) 
 
 
Part III – Application of Principles to Sri Lankan Context 
 
There are many ways to resolve the steep conflict that embroils Sri Lanka.  War, which 
itself is a form of negotiation, is one of them which can be used as an end in itself or as 
leverage in Peace Talks.  It can be fought to the point where it is lost, its reaches stalemate 
conditions or it is won and is replaced by a harmonious civic
86
 
 administrative system of 
governance.  There is a school of thought that a politically negotiated settlement is the 
more sensible way to resolve the conflict than military victory which risks genocide or 
secession.  
Post-colonial history shows few examples where arriving at such a politically negotiated 
settlement occurs without armed conflict.  War is frequently justified on the grounds of the 
need to enter into talks from a position of strength.  Since both sides seek to enter into 
negotiations from a position of strength, it is more usual that talks take place when warring 
reaches stalemate conditions.  The terminology  ‘two sides’ is used here because in Sri 
Lanka Tamil factions have largely eliminated each other leaving one dominant group.  The 
conflict has matured into a two sided affair between the GoSL and the LTTE.  To the 
extent that splinter groups exist they have become associated with one side or the other.  
                                                 
86 Note the distinction here is that the victory is carried to the point of a civic and not merely its prelude of a 
military administrative system.  In Sri Lanka most if not all the battles in the North and East have been won 
to the point of running a military based administrative system.  No elections have been held and this applies 
both to the victories of the GoSL and the LTTE.    
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Whatever the stimulus for talks and the prelude of polarization, the position put forward in 
this part of the thesis is threefold: 
 
1.  The process of finding a solution requires the involvement and consideration of more 
than the meta-level system and one of its embedded entities.   
 
2.  There is a subtle difference between diagnosing an existing system and designing a new 
system even though both require that the system be carved out and identified from the 
background in which it exists.  
 
3.  Given the need to cater for the variety of signal strengths, the system needs to come to 
terms with monitoring and feedback so that the system can correct itself.  
 
These three aspects are discussed below. 
 
4.3.1  Involvement of Whom and Consideration of What 
 
The process of finding a solution requires the involvement and consideration of more than 
the meta-level system and one of its embedded systems 
 
Two points are relevant.  One concerns who should be involved in negotiations and 
designing the solution and the other is the subject matters for consideration.  One could add 
to this the distinction between negotiations that pertain to principles and those that pertain 
to the design of the way those principles are architected.   
 
For example, a principle under negotiation could be whether race equality prevails or 
whether rights and responsibilities are matters for asymmetrical treatment.  Embedded 
within this is the question - in what context/s and subject domain areas does that principle 
apply?  An additional and interrelated matter is the design question of how the principle is 
to be architected.  If agreement was reached that the principle of race equality was to 
prevail, one way of designing it is via the Constitution where anti-discriminatory 
legislation is prohibited.  This was what came to be known as the ‘50-50 rule’ (proposed by  
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G.G. Ponnambalam in 1938).  The proposal was for the amalgam of minority races to be 
allocated 50% of the seats in Parliament and the balance 50% allocated to the majority 
race.  This was considered unfair since Sinhalese were 70% of the population
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.  Instead 
another way of designing this principle was architected into the 1946 Constitution  of 
Ceylon via Article 29(2) which prohibited anti-discriminatory legislation.   
An obvious question to prescriptive rules is - what the contingency is if it is not adhered to?  
In 1956 by exercising 2/3
rd majority vote this principle of race equality was flouted when 
the Sinhala language was made the language of the State, thus disadvantaging non-
Sinhalese speakers and by default non-Sinhalese races.  Whilst in certain instances an 
appeal process was architected into the Constitution, it was subordinate to the power that 
could be exercised by the majority.  Thus, the contingency situation was beyond the 
capability of Article 29 and within the capability of the majority to exercise –  which 
repealed the whole Constitution and replaced it with a republican Constitution.  The current 
1978 Constitution is weak on anti-discriminatory protection, where even the 13
th 
amendment which provides vernacular language parity is weak in implementation.  
Interestingly the LTTE, who in their propaganda take the moral high ground of arguing for 
Tamil equality, in the ISGA commit the same offence that they accuse the Sinhalese of 
having committed.  The ISGA disallows race discrimination (clause 6
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) but requires that 
LTTE appointees hold absolute majority in the ISGA (clause 2.3.a).  The Constitution of 
Ceylon had the preventative clause (S29 (2)) and yet voting based on majoritarian principle 
vested power in the Sinhalese, who were able to overturn all. 
The important meta-level consideration I want to draw from this example is the point von 
Foerster makes and it pertains to undecidable propositions and the circularity its answers 
entail.  He says -   
 
Only those questions that are in principle undecidable, we can decide. Why? Simply 
because the decidable questions are already decided by the choice of the framework in 
                                                 
87 As the 2001 census was not carried out in the war-torn areas, it is difficult to comment on the effect refugee 
migration has had on changing race demographics.  What the 2001 population census does show is an 
increase in the Muslim population. 
88 It reads - Prohibition Against Discrimination. The ISGA shall ensure that there is no discrimination on 
grounds of religion, race, caste, national or regional origin, age or gender in the NorthEast.  
Chapter Four  219 
 
which they are asked, and by the choice of rules of how to connect what we call “the 
question” with what we may take for an “answer.” (von Foerster, (1995) 
 
The race question posed here and many other matters that are up for negotiation in Sri 
Lanka belong to this category of undecidable propositions.  von Foerster (1995) suggests 
and I concur, these undecidable propositions pertain not to matters of truth  but 
understanding, which itself appears to spring from trust and breeds trust. This last point 
pertains to circularity which von Foerster explains by way of a story –  
 
I have a dear friend who grew up in Marrakech. The house of his family stood on the 
street that divided the Jewish and the Arabic quarter. As a boy he played with all the 
others, listened to what they thought and said, and learned of their fundamentally 
different views. When I asked him once, “Who was right?” he said, “They are both 
right.” “But this cannot be,” I argued from an Aristotelian platform, “Only one of them 
can have the truth!” “The problem is not truth,” he answered, “The problem is trust.” I 
understood: the problem is understanding; the problem is understanding understanding; 
the problem is making decisions upon in principle undecidable questions.  (von 
Foerster, 1995) 
 
A question remains however - how are such undecidable questions to be solved?  The Law 
of Requisite Variety gives a clear answer on this, which von Foerster (1995) states as “Tell 
them they should always try to act so as to increase the number of choices; yes, increase the 
number of choices!”  Or as Beer says “only variety absorbs variety”.  The question for Sri 
Lanka is - how is that variety to be generated? 
 
Bearing in mind this variety absorbing quality of variety generation let us return to the 
earlier pair of points.  Involvement of whom and consideration of what, present as applying 
with different nuances in the context of the negotiations that pertain to what can be called 
the ‘transition to peace’ and those that pertain to ‘peaceful co-existence’ which in this 
thesis is discussed in terms of meaningful devolution in conjunction with contingency 
considerations if devolution fails. 
 
The transition to peace across the various Sri Lankan communities rests upon the resolution 
of many considerations.  To name a few, they span such matters as reconstruction of war-
torn areas and rehabilitation of people directly and indirectly afflicted by the atrocities of 
war, return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), reclamation of properties, phased 
withdrawal of high security zones, de-mining land and naval mines, decommissioning of  
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military personal and training them for employment in an environment which is no longer 
based on destruction, and re-gearing the entrepreneurial community’s skills and networks 
so that they are prepared for the transition into what is termed the ‘re-construction’ 
economy.  This is a sample of the considerations which belong to the category of 
‘transition to peace’.  The considerations pertinent to ‘peaceful co-existence’ primarily 
involve designing the rules of governance pertaining to the revised and new tiers of 
government.  As discussed previously, this entails such considerations as the manner in 
which the embedded systems cohere to form the meta-level system that is Sri Lanka, each 
embedded system’s autonomy in terms of subject domains and the revenue raising and 
expenditure responsibilities, and borrowing powers of the various systems as exercised by 
their tiers of government, etc.  
 
Having gained a sense of the type of considerations, (which contain very difficult 
problems) requiring resolution, the important point is - what systems should be involved in 
addressing these considerations?  The realization may quickly dawn that the systems 
involved in both contexts are existing systems, albeit that in one context the aim is to 
design new systems.  However, for the moment what warrants highlighting is that the 
permutation of the degree of the combination of systems is different in the two different 
contexts.  In the ‘transition to peace’ the relevant systems are the GoSL and predominately, 
although not exclusively the warring embedded systems.  ‘Peaceful co-existence’ requires 
the involvement of the meta-level system Sri Lanka and all its embedded systems.   
 
This opens the question to - who are these embedded systems and by what identity are they 
recognized?  One could even extend the question to enquire - why are they recognized by 
that identity?  Let me attempt an answer here, not in the sense of it being authoritative but 
rather in the sense of exposing the type of thinking it takes to grapple with what von 
Foerster described as undecidable propositions. 
 
 
4.3.1.1  Transition to Peace   
 
Given that the more recent parties to the war have been the GoSL representing Sri Lanka 
and the LTTE who claim themselves as the sole representative of the Tamils, the embedded 
system presents as race stamped.  The Tamils labelling their campaign as against the  
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majority race, it forces in a sense, the other dominant embedded system to be viewed as 
race based too, albeit that it is not constitutionally constructed as such.  Whilst the GoSL is 
taken to be the representative of the meta-level system, there is much evidence, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, which shows that it is dominated by the Sinhalese.  On a 
different note, the array of considerations that pertain to the negotiations require in certain 
instances the involvement of other race embedded systems.  Notable amongst them is the 
Muslim community when negotiations concern matters of the return of IDPs and 
reclamation of property.  Military decommissions and retraining of soldiers also concerns 
the Sinhalese and importantly is applicable not only to the GoSL but to the LTTE too.   
 
For these reasons to exclusively limit involvement of negotiations to the embedded system 
of the Tamils and the meta-level system of the GoSL is to risk the meta-level system 
crashing in and being accused of representing the missing embedded systems rather than it 
acting in its negotiations as a supervening entity seeking cohesion.  Also, given the 
dominant influence of the Sinhalese with the GoSL the meta-level system gets tainted by 
the perception that the GoSL represents the Sinhalese which in turn feeds the view that the 
LTTE is a peer entity with the GoSL.  For this reason, the demands of variety absorption 
calls for greater involvement of the other race based embedded systems so that the GoSL as 
the supervening system is positioned to negotiate its cohesive considerations.  Having 
given expression to such thinking, the question turns to enquiring whether there are such 
race based embedded systems, besides that clearly projected by the Tamil community, and 
importantly who are their representative/s (i.e. S1 management unit)?   
 
This brings us to the point of the adequacy, in terms of diversity of views, of the 
representative of the one embedded system that is permitted to negotiate.  The same 
concern would apply if the other race based embedded systems were permitted to negotiate 
in their own rights.   
 
As would be recalled, the theme discussed here and its implications are similar to that 
discussed extensively in Chapter Three.  The question that arises is how is this diversity, 
both in terms of considerations and involvement, to be entertained in the negotiation 
process of the ‘transition to peace’.  This will be addressed in Chapter Five where Team 
Syntegrity® in its extended form is proposed as a process capable of accommodating both  
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aspects  of diversity –  meaning, which systems are represented and who are the 
representatives (note plurality) of those systems? 
 
4.3.1.2  Peaceful Co-existence 
 
In contrast, negotiations of the principles and design of the manner of governance that 
would foster peaceful co-existence require the involvement of the meta-level system and its 
full complement of embedded systems that belong to the next level of recursion.  Let us 
understand this from the viewpoint of variety in terms of the variety of content 
considerations and variety absorption afforded by the involvement of the various systems.  
 
The challenge facing Sri Lanka is not just to re-design its system of governance, as 
daunting as that is, but to identify its composition of systems and in that regard their 
embedment status as it pertains to the purpose of peaceful co-existence.  This begs the 
question - who is this peace co-existence with or between?  An obvious answer is between 
the races since that has been the burning issue.   
 
Yet one must not forget the double JVP insurrection (in 1971 and 1988) and the intensity of 
that war which shows clearly there are other homeostats that have been pushed to the 
margins of their physiological limits.  That 1971 insurrection, which was the first to see the 
ceremonial army convert to active battle, was described as the ‘haves versus the have nots’.  
Indeed there are some who would argue that the race war is really a ‘haves versus have-
nots’ war in disguise since the Tamils who took up war were not those socially and 
economically privileged. 
 
From a cybernetic framework there is no requirement to choose whether the conflict is race 
or economically based given that homeostasis, which pertains to relationships, can be a 
one-to-one relationship, one-to-many relationship or a many-to-many relationship.  What 
this means is that the homeostatic relationship for each race is minimally one to many.  
Therefore, what could be described as the Tamil homeostat could comprise the common 
element of the Tamil system and its relationship with the Sinhalese, another with the 
Muslims, and yet another with the group comprising the ‘haves’ and another homeostatic 
relationship between the group comprising the ‘have- nots’.  Also important to realise is  
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that these homeostatic relationships are bi-directional and each directional relationship 
carries its own unique variables and physiological limits.  The homeostat is balanced when 
the relationship in both directions operates within their physiological limits. What the 
profiles of these homeostats indicate is the phase space within which the system needs to 
operate to stay out of crisis or stated differently it indicates the phase space within which 
solutions need to be designed. 
 
There is a surfeit of these homeostats – wherever there is a relationship between systems or 
functions.  Prominent examples are the homeostatic relationship between the meta-level 
system and the embedded systems as individual systems and as an amalgam.  Also there is 
the homeostatic relationship between the individual embedded systems and of course the 
system and its environment.  Whilst it is not in any way suggested that the design comes to 
grips with the surfeit of homeostats, the design needs to figure out which homeostats are 
sensitive and in that sense important and understand the composition of the variables that 
comprise it and the physiological limits that appertain.  In saying this, the difficult point is 
that what constitutes important homeostats is a dynamic, not a static, concept and ideally 
the design of the system needs to cater for that.  A great example of importance being 
dynamic was the Asian Tsunami where the homeostatic relationship between the island and 
the sea was until those few minutes not viewed as a critical homeostat.   
 
As these prominent examples are the minimum set of homeostats that need to be managed 
in a devolutionary environment, it requires the involvement of the meta-level system and 
its embedded systems to enter into the negotiation to agree upon the principles (the what) 
and design (the how) of the manner of governance so that the systems have the capability 
to achieve viability.  In addition there are all the other considerations mentioned above 
which require resolution. 
 
Given that this complexity needs to be absorbed into the State’s foremost document, the 
Constitution, it is unlikely that linear processes or proposals developed within the 
monologue of a political party (in the South or the North) will have the requisite variety to 
address these issues.  Negotiating principles and designing solutions requires the full 
spectrum of systems to be involved in an interactive and iterative approach.  A process with 
the necessary potential for such is proposed in Chapter Five.    
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The question however is at the meta-level and its embedded systems. What is the identity 
of these systems and their representatives?  This is a particularly difficult question because 
already embedded in the generic answer is the potential for the interpretation that the 
embedded systems are what are called the devolved provinces.  This interpretation is 
further complicated given that the provinces, although legally titled as devolved units, are 
as discussed earlier, of an administrative nature rather than viable devolved units with 
distinct identities beyond their geographical location.  Thus, the current provincial units 
appear weak as the choice of embedded system of involvement to participate in the 
negotiation process addressing considerations of peaceful co-existence.   
 
There is of course within the meta-level system of the island Sri Lanka, the distinct identity 
of embedded races which occupy distinct landmass.  This combination is of relevance in 
terms of the contingency of secession should the devolution project fail to achieve peaceful 
co-existence.  Whilst these identities are not institutionalised as a legal entity, they do 
present as what can be called ‘hybrid provinces’, where their identity is either Tamil 
dominated (Northern Province), or Sinhalese dominated (provinces of Southern, Uva, 
Sabaragamuwa, North Central, North Western) or fairly evenly race mixed (provinces of 
Eastern, Western and Central
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).  Interestingly, the Western and Central provinces despite 
their ‘fairly even race mix’ are perceived as associated with the GoSL (given that the 
population of those provinces’ were historically Sinhalese dominated).  The Eastern 
province is contested by the LTTE as associated with the Tamils given their claim of the 
North East (Trincomalee and Batticaloa district) being part of their historical Tamil 
homelands. 
I now want to explore the potential of working with this ground reality of ‘hybrid 
provincial’ identities as the embedded systems with the objective of absorbing the variety 
of its ramifications.  Here there are two combinations.  One where the embedded level of 
recursion within the meta-level system of the island comprises three ‘geographically race’ 
based systems.  These are Tamil dominated systems, Sinhalese dominated systems, and the 
third the ‘fairly evenly race mixed’ systems.  The other combination is where the system is 
condensed to two systems, Sinhalese dominated systems and Tamil dominated systems and 
                                                 
89 Some may argue that the Central Province tends towards Sinhalese domination.  
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where the ‘fairly evenly mixed race systems’ get allocated to one or the other systems 
based on the ground reality.   Thus, the Western and Central provinces allocated to 
Sinhalese based systems and the Eastern province allocated to the Tamil based system. 
 
If one was to choose either of these options for the basis of selecting involvement, amongst 
the first questions to arise is -  who will represent these systems at the ‘peaceful co-
existence’ negotiations?  In VSM terms who is the management unit of such S1s?  One 
response is the LTTE for the Tamils and the GoSL for the Sinhalese and a question mark 
for the ‘fairly evenly mixed race systems’.  Since there is no clear candidate for that 
management unit role the answer could be either the LTTE or the GoSL.  In this sense, the 
combination of ‘three embedded systems’ appears unworkable, given the ‘missing 
representative’ who is required to be involved in the negotiations.  This leaves the 
combination of ‘two embedded systems’. 
 
Those that closely follow Sri Lankan politics realise this Sinhalese-Tamil combination has 
exercised itself in many flavours.  The 2002-2003 Peace Talks were orchestrated on this 
basis.  Many of the power-sharing proposals articulated by the GoSL via its political parties 
were and are of this type and there was the ISGA proposal by the LTTE.  Since the pause 
in Peace Talks these proposals have not had the opportunity to experience negotiations 
beyond the confines of each group’s own side.   
 
There are many ways of viewing these proposals, amongst which is categorising them on 
the basis of asymmetrical or symmetrical devolution.  To the extent it has been 
asymmetrical it has been based on the North and the East gaining enhanced powers.  A 
recent example of this was Coorey’s proposition that “This can be limited to the North and 
the East as there is no need for enhanced devolution in other provinces.” (Ilangamuwa, 
2007)  Whether power-sharing occurs or not and whether the devolved systems gain power 
on the principle of equality or not is a matter that the outcome of the negotiations will 
reveal.   
 
The crucial point however is - who gets invited to negotiate and decide on the principle of 
power-sharing and its design?  This is a meta-level decision which itself is a point for 
negotiation and should form what has been previously described as ‘talks about the talks’.   
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The decision on the systems chosen to negotiate, the capacity in which they negotiate 
(meaning as supervening or embedded system) and who represents the particular systems is 
critical.  It drives the framework, the axioms upon which evaluations get made and 
consequently the decisions.  
 
As stated in Chapter Three -  In VSM terms, whether a system gravitates to seeking 
cohesion or autonomy depends on the position the system occupies within a level of 
recursion.  When bringing together negotiating systems the design and implementation of 
peace negotiation processes need to be aware which systems are predisposed to negotiate 
which part of the equation and to ensure sufficient variety is pumped in by each side of the 
equation so that requisite variety is given a chance to be achieved.  Another way of looking 
at this is that this predisposition is indicated by the context of ‘relationship/s with whom?’   
By ‘context of relationship/s’ is meant that the negotiation could be with peer systems 
(squiggly line) or with supervening-embedded system/s (S3-S1 vertical line). 
 
If the representatives permitted into the negotiating forum are confined to the GoSL and the 
LTTE the risk is twofold.  Firstly, the GoSL’s functionality as representing the meta-level 
system of the island gets muddied with representing those embedded systems that are not 
represented by the LTTE.  This leads to the second risk of the GoSL being perceived as a 
peer entity to the LTTE especially when the GoSL collapses to represent the embedded 
systems.  As would be recalled, this is the same problem which was extensively discussed 
in Chapter Three.  There are three points warranting alert here.   
 
Firstly, the duality role that the GoSL plays arises due to the meta-level system being 
dominated by the Sinhalese embedded system.  Secondly, the duality of the GoSL 
representative role suggests that there is a clear need to design a meta-level system that 
encompasses the embedded systems, be it ‘hybrid provinces’ or the asymmetrically 
devolved Northern and Eastern provinces.  Thirdly, and this is a critical point, is that at 
some juncture the meta-level runs out and the system has to work out its own premises 
upon which its decisions are framed.  In other words, it needs to be self-referential and 
develop its framework and its solution together which requires that the process be circular.   
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This poses the question -  how is this residual variety to be absorbed?  Based on the 
principle that systems are embedded in systems and variety absorbs variety, one way is to 
involve the participation of the systems which are embedded within the embedded systems 
which the GoSL and the LTTE represent.  In other words, involve the participation of three 
levels of recursion in the negotiations.  Let us call this recursion level R+1 (meta-level 
system), R0 (system-in-focus which is embedded in R+1)) and R-1 (embedded systems 
within R0). 
 
This leads to the obvious question who is that third layer of systems?  Let us explore this 
internal self-determination negotiation answer, based on the premise that Sri Lanka is the 
meta-level system (R+1), and that R0 comprises what has been referred to as the Sinhalese 
and Tamil systems.  Note this does not have to be the case.  The second layer of recursion 
could be identified as some other systems.  However, it is referred to as such as it is a likely 
choice and to give an understanding of how it cascades.  The third layer of recursion is 
whoever is embedded within the systems that comprise R0, which in our case has been 
identified as being represented by the LTTE and the GoSL.  It is up to each system to 
propose who their embedded systems are.  Here what is sought is that those systems are 
identifiable and that in totality it caters for all.  Let me explicate this for both the LTTE 
represented systems and the GoSL given the duality role the latter plays. 
 
For the LTTE representing the Tamil race of people, the embedded systems could be 
geographically based on provinces (Northern and Eastern), or stated as districts 
(Trincomalee, Ampara, Batticaloa, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Jaffna, Kilinochchi).  It could also 
be based on sub-race systems like Estate Tamils, Colombo Tamils, Northern Tamils and 
Eastern Tamils.   
 
The GoSL in its meta-level capacity (R+1) gets to nominate its embedded systems (R0).  
This is likely to be based on the different races or geographically.  Assuming it to be races 
(R0), the races as represented by the dual role played by the GoSL, then nominates their 
embedded systems (R-1) which could well be identified geographically based on provinces 
or districts. 
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The choice of embedment is left for each encompassing system to nominate and its peer 
systems to accept.  Acceptance is also required by the embedded system.  From a design 
perspective the objective is to ensure that the different systems get included by some 
encompassing system.  Should a system not earn recognition that it is embedded within an 
encompassing system, then it should be left to that system to take the initiative to gain 
recognition that it is embedded within one system or another.  If this cannot be achieved 
then the design of the negotiation process needs to be capable of accommodating that 
system so long it is an identifiable system, which is to say in what manner it has a unique 
identity that is not covered by the identity of some other system.  It will also need to 
nominate its representative who will be involved in the negotiations.   
 
Stating this differently, this design of the ‘negotiations process’ has begun to show a way 
for ensuring that relevant systems are represented in the negotiation process particularly 
when they have a point of view  that is not being addressed by the other represented 
systems.  In the 2002-2003 Peace Talks that was the position of the Muslims and even the 
Sinhalese as they did not have specific representation.  To the extent it existed it was via 
the muddied dual role played by the GoSL whose primary role was to represent the 
cohesive needs of the meta-level system in negotiations.  Additionally, the Tamils who did 
not find themselves in alignment with the voice of the LTTE position were also excluded.  
 
We have now reached the point in the design proposition for negotiations which shows that 
adversarial two part negotiations are clearly inadequate.  By involving the third layer of 
recursion, it brings more variety absorbing capacity into the negotiations process.  This is 
particularly required to handle the extensive content that needs to be addressed in designing 
the manner of peaceful co-existence.  It also makes the negotiation stances by the second 
layer of recursion provable or contestable as the case may be.  Furthermore, it valuably 
opens variety absorption to take place between systems belonging to the same level of 
recursion by opening up a wider spectrum of levels of negotiation.  This means only 
residual variety needs to be negotiated by the higher levels of recursion.  The design of 
such negotiation processes and phases is explained in Chapter Five where the design 
proposition extends to using the orthogonal sets to connect the Team Syntegrity® based 
negotiations.  
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The final point to be made here is that what has been discussed is a basis for selecting the 
systems that are to be represented in the negotiations.  It is valuable that the systems 
belonging to the third layer of recursion do not need to be represented by politicians.  It is 
up to the negotiations to articulate the principles and the design of how those principles 
will be architected into the rules of governance.  Thus identifying the systems belonging to 
the various recursions, their composition, their relationships and functions/processes is 
what  the negotiations seek to explore and recommend.  Decision making itself on the 
acceptance or otherwise of those negotiated recommendations is another function which 
can be part of the negotiation process itself or left to such processes as referendum by the 
people, APRC, or Parliamentary decisions.   
 
4.3.2  Nuances of re-designing existing systems compared to designing new 
systems 
 
There is a subtle difference between diagnosing an existing system and designing a new 
system even though both require that the system be carved out and identified from the 
background in which it exists.  
 
In line with what has been espoused in this thesis, what constitutes a viable devolved unit is 
a matter for content negotiations to agree upon.  What I want to deliberate upon here is - 
what is sought when looking for identity and viability as it pertains to viable devolved 
systems having acknowledged that a system is “what we declare it to be”(Beer 1994e:11)   
 
It is well recognised among those that support a federal solution that the new type of 
federal proposal entails a transition from a provincial devolutionary structure that is 
essentially administrative and implementation orientated to a devolution structure where 
the devolved units have planning powers and the basic resource capability to implement 
those plans.  To use the economics cliché this resource capability includes land, labour, 
capital and enterprise, to implement those plans.   
 
Whilst that is the constitutional position in terms of functionality, in system identity terms 
what warrants recognition is that the transition is from a race based system to a territorial 
based system - or it is?   
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The proposed federal structure has the delineation of a race based system because the 
demands have been articulated by the Tamils as race based and in this sense when the 
others have responded have been classed as Sinhalese and Muslims.  Furthermore, the 
LTTE have classed themselves as representing the Tamil race of people given that the 
Muslims have categorised themselves on a religious and cultural basis, and rejected 
inclusion on (Tamil) language grounds.  As an aside, it is interesting to mention here that 
the LTTE has not classed itself as representing the tiny minority communities (Veddha, 
Burgher, Sindhi, etc).    
 
Now the question is - what is the identity of each of the proposed devolved units beyond 
their geographical contours?  The profile of this identity is important for it is the survival of 
that identity that is sought.  
 
By survival is meant the on-going existence of the identity of the system.  Given that a 
system lives in relationship with its environment, which is dynamic, the system is called 
upon to be dynamic and in that sense the system needs to adapt its identity so that its 
identity survives in that dynamic environment.   
 
Looking at the surrounds in which an entity exists, Maturana points out that an entity, 
any entity, exists not in isolation but in an environment of other entities with whom it is 
structurally coupled, and with whom it reciprocally interacts in varying degrees, as part 
of its existence.  Thus, the entity is dynamically vying from moment to moment to 
maintain its continued existence.  Equally so are all the other entities (for they live by 
the same principles) and so moment to moment it is like a dance where each is adapting 
and seeking to conserve their individual identity in the context of its structural 
couplings which are its environment. (Solomons & Moscardini, 2006a:111) 
 
What this means in terms of answering the question of ‘what should comprise the criteria 
upon which the devolved unit is delineated?’ is that there are two types of systems whose 
identities need to be identified and there are three orders of contrast to tests of their unique 
identity.  The two systems are 1) the identity of the meta-level system, Sri Lanka and 2) the 
identity of each of the embedded devolved systems.  The three orders of contrast are 1) the 
difference in identity between the meta-level system Sri Lanka and the amalgam of 
embedded devolved systems, 2) the difference between the identity of each devolved 
system and the meta-level system, 3) the difference between each of the embedded 
devolved systems.  This same set of questions can be applied with diagnosis.    
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The distinction between diagnosing and designing is that in the former the system is given, 
albeit that there might be different interpretations of what the system does and its identity.   
As Beer’s famous quote says ‘the purpose of the system is what it does’ not what it says it 
does – as said for example in the Constitution or in rules and procedures.  Yet the other 
important point is that what the system does is a matter of interpretation for the system is 
experienced differently by different people.  For example, many Sinhalese may view Sri 
Lanka as multi-racial, where many of the captains of industry and business are Tamils and 
Muslims, where Tamils are well represented in the professions, and given that Sinhalese 
live harmoniously with Tamil and Muslim neighbours.  An example is in Colombo
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 where 
21% of the population is Tamil and 17% are Muslims.  Yet Tamils may well refer to Sri 
Lanka as a State engaged in war against the Tamils, where at checkpoints Tamils are 
viewed suspiciously and where few in the police and public service can provide service in 
the Tamil language despite the constitutional status of Tamil being a State language.  In 
other words, our awareness is informed by what we consider as relevant (based on our 
values, our social conditioning, our physiological senses) and the rest is filtered out, 
invariably unwittingly.  As another of Beer’s famous quotes say, ‘The lethal variety 
attenuator is sheer ignorance’. 
The different experiences of Sri Lanka, lends itself to a Sri Lanka of different identities and 
somewhere within that landscape consensus is reached leading to convention as to the 
identity of Sri Lanka.  In its absence, a stake is driven which declares what that identity is 
so that diagnosis can proceed. 
 
In Part I of this chapter a diagnosis from a financial perspective in the context of provinces 
was provided.  Yet one could have commenced with a more fundamental question and 
diagnostic enquiry pertaining to what constitutes the unique identity of each of the 
provinces.  This path would have soon revealed that whilst there were eight (if not nine) 
provinces, their identity when compared to each other in many instances rested on their 
geographical uniqueness.  For example, beyond geographical terrain there seems no 
discernable uniqueness between the Sabaragamuwa and Uva provinces which begs the 
question what are these two provinces seeking to conserve in terms of identity when 
                                                 
90 Census of Population and Housing 2001 - Population by Ethnicity according to Urban Area (Provisional)  
Refer: : http://www.statistics.gov.lk/census2001/population/district/t002c.htm, accessed 23 June 2007  
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compared to each other.  Of course, if either of these provinces were to be compared to the 
Northern Province, the distinction of identity would be pronounced on the components of 
race, culture and religious identity.  This was why when provincial identity was referred to 
above it was possible to simmer it into three (and even two) categories, based on racial 
mix.   
 
Let us now turn to address, both generically and specifically in the context of Sri Lanka’s 
quest for peaceful co-existence, the matter of identity when faced with designing a new 
system.   
 
Generically, the point is that there exists no experience of how the system performs and 
thus evidence of its purpose is yet to be born.  Identity to the extent it exists, is conceptual 
although it can be informed by comparable examples or the system it is replacing.  
Scenario modelling would be tremendously valuable in figuring out the way a system and 
its embedded systems are to be architected.  In saying this, the identity of a system and how 
it is architected is an artificial construct for in nature the system is not compartmentalised.  
It interacts as a whole yet “we define an assemblage of entities as a system because those 
entities are observed as acting cohesively.”  (Beer, 1994a:25)   
 
The question is -  what will those systems be?  Whilst many in Sri Lanka concern 
themselves with the question of the acceptability of the various proposed units of 
devolution, I contend the insight to answering that question is built on understanding the 
identity that each unit seeks to conserve and this needs to be addressed in a comparative 
sense.  If this comparative uniqueness does not exist then it indicates that system is part of 
another system or vice versa and thus its border needs to be extended to contain the rest of 
itself.  This is a vital insight for it is this identity that the system seeks to conserve and 
therefore needs to control.  By this is meant the system’s in-built control mechanisms will 
seek to avoid or reinforce the dynamic behaviour of the system’s variables and their 
relationship based on its notion of whether the system is moving towards or away from 
what comprises its identity. 
 
What this requires is that we understand what comprises the identity of Sri Lanka and 
likewise what comprises the identity of its embedded systems.  Certainly the more critical  
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variables comprising Sri Lanka’s identity are its territorial island-wide sovereignty 
expressed in longitude and latitudinal terms, its monetary currency
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, its ethnic mix of 
people, its religious and language mix.   For each of these variables, we need to understand 
their components and what their physiological limits are before the identity of Sri Lanka is 
considered to have ‘disintegrated’ – using Maturana terminology.   
Taking the sensitive race variable, let us understand what is meant here.  The question is 
whether Sri Lanka is multi-racial or whether it is Sinhalese orientated because whilst it 
espouses plurality, in practice it is found to be ‘all men are equal but some are more equal 
than others’.  Given that we are considering matters of design, the emphasis is not its past 
but its future where we need to address what is the principle stance on race and how it is to 
be designed?  These are value-laden questions and a matter for negotiation both at the level 
of what is the principle and how it is to be designed into the manner of governance and 
practised.  It will certainly be influenced by history and yet it needs to cross the bridge into 
the future.  These same types of questions pertain to the sensitive variable of religion (for 
example, secular or State protected) and language (example, vernacular preference, 
vernacular equality including making a distinction between law and practice).  These 
sensitive variables, although not known as variables, are well recognised in Sri Lanka 
including the way the variables relate with each other and contribute towards Sri Lanka’s 
identity.  The classic in this regard, is that whilst no preference is give to race per se, by 
virtue of the preference given to language in practice, religion in the Constitution, and 
voting based on majoritarian principles, the hallmark of Sri Lankan identity is perceived as 
being Sinhalese.  The question pertaining to the future is whether that is to be the case and 
the important question I am posing is how that identity relates to the embedded-devolved 
systems.  
 
To help this understanding of the unique identity of the systems forming the recursive 
levels let us for example take two propositions and examine them in the context of the 
relationship between the meta-level Sri Lanka and the embedded-devolved  systems.  
Firstly, let us examine the proposition of ‘equality of plurality’ and secondly the 
                                                 
91 This has been included as a critical variable due to the weak state of the domestic currency as indicated by 
IATA to sell airline tickets in US dollars.  If such was implemented “Internationally it will convey the 
message that Sri Lanka is a country with a weak currency which will have a ripple effect on our economy” 
(Munzeer, 2006)   
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proposition of ‘according preference’ to a race via some mechanism or another, for 
example religion, or language, or basis of decision making.   
 
Disregarding its unique territorial demarcation, if equality based on race, religion and 
language comprises the identity of Sri Lanka and its manner of decision making does not 
distort this equality, then the question is - what is the unique identity of the embedded 
systems?   
 
To test this future design proposition let us compare this ‘equality’ Sri Lankan identity to 
the identity of the Northern Province and the Southern Province, respectively known for 
their Tamil and Sinhalese dominant population demographic.   
 
 
a)  Northern Province:  If this province too is designed to portray a similar ‘equality’ 
identity in principle and enacted in practice, the question begs - what is the purpose of 
the devolved system?  Since we are designing a future system, certainly the argument 
could be there is by default no evidence of practice.  Thus the lack of trust between the 
Northern Province, stemming from its historical perceived subordinated experiences, 
and the meta-level Sri Lanka warrants formalising recognition of that embedded 
system.  The Northern Province would argue it requires autonomy so as to intervene 
should  monitoring of sensitive variables like race demographics and language 
utilization patterns indicate their performance is contributing towards the deviation of 
from desired results. 
 
On the other hand, whilst Sri Lanka’s identity may take an ‘equality’ air, the Northern 
Province could take up a preference identity position.  For example, Tamils are given 
an advantage, directly or indirectly, by preference accorded to language or manner of 
decision making, etc.  Certainly, this would raise ethnical questions given the Tamil 
experience of inequality.  Yet such is the Tamil argument for autonomy which says ‘let 
us govern ourselves in the way we want’.  The accompanying question however is - 
what cohesive effect does it carry?  This balance between autonomy and cohesion is a 
matter for negotiation between the meta-level Sri Lanka and the embedded systems, in 
this instance the Northern Province.  
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At this preliminary juncture of explorations, the Tamil dominated Northern Province 
can make a case for itself being recognised as an embedded system both in the instance 
of its identity being based on ‘equality principles’ or the principle of the Tamils being 
accorded preference in the Northern Province.  The difference in identity when both Sri 
Lanka and the Northern Province carry the same ‘equality’ identity is their territorial 
demarcation , where the recognition of the embedded Northern Province gives that 
province autonomous rights to manage its sensitive variables subject to the limited 
restraints of cohesion. 
 
b)  Southern Province: If its unique identity is portrayed on the principle of ‘equality’ we 
need to enquire what is the difference in identity between the meta-level system Sri 
Lanka and the Southern Province, beyond its territorial demarcation.  Once again being 
a future system, by default previous practice is absent.  However, compared to the 
Northern Province its history with the GoSL is not infected by distrust which prompts 
the enquiry - what is the purpose and identity of delineating the Southern Province?  A 
sensible response could be that whilst history shows harmony between the south and 
the meta-level system Sri Lanka, there is no guarantee that such harmony will prevail in 
the future.  Thus the embedded system of the Southern Province should be recognised 
in its own right where its identity is known for equality across race, religion, language 
and caste  
 
Whilst design catering for such contingency makes sense, the question that now arises 
is - what is the difference in identity between the Southern Province and other dominant 
Sinhalese populated provinces, beyond of course their territorial uniqueness?  If it is 
negligible, then my argument is that these provinces warrant amalgamation.  Separation 
appears as administratively motivated, as was the case with British style of governance.  
On the score of territorial uniqueness, which the old provinces do have, they appear as 
non-threatened since they share the same identity.    
 
Let us now address the much more difficult contingency that arises based on the 
argument that what is currently a Sinhalese (or for that matter Tamil) dominated 
territory may not retain that status.  There could be deliberate, what the Tamils called 
‘state-aided colonization’ incentives to change the population demographics of an  
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embedded system.  The twist is that if ‘equality’ is the principle being enacted then 
such incentive based population demographic changes will not in the future need to 
carry the negative reaction that historically the Tamils experienced, when new comer 
‘non-Tamils’ took up residence and reduced the percentage of Tamils in the Eastern 
Province.  However, it is also possible that such ‘equality’ could result in an over swing 
resulting in a race becoming the major population.  Furthermore, in acknowledging 
such permutations, a distinction needs to be made between sheer numbers and who 
holds control, as was the case in South Africa where the minority held power by virtue 
of the manner of governance that gave preferential rights to whites.  Whilst that is not 
the case in Sri Lanka, its history does carry such legislated race based bias when Indian 
Tamils
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 were deprived of citizenship in 1948.  This has since changed, commencing in 
1964 under the Srima-Shastri Pact.  To cater for this contingency, an argument is that 
the amalgamation of ‘similar identity’ provinces warrants reduction, meaning be split 
so as to not be so consolidated. 
c)  The permutations considered include the possibility of Sri Lanka’s future identity 
having a Sinhalese orientation.  For example if Buddhism continues to have State 
protection or the Sinhala language in implementation terms enjoys a preferred status by 
virtue of there being more Sinhalese speakers and less people being bi-lingual in Tamil.  
Also considered are the permutations pertaining to the ‘evenly mixed race’ provinces. 
 
This exploration, based in this instance on a provincial structure, shows a sample of the 
significant variety which extends beyond financial viability that is at play when 
considering what should determine the unit of devolution.  Having looked for and 
found a reasoning upon which to guide the contours of the embedment systems - the 
clearest case being the Tamil dominated Northern Province - it securely places island-
wide Sri Lanka as the supervening system given that the overriding objective is internal 
self-determination.  Having done so, these two distinctions create minimally a non-
Tamil dominant embedded system, which more specifically was recognised as two 
                                                 
92 They were descendents of indentured workers who came from South India to Ceylon during British times.  
Initially, they migrated seasonally to harvest the coffee berries.  Later they migrated permanently to work in 
tea plantations.  Unlike coffee berries which require seasonal harvesting, tea requires the ‘two leaves and a 
bud’ to be plucked daily. Thus, when Ceylon moved from coffee plantations to tea, due to a coffee blight that 
hit the plantations, the Indian Tamil labour took up residence in the island rather than moving backwards and 
forwards between India and Sri Lanka,   
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systems.  Using the existing provincial terminology this comprises a system of 
Sinhalese dominated provinces and a system of ‘evenly mixed race’ provinces.   
 
Based on this type of variety absorption thinking, there is potential to win support from the 
multiple races for a proposal where the layer of embedment within Sri Lanka comprises 
four systems which while territorially demarcated are contoured on race lines.  Namely,  
•   A system of Tamil dominated provinces, following essentially the contours of the 
current demarcation of the Northern Province.   
 
•  One province comprising the ‘evenly race mixed’ provinces which comprises the 
contiguous landmass following the contours of the Western, Central and Eastern 
provinces.  
 
•  Plus two systems of Sinhalese dominated provinces so as to reduce the amalgam 
whilst architected on contiguous landmass principles.  
 
Thus proposed is one Sinhalese dominated system comprising what are today the 
Southern, Uva and Sabaragamuwa provinces.  The other system comprises the 
North Western and North Central provinces.   
 
•  There is also potential for the ‘evenly race mixed’ capital city of Colombo to 
comprise a system in itself given that it is the commercial and financial hub of the 
island with substantially better revenue raising streams than any of the other 
provinces.   
 
These hybrid provinces could be respectively called the 1) Northern Province, 2) Across-
Country Province, 3) Southern Province, 4) North Western-North Central Province, and 5) 
Capital City Province. 
 
This architecture presents as uniquely identified and better contoured for each embedded 
system to be viable given its size and resource capabilities.  Incidentally all the embedded 
systems enjoy coastal frontiers.  In-built into this architecture is a contingency which  
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partially caters for a fall back position on secession.  Should the threat of secession arise 
again, which is an option in the event of failure of peaceful co-existence, it has been 
contained to the Northern Province.  This is because there is no longer an Eastern province 
and thus that easily contoured system does not exist.  Yet it is important to acknowledge 
that should the threat of secession resurface, claims for historical homelands as contained 
within the ‘Across-Country Province’ could reappear. 
 
It is relevant to point here that the choice of Colombo forming a system requires further 
deliberations for it could form part of the meta-level system rather than an embedded 
system.  If that is the case, there is also the choice of Colombo being confined to the 
commercial and financial hub divisional area rather than the larger District of Colombo 
unit.  This combined option also holds ramification for the race balance of the Western 
Province.  It is worthwhile to point here that the Western Province was historically 
Sinhalese dominated but Colombo being the commercial hub, has attracted the various 
communities plus the war has seen significant Tamil migration to the Western Province.  
Likewise, but due to other reasons (like the opening up of irrigated land occasioned by the 
Gal Oya irrigation scheme) the population demographic of the Eastern Province has been 
diluted compared to its historical Tamil dominance
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.     
Overall the hybrid province based devolution unit deserves to be iteratively revisited to test 
for identity, viability and its contingency implications.  Whilst this is not done in this 
thesis, a manual process suitable to perform such evaluation is presented in Chapter Five.    
 
The hybrid provincial framework is not outlined to advocate that the devolved units should 
be province based.  Rather the intention is to show, using the example of the provincial 
framework, the type of questions and reasoning that is involved in proposing or evaluating 
devolution unit proposals.    
                                                 
93 Controversy surrounds whether the change in population demographics was deliberately done to undermine 
the strength of the Tamils in that province.  Tamils argue that it was and site the comparison between the 
1921 and 1981 census where the Sinhalese increase in Trincomalee moved from 4.5% to 33.6% and in 
Ampara from 8.2% to 37.6%.  Sinhalese argue that the increase was confined to AGA Divisions where the 
Sinhalese were in the majority and the increase was catering to meet the land hungry Sinhalese.  Rural 
population density in the 1946 census reports the Northern, Eastern and other provinces as being respectively 
7.2, 23.7 and over 200 people per square kilometre(Dharmasena, 2006)    
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The embedded systems could have been proposed based on the identity of language 
contours (Sinhalese Tamil and English).  A version of this is what is proposed by the 
Tamils when Tamils argue for the merger of the Northern and Eastern Province which 
include the Tamil speaking Muslims. It is interesting to point out that the ‘hybrid province 
based’ embedded system could be interpreted as portraying language based identity where 
the ‘Capital City Province’ carries an emphasised English language identity and the others 
carry vernacular based identity.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter a vital element of viability is the consideration of 
finance.  Yet with the exception of this thesis it is rare to find detailed evaluation of the 
devolution proposal on that score.  This is vital if the district based devolution proposal (as 
proposed by the SLFP) is to be taken seriously.  District identity considerations however 
would be very useful in negotiations to delineate the contours of the hybrid provinces 
proposal.   
 
Watts says –  
federal processes may be territorial or consociational or both. While there are some 
examples of federations in which there are nonterritorial constituent units recognized in 
the Constitution, the most notable example being the Belgian Communities, the 
constitutional distribution of power among territorial units is by far the most common 
pattern among federations. (Watts, 1999:14)   
 
A deeply interesting consideration is the value of a consociational arrangement to 
overcome Sri Lanka’s ethnically labelled conflict.  This thesis does not venture into this 
choice for it calls upon a very differently premised and architected proposal.  Chapter Five 
provides a process capable of designing such a proposal.   
 
The other point worthy of attention is who has the right to propose and evaluate devolution 
proposals.  On both aspects Sri Lanka’s history has shown this to be the preserve of the All 
Party Representative Committee (APRC).  Whilst APRC may contend that it has the 
requisite variety to evaluate proposals, it is wise to question the APRC’s requisite variety to 
earn the sole right to design proposals.  This alert is warranted because the 1978 
Constitution only permits political representatives to be from political parties.  The  
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Constitution no longer permits independent members.  As the renowned Late Hon. Mr. 
N.M Perera says –  
 
Under this new set-up there is no scope for the independent candidate.  Proportional 
representation has the defect of banishing him from the political scene, Parliamentary-
wise.  But this new Constitution, imbued by a sense of levity or cynicism, has provided 
for independents, if they form themselves into a group and function as a group.  In 
other words, they form themselves into a political party of independents with all the 
discipline that it involves and the cohesion that it requires.  Would it be a breach of 
privilege to ask the Parliamentarians who passed this provision whether they thought 
for a moment, who an independent is.  A person is an independent precisely because he 
cannot fit himself into a group. (Perera, 1991:85) 
 
What this means is that if civil society or an individual makes a proposal it must do so via a 
political party, which unfortunately is required to toe the party line.  In other words the 
only proposals that will surface for evaluation are those that conform to party policy.  For 
this reason, the charter of the APRC needs to be excluded from the privilege of enjoying 
exclusivity of proposal design. This is particularly because APRC is the body set up to 
inform Parliament on these matters and in that sense filters the initial solution phase within 
which the GoSL commences negotiations.  
 
The cybernetic importance of this exposition of variety, couched in political and legislative 
terms, is twofold.  Firstly, the discussion reveals a basis for discerning what should 
constitute the embedded systems, the profile of its identity and its boundary demarcation.  
Secondly, this discussion also shows the nature of the homeostatic relationship between the 
meta-level system and its embedded systems which carries with it vital organisational 
control insights as to the sensitive variables that are to be managed and their physiological 
limits. 
 
As a final point the critical realisation is that the VSM provides no indicators per se as to 
the size of each embedded system.  Certainly the VSM addresses size from a relative point 
of view – the dominance that an embedded S1 system can have on the overall system and 
the consequential subordinating effect on other embedded S1 systems. However, the 
invaluable insight of the VSM is its emphasis on the relationship between the various 
systems (S1 to S5) that form the level of recursion to which the viable unit belongs.  It is 
these relationships spanning S1 to S5 that need to be evaluated in terms of diagnosing the  
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viability of the devolution proposals.  These were summarised as the salient points in the 
close of Part II of this chapter. 
 
What this means is that at first glance the smaller district-based devolution unit proposal by 
the SLFP, if designed with its full complement of S1-S5 functions, appears viable.  
However, when its relationships are looked at in depth, there is a very high probability that 
‘Tamil’ contiguous districts will opt to amalgamate
94
 
 which will then prompt Sinhalese, if 
not Muslim, dominated districts to do likewise.  Thus the unit of devolution will soon 
gravitate to larger units.   
Note, the clause that states the ‘two districts could amalgamate and form one unit’ has 
minimally two interpretations due to its ambiguity.  One is that no more than two districts 
can amalgamate.  Once amalgamated they form a unit and are not eligible for any further 
amalgamation with other districts.  Another interpretation is that after two districts have 
amalgamated they are subsequently free to amalgamate with another district.  If the latter, 
then gravitation to larger units is almost inevitable which means the district proposal needs 
to be evaluated against that larger amalgam.   
 
Overall, the search for the identity upon which the unit of devolution will be architected 
and its relationship to the identity of the meta-level system which itself is another 
negotiation, is a matter for iterative negotiation by the multiple stakeholders.  One would 
expect each stakeholder representative, which is also a matter for negotiated agreement, to 
have a position on their principles and architecture of devolution.  The solution is the 
product of negotiations as each stakeholder jostles around the multiple others’ dynamic 
solution space.  I say dynamic for that is the effect of feedback, having being exposed to 
the others’ position and reasoning.   
 
The question now becomes how such a non-linear negotiation process involving more than 
two stakeholders is to be conducted.  Such a process is proposed in Chapter Five.  It is 
                                                 
94 The SLFP proposal states “The Unit of devolution would be the district. Two districts could amalgamate 
and form one unit; however, the amalgamating units should be in the same geographical division and also be 
contiguous. Amalgamation will be implemented in consultation with the people of the relevant districts. In 
forming and amalgamating the district, due consideration would be given to minorities concentrated in those 
districts.” Daily News, 1 May 2007  
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particularly deserving for it has the potential to be used to ask a very fundamental question 
– is ethnicity to be the underpinning characteristic that delineates the embedded systems (as 
has been done here) and if so should the embedded systems, given the passage of time, 
seek a transition to emphasise some other characteristic?  In this regard does the proposed 
‘evenly race mixed’ province hold potential to lead the transition? 
 
4.3.3  Prospecting for Ultrastability  
 
Given the need to cater for the variety of signal strengths, the system needs to come to 
terms with monitoring and feedback so that the system can correct itself. 
 
The objective of designing ultrastability into a system is by far one of the most difficult to 
achieve.  The objective is to cater for signal strength which at the time of design is 
unknown not just in the sense of it being absent, but in the terms of the composition and 
relevance of the signal being conceptually unknown.  Warren Buffett in looking for 
Berkshire Hathaway’s next Chief Investment Officer to succeed Buffett says –  
 
Over time, markets will do extraordinary, even bizarre, things. A single, big mistake 
could wipe out a long string of successes. We therefore need someone genetically 
programmed to recognize and avoid serious risks, including those never before 
encountered. Certain perils that lurk in investment strategies cannot be spotted by use 
of the models commonly employed today by financial institutions.  (Berkshire 
Hathaway, 2006, italics in quote)  
 
Here we have an iconic corporate example of the search for ultrastability based on  a 
person/s.  Pertaining to matters of national sovereignty, my understanding of variety is that 
the search is more far-reaching and needs to extend beyond personality to the institution 
itself.   
 
Beer is amongst the very few to provide a logical framework as to how to go about 
designing ultrastability.  The logic as discussed in Part II of this chapter is based on 
structural and process considerations and depends upon the relationship and informational 
flow between levels of recursion, which makes the channels which connect the systems 
vitally important.  As Beer’s logic reveals, and Buffett indicates, the search is not for pre- 
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built transformation processes capable of handling content, although it is content that 
triggers the ultrastability process into action.   
 
4.3.3.1  Technical Point 
 
Before discussing the relevance of ultrastability to Sri Lanka let me first address a technical 
point.  Whilst Beer (1994e:70) refers to Adjuster Organizer, Feedback Adjuster, the Muddy 
Box and its Management (all contained within the heavily lined box in Figure 13) as 
belonging to the Management Unit he does not further distinguish where these functions 
belong in the VSM.  I say this because I am unclear as to which Management Unit he refers 
to.  Is it the generic Management Unit when contrasted to the environment and operational 
unit , meaning his famous variety diagram called the Elemental Organizational Unit 
(1994e:96) comprising the amorphous cloud, the circle and the square box as shown in 
Figure 13  Or is it the Management Unit of S1 as shown in the VSM?  Having noted this, 
the generic management unit (square) is the equivalent of the more specific S1 
Management Unit, which at next lower level of recursion is S3 to S5. 
 
This poses the VSM question of the situation of the functionality of the adjuster organizer, 
Feedback Adjuster and Muddy Box.  Clearly the Muddy Box belongs to the S1 operation 
unit and the management box in Figure 12 is the S1 management unit.  The functionality of 
the Feedback Adjuster suggests itself as belonging to the functionality of S3.  The 
functionality of the Adjuster Organiser suggests as belonging to the functionality as 
performed by S4 which is privy via its direct connect to S5 to the logic of the higher level 
of recursion.  I say ‘suggests’ because there are questions when it cross-maps to the VSM, 
for example the vertical channels do not match.  
 
The importance of the meta-level connection in pursuing ultrastability is however 
absolutely clear.  Beer’s design in the pursuit of ultrastability hinges on the Adjuster 
Organiser, whose objective is to modify the design of the Feedback Adjuster, being open to 
the influence of the meta-level of recursion which ideally “is modelling the whole system 
with which the Feedback Adjuster is trying to cope.” (Beer, 1994e:66)   
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From a design perspective what this means is that the design needs to be clear on who or 
what process performs the functionality of the Adjuster Organiser and Feedback Adjuster.  
Similarly the design needs to identify the meta-level of recursion with which the channel of 
communication is to be established given that there are many a meta-level system with 
which a system is connected.  
 
4.3.3.2  Constitutional Insight 
 
The heyday of designing State constitutions was during the decolonization era following 
World War II.  Since then new constitutions are rare although Sri Lanka has promulgated 
two constitutions since its independence in 1948.  At this juncture of Sri Lanka’s evolution, 
rather than tinkering with amendments to address not only the crisis of the ethnic conflict 
but also other crises, it has the option of designing a new Constitution which offers the 
opportunity to incorporate ultrastability design considerations.    
 
There is an argument that could be proffered that Sri Lanka’s existing Constitution does 
incorporate ultrastability capability given the overriding powers the Executive President 
can invoke.  These include the unilateral power of the President to dissolve Parliament after 
one year of its existence, and the right to hold the portfolio of any, and therefore all, 
ministries.  For example, such powers were exercised by the Executive President in 2003 
when Parliament was prorogued, and was preceded by the Executive President taking over  
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three critical ministries
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.  In the later instance, what we find here is more a case of S5 
collapsing to be S3 rather than the Adjuster Organiser (presumably a S4 function) 
influencing the Feedback Adjuster (presumably Parliament functioning in its S3 capacity) 
to regulate activity in the Muddy Box (presumably a S1 race based operations unit). 
My understanding of the design of ultrastable systems in the context of governance as it 
pertains to governments comes from my discussion with Professor Dr. Stafford Beer.  My 
understanding of what he explained was a system which has both an elected representative 
system of government and what looks like a ceremonial monarch is the closest we have 
come to designing ultrastability into the architecture of the system of governance of 
governments.  Here we discussed the United Kingdom system of governance with its 
elected Parliamentarians and the British monarch who holds tenure not just for life but 
from ancestry to progeny based on birthright.   This security of tenure afforded to the 
monarchy enables it to function with a much longer term perspective compared to 
Parliament, where the elected Parliamentarian whose perspective is destined/induced to be 
short term due to the Parliamentarian’s necessity to win elections which take place every 
few years.  Additionally, in the case of the United Kingdom the Queen takes a very active 
and serious position in her involvement in world affairs which includes her function as 
Head of the Commonwealth
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.  Thus the British monarchy lends a metasystemic view that 
is both temporal (by virtue of its tenure of heritage) and spatial (based on the experience 
the Commonwealth affords of multiple types of governance structures, etc.).   
I recall Beer mentioned
97
                                                 
95 Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Communication & Media 
 that as questionable as the birthright privileges of the monarchy 
may be, it is the best we have so far been able to work out in order to bring longevity into 
perspective.  In other words a secure monarchy in its homeostatic relationship with the 
Parliamentary system is positioned to influence shorter term thinking with its longer term 
perspective.  The public service based on ‘tenured employment until retirement’ is also 
positioned to afford this longer term perspective both in person and as an institution.  
However, loss of ‘tenured employment until retirement’ runs the risk of the institution also 
96 The Commonwealth was established by the Statue of Westminster of 1931. It comprises 53 member States, 
16 of whom are Commonwealth Realms (where the Head of the Commonwealth is also the Head of State) 
plus 31 Commonwealth Republics (where the Head of State is not a monarch) and 5 States which have their 
own monarchs. 
97 Personal communication – a discussion we had around August 2002  
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losing its long term perspective.  This expectation stems from the person/s losing the 
climate to think long term. 
 
Internationally, as many realise, this ‘non-retirement tenure of employment’ is increasingly 
becoming the choice of employment contracts for public servants.  Whilst it is too early to 
detect a pattern of its ramifications the question that sits in the background is - on who can 
the system of the governance of government rely for taking a long-term perspective to 
counteract the short term view generated by the short term tenure of those elected?   
 
A point should be made here concerning monitoring for pattern detection.  There are 
segments of the public service that are called upon to make recommendations to Parliament 
concerning  long term projects that take decades to build and/or are intended to serve 
communities for centuries.  Such examples are damming rivers for hydro electricity and 
irrigation, construction of commercial harbours and international hub airports, laying 
underground infrastructure for cables and pipes for water, sewerage, gas, 
telecommunications, etc.  Detecting the pattern of ramifications of these types of projects 
being delayed (until the need is obvious by which time the lag time of construction imposes 
heavy penalties) is difficult to monitor because it takes time for these ‘step-based’ capacity 
effects to reveal themselves.  Furthermore, it is not overnight that the ramifications of ‘non-
retirement tenured employment’ system come into effect.  After 20 to 30 years the effect of 
delayed projects (which besides being capital orientated may relate to maintenance) and 
change in employment tenures may begin to evidence themselves.  I say 20 to 30 years for 
that is the time it takes to retire for those who were employed with ‘retirement structured 
tenures’ and who were trained and experienced in the ways of taking a longer-term 
perspective. 
 
Returning to reflect on the UK example, the more recent century shows the monarchy does 
not collapse to being the Parliament.  Rather it retains its S5 function and monitors the 
performance of S3.  This ultrastability capability was exercised in a rather unusual way in 
Australia in 1975
98
                                                 
98 Refer The Head of State by Sir David Smith (who was the Governor-General’s official secretary in 1975)  
 when the Governor-General (the vice-regal representative of the Queen, 
the Head of State of Australia) dismissed the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam and the  
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Leader of the Opposition, Malcolm Fraser, was appointed as caretaker Prime Minister.  
Whilst debate yet continues whether this action by the Governor-General was warranted, 
the cybernetic point is that there was access to metasystemic influence, and in this instance 
legal action, to re-stabilise the system given the blocking by the Senate of the money 
supply (Appropriations Bill) and thus the crippling of government.  There is scope to 
describe the Australian constitutional design based on McCulloch’s redundancy of 
potential command.  However, this is not pursued here. 
 
The invaluable insight I gained from this discussion with Beer was the understanding of the 
way structure (the institution of the  monarch and the Parliament) can play a part in 
balancing the homeostatic relationship between long and short term visioning.  This led me 
to re-examine the relationship between the Sri Lankan executive system of governance and 
the public service and in turn the homeostatic relationship with the races in the context of 
Parliament and the public service.  Historically, employees of the latter enjoyed tenure of 
service until retirement which afforded it the privilege to think with a long term 
perspective.    This however was denied commencing with the 1972 Constitution and 
reinforced in the 1978 Constitution when the public service lost its independence and was 
vested under the control of the Cabinet of Ministers with authority to delegate it to 
Ministerial level.  In 2001 the public service partially began to regain its independence 
under the 17
th Amendment by placing the public service under the purview of the Public 
Services Commission.  A paper addressing this topic was published (Solomons & 
Moscardini 2006b).  Since then, the hopes of Independence Commissions
99  have been 
vanquished due to the re-appointments of members to the Constitutional Council not taking 
place (due to the weakness in the Constitution
100
 
) and consequently the new 
Commissioners, replacing those whose tenure has expired, of the various Independent 
Commissions are direct appointees of the Executive President.   
The critical cybernetic alert here is that there is no vestige of long term capability in the Sri 
Lankan system of governance and there  is no ultrastability capability to influence 
otherwise.   
                                                 
99 These include the Public Service, National Police Commission.  Refer Article 41B Schedule of the 17
th 
Amendment of the Constitution. 
100 This specifically relates to Article 41A(f).    
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Tying the Parliament and the Executive President to an electoral process is the norm in 
republican (non-monarchist) styles of governance.  What is unusual is that the public 
service (the government’s arm of implementation, particularly regulation) has been entirely 
subordinated by binding it to the election based political system.  It is not unusual in many 
countries to find the top echelons of the public service changing with each new party in 
government.  In Sri Lanka, however, that change is not reserved to the top echelons and of 
recent years the change in government is occurring at a very much faster rate
101
 
 and on 
each occasion a different party has won government (since 2000 there have been three 
Parliamentary elections and two Presidential elections in eight years).  In this regard it is 
important to acknowledge that in Sri Lanka the cohabitation problems between the ruling 
government and Executive President are well known.  Admittedly, it took 25 years to 
exercise itself.  The Constitution was promulgated in 1978 and the cohabitation problems 
were evidenced in the 2003 proroguing of Parliament.  Also well known is the loss of 
independence of the public service.  Consequently, the hope is that such strong signals will 
be heeded and that the next Constitution will remedy such weaknesses.   
However, such weaknesses can be expected to be replaced with others which at the time of 
design may well be unthought-of.  This is why incorporating ultrastability capability into 
the Constitution is critical in a system which has suffered as much weakness as Sri Lanka 
has, as evidenced by its many crises.  As Beer says –  
 
The controls we institute are devised to regulate what we think the world is like.  Since 
that representation must be expected to have lower variety than the world actually 
proliferates, the controls are often circumvented. … Secondly, to point out that 
Feedback Adjusters are based on the presupposition that the model in the regulator is of 
adequate variety, which is probably not the case, and that this is why we need Adjuster 
Organizers. (Beer, 1994e:72, italics in original quote)  
 
Having discussed the theoretical and Sri Lankan experience to warrant incorporating 
ultrastability into the design of the Constitution, this leads to the other insight of my 
discussion with Professor Dr. Stafford Beer.  It pertains to understanding the spirit of the 
metasystemic relationship with the lower level of recursion in the context of seeking to 
design ultrastable systems.   
                                                 
101 Since 2000 there have been three parliamentary elections (Aug 2001, Dec 2001 and April 2004) and one 
Presidential election (Nov 2005) which influences the national level of the public service.  The previous 
Presidential election was in December 1999.  
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4.3.4  Seeking to Design an Ultrastability Capability 
 
Let us now turn to applying the metasystemic concept in the context of Sri Lanka’s 
Constitution.  I know of no instance where ultrastability considerations have consciously 
influenced the design of a State’s Constitution.  Neither have I found published writings 
about Beer’s actual experience of designing ultrastability capabilities when called upon to 
design a system.  In this sense, the exploration of ultrastability design considerations 
undertaken here is virgin territory and Sri Lanka offers a rare opportunity to apply such 
ultrastability requirements at the constitutional level.  Designing ultrastability has to be 
done in the context of the particular system in terms of what it comprises and how it 
governs itself.  It will be useful to explore the thinking associated with seeking to build 
ultrastability into the design of the Sri Lankan Constitution, both in the context of 
devolution and its higher level of recursion, the State of Sri Lanka. 
 
Firstly, it is important to realise that designing ultrastability capability into a system entails 
two vital elements.  These pertain to directional communication channels, where all four 
aspects need to exist.  These aspects are that the channel connects the full span from end to 
end; the channel can carry the content being communicated; the communication is capable 
of being understood (transduction) when received at the other end including any 
intermediate boundaries it may cross; and such channels must be consistently maintained 
without hiatus or lags.  The other vital element is the matter of metasystemic connection.  
As disclosed in Figure 12 Beer’s way to incorporate ultrastability capability hinges on 
connecting the system-in-focus to its meta-level of recursion.  Another way, as conveyed in 
the UK monarchy example, is to connect with a system affording a metasystemic view.  
The B comparator in Figure 12 illustrates this point. 
 
Secondly, what this implies is that the designer needs to know between whom connection 
is required so that the appropriate channels of communication are designed.  By this I mean 
in the case of a particular system, what is the specific entity that carries out the 
functionality performed by the Feedback Adjuster and Adjuster Organizer?  Similarly, the 
specific meta-level system upon which it is relying for a metasystemic view needs to be 
identified which requires that both sides acknowledge each other’s role.  To better 
appreciate this point, I will discuss this next in the context of the 2004 Asian Tsunami.  In  
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the meanwhile, it is pertinent to point out that whilst systems are embedded in systems, it 
does not mean that a system is exclusively embedded in one system.  For example, a State 
is embedded in many systems, like the international banking system, a regional system like 
SAARC, the UN, etc.  Thus designing ultrastability capability requires that the relevant 
meta-level system be specified in each context.  It also means that composite systems 
(using Maturana terminology) may have components within them that enjoy metasystemic 
perspectives.  In the case of the UK, the monarchy enjoys such perspective both temporally 
and spatially (by virtue of the perspective that hereditary tenure nurtures and being Head of 
the Commonwealth, respectively).   
 
Thirdly, when designing ultrastability capabilities, its very nature of being unknown means 
there is neither regulatory function nor transfer function to be designed per se at the time of 
designing the system.  The regulatory function (the delimitation of acceptable variety) to 
restore stability is designed at the time the need for ultrastability is triggered.  Also in cases 
where the alert signal has not been recognised within the system, which has a higher 
probability of happening with rapid on-set instability, then initiating the ultrastable 
capability relies upon the entity with the metasystemic view to activate the alerting 
mechanism.  With slower on-set disasters the frequency and increasing deviation has the 
potential to serve as alert mechanisms for the Adjuster Organiser to realise that the 
Feedback Adjuster requires re-modelling so that it can in turn influence the activity of the 
Muddy Box.  When that does not occur, it is that failure or potential for failure that the 
ultrastability afforded by the metasystemic system seeks to alert. 
 
4.3.4.1  Ultrastability & Asian Tsunami Alert Potential 
 
Monitoring and broadcasting potential cyclonic and heightened wave activity is well 
known to the Meteorological Department and NARA
102 in Sri Lanka.  However, tsunami 
activity appears to have been completely outside its filtering mechanism and in that sense 
was outside the design of the system’s capability.  Yet it reportedly took two
103
                                                 
102 NARA is the National Aquatic Resource Research & Development Agency. 
 hours to 
103 “Due to the distances involved, the tsunami took anywhere from fifteen minutes to seven hours (for 
Somalia) to reach the various coastlines.  The northern regions of the Indonesian island of Sumatra were hit 
very quickly, while Sri Lanka and the east coast of India were hit roughly two hours later. Thailand was also 
struck about two hours later, despite being closer to the epicentre, because the tsunami travelled more slowly  
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travel from the epicentre to Sri Lanka and was almost immediately detected by Pacific 
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC).  It was routinely reported in a bulletin 15 minutes after 
it occurred to the Pacific Islands and to The Naval Meteorology and Oceanography 
Command Detachment in Diego Garcia.
104
 
 (USINFO, 2005)  
Yet there was no established communication channel to alert Sri Lanka, India, etc that an 
undersea earthquake had occurred off the western coast of northern Sumatra.  Within Sri 
Lanka, despite its exposure to terrorist attacks, there was no communication process in 
place to broadcast the devastation that had hit the east coast minutes prior to it hitting the 
southern coast.  Such an alert would have given people a chance to seek higher ground and 
move inshore.    
 
Lacking channels of communication connecting entities with a metasystemic view, the 
system had zero capability to withstand the destabilization.  This is also a clear 
demonstration that the alerting mechanism relied upon the entity with the metasystemic 
view to trigger the process.  The response however is a matter for action by the system-in-
focus   
 
Since the Asian Tsunami  the metasystemic view of the PTWC has been extended to 
include the Indian Ocean and formal communication channels have been established with 
countries in the region. 
 
4.3.4.2  Potential for building ultrastability capabilities into the design of the 
Constitution 
 
Let us now attempt to address the very difficult matter of the potential for building 
ultrastability capabilities into the Sri Lankan Constitution.  Concerning matters of internal 
perturbations unperceived at the time of designing the Constitution, it is considered 
unlikely that a State will agree to establish a communication channel with a meta-level 
system that is outside its State, be it at a regional or international level.  This is because 
sovereignty is associated with being free of outside interference.   
                                                                                                                                                    
in the shallow Andaman Sea off its western coast.” (Department of Meteorology, Australia Government - 
http://www.bom.gov.au/info/tsunami/tsunami_info.html, accessed 5
th September 2007 
104 An island south west of Sri Lanka  
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Thus if ultrastability capability is to be designed it will need to find its metasystemic view 
from within itself.  This almost seems contradictory but it is not when one realises that 
components within a system could concurrently belong to other systems, some of which 
may be meta-systemic or afford it a meta-systemic view.  For example, in the instance of 
systems of governance with a monarchical presence, the system is minimally able to rely 
on its monarchy to provide a meta-systemic view as far as longevity is concerned.  In some 
instances, that monarchy is also able to afford a meta-systemic view across spatial frontiers 
also as is the case with the British monarchy due to it exposure from being the Head of the 
British Commonwealth of countries. 
 
With republican constitutions as in Sri Lanka, there is no monarchy to provide the longer 
perspective to counter-balance the shorter perspective of an elected representative.  
Furthermore, the denuded state of the public service makes this need for longevity even 
more pronounced.  Of course, a remedy is to restore the quality of the public service 
through such means as ‘tenure of appointment until retirement’, merit based promotions, or 
independent commissions to audit various aspects of the public service.  Yet for 
constitutional controversies like the non-appointment of the Constitutional Council 
members and trends of the magnitude that the Sinhala Only Act unleashed this may well be 
inadequate.  Decisions by the judiciary may also be inadequate since they are required to 
comply with the Constitution whereas, as will be discussed later, the people can change the 
Constitution.  
 
There is a however a process that the Swiss use that in my opinion affords their non-
monarchy based Constitution not only an ultrastability capability but one built on the 
principle of the Redundancy of Potential Command.  Whilst Redundancy of Potential 
Command is discussed more fully in the next chapter, let me say here “It is the information 
flow that determines which concatenation matters, and that therefore delineates the 
command centre.” (Beer, 1994a:232)  What this means is that command does not reside in 
a static place.  Rather it is dynamic and resides where the concatenation of information is 
better. 
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The Swiss system of governance
105
 
  invokes this via the constitutional provision of a 
‘citizen-initiated referendum’.  Initially, this citizen initiative starts as a petition to the 
federal government but once the petitioners reach a certain number (in 2001 it was raised to 
100,000 Swiss voters) it obligates the federal government to go a referendum.  (Knutsen, 
2004)  Before exploring the cybernetics of this it is useful to contrast this Swiss system 
with the petition method in England and that of the newer Scottish Parliament.  Under the 
Westminster system, a resolution of the House of Commons of 1699 states ‘That it is the 
inherent right of every commoner in England to prepare and present petitions to the House 
of  Commons in case of grievance and the House of Commons to receive the same’. 
However, there is no particular requirement for the House of Commons to do anything with 
it.  With the newer Scottish system the Parliament is obligated to consider any petition 
addressed to it. (Public Petitions Committee Report)   
Whilst the Swiss citizen-initiated referendum and the two British petition systems may not 
have been designed with the intention of invoking ultrastability, they do offer useful 
insights when viewed from that perspective.  First let me offer an interpretation of the 
Swiss system from the perspective of ultrastability.  What we have here are the people (not 
to be confused with ‘the individual’) forming the meta-level system by virtue of the people 
being S5
106
                                                 
105 Switzerland’s 2000 Constitution for the first time specifies the limitations on citizen initiatives.  For an 
informative introduction refer Direct Democracy in Switzerland by P Ruppen.  
.  The Swiss Constitution has in-built within it the concept of redundancy of 
potential command.  I say this because the Constitution provides for any concatenation of 
100,000 Swiss voters to communicate a matter to the federal level of Parliament obligating 
it to refer the matter to the people through the medium of a referendum.  In other words, the 
static relationship of Parliamentarians or Ministers taking government decisions is in that 
instance void.  Better still, what the Swiss Constitution has architected is a dynamic 
homeostatic relationship between the political process and the people.  That dynamic 
homeostat is exercisable at any time and can be invoked by the people so long as it reaches 
a certain physiological limit (100,000 Swiss voters).  When that physiological limit has 
been reached it tilts the homeostat so that it operates differently – meaning the people 
rather than the Parliamentarians are the decision makers.   This ‘people’ decision making 
106 This aligns with Beer’s narration of his initial meeting with President Salvador Allende, when the 
President exclaimed ‘at last el pueblo’ at being told of S5. (Beer, 1994a:258)  
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capability is available all the time and not just at the time of elections, which is the norm in 
other Constitutions.   
 
From a legal perspective it is valuable to bring to attention the Kenyan deliberations on 
their two constitutional proposals (Bomas and Wako drafts).  Kangu, making a distinction 
between authority and delegated power says –  
The use of the term sovereign authority  in Article 1 (1) refers to the premordial 
(primordial) constitutive authority of the people as the foundation source of all power. 
Because of this the people can donate some of their power to organs of state to (be) 
use(d) to serve the welfare, aspirations and values of the people. Such donated power is 
normally limited by the people through the Constitution. …When exercising this 
limited dominated (donated) power, state organs can not substitute themselves for (the) 
me people. They can not usurp the authority of the people, which is the source of their 
power. The people normally reserve their authority to, not only recall the donated 
power but also to directly exercise their authority. It is for this reason that the design of 
the Article 1 of the Bomas draft establishes the sovereign authority of the people in 
Article 1(1) and recognises in Article 1(2) that the power emanating from these 
sovereign authority (authorities) can be exercised by the people either directly or 
through their democratically elected representatives. The representatives therefore only 
receive power but not the sovereign authority of the people. In other words the 
democratically elected representatives can never be the substitute of me (the) people. 
(Kangu, ca. 2005) 
 
Thus what the citizen-initiated referendum does is recognize the right of the people to 
exercise their authority and temporarily withdraw the delegatory power they donated to 
politicians and to exercise their own authority and decide on the referendum matter at hand.   
In other words, what the Swiss Constitution does is specify a physiological limit (100, 000 
Swiss voters) beyond which that authority is guaranteed the right of exercise.  
 
Given this interpretation of the Swiss citizen-initiated referendum it is useful to enquire - 
what is the difference between ‘redundancy of potential command’ and ultrastability.  I 
propose the enquiry because one could say that redundancy of potential command performs 
the same alert that the ultrastability capability enables.  Both permit a concatenation outside 
the norm to influence the workings of the normal way of operations/decision making.  Thus 
the question - where lies the difference?  As I understand it, the distinction concerns the 
transformation function.  In the case of redundancy of potential command the 
transformation function could be pre-designed.  With ultrastability that is not so – the 
required transfer function is not know at the time of design.    
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To gain a sense of this subtlety, let us look at the other important point that the Swiss 
Constitution achieves.  It has designed a process so that when a concatenation, other than 
the  Parliament, believes it has better information, the Constitution has paved a 
communication channel and linked it to the people via the Parliament, so that the 
concatenation can exercise the procedure to alert the Parliament. Clearly, this alert is 
exercised when the Parliament is not acting in a way that that concatenation believes is 
appropriate.  What the Constitution is saying is ‘I do not know what these circumstances 
may be.  However I know such things can occur.  Thus, I have put in place a 
communication channel with a meta-level system and designed a procedure so that such 
unknown situations can be addressed in a way that the normal procedure does not allow.  
Furthermore, not knowing what that situation is, it requires no design on the part of the 
Constitution to specify a transformation process.  Rather what the Constitution does is, it 
leaves it open to the particular concatenation to frame the initiative to Parliament’. 
 
One may also enquire in the Swiss instance from the perspective of Beer’s ultrastability 
model - who performs the functionality of the Adjuster Organizer and Feedback Adjuster?  
My interpretation of this is that the Adjuster Organizer is the Constitution, Parliament is the 
Feedback Adjuster, the Government in power is Management and the Muddy Box is the 
particular operational unit, as it pertains to that referendum instance.  My interpretation of 
the Parliament being the Feedback Adjuster is because it monitors the results of the 
government that runs the country.  The Parliament is the entity that passes the budget or 
laws (mostly prepared by the government in power) to influence the workings of the 
Muddy Box.  Thus from within itself the system has the capability to self regulate.   
 
For some, more unusual is the nomination of the Constitution as the Adjuster Organizer.  I 
say this because it is the parameters of the Constitution that shape the functionality of the 
Parliament and any changes to the Parliament must be within the confines of what the 
Constitution allows.  So in this sense the Constitution is monitoring the activity of 
government and assessing whether changes are required to Parliament in order to influence 
the Muddy Box activity.  Yes, the Constitution is a document, but what I am referring to 
here is the functionality of the Constitution and more specifically the reviewing function 
performed by a group of people that is asking what changes need to be made to the 
Parliament to influence the workings of the Muddy Box.  Such changes usually appear as  
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legislation - to subject domain areas, amendments to the Constitution and more rarely the 
replacement of the Constitution as a whole.  The group reviewing the workings can be 
those within the system (e.g. political parties) or external.   
 
Note, the distinction with the Scottish and English models is that no action is assured as a 
consequence of the alert.  Certainly the Scots have to consider the alert but change is not 
obligated.  Furthermore, both these petitions carry little weight as they can be single person 
initiated and that single person cannot be categorised as ‘the people’ in the group sense. 
 
From a variety perspective it is pertinent to note that the Swiss system permits itself a lot of 
variety from where its ultrastability requirement can be recognized.  The recognition can 
come from any one of its voters.  To give the alert the assurance of action, namely a 
referendum, it calls for support of 100,000 Swiss voters.  What the alert emanating from a 
meta-level system does not do is make a decision on the way to react to the alert.  This is 
left for the people to deliberate upon and decide upon which thus respects the autonomy of 
the system-in-focus.  In comparison, in Sri Lanka there is absolutely no such provision.  
The Organizer Adjuster has no formal avenue for anything external to the political system 
to alert it of the need to substantively change the Feedback Adjuster. 
 
With this background let me propose that a way of building an ultrastability capability into 
the Sri Lankan system of governance is via a procedure similar to the Swiss ‘citizen-
initiated referendum’.  Whilst the relationship between the Executive President and the 
Parliament is a matter for design, if Sri Lanka was to seek to design an ultrastability 
capability the question in the context of the State is - who or what are these entities that 
function with the objective of seeking to modify the Feedback Adjuster?  This cascades to 
enquire  -  who or what entities perform Feedback Adjuster functionality -  the role of 
adjusting the way the Muddy Box works?  It is to these entities that the communication 
channels need to be established between the system-in-focus and the meta-level of 
recursion.  To these need to be specified the physiologic limit/s and context of reference to 
which these alerts apply.  Given the experience of a mandated referendum not being carried 
out  (e.g. which was agreed to at the Indo-Lanka Talks) it is wise that contingency 
provisions be specified, such as the time within which the referendum must be put to the 
people and the consequences if it is not.    
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Converting this to VSM terms, the Feedback Adjuster shares the functionality initiated by 
S3 and performed by S3* due to the latter auditing the effectiveness of the S1 operational 
unit.  Adjusting the input into the transformation function as performed by the Muddy Box 
can also be performed by S3 (in the context of the particular alert) based on S2 findings.  
This adjustment could be done via any one of the three vertical channels that connect S3 
with S1.  The Adjuster Organizer functionality appears to belong to the type of work done 
by S4 since it enquires of the effectiveness of the current way given its view of the 
emerging trends.  Discerning these trends (a function of the Adjuster Organizer), which can 
be in the environment or internal to its own level of recursion, relies on connection with the 
environment and connection with the Feedback Adjuster.  This needs connection with a 
metasystemic view which it can gather from within itself or via the level of recursion above 
it.  
 
Besides deciding on the manner of building ultrastability into the Constitution (and for that 
matter devolved systems of government) these types of self-organization considerations 
need to be addressed as part of the re-design of the governance structures in Sri Lanka.  A 
way of engaging in such design is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The significance of this chapter is twofold.  Firstly, it moves beyond the immediacy of 
conflict resolution to addressing other crises which impact on the viability of the State and 
its embedded systems.  Secondly, it steadfastly  continues to use principles of 
Organizational Cybernetics.  Specifically notable is the use of the concept of Ultrastability 
and the principle of Redundancy of Potential Command in conjunction with the notion of a 
Feedback Organiser to address the infrequently  used research area of how to design a 
system so that it caters for matters that are not even conceptually recognised.  
 
This recognition of signals contributes to extend the content of what needs to be addressed 
and serves to identify the variety of subject domain areas and functionality that the Peace 
Talks will need to address.  In turn, the combined variety disclosed in Chapters Three and  
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Four is used in Chapter Five to inform what the design process of negotiations will need to 
cater for.  
 
 
Next Chapter 
The view of this thesis is that the design of the solutions, for example the architecture of 
the Constitution, and the number and geographic contours of the provinces, is a matter for 
representatives of the various segments of Sri Lankan society/citizens to decide.  A process 
for designing such solution by representatives of various communities is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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  Chapter Five 
A Process Design for Negotiations 
 
 
Maya is the magical power in creation  
by which limitations and divisions  
are apparently present in the  
Immeasurable and Inseperable. 
- Paramhansa Yogananda 
 
 
We now approach the penultimate stage in the development of this thesis.  This Chapter 
continues with the theme of addressing process considerations which in this instance 
pertain to negotiations.  The search here is for a meta-level logic that contains the incentive 
for participants to return to the negotiations table and which meta-level logic has the 
capability to assist the resolution of what so far has presented as an undecidable 
proposition.  Also proposed is a process of negotiations which has the capability to 
accommodate a diverse array of interrelated content and to move beyond two party 
negotiations. 
 
This Chapter is presented in three parts.   
 
•  Part I - Addresses who needs to be involved in negotiations based on the cybernetic 
reasoning that was extensively discussed in the previous two Chapters.  Working with 
the levels of recursion pertaining to the UN, the State and its embedded systems, a 
proposal is made for a way of absorbing residual variety so as to gain agreement to 
negotiate internal self-determination based on interlocking negotiations involving those 
seeking cohesion and those seeking autonomy. 
 
•  Part II – Recognises the need for a large group intervention negotiation capability to 
accommodate multiple stakeholders and to absorb the diversity of content that needs to 
be addressed.  Beer’s Team Syntegrity® protocol is proposed along with the enhanced 
functionality that the orthogonal sets afford.   
Chapter Five  260 
 
•  Part III – Suggests a way of configuring the basis for participant selection for Team 
Syntegrity® based negotiations to re-design the principles and architecture of the 
Constitution so as to address the crises that embroil Sri Lanka 
 
 
Part I – Meta-Level Logic and Pre-Talks Intervention 
 
The vital question to be addressed here is – what needs to be done to let requisite variety 
exercise itself so that Peace Talks are sustained to the point of resolving the conflict?  This 
is particularly relevant because in recent decades Peace Talks have followed a sporadic 
pattern and results have scarcely fostered peace.  They have served instead the spiral into 
war. . 
 
5.1.1  Cyclical pattern of negotiation modalities 
 
It is useful to understand the cyclical pattern of negotiations which employ the modalities 
of war and Peace Talks  and ask -  how can this recurrent theme be broken when 
preservation of territorial integrity is sought and secession is threatened? 
 
The cycle evidenced is that when war reaches stalemate conditions Peace Talks become an 
attractive option to pursue.  When Peace Talks reach stalemate conditions a return to war 
gains attraction and once it is exercised usually breeds retaliation.  Victory at war, unless it 
is sustained, rarely brings the defeated to the negotiating table.  Rather the defeated opt to 
abstain, bide time and use it to re-train, re-equip and retaliate with counter victories so that 
they enter into Peace Talks on a relatively level playing field.  If they do enter into Peace 
Talks as militarily defeated participants, then it is likely to be used as a ploy to gain time, to 
re-train, re-equip and retaliate so that a level playing field can pervade the Peace Talks.   
 
Either way, the trend evidenced is that when neither side has a definitive advantage it is 
then that engagement in Peace Talks becomes attractive.  Thus, the stalemate permutation 
could be due to both sides having different advantages or both being disadvantaged.  An  
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additional point is that in Sri Lanka, the recent decades of warring have been essentially 
reduced to two sides.  To the extent that others have participated they have been painted as 
belonging to one or other of the two sides.  Here the obvious example is the Karuna faction 
who defected from the LTTE and holds the position of not belonging to the LTTE.  By 
default this faction has been slanted as belonging to the GoSL camp.  It is also pertinent to 
realise that in Sri Lanka the conflict is not of the type where multiple warlords control 
territory or people, which thus reduces the permutations of warring parties
107
 
. 
Let us now address a different permutation.  What happens in the case of victory which 
carries a heavy toll of deaths, nearing what could be described as genocide or large scale 
ethnic cleansing, or mass atrocities of the civilian community?  If an atrocity of such 
dimension is committed by the Sovereign State, then on humanitarian grounds it is likely to 
outweigh a State’s ‘defending territorial integrity’ argument and favour the secessionists in 
their claim to the UN for recognition of separation.  Therefore, the type of victory sought is 
not one of excessive death (how much constitutes ‘excessive’ is a heuristic physiological 
limit) of the rebel community (a variable) but one where they are disarmed and contained, 
and where a civic administrative system is installed to replace what after a war initially 
continues as a military based administrative system.   
 
On the other hand, if the excessive civilian killings are attributed to the secessionists then it 
augurs against them when seeking recognition by the UN of separation.  Thus, the victory 
sought here is spurning the de jure State’s military, destabilising the State’s economy by 
targeting economic sites, and very importantly of isolating territory to establish and run a 
de-facto State which in its formative years is likely to be administered under the command 
of the aspiring secessionist’s military.  Pursuant to Peace Talks negotiations this de-facto 
system along with possibly extended territory, is likely to convert to an autonomous 
devolved system within the coherence of the supervening State or used as the base upon 
which to claim for secession. 
                                                 
107 Fewer opposing parties mean fewer agreements need to be made, sustained and ensured that they are 
adhered to in practice.   However, the fewer the opposing parties the greater their consolidated powerbase.  It 
is this reasoning that makes it attractive to absorb variety by splitting a monolith’s powerbase.  The question 
is - what is the balance between the variety absorption that splits give and the ‘agreement’ proliferation, when 
it is entered into, that it entails.  
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So here we see a particular variant of war.  The objective if it is to be effective in claims for 
secession and counter-claims of territorial integrity needs to be what may be described as 
‘subdued victory’.  Each side needs to contain itself and not cross serious thresholds that 
will breach its claim/counter-claim with the UN or other foreign bodies.  Given the passage 
of time, it is possible that this type of iterative stalemate of ‘war triggered-Peace Talks and 
vice versa’ may inch its way to produce resolution of the conflict.  However, let us ask - is 
there a different logic that may speed resolution? 
 
5.1.2  Meta-Level Logic  
 
Cybernetically the negotiation between the embedded system (one of which is threatening 
secession in the event of inadequate autonomy being agreed upon) and the encompassing 
system (insisting on preservation of territorial integrity) finds itself with a residual variety 
that keeps their negotiating position as an unanswerable proposition – as evidenced by the 
stalemate.  It is this residual variety that a higher level of logic is called upon to absorb.  In 
other words, the search is for a higher level of recursion within which the disputing systems 
are embedded.  Given that systems are embedded in multiple systems the higher level 
recursive system being sought is the one which has variety to absorb the type of residual 
variety that the disputing systems are unable to absorb, either within themselves or between 
themselves. 
 
As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, these systems are the meta-level system of the 
UN (R+1), Sri Lanka being the system-in-focus (R0) and the race community of the Tamils 
(R-1) being the embedded system.  The reason the UN is selected as the meta-level system 
is because its cohesive principle (utilizing the command channel) has the duality which 
conveys to its Member States (embedded systems) the ethos that sovereign territorial 
integrity and self-determination of peoples is recognised.  Whilst the UN Charter (refer 
appendix 5) does not apply to matters within a UN Member State’s domestic jurisdiction 
(Article 2 (7)), what places secessionist claims under the UN mantle is the UN membership 
that the potential breakaway State seeks.  Such application for UN membership requires 
that the UN evaluate the secessionist claim for self-determination and counter-claim by the  
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State for the preservation of its territorial integrity.  This evaluation is based on what the 
UN stands for - the principle of equal rights and international peace (Article 1). 
 
5.1.2.1  State Recognition by UN  
 
The critical value of UN membership is not that UN membership is a, if not the, most 
powerful validating symbol of independence.  Rather it is that UN recognition of 
sovereignty (which is what ISO 3166 reflects) is the usual prerequisite for entry into the 
various international interchange systems when it is based on sovereign nations.  Some 
describe ISO 3166, Part I comprises a listing of UN Member States, as the base standard 
for international interoperability.  In stating this let me acknowledge that “The three parts 
of ISO 3166 do not express any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any 
country, dependency or other area named herein, or concerning its frontiers or 
boundaries.”(ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 32/WG1,  2000)  Notwithstanding this, being a UN 
Member State is the re-requisite requirement which is usually exercised to enter into many 
of the international interchange systems (e.g. ITU’s allocation of a telephone country code, 
recognition of the new State’s currency, passports, etc).  
 
Thus for the secessionist UN recognition is vital if it is to function internationally as a fully 
fledged Sovereign State with its complement of international interchange system rights and 
responsibilities.  It is because of the UN’s almost effective monopoly over the entrée into 
what is a compulsory requirement for a State to participate in the international interchange 
system, which gives the UN the negotiating strength to require its aspiring new member to 
comply with the UN ethos of respect for the principle of equal rights and peace.   
 
For the secessionist, this UN principle of equality is minimally three pronged: 
 
1.  If evidence of equality is absent in legislature and in practice in the relationship 
with the supervening
108
  
 State, it offers an embryonic basis to claim for secession; 
                                                 
108 The term ‘Parent State ’ is used in the context of external self-determination, when referring to claims for 
secession, also known as separation.  The term ‘supervening state’ is used in the context of internal self-
determination.  
Chapter Five  264 
 
2.  If internal self-determination negotiations do not result in agreement on 
institutionalising the principle of equal rights within the supervening system of 
governance it strengthens the case to claim for secession, and  
 
3.  If recognition of external self-determination is sought, the secessionist needs to 
demonstrate that in its manner of governance it applies the principle of equal rights 
in its relationship with its embedded systems.  This can be evidenced in the manner 
it governed its de-facto State (if it had such) and in the proposed Constitution under 
which it will govern itself.  From a UN perspective, one would expect that the 
Security Council as part of their evaluation will place importance on such equal 
rights being evidenced because otherwise its absence or weakness might eventually 
lead to another secessionist claim by an embedded system.  Furthermore, it would 
be hypocritical for the secessionist to propose less, given that is the very principle 
that its Parent State stands accused of as perpetrating on its embedded community.  
It is likely that the UN would be alerted to such hypocrisy by the Parent State or 
others who oppose the secession. 
 
In contrast, the negotiation strength of the UN is felt by the Parent State as a consequence 
of the secessionist claim particularly should the UN concur with the secessionist and 
recognise the change in territorial borders.  Whilst it is rare to have UN Member States 
challenge their neighbour’s territorial borders, it does happen (despite Article 2.4
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of the 
UN Charter) as was the case with Iraq-Kuwait and the UK-Falkand Islands-Argentina 
disputes and continues to be the case with India-Pakistan in terms of Kashmir.  Under 
Chapter II of its Charter, the UN has the power to suspend membership rights and 
privileges (Article 5) and even expel members (Article 6).  
To date, no country has been expelled
110
 
  from the UN or opted to leave it.  Thus a 
country’s loss of ISO 3166 status in that sense has never been tested. 
                                                 
109 It states ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.’  
110 There is the unusual case of China where in 1971 the People’s Republic of China replaced the Republic of 
China (popularly referred to as Taiwan) who until then had represented China and was one of the founding 
members of the UN.  0  
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The critical variety absorption point however is that such UN suspension or expulsion 
probably does not affect the Parent State in terms of it retaining its participant status as a 
sovereign entity in the international interchange  systems, albeit its trading terms may 
change.  For example, its risk rating may change and impact on its interest rates from 
multi-lateral lending agencies whereas it makes no difference to its telecommunications 
country code.  I say ‘probably’ because formal legal consultation needs to be undertaken.   
 
The point being made here is not that, in the case of Sri Lanka, it would incur expulsion, 
suspension, or opt for invasion manoeuvres if the secessionist secures sovereignty.  Rather 
the importance is to recognise the difference in the strength and manner in which the UN 
variety absorbing capacity is exercised when negotiating with the secessionist claims and 
Parent State ’s counter-claims. 
 
Before leaving this point it is valuable to enquire of the difference between the variety 
absorbing capacities offered by the meta-level system of the UN compared to sub-sets of 
the international community (refer 5.1.2.1.1).  The other point requiring addressing is the 
matter of the UN’s relationship in the context of domestic jurisdiction (refer 5.1.2.1.2). 
 
5.1.2.1.1  Variety of UN ISO 3166 versus Sub-Sets of the International Community 
 
Over recent years the international community has taken a more active role in persuading 
the GoSL and the LTTE to engage in Peace Talks.  During the 2002-2003 Peace Talks, 
various Donor Conferences were organised where the international community, such as 
foreign countries and multilateral lending agencies, pledged grants and loans based on 
progress being made on the terms of peace agreements.  Despite this carrot, which came to 
be known as the ‘peace dividend’, the LTTE suspended their participation at the Peace 
Talks.  In 2007 with war taking increasing strides, donors such as the UK and Germany 
have cut back on their aid programmes and more countries plus the EU are listing the 
LTTE as a proscribed organisation within their jurisdictions.  Yet these constraints have 
had little effect in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table. 
 
This prompts the question - why should the UN meta-level variety absorbing attempt be 
any more successful than what the international community has experienced.  The answer  
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lies in understanding the way variety is absorbed given the distinction between mandatory 
and optional requirements and the alternative ways of achieving such requirements/goals.   
 
In the instance of the need for finance (a mandatory requirement) there are many ways to 
achieve it.  For example in the case of the ‘peace dividend’ one explanation is that for the 
LTTE the carrot of finance was accessible from other sources such as the Tamil diaspora, 
LTTE’s business enterprises run under proxy names, and from organising lending at the 
time of development.  It was more valuable for the LTTE to suspend their participation and 
adduce it to various grounds
111
 
 which given time grew to engaging in a retaliatory war.   
Likewise, the 2007 financial constraint from the aid community has required the GoSL to 
search for alternative financial sources, which needless to say exist ever if their terms of 
lending may not be as attractive.  Regarding proscription of the LTTE, this is a reality that 
the LTTE is well experienced in circumventing given its proscribed status in countries like 
the USA and UK.  Whilst these variety constraints have been imposed on the warring 
parties they are slower to impact given the alternatives available to overcome them.  It 
indicates the various systems’ variety generating ability to absorb the constraints imposed.   
 
Now let us look at the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P).  In the face of 
intransigence and the atrocities experienced in intrastate conflicts like those of Sri Lanka, 
and the more conscience-shocking events like those of Rwanda in 1994
112 and Srebrenica 
in 1995
113
 
, the question arises -  when is international intervention warranted despite 
internal conflict being a matter for domestic jurisdiction in terms of the UN Charter?  
Evans says –  
                                                 
111 The letter suspending the LTTE’s participation at Peace Talks stated “the exclusion of the LTTE from 
critical aid conference in Washington, the non-implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in the 
truce document, the continuous suffering and hardship experienced by hundreds of thousands of internally 
displaced Tamils, the aggressive Sinhala military occupation of Tamil cities and civilian settlements, the 
distortion and marginalisation of the extreme conditions of poverty and deprivation of the Tamils of the 
northeast in the macro-economic policies and strategies of the government have seriously undermined the 
confidence of the Tamil people and the LTTE leadership in the negotiating process. Under these 
circumstances the LTTE leadership has decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time 
being.”  Source: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/letterpm2003.htm  
accessed 29 June 2007 
112 An estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed in a space of 100 days. 
113 In the five days after Bosnian Serb forces overran Srebrenica, more than 7,000 Muslim men are thought to 
have been killed. Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/675945.stm , accessed 15 July 2007  
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There is a widespread concern that involvement of countries in the affairs of others, and 
in particular the involvement of developed countries in the internal affairs of 
developing ones, has not always been principled or consistent in the past.  It is an 
article of faith around a good deal of the global South that Article 2 (7) of the UN 
Charter is to be read as an all embracing prohibition. (Evans, 2007) 
 
A response by the international community was the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
which was the outcome of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty.  Evans explains this was premised on two critical conceptual contributions.  
One, the ‘right to intervene’ is not about ‘right’ but ‘responsibility’ to protect people at 
grave risk.  The other was that the new way of looking at sovereignty was not as ‘control’ 
but as ‘responsibility’.  Evans delivering the 2007 Neelan Tiruchelvam memorial lecture 
says –  
 
The starting point is that any state has the primary responsibility to protect the 
individuals within it.  But that is not the finishing point: Where the state fails in that 
responsibility, through either incapacity or ill-will, a secondary responsibility to protect 
falls on the wider international community.  That, in a nutshell, is the core of the 
responsibility to protect idea, or ‘R2P’ as we are now all calling it for short. (Evans, 
200:6) 
 
Let us now review R2P from the perspective of the meta-level logic it employs.  Re-
expressed in VSM language R2P means some element/s of the international community, a 
meta-level system, seeks to employ its vertical channel of communication to persuade or 
coerce a Sovereign State to desist from the atrocities it is committing against segments of 
its own people, an embedded system within the Sovereign State.   These atrocities could 
likewise be committed by the embedded system against the Sovereign State and similarly 
deserve international intervention.  The international response, which could be to prevent 
serious deterioration or arrest gross violations, could take the form of legal, diplomatic, 
economic or in more severe cases military intervention.  It will be aimed both at the 
Sovereign State and the opposing protagonist/s.  Such intervention besides seeking to halt 
the perpetration of the humanitarian crisis seeks to convey to the opposing protagonist the 
value of adopting the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’.   
 
The question is – does this meta-level logic of ‘responsibility to protect’ carry sufficient 
variety to absorb the counter-variety which made perpetration of atrocities a sensible 
avenue to overcome whatever the reason for the conflict?  An answer to this question is to  
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enquire - ‘responsibility to protect whom?’  For the Sovereign State the answer is all its 
citizens.  However, for the aggrieved subset community of the Sovereign State the answer 
is their subset community!  Thus R2P stands up to the issue of the aggrieved sub-set 
community using its civilian community as human shields.  However, for the aggrieved 
sub-set community the logic of R2P does not by definition extend to the citizens of the 
whole Sovereign State.   
 
Certainly, in the face of mounting atrocities, R2P offers a logical argument for the 
international community to intervene.  However, applying this logic to local participants 
fails in its intended purpose.  As Beer says “Each system speaks its own language which is 
not comprehended by the embedded system.” (Beer, 1994g: 240) 
 
If R2P logic was to be introduced to Sri Lanka in its war with the LTTE, we could find that 
this principle and the chosen penalties (or incentives) could both act to arrest the atrocities 
perpetrated by the Sovereign State.  However, with the LTTE it would be the effect of the 
penalties (not the meta-level logic) that could be depended upon to carry the variety 
absorbing power to counterbalance the attractiveness of perpetrating gross human rights 
violations on the other side.   
 
To some this narrow definition of ‘responsibility to protect’ one’s community may present 
as a pedantic point.  Yet this is the sticking point in the UN Charter of Article 2 (7) that 
R2P seeks to overcome.  The question is - has it done so?  Those advocating R2P may have 
had success due to the variety absorbing capacity of the array of penalties available and the 
high calibre of political influence of officials that negotiate the acceptance of R2P thinking, 
but it leaves one wondering about the effect of the meta-level logic of ‘responsibility to 
protect’ on the non-State protagonist.  If the R2P logic fails to influence the non-State actor 
against the perpetration of violence then it acts as a reason for the Sovereign State to avoid 
R2P thinking too and with it resist and question foreign intervention on the grounds of 
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
 
Yet one must admit that R2P logic of turning rights into responsibilities is astute variety 
engineering, arguing that rights need to be attenuated and responsibilities amplified in 
order to absorb the variety that human rights violations pose.  What R2P has done is given  
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expression to the heated example of intrastate conflict involving gross violations of human 
rights and in that context proposes the latter part of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter - 
namely, ‘but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII’ warrants application under the logic of responsibility to protect.   
 
The point remains that the aspiring secessionist is outside the net of the UN and so too the 
logic of ‘responsibility to protect’ in the sense of the wider community which the 
Sovereign State obviously covers.   However, combining R2P with Article 35 (2) of the 
UN Charter and the ISO 3166 mandatory-monopoly requirement draws in the aspiring 
secessionist.  R2P catches the Sovereign State.  But it is the strength of ‘ISO 3166 
mandatory-monopoly gateway into the international interchange systems that attracts the 
secessionist which in turn draws in the Sovereign State in order to address the risk which 
the secessionist has elevated by recognising and seeking ISO 3166 accreditation.   
 
Importantly R2P is aimed at alleviating gross human rights violations much like the various 
Geneva
114 and other international
115
 
 conventions  –  alerting the Sovereign State and its 
opposing non-state actors against seriously crossing thresholds of violations.  R2P does not 
necessarily have variety absorbing capacity in its meta-level logic to get the opposing 
protagonist to the negotiating table.   By this is meant, so long as the protagonists stay this 
side of seriously violating thresholds (i.e. physiological limits) then it evaporates the need 
for penalties imposed by the international community and with it is downgraded the 
prioritisation in the scheme of competing values that would have otherwise been accorded 
to comply with the meta-level logic of the ‘responsibility to protect’. 
In contrast, the meta-level logic of the principle of equal rights that the need for the ‘ISO 
3166 mandatory-monopoly requirement’ secures presents as having the stand-alone 
capability to act as the incentive for the opposing protagonist to enter into sustainable 
Peace Talks  negotiations.  In response to the question of ‘equal rights of what?’ the 
cybernetic way of expressing the answer is - whatever it takes to achieve peace which in 
                                                 
114 Amongst these are 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War and 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
115 These relate to the rules of war concerning allowable practices and justifications for armed force.  Also 
included here are other conventions like the 1978 Red Cross Fundamental Rules of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.      
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the instance of internal self-determination negotiations is evidenced in the evaporation of 
secessionist claims.   
 
The other critical point of ‘ISO 3166 mandatory-monopoly requirement’ is that the 
principles and design upon which peaceful co-existence are architected are not externally 
imposed.  Rather, what the UN, an external influence, does is say that if external self-
determination is sought then the principles enshrined in the UN Charter are the principles 
by which the secession claim and counter-claim will be minimally  evaluated.  The 
principles  and architecture of internal self-determination is however a matter for the 
internal actors to resolve.  It is this tension of providing a principle and not providing a 
principle that is the strength of the UN’s principle of equal rights upon which international 
peace depends.  
 
Let us now look more closely at the UN monopoly of recognition of a new State in terms of 
gaining IS0 3166 accreditation.  Such monopoly means there is no alternative for the 
secessionists if their objective is to participate in their own right (not via proxy) as a 
Sovereign State in the international interchange system.  This binds the Tamil aspiration to 
abide by the cohesive terms of the UN charter if its threat of secession is to be realised in 
the event of it not being dissolved  by achieving peaceful co-existence with the other 
communities in Sri Lanka.  In turn, this links the Parent State to comply with UN 
requirements of the principle of equal rights or else run the risk of separation.  Reflection 
on this point indicates whilst negotiations take place on one front (e.g. internal self-
determination) an astute pro-active  negotiator has the opportunity to in-build into the 
negotiation a stance that can withstand the contingency of having to claim/counter-claim 
secession. 
 
In other words, requirements can be mandatory or optional and the way of achieving them 
can be offered by a monopoly or by many alternatives.  From this combination the 
following useful table serves to gain an appreciation of the way variety is absorbed – refer 
Table 8. 
 
It is important to note that with a mandatory requirement time needs to be factored in.  
Whilst a requirement is mandatory it may only be at a particular moment in time or for a  
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particular duration of time.  Thus the power associated with that mandatory requirement 
prevails only during that time and the variety engineering needs to recognise that.  
Likewise the power associated with the monopoly too is time bound and applies during the 
currency of the mandatory requirement.  It is also important to recognise the existence of 
multiple, but not concurrent, mandatory requirements which may prompt prioritisation 
particularly if there are mandatory requirements whose terms of achievement impose 
restrictions.   
 
Table 8 - Variety Absorption of Mandatory-Monopoly Considerations 
 
Requirement 
 
Achievement 
Variety – from the perspective of the system seeking 
the requirement 
Mandatory  Monopoly  Variety reduced to one.  There are more but since they do 
not achieve the requirement they are ignored here. 
 
Thus the seeker of the requirement will need to comply 
with the terms of the provider of the achievement. 
Mandatory   Various  
Alternatives 
Variety = many alternatives 
 
Seeker will need to comply with the terms of the chosen 
provider.  In arriving at the choice of provider, a factor 
will be the ramifications of the terms of the provider. 
Optional  Monopoly  Means the requirement can be avoided.  If avoided the 
power of the monopoly is unexercised and thus the power 
is not relevant. 
 
If the requirement is exercised, then the monopoly enjoys 
full variety absorbing power.  Thus the seeker will need 
to comply with terms of the monopoly provider. 
Optional   Various  
Alternatives 
Variety = many alternatives 
 
Means the requirement can be avoided. If avoided the 
power of the various alternative providers is 
inconsequential. 
 
Seeker will need to comply with the terms of the chosen 
provider.  In arriving at the choice of provider, a factor 
will be the ramifications of the terms of the provider. 
 
Accreditation with World Trade Organization (WTO) is a classic example of the variety 
engineering considerations given the relationship between requirements achieved through 
monopoly channels which required compliance with the monopoly’s criteria.  Here the 
need (an optional requirement) is to be part of the globalization process and thus part of the 
WTO.  However, as Dr. Allenna Leonard pointed out in personal correspondence, many a  
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country has complied with WTO requirements to later realise the amount of sovereignty 
they have ceded. 
 
5.1.2.1.2  Secession Claim and Domestic Jurisdiction  
 
Given the monopoly, in practical terms, enjoyed by the UN in providing the access to the 
mandatory requirement of participating in the international interchange  system, the 
principle of equal rights has the effect of employing the command channel (in VSM terms) 
on the aspiring State, which however de jure is an embedded system within the Parent 
State.  Within the UN charter this raises the important distinction of the right of non-
interference in matters of domestic jurisdiction (Article 2.7) given that the conflict is 
between a Sovereign State and one of its embedded systems.   
 
However, the concurrent points are that the demand for secession by definition is a matter 
for UN decision making and a matter of domestic jurisdiction.  In this regard, what the UN 
Charter provides in Article 33.1 is that ‘The parties to any dispute, the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first 
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their 
own choice’.  It is in the event of the lack of domestic resolution, which may be aided by 
others, that the secession claim gains strength under what is more extensively provided for 
in Chapters VI to VIII of the UN Charter.   
 
In cybernetic terms, the UN monitors the homeostatic relationship between the Member 
State and its disgruntled embedded system/s or the relationship between Member States.  
What the UN is looking for is whether peace and equal rights prevail.  If the physiological 
limits of the variables that comprise this homeostat are operating close to their outer 
margins, they present as disputing international peace and/or as secessionist claims.  If 
either prevails they indicate to the UN the need for intervention in terms of its charter – 
which the UN itself or its Member States can initiate via the UN – refer Chapters VI and 
VII of the UN Charter. 
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In the case of Sri Lanka, the threat of secession and war within the State clearly indicates 
the physiological limits are being disturbed.  This opens the prerequisite question of 
whether adequate expression has been given to resolving the conflict internally.   
 
The argument of Chapters Three and Four is that this is not the case on many frontiers in 
Sri Lanka.  Notable amongst these is that at the peace table the negotiations pertaining to 
matters of internal self-determination have been fundamentally flawed as talks have been 
restricted to the warring systems – Sri Lanka, the encompassing system, and the Tamils, 
one of the embedded systems within Sri Lanka.   
 
The need for Peace Talks negotiation-s to involve the participation of representation of 
systems as encompassed within three levels of recursion was advocated.   
 
The distinction was made that for internal self-determination negotiations, these triadic 
levels of recursion comprise the system Sri Lanka (R0), the various race-based community 
systems (R-1) and those systems embedded within that second layer of recursion (R-2).   
Two sets of interlocking negotiations were proposed.  One set would be between the 
encompassing system, the State (R0) and its encompassing systems (R-1).  The other set 
would be between each of those embedded systems (R-1) and in turn their embedded 
systems (R-2).  This places the systems belonging to R-1 in the dual role of an autonomous 
system in its relationship to R0 and as a cohesive system in its relationship to the systems 
belonging to R-2.  This interlocking relationship accommodates the array of embedded 
systems, provides an avenue for assertions made at ‘R0 and systems belonging to R-1’ 
negotiations to be verified and/or contested and even proposed by systems belonging to  
R-2.  This is achieved when the interlocking relationship is employed in a bi-directional 
iterative and circular manner where in the negotiation process the cohesive requirements 
shape the autonomous requirements, which in turn serve to shape the cohesive 
requirements.  The other strength is when principles that constitute the system being 
designed are consistently applied between the cascades of embedded systems.  Recall these 
matters have been more extensively discussed in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
For external self-determination the negotiation involves the recursion levels of the system 
of Tamils seeking secession (R-1), Sri Lanka (R0) who seeks preservation of its territorial  
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integrity and for the reasons proposed in this Chapter, the UN (R+1).  In the case of 
external self-determination the UN plays an adjudication role, based on its principles, 
whether secession is to be granted or not. 
 
Now I want to draw a distinction between internal self-determination negotiations  and 
external self-determination negotiations as they pertain to matters of cohesion.   
 
In external self-determination negotiations the cohesive policies of the UN are themselves 
not matters for negotiation.  Their interpretations are.  It is those differing interpretations 
that the Parent State and aspiring State seek to convey, initially to the five permanent 
members of the Security Council, so as to convince the meta-system that they comply with 
the UN’s cohesive policies.  As the UN’s cohesive policies are not matters for negotiation, 
its embedded Member States are not called into the negotiation process.  However, the 
Member States are called upon to vote on the secession claim and counter-claim based on 
their interpretations of the cohesive policies and their own strategic interest.  
 
In contrast with internal self-determination negotiations the cohesive policy of the meta-
level system, the Sovereign State, is open for negotiation.  Indeed it is a vital part of the 
negotiation for it is the complement of autonomy which is the very point of negotiation - to 
avert secession and achieve peaceful co-existence.  Thus the principles of cohesion need to 
be re-designed and agreed upon so that the State’s identity adapts so as to avert secession 
and achieve peaceful co-existence amongst its embedded systems.  The need to re-design 
the principles upon which cohesion is premised therefore requires that the full array of 
embedded systems participate to negotiate the principles and the way in which the 
principles are to be designed and achieved.     
 
Part II of this chapter proposes a protocol for internal self-determination negotiations which 
is capable of handling variety in terms of the multiplicity of systems, who represents those 
systems, and the plethora of content issues that pertain to internal self-determination.  In 
this regard, the content will pertain to more than resolution of the conflict as there are other 
matters, some of crisis proportion, that interact with the principles upon which peaceful co-
existence is premised.  These too along with weak signals (discussed in Chapter Four) need 
to be addressed as part of the negotiations.  
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5.1.3  Positioning for Pre-Talks Negotiations  
 
This thesis has straddled generic considerations and the contextualised situation of Sri 
Lanka.  It is now time to provide a contextualised answer to what has so far proven an 
undecidable proposition between the right of preserving territorial integrity of a Sovereign 
State and the right to self-determination in the face of discriminatory privileges accorded to 
certain communities.   
 
Historically, amongst the most notable of these privileges was the massive economic, 
cultural and educational advantage bestowed by the Sinhala Only Act which was 
exercisable due to the majority decision making power of the Sinhalese despite the 1947 
Constitution’s section 29 anti-discriminatory provision.  Conceptually, this same 
discriminatory trend is evidenced in the ISGA proposal by the LTTE when they specified 
that the LTTE hold an absolute majority of appointees in the composition of the ISGA 
(clause 2.3.a) despite the anti-discriminatory provision as stated in clause 6.  Later the 
principle of fairness begins to be conceptually evidenced in P-TOMS via the need for two-
thirds majority voting when minority  groups are disadvantaged –  refer clause 6.3.e.iii.  
However this does not apply if the disadvantage applies to a majority group who 
presumably is not the Tamils as an LTTE appointee must be the Chairman and enjoys the 
casting vote in times of a tie (Clause 6.3.ii). 
 
As mentioned earlier, undecidable propositions are the product of the framework of logic 
applied.  This is why a meta-level logic capable of absorbing the residual variety and thus 
resolving the proposition is sought.  The threat of secession also shows that cohesive 
restraint affecting autonomy of embedded systems will be accepted if the affected 
embedded system benefits from belonging to the encompassing system.  Else the 
embedded system will seek a way out. 
 
Having found a meta-level system that provides a valuable reason for belonging, its meta-
level logic becomes attractive to abide by.  This attraction however needs to apply to all 
parties affected by the undecidable proposition.  Like a game of chess, it may also take 
many moves in conceptual thought to figure out the attraction and/or repulsion.  Having  
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done so, conceptual reflection will serve to inform how earlier moves must be played so as 
to gain the benefits sought. 
 
In the context of Sri Lanka’s conflict the question is – who should be undertaking these 
design considerations and who should those designers be positioning with in order to gain 
acceptance of the design under which negotiations will take place?  My proposition is that 
design is part of the facilitator’s role.  The facilitator, or by whatever other preferred title, is 
an entity distinct from the negotiating parties.  The facilitator not only facilitates the 
agreement of the stakeholders to negotiate and facilitates the talks, but importantly 
facilitates the negotiation of the design of the negotiations. 
 
This implies that the facilitator needs to start with a variety of designs for negotiations that 
offer the capability of absorbing the residual variety of the undecidable proposition.  Such a 
starting design has been proposed in this thesis, which opens the question - what minimally 
does the facilitator need to do (or not do) which will also serve to inform of the type of 
facilitator sought for future phases of negotiations?  ‘Starting’ is stated because the design 
of the negotiation is a matter for the primary stakeholders to decide.  
 
Much is already known about what is involved with facilitation based on the experience 
gained from designing the various Peace Talks, and as discussed in Chapters Three and 
Four the diagnosis and Peace Talks design proposals.  I now want to focus on the design 
and facilitation of Pre-Talks negotiations –  the negotiations of the design of the 
negotiations. 
 
Facilitating for ‘Pre Talk Negotiations’ to occur requires that the system (the UN, Sri 
Lanka and the Tamils) be approached to present and discuss the type of reasoning that has 
been presented in this thesis.  Needing particular amplification is the proposal that internal 
self-determination negotiations be informed by the meta-level logic of the UN’s criteria for 
recognition of external self-determination, which is amongst the contingencies (war being 
another) if internal self-determination talks fail to achieve agreement on the design of 
peaceful co-existence.  To date, each of the opposing protagonists have argued their rights 
based on the UN Charter.  The existing Parent State premises its argument on the right of 
preserving its territorial integrity and that the conflict being amongst its own citizens makes  
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it a matter within its own domestic jurisdiction.  The Tamils premise their argument on the 
right of self-determination of peoples in the absence of equal rights.  Yet despite the 
recurring theme of war and failed Peace Talks negotiations, the threat of secession has to 
date not been formally applied and claimed for at the UN.  This has the effect of keeping 
the Tamil threat of secession beyond the reach of the UN because the Tamil system 
involved in the conflict is per se not a Member State. 
 
In a bid to absorb residual variety the proposal  is to give expression to that threat of 
secession and understand what it takes for that threat to be realised in terms of separation 
and to use that meta-level logic to provide/underpin the basis of internal self-determination 
negotiations.  For this to succeed it depends on the duality of the tension of territorial 
integrity and self-determination as it gives each opposing protagonist the incentive to prove 
the extent of their compliance with the principle of equal rights.  When secession is 
formally applied for, the UN (commencing with the five permanent Member States of the 
Security Council) is called upon to decide in favour of the Parent State or secessionist 
based on who evidences greater compliance with the principle of equal rights, amongst 
other considerations.  This compliance with the principle of equal rights is likely to be 
considered not just at a moment in time.  Rather it spans a length of time, covering the past 
in terms of legislation and implementation, and conceptually into the future based on 
propositions accepted and declined which therefore includes the phase of internal self-
determination negotiations.   
 
Based on ISO 3166 listing which is the usual gateway into the international interoperability 
systems, the incentive for the secessionist to comply with the UN meta-level logic of the 
principle of equal rights has already been discussed.  Once the facilitator has brought home 
the significance of this leverage point and it has been accepted by the designers of the 
secessionist system, it acts as a compelling force to draw in the Parent State to vie for 
greater compliance with the UN’s principle of equal rights.  Whilst this too has been 
discussed, there are two aspects that still require addressing.  Firstly, can the five 
permanent members
116
                                                 
116 Whilst the permanent members comprise an East West combination, it may well be that a different array 
of Member States drawn from the totality of UN Member States may be preferred.   However, better variety 
 of the UN be involved in the dispute resolution given the absence of  
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a formal secession claim and secondly what happens if the Parent State and/or secessionist 
superficially participate and thus effectively sabotage internal self-determination 
negotiations?  These two questions are considered next and addressed in 5.1.3.1 and 5.1.3.2 
respectively. 
 
 
5.1.3.1  Monitoring and Guidance by Permanent Members of Security Council 
 
Chapter VI in conjuncture with Article 11 and 12 of the UN Charter provides avenues for 
the Security Council to be involved in monitoring and guiding the negotiations process of 
the opposing protagonists.  A matter for consideration is the status of the aspiring 
secessionist who is not a UN Member State.  Article 35.2 provides for a State which is not 
a Member of the UN to bring disputes to the attention of the Security Council or General 
Assembly, if it accepts in advance,  for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of 
pacific settlement.   This opens the question of whether the secessionist is a State and who 
gets to attribute identity (a cybernetic discussion concerning matters of identity was 
presented in Chapter Three).  The Security Council under Article 34 is also given rights of 
investigation of any dispute which might lead to international friction or endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  Article 35.1 also gives any Member State 
the right to bring any dispute or situation to the notice of the Security Council.    The 
opportunity that Article 34 and 35 affords is discussed ahead in 5.3.1.1.1 
 
Thus the facilitator, particularly if a Member State of the UN, has many facilitatory 
avenues to gain the support of the Security Council to help resolve the conflict.  In this 
proposal, it includes the Security Council monitoring and guiding internal self-
determination negotiations, particularly as such internal self-determination negotiations are 
a prelude which is evaluated as part of the history of claim and counter-claim concerning 
external self-determination.  
 
In variety absorption terms participation of the five permanent Member States of the 
Security Council is sufficient to provide the monitoring and guidance role during the 
internal self-determination negotiations.  It is vital to realise here that in opening up these 
                                                                                                                                                    
absorption is achieved with the permanent members as the sensitivity of their veto power is given a chance to 
be sensed.   
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channels of communication, the role of monitoring and guidance played by the five 
permanent members is in their individual capacities and can be performed in their 
international diplomatic capacity, much like the Sri Lankan Co-chairs of the Tokyo Donor 
Conference
117
 
 (USA, EU, Japan and Norway) perform.  To the Parent State and aspiring 
secessionist however, they present as channels to less formally interact with the members 
of the Security Council who carry veto and majority decision making powers.  The details 
and implications of this were discussed in Chapter Three.   
The ideal is to gain monitoring and support by the five permanent members in their 
capacity as members of the UN Security Council (Russia, China, USA, UK and France).  
They serve as the meta-level guiding the negotiations process of Pre-Talks negotiations 
(between the Parent State and aspiring secessionist), which in turn circularly guides the 
Peace Talks negotiations (between the Sovereign State and all its embedded systems) and 
in turn circularly guides the negotiations involving their embedded systems and their next 
lower level of recursion.   
 
Some important cybernetic distinctions this inter-linked design of internal self-
determination negotiations is aiming to achieve are: 
 
a)  Moving away from linear linkage of negotiation to circularly linked negotiations.  To date, 
it appears the UN is called in when other avenues like war and internal self-determination 
talks have failed.  Here, however, the UN meta-level logic is built-in to inform the inter-
linked circularity of internal self-determination negotiations, which valuably covers talks as 
well as war. 
 
b)  The UN meta-level does not negotiate with, although it is influenced by, the lower level 
negotiations.  The UN seeks to support by influencing the negotiations to abide by its meta-
level logic of the principle of equal rights.  It monitors the results of the negotiations in 
terms of the improvement of international peace and respect for sovereign borders, which 
includes as in this case demands for secession.  Neither does the UN adjudicate during the 
phase of internal self-determination negotiations.  It lets its cohesive policy be known, 
                                                 
117 This is usually classed as the only international mechanism solely dedicated to peace in Sri Lanka.  
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gives autonomy to its embedded systems to carry out their variety absorbing work, and 
monitors its adherence.  The results of this monitoring are given the opportunity to be 
conveyed to the embedded systems, in this instance the Parent State and aspiring 
secessionist, so that the embedded systems can incorporate the feedback as appropriate into 
their future manoeuvres.  
 
c)  Linkage of monitoring results so they have a better chance to invoke feedback correction.  
With UN monitoring, feedback correction is enticed because of the mandatory/monopoly 
variety capability of international interoperability that ISO 3166 affords to the secessionist 
and the risk of loss of territory to the Parent State if the UN decides in favour of the 
secessionist.  Current monitoring by the SLMM does not enjoy this ability to entice 
correction by the offending parties.  Associating the SLMM results with the UN would 
give SLMM the teeth it requires.  Another way is to include within the composition of the 
SLMM, permanent member/s of the UN Security Council. 
 
d)  Positioning the UN so its channel of recursive inter-linkage is activated and its meta-level 
logic is positioned to inform cascades of internal self-determination negotiations.  In other 
words, ultrastability features are built into the design of the negotiation process of internal 
self-determination. 
 
 
5.1.3.2  Sabotage of Internal Self-Determination Negotiations 
 
Having linked the internal self-determination negotiations to the UN meta-level system in 
two ways, this presents as a lesser problem than has been the case so far.  Currently, the 
UN is positioned in linear ‘one step at a time’ mode.  Consequently, the UN’s ethos is not 
necessarily positioned to influence the internal self-determination negotiations.  It is left to 
each opposing protagonist to interpret and factor in the UN’s ethos in the way it so desires.   
 
Intrinsic to the proposal made here is that the UN monitors and guides the internal self-
determination negotiations with its principle of equal rights.  In the event of failure of the 
internal self-determination negotiations then the UN can be called upon to adjudicate on 
the matter of recognising external self-determination and the borders that result.  In arriving 
at that decision it will factor in whether sabotage has been part of the reason for the failure  
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of negotiations to produce resolution of the conflict.  If so, it has the option to reflect in its 
decision a penalty factor against the saboteur.  Note here, it is the history of sabotage that is 
reviewed and both sides are likely to have committed the offence.   
 
It is hoped that UN monitoring of sabotage during internal self-determination negotiations 
and the awareness of the risk of saboteur penalties should external self-determination 
claims be lodged is sufficient incentive to avoid internal self-determination sabotage and 
induce self correction.  It must however be admitted that the variety here is massive as the 
sabotage could be from within embedded systems and not directly by the aspiring-state or 
Parent State.   In this regard, much depends on whether the embedded systems understand 
and appreciate the significance of the ‘mandatory/monopoly’ and ‘risk of territorial loss’ 
issue.  This is particularly important given that –  
 
Pape makes clear that at the strategic level, suicide terrorism exerts coercive power 
against democratic states to cease occupation of territory, which terrorists consider to 
be their homeland, while at the social level, it is shown to depend on mass support and 
at the individual level, on altruism.  In addition, suicide terrorist organisations are 
shown to be better positioned than other terrorist groups to 'heighten expectations of 
escalating future costs by deliberately violating norms in the use of violence.  They can 
do this by crossing thresholds of damage, by breaching taboos concerning legitimate 
targets and by broadening recruitment to confound expectations about limits on the 
number of possible targets.' (Rupersinghe, 2007)   
 
Thus it is critical that systems belonging to the lower levels of recursion understand the 
meta-level effects of their actions in terms of the overall objective that the protagonists 
seek.  
 
5.1.4  Agreement on Pre-Talks by Protagonists 
 
It is proposed the negotiation for ‘Pre-Talks negotiations concerning the design of Peace 
Talks negotiations’ be influenced by the meta-level logic of the UN’s principle of equal 
rights.  Let us call this a ‘meta-level negotiation’ as its purpose is to agree upon the 
processes that appertain to negotiation.   
 
It is proposed this meta-level negotiation be facilitated to occur between the Parent State 
and the aspiring secessionist system.  This is because if secession is applied for, it is those  
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two systems that will present their claims and counter-claims to the UN.  Therefore, 
cascading downwards it is these two systems that are called upon to design the principles 
and processes under which internal self-determination negotiations will be conducted.  This 
is because if it fails it is these two systems that negotiate their positions with the UN.   
However, as discussed in Chapter Three there is a fundamental difference in external self-
determination compared to internal self-determination.  In the case of the former, the act of 
separation severs the need to address cohesive issues in the context of each other.  In 
contrast, internal self-determination requires that a balance be achieved between cohesion 
and autonomy which interaction means those affected must participate in the design of that 
balance. 
 
The proposal in this thesis, as discussed in Chapters Three and Chapters Four, is that 
autonomy be exercised by the embedded systems to design the cohesive constraints of the 
meta-level system to which they belong.  Here is where we encounter the first of the major 
decisions – namely, the capacity in which each system negotiates in the context of internal 
self-determination.  Recall the extensive discussion of Chapter Three where the question 
was posed as to who the GoSL represented given the way it was positioned in the 2002-
2003 Peace Talks, ISGA, P-TOMS, etc.  This is not just a semantic issue.  It pertains to the 
very heart of recognising a system’s predisposition towards matters of cohesion and 
autonomy.  Quoting from Chapter Three, ‘In VSM terms, whether a system gravitates to 
seeking cohesion or autonomy depends on the position the system occupies within a level 
of recursion.  Thus the design and implementation of peace negotiation processes need to 
be aware when bringing together negotiating systems, which systems are predisposed to 
negotiate which part of the equation and to ensure sufficient variety is pumped in by each 
side of the equation so that requisite variety is given a chance to be achieved.’ 
 
The reasoning for triadic based recursion level negotiations is so that cohesion, autonomy 
and verification are provided with avenues for communication.  Implicit within this is that 
the embedded recursion levels comprise multiple systems and thus entail negotiations 
between more than two parties.  In this regard it minimally involves three systems – the 
encompassing system and at least two recursive levels of embedded systems.  The other 
important reasoning for triadic based recursion level negotiations is that they generate a 
way to overcome deadlock if the residual variety is linked to the appropriate meta-level  
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logic.  Also by positioning the recursion layer seeking autonomy (R-1) also as a layer of 
cohesion to its embedded systems, the autonomous demands of R-1 become contestable by 
R-2 and verifiable by R0 whilst giving R-1 the experience to understand the value of 
applying consistent principles.  The cohesive principles R-1 applies to its relationship with 
its R-2 systems should be consistent with the cohesive principles it asks for from its R0 
relationship. 
 
A point of VSM clarity is appropriate here.  Cohesion and autonomy do belong to one level 
of recursion which comprises a system (R0) and its embedded S1s.  It is these S1s which I 
refer to as belonging to the next lower level of recursion (these are the multiple systems 
which comprise R-1).  The meta-level logic comes from a meta-level layer of recursion 
(R+1).  In the case of the UN, some may argue it is many layers higher than R+1 if one was 
to interpose regional layers of recursion.  This too is correct for it depends on the 
boundaries and identities of the systems defined.  
 
In the context of a meta-level logic being positioned to inform the triadic based (so far 
deadlocked) internal self-determination negotiations, it means a fourth layer of recursion 
needs to be added so that the highest level of recursion of the triadic set has a meta-level 
logic it can access.  By doing so, this concurrently connects internal self-determination 
with its contingency of external self-determination and offers the opportunity to keep the 
latter criteria in focus as internal self-determination negotiations are undertaken.  
 
Thus, the proposal for negotiations is as follows: 
 
 
Meta-Level Negotiations  
These negotiations involve the participation from the triadic recursion levels comprising: 
•  Representation from the aspiring secessionist Tamils (R-1),  
•  GoSL representing Sri Lanka the Parent State (R0),  
•  Representation by the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council (R+1) 
 
The objective is to agree on the starting position of the broad parameters of internal self-
determination negotiations.  One consideration here is the high level principles it stands for  
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both  in terms of content and process which includes verification, and the type of 
negotiation modalities it will use to architect those principles.  Agreement is critical 
regarding the systems that comprise the layers of recursion and the way of identifying who 
will represent those systems at the negotiations.  One would expect the broad statement of 
principles to be of the calibre that lends itself for use by others thereby evidencing 
equality/fairness.  In Chapter Three (3.1.6) it was proposed the minimum requirements that 
the ‘design of the negotiation processes’ will need to cater for were: 
•  Balancing autonomy and cohesion, 
•  Establishing and sustaining the three aspects of the channels of communication, 
•  Error control feedback systems which require monitoring and correction processes 
which include criteria specification, 
•  Homeostasis, and  
•  Embedment of systems within other systems which thus entails recognition of multiple 
stakeholders. 
  
The representatives of the UN Security Council play an overseeing role to alert the aspiring 
secessionist and Parent State when the principles of equal rights and peace are being 
flouted in the internal self-determination design process which is being negotiated and 
agreed upon. 
 
The facilitator is the backbone in initiating this type of negotiation which will most likely 
be informal, and could well run in parallel with war or a lull in attacks.  This meta-level 
negotiation would then result in the facilitator being endorsed by the meta-level negotiators 
as the facilitator, or appointing some other to take on that primary role. 
 
a)  Pre-Talks Negotiations – Design of the Process of Negotiations 
Given the parameters of the meta-level agreement to enter into internal self-determination 
negotiations the objective here is to negotiate and agree upon the design of the negotiation 
processes that will be employed for Peace Talks Negotiations.  The design of the process of 
the portfolio of negotiations has to be capable of absorbing the variety of content that the 
various negotiations need to address.  The designers therefore require a healthy awareness 
of the content that will need to be addressed.  However, the primary purpose of the  
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thinking, negotiating and agreement pertains to matters of design of the negotiation/s 
processes.  Monitoring and feedback are important particularly if the negotiations entail 
more than a single episode of negotiation.  That is, they need to be bi-directionally linked 
in their build-up and interrelated across various themes that the portfolio of negotiations 
undertakes. 
 
Those called upon to participate in these Pre-Talks negotiations are those seeking cohesion 
and autonomy.  Minimally therefore this must include representation from the State (R0) 
and each of its embedded systems (R-1).  This has the value of positioning the State to 
negotiate for its cohesive requirements and not collapse to negotiate on behalf of absent 
embedded systems.  It also gives clarity to the supervening character of the State and 
contributes to reducing it being perceived as dominated by its dominating embedded 
system. 
 
Ideally participation should also include representatives from a broad spectrum of systems 
belonging to the next layer of recursive systems (R-2).  This way duality of designing for a 
system (e.g. belonging to – R1) that is being called upon to be autonomous and cohesive is 
experienced.  I say ‘ideally’ because the identity of the systems belonging to R-2 may be a 
matter for negotiation and agreement at these Pre-Talks negotiations.  Having 
acknowledged this, the need to come to terms with variety prompts one to suggest that 
greater value will be had from including representation from systems in what is perceived 
to be R-2 and the results of the Pre-Talks may either ratify or nominate some other.    
 
A distinction could be made between designing process negotiations pertaining to the 
‘transition to peace’ compared to negotiations pertaining to matters of ‘peaceful co-
existence’.  One would however expect that at some juncture these two negotiations would 
need to coalesce or dovetail. 
 
b)  Peace Talks Negotiations 
There are two interrelated parts to these negotiations and it is vital that the two parts be 
exercised and that they interrelate.  The objective of this set of negotiation series pertains to 
content issues and matters of governance.   
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The first pertains to negotiations between the State (R0), whose focus is matters of 
cohesion, and each and every one of the embedded systems within the next level of 
recursion (R-1), whose focus gravitates to autonomy.  The compelling question that needs 
to be addressed is the design of the balance between cohesion to preserve territorial 
integrity and autonomy to avert secession.  There may also be a subset of negotiations 
where embedded systems may opt for additional negotiations with one or more of its peer 
systems (the squiggly line connect of S1s in the VSM). 
 
As mentioned previously the importance of the full set of embedded systems participating 
in the negotiations is that it overcomes the need for the supervening system to collapse to 
represent the missing embedded systems.  It also helps reduce the dominance of the 
dominant embedded system/s by each system having the opportunity to pump in their 
variety and by so doing act to absorb each others’ variety.   
 
The second set of negotiations pertains to each system within R-1 negotiating with its 
embedded systems (R-2).  The objective of each of these negotiations is that assertions 
made at the higher level of recursion can be verified in terms of acceptability at this 
negotiation.  It also provides the avenue for this level of recursion to surface and negotiate 
for its content needs and to negotiate the type of autonomy it seeks in the context of the 
cohesive requirements that its meta-level seeks to negotiate.    
 
To interrelate these two sets of negotiations, they need to be bi-directionally linked so that 
each informs the other of its outcomes of negotiations and the other signals its acceptance 
or otherwise.  In the latter case, particularly when it pertains to substantive matters, then 
negotiations need to be re-opened/continued. 
 
There might also be need for subject matters experts to join the negotiations process or give 
advice to the political negotiators as politicians may not have the required skills and 
experience.  In this regard, it is valuable to make a distinction been designing solutions and 
approving solutions.  The latter may be the preserve of politicians or people via a 
referendum.  The former requires people with experience and skills in designing systems, 
particularly given the complexity, particularly compounded by the interrelatedness of the 
content that needs to be addressed.  
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Recapitulation 
 
The power of the 'UN-ISO 3166-international interchange system' relationship, initially 
discussed in Chapter Three, lies in its meta-level logic capability to absorb residual variety.  
Without it the question of secession versus the integrity of sovereign territorial borders 
stays as an undecidable proposition -  as evidenced by the war and stalemate in 
negotiations.  Applying international embargoes or carrots is inadequate as a meta-level 
logic to absorb the residual variety.  This is because one or other of the conflicting sides 
can circumvent the international carrot or stick due to the availability of alternatives as 
regards requirement/s or the way of achieving them.  These embargoes or incentives, 
besides being financial and legal, can be economic, political and military. 
 
The UN/ISO 3166 works because ISO 3166 is a mandatory pre-requisite in order to gain 
entry into the mandatory  international interchange  systems which a Sovereign State 
requires in order to be viable and participate in the international arena.  Here I mean the 
need for example for a country code to be used to join the international postal, telephone, 
banking, aviation systems, etc. 
 
The UN is the monopoly body that populates ISO 3166.  When the UN recognises a State 
as part of the procedure it gains ISO 3166 listing.  This then acts as the authenticator that 
signals a country is the country it says it is.  
 
If the aspiring secessionist Tamils want secession they require this UN recognition.  In 
order to earn it they must comply with the UN ethos, which is built on the principle of 
peace and equal rights.  These principles present as having the capability to provide the 
requisite variety so as to answer the question of whether preserving territorial integrity of 
Sri Lanka or recognition of secession is to prevail.  It is in the UN's power to recognise a 
new State that draws in secessionists and consequently the Parent State to comply with the 
UN's ethos.  If the Parent State fails this test, then it pays the price of erosion of its 
territorial borders. 
 
This is the risk the Parent State has to factor into its negotiations and thus influences the 
extent and way it crafts its cohesive restraints on the autonomy of its embedded systems.   
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The embedded system seeking cohesion also needs to position itself to portray equal rights 
in its negotiations.  Here are multiple homeostats all vying for balance which carve out the 
solution space - initially pertaining to internal self-determination and if it fails then to 
external self-determination. 
 
In the case of external self-determination the equality principle needs to be applied by the 
secessionist on many fronts.  If it evidences this principle in its manner of governing its 
embedded systems and if non-equality is evidenced in the results of internal self-
determination negotiations then a prima facie case has been justified for external self-
determination.  That is, the Parent State has failed to legislate and enact the principle of 
equal rights.  This still leaves questions of borders, movement of populations etc to be 
resolved. 
 
The important point of this exploration is that it shows to the Parent State a way of 
avoiding secession.  Namely, grant and enact the principle of equal rights.  If this is done, 
there is no basis for a claim for secession.  It is this amplification of reasoning that re-opens 
the possibility of internal self-determination negotiations.  It is this that the five permanent 
members of the UN need to convey to the conflicting parties.  This applies equally to the 
aspiring secessionist.  Evidence this principle of equal rights in the manner that the de-facto 
state is being governed and in the governance proposition under which the seceded State 
will be governed.  It is the strength of this principle in its application to the opposing 
protagonist that holds hope for internal self-determination negotiations to resolve the 
impasse and work out a way to achieve peaceful co-existence and preserve territorial 
integrity. 
 
Cybernetically, the critical realisation of this exploration of content is that when looking for 
meta-level logic with the capacity to absorb residual variety, you know you have found a 
nugget when the REQUIREMENT is MANDATORY and the way of ACHIEVING it is 
via a MONOPOLY.  The question then becomes - do the compliance conditions of the 
monopoly have the requisite variety to absorb the particular residual variety that feeds the 
crisis? 
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The value of this triadic meta-logic is that it can be employed for devolution negotiations 
too - meaning between the State and its embedded entities.  This is not done in the thesis 
but certainly needs to be done so that what needs to be amplified is known.  The search is 
not just for the 'mandatory requirement and monopoly way of achievement' but also for a 
meta-logic that has the capacity to absorb the type of residual variety.  It is that meta-logic 
that has to be amplified.  In the case of the UN that meta-logic was the principle of equal 
rights. 
 
The question in my thesis is whether those three aspects in terms of context are correct.  By 
this I mean - does the UN hold the monopoly on populating ISO 3166, is UN recognition 
the only way into at least one of the international interchange system, and is at least one of 
the international interchange systems a mandatory requirement for a State's viability?  So 
far all my research has indicated this to be so.  The other question is - does the principle of 
equal rights have sufficient variety to guide a solution to Sri Lanka’s conflict?  This will be 
tested in the negotiations.  In order to engage that variety, wide participation in negotiations 
is sought and thus in Part II Team Syntegrity® is proposed as the primary negotiation 
protocol for designing solutions. 
 
 
Part II – Internal Self-Determination ‘Negotiation Process’ Requirements 
 
There are two principal negotiation process requirements for internal self-determination 
Peace Talks.  Firstly, the negotiation protocol needs to have the capacity to accommodate 
more than two parties.  This is because cohesion and autonomy are integral counterparts to 
each other, and they both need to be designed collaboratively by the systems belonging to 
both sides of the homeostat
118
                                                 
118 The (autonomous) systems embedded within the (cohesive) encompassing system by default must 
comprise two or more systems.  If not, the cohesive and autonomous system would be one and the same.  
 so that the terms of cohesion and autonomy under which 
their identities cohere is agreed upon.  Secondly, there is an enormous amount of content 
that needs to be negotiated in terms of subject areas and manner of governance, which  
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themselves interrelate on both counts
119
 
.  This calls for a diversity of mind-sets to be 
involved in the negotiations so as to give expression to this content and by doing so acts to 
absorb each other’s content.  The variety that remains unabsorbed is what the solution is 
called upon to address and whose design needs to heed the significance of the 
interrelationships of the content.  
This calls for what might be termed large group intervention processes so as to diagnose 
the critical issues and identify the solution space within which remedies can be 
pragmatically proposed.  If given the opportunity these issues will almost inevitably be 
addressed from a wider amalgam of crises than just the ethnic conflict.  Many surmise such 
enormity is too great to handle due to the complexity and range of issues that would surface 
and opt for compartmentalization into manageable chunks.  However, the price of 
‘manageable chunking’ is that we lose sight of the interactions between the ‘chunks’ and 
we trap ourselves into the artificiality of prioritisation.  Yet the reality is that the crises 
inexorably and disastrously interact.   
 
5.2.2  Search for a Negotiations Process 
 
The search is for a process which can withstand and non-hierarchically integrate, or at least 
less hierarchically integrate, the discussion of the variety of sub-systems that interact to 
produce the kind of crises experienced.  If we admit to this reality and recognise the need to 
deepen our understanding of the patterns and interactions of these crises, it invites the 
realisation that the requirement is for processes capable of accommodating the variety and 
depth of issues requiring diagnosis. 
 
Yet the traditional modes of meetings, conferences or workshops are structurally hampered 
to absorb the diversity and coherence that is needed.  For example, with meetings, as 
appears to be the format used at the 2002-2003 Peace Talks, its protocol requires that 
agenda be pre-set, which poses the question - by whom?  This agenda then acts to confine 
the exploration of discussions and negotiations to these pre-set boundaries.  Additionally, 
                                                 
119 Such relates to the interrelationship between various matters of content.  Also, there is the interrelationship 
between subject areas and the manner of governance applied to those subjects.  
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the nature of the protocol of meetings is that it moves from one agenda item to another thus 
trapping itself into a serialized mode where whilst it is possible for previous agenda 
discussions to influence agenda items after it, the reverse is precluded.  Therefore, 
comprehensive coherence if it is achieved is more by happenstance than by design.  
Certainly there are many large group interventions processes.  Some of these are discussed 
in the UK publication Participation Works and another source is the USA book 
descriptively titled Large Group Interventions.  Amongst these are such processes as 
Interactive Strategic Planning, Future Search, Open Space Technology, and Citizens Juries.   
Briefly overviewed are two of these processes.   
 
a)  Interactive Strategic Planning 
It’s a two to three day process bringing together 100 to 2300 people.  The approach was 
developed by Danneiller and is built on the formula: 
 
Dissatisfaction x Vision x First Steps > Resistance to Change  
Rouda explains –  
This means that three components must all be present to overcome the resistance to 
change in an organization:  Dissatisfaction with the present situation, a Vision of what 
is possible in the future, and achievable First steps towards reaching this vision.  If any 
of the three is zero or near zero, the product will also be zero or near zero and the 
resistance to change will dominate.  The purposes of these OD (organizational 
development) interventions are to bring approaches to the organization that will enable 
these three components to surface so that the process of change can begin. (Rouda, 
1995) 
 
b)  Citizens Jury 
This is a process where citizens, around 18-24 in number, serve as a microcosm of the 
public to address an issue.  Over a passage of four to five days they discuss and hear from 
various subject matter experts as is relevant to the issue under consideration and then 
deliberate together on the issue to arrive at recommendations.  These are then presented to 
the public or decision makers.  
 
Leonard says –  
If understanding technical information is part of the picture, the tightly integrated teams 
in a Syntegration might not be as useful.  Future Search is one process where people 
meet according to community or professional groups for some sessions and integrate  
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their perspectives at the end.  In the Citizens’ Jury format, jurors are selected to be 
representative of the affected community on the basis of age, gender, employment 
status and so on.  They hear presentations and ask questions of experts  in the 
specialities affecting their decisions.  The distinction here has to do with whether the 
tangible and technical information such experts bring is best mixed into the general 
discussion or dealt with separately. (Leonard, n.d.) 
 
With large group interventions it is relevant to point out that there are some commonly 
applied processes which admit of large numbers.  The most obvious is broadcasts where 
the communication is unidirectional.  This happens with for example, TV, radio, political 
rallies where the head table is afforded the airplay to talk to its audience and in that sense 
negotiate a position.  Another variant is what is aptly described as ‘hub and spoke 
communications’.  Here the audience (spoke) is invited to dialogue with the head table (the 
hub) and in this sense via what the head table will entertain the audience communicates 
amongst itself (refer Figure 20 which is a few figures ahead).   
 
Thus, the search is more than for large group interventions and the obvious statistical 
avoidance of skew of participant representation.  The search is for the individual 
component of large group interventions, whether people or topics, to interact with and be 
informed by each other.  In the absence of such, a protagonist is afforded the opportunity to 
take an intransigent position on a particular subject and solution they propose.  Likewise, if 
a subject (or topic) is not informed by the nature of its effect on other subjects, the design 
of the solution is prone to be at the expense of some other subject, or where it is 
unavoidable little is done to manage the downside of the imposition.  Lastly, if 
accommodating the large group, whether it pertains to people and/or topics, is done in a 
manner of discrete events then the design of the process needs a way  of achieving 
connectivity between these discrete events. 
 
Of the negotiations processes researched the only process that meets these criteria by way 
of the design of its structure, rather than by happenstance is Team Syntegrity®.   
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5.2.3  A Non-Hierarchically Based Negotiations Process 
 
Team Syntegrity® more commonly referred to as a Syntegration is a structured group 
process which combines the strength of a tightly interconnected structure whilst 
accommodating the free flow of content.  Applying certain of its geometrical features, the 
structure lends itself for participant numbers to expand from 30 upwards and contract to as 
few as six.   
 
Team Syntegrity® is a protocol developed by the inventor of management cybernetics 
Prof. Stafford Beer.  It was motivated by the need to balance the VSM S3-S4 homeostat - 
to address the tension between ‘here and now’ and ‘there and then’ thinking and to plan a 
dovetailed transition where needed.  The manner of its design seeks to optimize effective 
information exchange and integrate various points of view.  Like many group processes it 
depends upon the involvement and commitment of participants to share their explicit and 
tacit knowledge and to apply their resultant new knowledge to design feasible solutions.  
 
5.2.3.1  How Team Syntegrity® Works 
 
A Syntegration opens not with an agenda of topics but with a broadly stated question or 
statement, reflective of the matter that the participants have been asked or seek to address.  
Participant selection, like the opening question, is a matter for the organizer or sponsor/s of 
the Syntegration to choose.  However, unlike the opening question whose scope can be 
altered once the participants have gained a grasp of the issue at hand, participants are fixed 
for the duration of the Syntegration.  Therefore, appropriate participant selection is vital to 
the success of a Syntegration.  Besides avoiding a skew amongst the 30 participants, the 
objective is to select those who have knowledge, experience and expertise of the way the 
current system operates from various perspectives and to choose those that have a thinking 
of future requirements and ways of achieving it.  
 
The Syntegration event, which runs over five days, preferably under residential conditions, 
is a facilitated process.  The event itself begins with all the assembled participants being 
invited to address the opening question and write their responses on adhesive notes.  This  
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may take the form of questions, solutions, clarification, addition or subtraction or 
amendment to the opening question/statement.  This collective of individual brainstorm 
captured on adhesive notes are then displayed on walls for all to see and discuss.  This 
forms the basis for expanding one’s perspective on the issue.   
 
Participants are then invited to cluster the adhesive note responses into topics.  From the 
chaos of responses that would have been generated, an order begins to appear through the 
clustering process and what would conventionally be called an agenda begins to be 
prospected.  This is further refined by the clustered topics being clarified and sometimes 
rephrased into consolidated (or divided) clusters.  The net result of this part of the process 
is that the participants define their own agenda by voting for the 12 most important topics 
that will form the basis of detailed deliberations during the remainder of the Syntegration 
event.  Note, the contents of adhesive notes that do not make it into clustered topics, whilst 
appearing to fall by the wayside, still have the potential to be utilized because their 
embryonic form has reached at least some of the participants, by the very act of deciding to 
reject it.   
 
Next each participant ranks their level of interest in a topic and through an optimization 
process each participant is allocated two topics, which combination is unique to each 
participant.  The allocation of topics and participants is mapped on to an icosahedron.  The 
significance of employing this regular polyhedron
120
 
 structure is that it is non-hierarchical 
– meaning it has no single top, bottom or side.  Each person is allocated a position on the 
icosahedron and occupies a unique edge (also known as strut or line) and likewise each 
topic occupies a unique vertex (also known as node) position. 
Each topic forms the basis for a facilitated meeting where the five persons (struts) that abut 
the topic (node) attend the meeting as team members to address the topic at hand.  The 
meeting is also attended by five critics who, coming from a different perspective, interact 
to share their views on the topic under discussion.  These critics come from the topics that 
abut the nodes that are two struts removed from the topic under discussion - refer Figure 14  
                                                 
120 A regular polyhedron is a many sided geometrical figure with equal length sides and equal angles. The 
sum of the inner angles of a regular polyhedron equals 180
0 degrees.  
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Consequently, in a Syntegration each topic is informed by 10 of the possible 11 remaining 
topics.   
 
The meeting process is iterative in that once all twelve topics have been discussed the cycle 
of meetings is repeated twice over.  This iterative design means a topic is offered the 
opportunity, by virtue of each participant’s double-topic involvement, to be informed by 
other topics that were discussed after it.  At the conclusion of each meeting, the participants 
summarize the meetings results in written form and it is posted for comment.  At the end of 
each full cycle of twelve meetings a plenary session is held where team members of each 
topic present their meeting results and other participants are encouraged to provide 
feedback in various ways. 
 
 
 
It is useful to restate this meeting process from a participant perspective to gain a sense of 
the comprehensive awareness that the Syntegration process is affording the participants and 
the way it reduces polarization.  Each participant is required to attend the topic meetings 
which relate to the two topics which abut his/her unique strut.  At these facilitated meetings 
the participant in the capacity of team member, is responsible to contribute and discuss the  
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topic at hand with the objective of understanding and resolving the issues as they pertain to 
each of those two topics.  Each participant is additionally required to attend, in the capacity 
of critic, two other topic meetings.  The role of critic is to convey one’s experience of what 
is happening in their topics as it relates to the topic under discussion and to take back 
information to their other ‘team member/critic’ topic meetings from the meeting where 
they participate as critic. Thus each participant directly participates in four topics - two 
topics where as team members they seek to get a grip on the issues and address solutions 
and two topics where they  participate as critics.  As two topic meetings are held 
concurrently during each full cycle of the twelve meetings, each participant is free during 
two meetings times.  During these free times they have the opportunity to attend other 
meetings in the capacity of a silent observer or mill around interacting with those not 
attending meetings or utilize this free time as they wish.  
 
Every participant through their participation as team member on two topics connects 
directly with eight other topics through their fellow team members as well as indirectly to 
the other topics.  This feature enables ideas that arise in one setting to reverberate 
throughout the structure and the meetings.  Another invaluable attribute is that when a topic 
is being discussed at a meeting, ten other topics through their representative participants are 
concurrently present thus giving the structured meeting the opportunity for those other 
topics to be concurrently kept in focus. 
 
At the end of three iterations of the full cycle of twelve meetings and plenary sessions, the 
faces of the icosahedron can be used for planning purposes.  These faces, interlocked by 
common struts, help towards planning not being at the expense of other topics.  Each of the 
20 face planning meetings is attended  by the three participants who occupy the struts 
pertaining to a face.  Two cycles of iterative face planning meetings work to ensure that 
earlier face planning meetings (comprising three topics) are informed by the thinking of 
more latterly conducted face planning meetings. 
 
Team Syntegrity® primarily utilizes a verbal, as distinct from written, communication 
medium.  Thus it relies on the participants’ verbal communication skills.  Being a very 
dynamic process it also relies on the preparation and on-the-spot thinking capacity of the 
participants.  What it also means is that if the participants speak and/or write different  
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languages, then translators in real-time mode are essential.  Whilst the need for translation 
catering for a multi-lingual audience is not unique to Team Syntegrity®, the dynamics of 
the logistics of translation (both verbal and written) are much more complex due to the 
short duration of interaction, compared to say the monologue of a speech.    
 
5.2.3.1.1  Linkages beyond a Team Syntegrity® Event 
 
Once a Syntegration is over, the orthogonal combination of six participants has direct 
coverage, in their capacity as team members, of all twelve topic meetings.  There are five 
of these orthogonal sets which lend themselves to connect one Syntegration to another 
Syntegration and so on – refer Figure 15. 
 
Additionally, those orthogonal sets can also be used as teams to monitor and audit 
implementation progress.  They would be particularly useful for reviews when plans may 
need changes.  The essential feature relied upon is that the ‘orthogonal comprising team’ in 
their status as a group comes in with an overall understanding of the relationship between 
the components that form the whole system.  This whole system perspective helps alleviate 
amendments being designed which are at the detrimental expense of other interacting 
aspects of the system. 
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The other opportunity after a Syntegration is that should further exploration of a topic be 
required, linkage can be achieved utilizing the five team members of that topic to form the 
core of the detailed exploratory Syntegration to follow.  These five team members can then 
move between what could be described as three sets of Syntegrations, where the third 
Syntegration is the bi-directional complement that receives input from the detailed 
exploratory Syntegration – refer Figure 18 further ahead. 
 
Truss has also worked out the sequencing pattern to utilize fewer participants than 30 
whilst adhering to the principles of ‘twelve topics’ and ‘multiple-topic participant 
positioning’.   Truss calls these Syntegrations ‘Short Forms’ which accommodate reduced 
participant numbers of 24, 18, 12 and 6.  These and a permutation which is useful for a 
conference setting are presented in the Truss, et al. article titled ‘The Coherent Architecture 
of Team Syntegrity® ’. 
 
The critical point to realize when opting for reduced participant numbers is its cost in terms 
of topic variety.  This risk of losing variety in terms of content can be overcome by opting 
for participants who have a breadth and depth of knowledge.  Whilst such Short Forms may 
well hold an attraction for decision making forums, it defeats the purpose when 
participation and a diversity of views and experiences are sought.  
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Working in the opposite direction which is particularly relevant for engendering 
participation is a calculation that Truss and Cullen provide which shows for example that 
125 Syntegration events could involve 3,750 participants based on linkage being achieved 
via the use of orthogonal sets.  The important point when working with large participant 
numbers is the way linkage of the Syntegrations is to be designed so that the coherence of 
the informational flow is preserved.   
 
The other aspect in any linked Syntegration design is participant availability across the 
string of linked Syntegrations.  One way of overcoming this is through the use of ‘double 
struts’ or what might be called a ‘shadow participant’.  This is where two participants 
participate as one so that if one leaves the other is there to continue. 
 
Overall as structured as the outline of a Team Syntegrity® event is within a content free 
fluidity, there are many features requiring design in terms of customization to meet the 
requirements of the particular reason prompting a Team Syntegrity®.  Vital amongst all 
this is the selection of participants which circularly informs the design for linking of 
Syntegrations. 
 
Recapitulation 
 
There are many participation processes, some mentioned above, that use brainstorming and 
clustering to open to a flood of ideas and then to streamline that content.  Yet, it is the 
interlocking characteristic across multiple frontiers that is the invaluable uniqueness and 
strength of Team Syntegrity®.  Whilst there are many cybernetic features like channel 
capacity and transduction of communications, variety generation and absorption, the one I 
want to close on is homeostasis. 
 
The design of Team Syntegrity® promotes homeostasis in the context of participants, 
topics and importantly between Team Syntegration events by the  way the structure 
positions these aspects.  It is this latter feature that I want to address and customize in Part 
III.  This is done to cater for the context set out in Part I of this Chapter - namely the triadic  
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linkage of recursion levels as they pertain to internal self-determination as informed by the 
meta-level logic of external self-determination.   
Part III – Solution Design for Sri Lankan Negotiations 
 
Around the world peace-making is by and large a part-time occupation and the by-product 
of other  activity.  In countries embroiled in internal conflict, where Sri Lanka is no 
exception, vastly more resources are allocated to military thinking and implementation than 
to non-violent peace negotiation.  Yet many argue, as does this thesis, the terms of peace 
are mostly likely to be the product of inclusive Peace Talks negotiations based on the 
principle of equality. 
 
This opens the question to - who should be included in the Peace Talks.  This has been 
extensively addressed in the previous chapters.  In this Chapter the distinction was made 
between what was called ‘Meta-Level Negotiations’, ‘Pre-Talks Negotiations – Design of 
the Process of Negotiations’ and ‘Peace Talks Negotiations’.  Also explored was the logic 
that informs which systems need to participate in those negotiations.   
The question to be addressed now is - who should represent those systems in the various 
negotiations whilst making the distinction between designing solutions and the manner of 
decision making that approves of the solutions proposed?  Here the emphasis is on design. 
 
The other point addressed is a way of resolving the representation issue and to 
accommodate the plethora of content that needs to be considered.  In this regard Collier’s 
distinction (stated in the context of philosophy) between alleviating the state of affairs and 
the transformation of structure is a vital consideration that the design of solutions will need 
to address.    
 
First, there is of course no disparagement of the amelioration of states of affairs.  
Indeed if it is desirable to transform structures, that is so that states of affairs can be 
ameliorated.  The point is that certain states of affairs cannot be ameliorated within 
existing structures.  … Second, it should not be denied that some things can be made 
better without changing the main social structures, and the question which can and 
which can’t is ultimately an empirical one – thought this does not mean that it can be 
answered only making the attempt.  Depth realism does not by itself tell you where to 
draw the line between the improvements which can be made without transforming the 
structure of the state, and the economy, and those which can’t.  But the point is that  
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‘shallow realism – actualism that hold, or tacitly assumes, that there are no structures, 
only state of affairs – can’t make the distinction between the two sorts of reform.  At 
the theoretical level, this leads to such ideas as Popper’s,  that in a Parliamentary 
democracy any change is possible once the majority supports it.  … At the practical 
level this actualist assumption leads to the paring down of programmes of reform to 
small-scale tinkering such as can be achieved without structural change, as if those 
things that are precluded by the existing structure of society were precluded by laws of 
nature. (Collier, 1994:10) 
 
Thus, in this final stretch of the thesis a design is proposed which applies the process and 
architecture that Team Syntegrity® affords.  Undoubtedly if the design principles and 
architecture articulated in this thesis find a resonance in the political environs that matter in 
Sri Lanka, then there are more aspects that warrant research.  Some of these are briefly 
considered as a finale to this chapter. 
 
5.3.1  Design for a Way Forward to Engage in Negotiations 
 
Given that this thesis advocates the employment of the meta-level logic of the principle of 
equality as required by the UN let me acknowledge the well known cliché that foreign 
interference is generally spurned in matters that fall within domestic jurisdiction.  
However, history evidences a fair share of courting of the foreign community by domestic 
protagonists which consequently prompts, if not forces, the opposing domestic 
protagonist/s to respond and participate in that forum so as to absorb the variety.  In this 
regard, the myriad of aspects that helped resolve the conflict in South Africa and more 
recently Northern Ireland in their bid for resolution have been the cynosure of study in 
many conflict ridden countries.  Both countries heavily utilized the pressure of the 
international community to help bring the opposing protagonists and those collaterally 
affected to the negotiating table in order to design the way to resolve their conflicts.  
 
In June 2007, the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, Mr. Dominick Chilcott, 
addressing a panel discussion on the United Kingdom’s Peace Building Efforts in Sri 
Lanka said that the Northern Ireland peace process held many useful lessons for countries 
suffering from internal conflict.  From amongst these very useful lessons, Lesson Four 
holds particular relevance from a process perspective.  Chilcott states some of the features 
of the process in Northern Ireland that led to the Good Friday Agreement were:-  
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(a) Inclusivity.  In Northern Ireland's case, all political parties and many civil society 
organisations were present at the talks.  So it was as inclusive as possible. 
(b) Intensity.  Representatives were elected to the talks and paid to attend them.  They 
were full-time, dedicated negotiators to the peace process.  The(y) worked every week 
from Monday to Friday for about two years. 
(c) Facilities.  A special purpose-built building was used for the talks, with each party 
having its own offices and secretariat, provided free of charge. 
(d) Parity of esteem.  Each party had the same number of places at the table and had the 
same rights to speak.  Every party was treated with the same respect, despite the terrible 
things some had done. 
(e) Complexity.  The talks were continuous and involved a complex structure of 
plenary sessions and working groups.  The scope of the talks was very comprehensive, 
covering anything any party wanted to put on the table –  prisoners, education, 
constitutional change, transport, justice, discrimination, human rights, the economy etc. 
(Chilcott, 2007) 
 
5.3.1.1  Search for Each System’s Representative/s for the Various Negotiations 
 
In Chapter Three an extensive diagnosis was presented making a distinction between 
systems (S1), who represented which system (S1 Management Unit) and in what position 
in terms of cohesion and autonomy each system was negotiating in a particular context (its 
recursion level).  The diagnosis also extended to addressing the clarity with which the 
representatives of those systems presented themselves to the other systems.   
 
The muddiness of representatives and the clarity of which system they represent needs to 
be resolved including finding a representative voice and person/s to represent those systems 
who have so far been absent at the negotiating table.  This is addressed in the context of the 
various negotiations. 
 
5.3.1.1.1  Meta-Level Negotiations 
 
It was stated earlier that the objective of these negotiations is to agree on the starting 
position of the broad parameters of Peace Negotiations  pertaining to internal self- 
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determination.  This meta-level negotiation involves the participation from the triadic 
recursion levels comprising:-  
 
•  Representation from the aspiring secessionist Tamils (R-1),  
•  GoSL representing Sri Lanka the Parent State (R0), and  
•  Representation by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (R+1) or 
mutually selected members of the General Assembly. 
 
Given that the LTTE in current terms is the group that has survived to continue to aspire 
for secession in the event of non-agreeable terms of autonomy it is the most likely 
contender to represent the Tamils in this particular negotiation.  Furthermore, it is the group 
with the established political-administrative institutions and thus the capability to initiate 
an Eelam claim with the UN on behalf of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. 
 
Certainly, the GoSL would represent Sri Lanka at these Meta-Level Negotiations.  It is also 
the representative, in the event of internal self-determination negotiations failing to agree 
on the areas where equal rights prevail, who will counter-claim so as to preserve the 
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka in the event of a secessionist claim at the UN. 
 
Both these representatives are loaded with firepower and exercise it.  Thus any ceasefire 
agreement minimally must include them but it would be inadequate for Peace Talks to be 
contained to them.  The reasoning for non-exclusivity has been extensively discussed 
previously. 
 
The more engaging question concerning the UN than its representation is the basis upon 
which the UN can be drawn into guiding and supporting the Peace Talks.  This means the 
principle under which peaceful co-existence is to be achieved and the way it is to be 
architected is for the locals to design and decide upon. 
 
To garner this UN involvement, the UN Charter offers three avenues:-   
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a)  Via Article 35 (1)
121 and if need be in conjuncture with Article 11 (2)
122
 
.  This provides 
that any Member of the UN can bring any dispute to the attention of the UN.  Note the 
member does not need to have a connection to the dispute.  Any Member can refer the 
dispute to the UN.  In a sense, this was an aspect of the way India was involved in the 
resolution of the conflict between East and West Pakistan that resulted in the separation of 
East Pakistan to form the State that today is known as Bangladesh.   
In the instance of Sri Lanka’s conflict, the likely entities to whom such a provision would 
appeal are Norway (given its role as Facilitator) and India given the ramifications that Sri 
Lanka’s position holds for India in terms of Tamil Nadu’s close relationship with Tamils 
and the potential for separatist type disputes within India, like that of Kashmir.  Indeed one 
would well expect that those in the international community that argue that the retaliatory 
war in Sri Lanka warrants international intervention based on the principle of R2P, have 
the choice to exercise this UN Article and formally bring the dispute to the UN.   
 
This raises the question - who would initiate this?  Such would be the delicate role the 
facilitator plays.  In this sense it is very much like the vital behind-the-scenes facilitatory 
work that the Norwegian diplomatic community played to establish communications with 
the LTTE and political parties in Sri Lanka.    
 
b)  Via Article 34
123
                                                 
121 Article 35 (1) of the UN Charter states “Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any 
situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General 
Assembly.” 
  where the UN through its Security Council can initiate dispute 
investigations.  Here we have the UN initiate its own action.  The classic example where 
 
122 Article 11 (2) of the UN Charter states “The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or 
by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 
35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such 
questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which 
action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after 
discussion.” 
 
123 Article 34 of the UN Charter states: “The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation 
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the 
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security.” 
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this was expected, but did not occur, was in the case of genocide that occurred in the 
Rwandan Civil War in 1994 and the less recognized Burundi atrocities of 1972 and 1993. 
 
In the case of Sri Lanka, given the recurring cycle of war and the deepening effects as 
Evans pointed out in his R2P speech (referred to above),  the case for international 
intervention is mounting. 
 
Once again amplification of the signals for the attention of the UN could well be 
undertaken by the Facilitator as is the case with Norway. 
 
c)  Via Article 35 (2)
124
 
 where a State which is not a Member can refer a dispute to the UN on 
the proviso that that non-member accepts the obligations of peaceful settlement.  The most 
likely contender to exercise this Article is the aspiring secessionist or more specifically a 
representative of the aspiring secessionist.  In the case of Sri Lanka and its Tamil segment 
who aspire to secession, the representative who places the claim for Statehood before the 
UN may well be the LTTE or one of its affiliated political institutions.   In this regard, I 
have nominated the LTTE due to the recognition accorded by virtue of the 2002-2003 
Peace Talks and the MOU concerning Cessation of Hostilities being between the GoSL and 
the LTTE. 
For an aspiring secessionist this is a particularly powerful clause if a pacific form of 
adjustment is acceptable.  Indeed one would argue that in the case of mature conflicts like 
that in Sri Lanka where a de facto State has emerged; this clause offers the opportunity to 
gain resolution of the quest for equality.  The question for the aggrieved community is - 
what is the right timing for invoking this Article?  
                                                 
124 Article 35 (2) of the UN Charter states ‘A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to 
the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts 
in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present 
Charter’. 
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The critical question for the UN is whether the UN will allow the de facto State to exercise 
Article 35 (2).  Legal council is required on this, particularly due to Article 4
125
 
 which 
applies to new membership.   
Considering the variety absorbing power of the Articles in terms of engaging the UN in 
helping resolve the internal conflict in Sri Lanka, the one which presents as most 
encompassing is Article 35 (2) as it gains the buy-in of the non-State actor including 
agreeing by their own volition to pursue pacific forms of settlement.  With the other 
options, the aggrieved community threatening secession and the Parent State is drawn in by 
default.  In favour of exercising intervention via Article 34 and Article 35 (1) is that there is 
no legal question pertaining to statehood that presents.   
 
Whatever the option chosen in terms of enlisting the involvement of the UN, the effect is 
what could be described as ‘calling the bluff’ or ‘testing the assertion’ of each opposing 
protagonist, one of whom claims the right of secession and the other the right of preserving 
territorial integrity.  This moves the manoeuvres from threat to formalised intervention, by 
both the aspiring secessionist and the counter-claiming State, under the watchful eye of UN 
monitoring. 
 
Once the UN is enlisted it opens the doors for the type of resolution proposed in this thesis 
– namely promoting Peace Talks and monitoring their results based on the principle of 
equality which in the event of non-sabotaged failure makes a prima facie case for secession 
if all three aspects of equality (namely, evidence of historical and continuing inequality 
pertaining to substantive matters, and non-achievement of their rectification in 
negotiations, plus evidence of equality in the manner of governance proposed by the 
secessionist) can be substantiated.  Being a matter of ‘statehood’ dispute the UN Security 
Council would then call upon all or some of its permanent Security Council Members or 
General Assembly members to nominate who their representative/s will be to guide the 
Meta-Level Negotiations between the State and aggrieved non-state actor in working out 
the outline of the broad parameters of Peace Negotiations.  
                                                 
125 It appears the pre-requisite for recognition as a new State is that the State has resulted as the outcome of a 
won referendum of the people and that such election was conducted in a free and fair manner.  In the absence 
of either of these conditions, the Vienna Formula is applied to determine statehood.  
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In addition to the principles upon which resolution is to be architected an important aspect 
of the negotiations will be the identification of the systems within each of the levels of 
recursion pertinent to resolution based on internal self-determination. 
 
5.3.1.1.2  Pre-Talks Negotiations – Design of the Process of Internal Self-
Determination Negotiations 
In VSM terms this is a S4 type activity addressing what could be described as process 
architectural matters that pertain to the adaptation that is required for Sri Lanka to conserve 
its ‘island-wide’ identity which aspirations of secession threaten.  The type of participants 
sought for these negotiations are those with expertise in matters of designing processes 
relevant to the type of content that the Peace Talks negotiations need to address.  An 
example of these process considerations is the type of matters as addressed in this thesis 
which has been done in the context of the crises, note the plurality – it extends beyond the 
ethnic crisis which embroils Sri Lanka.   
 
Whilst content issues and solution options are well known in Sri Lanka, process 
considerations are much less recognized including local availability of expertise in such 
matters.  Yet what is sought is not big numbers of such process designers but representation 
from R0 and each of the systems forming R-1 plus ideally at least some representation 
from the systems belonging to R-2. 
 
Whilst the systems that form recursion level R-1 and R-2 are a matter for the Meta-Level 
Negotiations to agree upon, let us continue our exploration based on what was proposed in 
Chapter Three so that we can address the question of representation. 
 
The search for who represents which system is difficult at this early stage of negotiations.  
One option, based on the major political parties in Sri Lanka being race orientated, is to 
have the political parties select who is to represent their community at this process 
negotiation.  Thus, the Sinhalese could for example be represented by the party in power, 
and a few of the largest opposition parties in Parliament.  The Tamils could be represented 
by the TULF, LTTE, TNA, CWC, TULF and Karuna Faction.  Certainly, there is value in 
including the religious bodies and professional communities.    
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The important point of such a selection is that it provides an opportunity for R-2 systems to 
participate in designing the processes which pertain to negotiation, monitoring, feedback, 
verification, etc.  As always, to avoid polarization of positions it is vital that the negotiation 
process involve participants in solving multiple problems so as to reduce the risk of 
solutions, in this instance process design, being at the expense of other problems.   
 
5.3.1.1.3  Peace Talks Negotiations 
 
While at times it is clear who is the representative of a system, at others it is not.  In the 
latter instance, the representative may be cloudy as in the case of the GoSL appearing to 
represent embedded systems, especially the Sinhalese, due to the lack of presence of such 
embedded systems in the negotiations held to date.  At other times, as in the case of the 
LTTE, questions may arise as to the adequacy of their representation in the context of a 
greater whole.  For example, whilst the LTTE may well capture the sentiment of the 
demand for substantial autonomy they may not capture the thinking of moderate Tamils.  
Representation via R-2 systems and amalgamated into R-1system representation is one way 
of overcoming this.    
 
Working with the architecture that Team Syntegrity® affords, one way of finding 
representatives of these systems is via participation at Team Syntegrity® events.  These 
participants through their participation then are exposed to the issues of their systems and 
can be chosen to represent their system.   
 
An example of that is where after a Syntegration the orthogonal set of participants are used 
to represent that system at the next level of connected Syntegrations.  Stafford Beer, the 
inventor of Team Syntegrity®, is also known to have suggested nominating one person per 
Syntegration to go into the next level of connected Syntegrations.  Whilst 900 persons 
participating in 30 Syntegrations resulting in 30 nominees who then connect to participate 
in the next Syntegration may not be required in some instances, it may well be very useful 
for the Sinhalese community where they historically have been very much represented by 
the GoSL.  Making a very clear choice of representation by all of the S1s belonging to R-1 
acts to overcome the weakness of R0 collapsing to represent missing embedded systems.  
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An important feature to bear in mind with participants is that whilst a certain criteria is 
employed to select Syntegration participants it in no way means the participant is contained 
to discuss only those issues that pertain to the reasoning which earned him/her that 
selection.  The reality is that each person belongs to multiple systems and so has the 
opportunity if they so wish to exercise it, to discuss issues and solutions from the 
perspective of any one or more of those systems to which the person belongs.   
 
5.3.1.2  Way of Resolving the Representation Issue and Accommodating the Plethora 
of Content 
 
As the participants in negotiations are representatives of the relevant systems, there is an 
embedded question within the ‘who should represent the system’ question.  That question 
is - what is the profile of the representative sought?  Are the representative/s of the relevant 
systems that are called upon  to design and negotiate the solution/s to come from the 
political ranks given that those elected to Parliament have won the peoples’ vote to 
represent them?  Or should these negotiations pertaining to designing the solution/s fall to 
the public service and the military because they are employed to advise government on 
planning matters and are the implementation arm of government policy?  Or should the 
process of designing a solution involve a wider spectrum of society (e.g. civil community, 
business community, professional community, religious community) from within each 
system?   
 
Answering this question from the logic of Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety indicates that 
involving a wider spectrum of representatives of each of the systems would be better if that 
wider representation means more discernable variety is generated which additionally serves 
to absorb variety generated by other systems.  However, let us recognize that whether 
variety is attenuated or amplified each carries its own brand of risk which has the potential 
to be traded off if understood.  Beer explains, “… every variety reduction ipso facto 
reduces information, and is therefore dangerous.  But it must be done.  Every variety 
amplification increases information, and leads ipso facto to instability.  That risk must also 
be run.” (Beer, 1994a:228, italics in quote) 
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In seeking to understand the variety engineering considerations let us consider the trade-
offs given the interacting nature of the crises and the prospect of substantive if not 
complete overhaul of the Constitution  as a response to preserve viability by adapting 
identity and reasserting coherence in a climate of meaningful autonomy.  In acknowledging 
this let us realize that viability is a recursive concept which explains why coherence and 
autonomy co-exist.   At play here is huge variety both in terms of understanding the 
problems from the perspective of different systems, and in terms of designing solutions.  
Given the inherent constitutional weakness that the political system has  evidenced on 
multiple frontiers, and the lack of stability, quality and independence that afflicts the public 
service, the political circles and the government service present as unreliable components 
upon which to place sole dependence for the design of solutions of the calibre required.   
 
We are thus faced with two questions.  How is variety to be pumped into the design process 
sufficient to produce a feasible solution?  How is this variety to be generated given the 
unreliability of components?  One well known way of building reliability from unreliable 
components is to back-up parts or functions.  For example, we carry a spare tyre in our car, 
or in computing use parallel processing so that if one fails the other can take over.  Note 
here that the structural relationship between the failed unit (now replaced) and the rest of 
the system is static.   
 
Another is what Warren McCulloch discovered and named - ‘the redundancy of potential 
command’.   Here the redundancy pertains not to the physical but an organizational entity 
which Beer describes as “It is the information flow that determines which concatenation 
matters, and that therefore delineates the command centre.” (Beer, 1994a:232)  Looking at 
biological systems (e.g. neuron activity in the brain) it was found that the command centre 
does not reside in one particular area, it changes from time to time.  The design of the 
system is not hierarchically orientated.  It appears as based on the interaction between the 
entities.  Each entity (e.g. neuron) has the potential to be the command centre and works to 
reinforce each other.  Thus each entity is redundant for another.  If one entity does not 
work or is inadequate for the task at hand, or is unreliable in a moment of time, the system 
can rely on another entity or concatenation of entities.  In other words, the reliability of the 
system to absorb variety is built into the system by calling into play many entities.  These 
variety generating entities due to their dynamical structural positioning (redundant to each  
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other) are placed to exercise command (make a decision) should they at a moment in time 
be the entity or concatenation of entities that have the best variety absorbing power for that 
decision.   
It is this ‘redundancy of potential command’ that I seek to invoke when I propose that 
representatives be drawn from a broader spectrum of each system’s members so as to 
strengthen the reliability of representatives which up to now have been constrained to the 
political, military and public servants.  There is a penalty, however.  Being overload by the 
proliferation of variety!  It is for that reason that Team Syntegrity® is proposed.  It has the 
structural non-hierarchical dynamic capability in-built into its design to both generate 
variety and absorb variety.  Active participant involvement, aided by facilitation, gives life 
to that structural capability.  However, the variety engineering offered by Team 
Syntegrity® too has its trade-off.  It is time consuming and some may even contend 
requires too many participants.  
 
Yet let us keep in focus that it is the very viability of systems in their recursive state that is 
the objective of the design.  The carnage and ill-will has already been too high and the 
duration too long.  Invoking the architectural capability that Team Syntegrity® affords 
offers few shortcuts.  As Chilcott, speaking of lessons learnt from Northern Ireland said 
and with which I wholeheartedly concur –  
 
the people themselves have to feel they own the talks.  The solution must be generated 
by them, not produced by outsiders.  The British Government and most outsiders knew 
what the solution would almost certainly have to look like.  They could have drafted it 
in two weeks.  Had they done so, it would have failed.  The parties may have taken two 
years to reach the same destination but it was vital that they should feel ownership of 
the outcome. (Chilcott, 2007) 
 
The journey is arduous.  Some representatives may voluntarily opt to join in the 
deliberations.  Others may be seconded to participate.  Still others will be mandated full-
time to employ their expertise and experience to interlink the negotiations.   
 
The importance of what follows next is the linkage using the architecture of Team 
Syntegrity® based on R-2 representatives being chosen from a starting base of +4500 
people.  The numbers of participants can be smaller or larger and there is no need for all 
systems to base their selection formula on across the board consistent criteria.  There will  
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however be minimum criteria that each system must abide by and these criteria are a matter 
for ‘process negotiations’ to decide upon.  
 
5.3.1.2.1  Meta-Level Negotiations – Based on Team Syntegrity® 
 
Respecting the principle of non-hierarchical negotiations and an agenda formed after 
negotiators have gained an appreciation of the issues involved from the perspective of the 
multiple systems represented, Team Syntegrity® is chosen as the protocol for these 
negotiations.   
 
Based on the number of representatives from the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, equal numbers of participants will be required representing the State and 
the aspiring secessionist community.  Note the latter is not the same as the Tamil 
community some of whom may not aspire to secession.  Accordingly, representatives will 
be the GoSL representing Sri Lanka and an equal number of participants representing the 
aspiring secessionist community.  
 
If each permanent Member of the UN  Security Council was to make available one 
representative to participate at these negotiations, plus making allowance for an additional 
UN representative, Team Syntegrity® would take a Small Forms format – refer Figure 16.  
It would comprise a group of six representing the UN, the State and the aspiring 
secessionist community.     
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The important point to achieve  with representation from the State actor is to include 
representation from opposition parties in Parliament and representation from the Executive 
President.  This works to achieve broader understanding of perspectives and commitment 
including catering for continuity in the event of change of government.  This suggests that 
the State actor is likely to require representation of larger numbers than the group of six 
mentioned above.  To maintain balance it is important that the aspiring secessionist 
community have an equal number of representatives participating as the State actor.   
 
This aspect of continuity on the side of the State actor is an aspect that has been almost 
consistently absent in negotiations by the body representing Sri Lanka.  In comparison the 
embedded Tamil community representatives have had a much better record of consistency 
(and thus an institutional memory) given the early days of continuity by the TULF and later 
the LTTE.   
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Working on a 30 person Syntegration, a combination of representation could comprise six 
representatives from the UN and twelve representatives each from the State and the 
aspiring secessionist community.  The relaxation of UN representation, from a variety 
capability has prospect for acceptance as the primary design falls within the hands of the 
domestic participants with guidance from the UN representatives concerning the 
application of the principle of equality.  If such were the numbers and combination, it 
offers the scope for each set of six participants from each of these communities to 
participate at the Syntegration positioned as an orthogonal set.   
 
Of the twelve representatives from the State, six could represent the political parties of the 
government in power and the remaining six could be representatives from the opposition 
parties.  Each of these two sets of six representatives, one from the government in power 
and the other from the opposition participate, could participate at the Syntegration 
negotiations positioned as an orthogonal set.  
 
With the twelve representatives from the aspiring secessionist community, six could come 
into negotiations with the focus to address issues from the perspective of the relationship 
between the cohesive needs of the State (R0) and the autonomous needs of its community 
(R-1).  The other set of six could start from the position of addressing meta-level 
considerations from the perspective of the relationship between the cohesive needs of the 
community (R-1) as a whole and the autonomous needs of its embedded systems (R-2).   
 
In proposing this deliberate positioning of the combinations of the five orthogonal sets, I 
am aware that it is unusual.  What it does mean is that unlike the usual Syntegration of 
optimization of participant topic preferences across 30 participants, the optimization takes 
on a different complexion and occurs as five sets within which another set of optimization 
takes place across its six participants.   
 
What such pre-positioned participant orthogonal sets ensure is that each group (UN, Sri 
Lanka and aspiring secessionist group) has within its participant set first hand design 
involvement in all of the topics and thus carries detailed understanding of what it took to 
reach those design decisions.  On the other hand, a counter argument is that if such 
‘orthogonal based’ optimization did not take place, the results of the positioning based on  
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‘optimizing participant preferences across all 30 persons’ is that the resultant positioning 
tells something about the skew of strength/weakness of each of the groups as viewed from 
a topic perspective.   Another option is to ‘pre-orthogonally position’ only the UN 
representatives and one set each of the representatives from the State and the aspiring 
secessionist group.  This hybrid option thus has the capability to provide a sense of the 
skew of the two remaining groups.   
 
The tremendous value of these pre-positioned orthogonal sets is that it assures a set 
comprising the State and the aspiring secessionist.  Each of those sets is then available to 
participate, when required, in any of the other Syntegrations, for example involving R0 and 
R-1systems.  This affords a way to establish a link and thus the flow of information and its 
interpretations between the Meta-Level  Negotiations  with the portfolio of Peace Talks 
Negotiations.   
 
The important point here is that based on the way the orthogonal sets are harnessed, 
account is taken of the trade-off that goes with it.  The choice of which option is a matter 
for the facilitators to discuss with the groups, as part of the behind the scenes positioning 
that must be achieved in order to have got to this stage. 
 
5.3.1.2.2  Pre-Talks Negotiations –  
Design of the Process of Internal Self-Determination Negotiations 
 
Once  Meta-Level  Negotiations  have agreed on the broad parameters of Peace Talks 
negotiations including identifying the systems that comprise the layers of recursion, the 
question of the design of the Peace Talks negotiations arises.  Continuing with respecting 
the principle of non-hierarchical negotiations and an agenda formed after negotiators have 
gained an appreciation of the issues involved from the perspective of the multiple systems 
represented, Team Syntegrity® is chosen as the protocol for these negotiations.   
 
The objective here is to bring together the triadic levels of recursion into negotiation so that 
designed via negotiations is the process design of Peace Talks (which includes flanking  
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processes like monitoring, feedback correction processes and participant criteria for the 
Peace Talks).  What I am seeking to convey here is that: 
 
1)  These triadic levels of recursion need to negotiate with each other, and 
 
2)  The issues negotiated at the 'Pre-Talks' relate to matters of design in specific the 
'process' of the way participants come together to design matters of content which is 
what the 'Peace Talks' are about. 
 
Thus, there are two types of negotiations.  Both are negotiating design issues.  The 'Pre-
Talks' negotiations pertain to matters of 'process' and the 'Peace Talks' negotiations relate to 
matters of ‘content’. 
 
I say design is negotiated in the sense that this is where the issues of the design are 
discussed to understand their ramifications.  Concerning the design of the solution there 
may be various options and each carries its own ramifications.  It is valuable to note here 
the difference between negotiating the solution (e.g. unitary or devolved form of 
governance) and negotiating the terms of a unitary or devolved form of government.  
Indeed, what may result when the terms are negotiated is a hybrid which is more unitary or 
devolved.  The resultant solution can then be put to the decision makers for their approval 
or not.  In this regard the decision makers may have more than one solution on the table 
and those solutions may themselves be negotiated by the different camps of decision 
makers. 
 
The above is an example of content negotiations.   Now let us look at an example of 
'process' negotiations and use the example of monitoring, in specific the neutrality of 
monitoring. Here an aspect of monitoring is -  who will do the monitoring?   Will the 
monitoring be carried out by representatives of the international community and if so will it 
be one entity (e.g. UN) or many (comprising various countries each of who is acceptable to 
the opposing protagonist) entities that come together (as done under the SLMM)?  Or, will 
monitoring be carried out by locals where each monitors the other?  In turn both these 
options open the question as to access to monitoring in each context (military, 
reconstruction projects), the criteria upon which the monitoring results are compared and  
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what happens in the instance when actual results show marked deviation from the criteria 
or a discernable pattern of growing deviation.  For this reason Pre-Talks process 
negotiators need to understand the content issues, although the criteria upon which 
monitoring results will be compared are a matter for content negotiations to agree upon.  
What the process negotiations need to resolve is the process matters that apply to 
monitoring.  Examples of these are that monitoring is established for substantive issues 
(e.g. ceasefire, major reconstruction projects), that criteria be established upon which 
comparison is to be made, a process is set in place to report deviation and most importantly 
a process is designed to do something about it. 
 
It is important to recognize that the participant criteria for this ‘design of process 
negotiation’ are those with skills in ‘process’ design and who have a healthy understanding 
of the type of content issues facing Sri Lanka.  The type of skill-set sought is the type 
displayed in this thesis.  
 
Based on R-1 comprising four systems, (the Tamils, the Sinhalese, the Muslims and other 
minor communities each of which gravitates toward autonomy (albeit different degrees of 
autonomy) and  R0 seeking to cohere these systems, the proposal is for each of these 
systems to be represented by six participants.  Amongst the six participants from each of 
the R-1 systems the objective is that at least some of these be direct representatives of the 
R-2 embedded systems.   
 
As may be obvious, like the Meta-Level  Negotiations, potential exists to deliberately 
position each of the five sets of groups (meaning the cohesive and autonomous seeking 
systems) across each of the orthogonal sets.  However, this is not advocated except limited 
to one pre-positioned orthogonal set of the type of full-time professionals that Chilcott 
refers to for the purposes of running a ‘multi-system representative’ Peace Talks 
Secretariat.  That set of full-time professionals forming the orthogonal set is to comprise 
one representative from each of the systems (State, Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and Others 
and one representative from an R-2 system). 
 
The proposal here is to employ that orthogonal set in a full-time professional capacity to 
run a multi-system Peace Talks Secretariat which maps and diagnoses the progress of the  
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Peace Talks in terms of topics, their findings, their design solutions, agreements, etc.  This 
is what in VSM terms would be the S4 Development Directorate.  Not only is the work of 
this Development Directorate tremendously important, it is very complex given the 
complexity of the portfolio of Peace Talks that needs to occur to address the diversity of 
issues that participants would want to raise and have solved.  The objective of this Peace 
Talks Secretariat is to find the gaps and figure out what needs to be done so that such 
matters are addressed.  This ‘multi-system representative’ Peace Secretariat would report to 
each of the orthogonal sets of the ‘Meta-Level  Negotiations’ team.  This way, the 
communications channel is formalized so that the influence of the meta-level negotiators 
can be harnessed when it is required to correct anomalies.  
 
If the decision is taken to pre-position each of the five sets of groups (meaning the State, 
Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and Others) comprising orthogonal sets of mono-representative 
groups, those orthogonal sets are then available to establish Peace Secretariats (S4 
Development Directorates) for each of the R-1 systems and one for the R0 system.  There 
is value in employing this type of design in this way, but it needs to be weighted against the 
ramifications that arise given that the potential exists that the Peace Talks may result in the 
R-1 systems migrating from being communal based to be territorially based (e.g. 
Provinces).  
5.3.1.2.3  Peace Talks Negotiations 
 
Let us recall, there are two interrelated parts to these negotiations which create a third and 
it is vital the negotiations spanning the systems belonging to the three levels of recursion 
(R0, R-1 and R-2) be exercised.  One part pertains to negotiations between the State (R0), 
whose focus is matters of cohesion, and each and every one of the embedded systems 
within the next level of recursion (R-1), whose focus gravitates  to varying degrees of 
autonomy.  The other set pertains to each system within R-1 negotiating with its embedded 
systems (R-2).  It provides an avenue for R-2 systems to surface and negotiate for their 
content needs and to negotiate the type of autonomy they seek in the context of the 
cohesive requirements that their meta-level (R-1) seeks to negotiate.  The third part is that 
by doing so the opportunity is created for solution designs (required by R-1 of R0) to 
surface (as content in R-2 systems) and be verified in the bi-directional R-2 Syntegrations.   
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The variety handling capability of Team Syntegrity® and the linked architecture it affords 
is proposed as the cornerstone of these negotiations where content needs to be expansively 
addressed without it resulting in overload.   
 
If time permitted and all citizens were sufficiently interested in being consulted and 
contributing to the identification of problems and their solutions, the question of 
representation would not arise.  Yet quite apart from anything else, time and resources are 
unlikely to be devoted to such a degree despite the gravity of the situation facing Sri Lanka.  
Thus the question arises - who really is interested in contributing to designing the solution 
path for Sri Lanka and how many are they likely to involve?   
 
The numbers used here are based on that number being minimally 750 participants based 
on the double set of negotiations required - refer Figure 9 and more specifically Figure 17.  
The double set would be between R0 and the systems that comprise R-1 and the other set 
would be between each of the systems belonging to R-1 and each of their embedded 
systems.  
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There are two outstanding questions whose answers need to be incorporated into the design 
of these negotiations.  They are - in the event that a system lacks clarity as to who will 
represent it, how will that representative, or better still concatenation of representatives, be 
recognised?  In saying this, the representative needs to have an understanding of the way 
the current system operates, its advantages and problems and an idea of the type of future 
system sought.  Ways of finding that skilled representative or concatenation of 
representatives is addressed within the proposal below.  The other question is - how is the 
principle of equality between systems to be respected so that it is neither top-down driven 
nor bottom-up driven given the ramifications that each carries?   A way of addressing this 
is by bi-directionally connecting these processes which has the added value of verification 
and/or modification by lower levels of recursion.  This too is built into the proposal. 
 
Taking the systems belonging to R-2 (e.g. Tamils in the Northern Province, Muslims of the 
Eastern Province, Sinhalese of the Southern Province) as the lowest level of recursion 
significantly dealt with here, the proposal is to begin addressing design considerations at 
this level and therefore consult those systems that are embedded within that level of 
recursion – refer Figure 9 that appears in Chapter 3 and Figure 17. 
The results of those individual R-3consultations are then circulated to merge with the 
results of their peer systems belonging to R-3 and move into negotiations at the next level 
of recursion and so on until they reach R0.  Note, what primarily moves into the higher 
levels of recursion is residual variety.  The results of those solutions applying to that 
residual variety reached at R-1 and R0 move back recursively across the array of embedded 
systems to verify and inform modifications so that they move upwards once again through 
the recursive layers of negotiations to emerge in negotiations at R0 level Peace Talks.  This 
iterative approach in search of change and resolution will be repeated until substantive 
matters reach agreement.  To this end the influence of the three groups of meta-level 
negotiators can be brought to bear. Many topics will be the focus of discussion and design.  
However, underpinning these negotiations will be the issue of how the balance of cohesion 
and autonomy is to be designed between R0 and R-1 and between R-1 and R-2. 
 
Whilst there are many large group participatory intervention processes that can be 
employed to engage in airing concerns and solutions, the one advocated here is Team 
Syntegrity®.  The reasons for the selection are the same as before along with the vital  
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linkages that the architecture affords.  Undoubtedly, this includes the linkage power of the 
orthogonal sets and the less appreciated ‘gradients of structural multi-topic’ exposure that 
participants are afforded (refer Table 9).  I expect understanding of this variety gave Beer 
the insight to suggest that any one participant has the variety at the end of a Syntegration to 
represent the discourse and findings of that Syntegration having directly participated in 
four topic discussions and having direct contact with at least one participant who was 
directly involved with the other eight topics.  Harnessing both these features plus the 
connectivity a ‘topic concatenation’ affords is what is proposed for this tiered set of linked 
Peace Talks negotiations. 
 
Table 9 - Participant Exposure 
 
The proposal is reflected in Figure 17.  It incorporates different permutations of ways of 
linking the informational flow between the Syntegrations and thus accommodating content 
that may well proliferate once more people are offered the opportunity to contribute 
towards the identification of problems and design of solutions which importantly extends  
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beyond ‘their own group’ and the ethnically labelled crisis.  It also provides the basis upon 
which representatives can be selected who having participated at a Syntegration have been 
given the opportunity not just to be aware of a wide spectrum of issues but have an 
understanding of the nature of the way those issues interact and are interrelated.   
 
At the centre of Figure 17 is a single Syntegration whose participants represent R0 (Sri 
Lanka) and each of its embedded systems (R-1).  Whilst the systems belonging to R-1, who 
seek various degrees of autonomy, is a matter for the Meta-Level Negotiations to identify, 
for our purposes here they are identified as the four communities - Sinhalese, Tamils, 
Muslims and Others.  Each of these five systems (includes a Syntegration for R0 
whose purpose is explained a few paragraphs ahead) send six representatives to participate 
at this Syntegration which is devoted to addressing issues that pertain to the relationship 
between R0 and systems belonging to R-1.  Recall our old problem of the GoSL collapsing 
to represent missing embedded systems (referred to in Chapter Three).  This composition 
of representatives is one very effective way of overcoming that problem. 
 
It would also be realistic that issues pertaining to the relationship amongst the embedded 
systems would be part of these negotiations.  If so, it may result in a supplementary set of 
negotiations that may also use the Syntegration protocol.  In that case, the opportunity is 
there for that Syntegration, which may be a Short Form, to comprise an orthogonal set of 
representatives from each of the R-1 system Syntegrations.  On the other hand, instead of 
opting for a Short Form, the balance participants for a 30 person Syntegration would be 
nominated by each of the R-1 systems.  There is also scope for bi-lateral (or more) 
negotiations between R-1 systems and for this too the Syntegration protocol can be used for 
it affords the orthogonal set to report back to each of the systems.   
 
An important point needs to be addressed when one or more orthogonal sets are to be used 
bi-directionally to link Syntegrations.  The linkage of informational flow that occurs as a 
consequence of an orthogonal set feeding from a previous Syntegration into a new 
Syntegration is well known.  To get a sense of the onward reach of utilising the orthogonal 
set Truss and Cullen have calculated it would take twelve levels of recursions of 
Syntegrations to reach over seven billion people.  Yet the question is - what are the variety  
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considerations and logistical implications when the orthogonal set is to be re-used to move 
backwards so as to verify or modify agreements reached at the newer Syntegration? 
 
To discuss the full impact of this let us use the example of the two innermost sets of 
Syntegrations as shown in Figure 17.  Here we have the participants of the centremost 
Syntegration (let us call it TS9) comprise the orthogonal sets of the next five outer layers of 
Syntegrations (let us call them TS8a, TS8b, ... TS8e).  Now if we want each of those 
orthogonal sets (from TS8a, TS8b) to report back to their home base as the same 
composition of people that went into the new Syntegration (TS9) and with the ‘power of 
the direct coverage of the new Syntegration’s twelve topics that an orthogonal set affords’ 
then it means the new Syntegration (TS9) orthogonal sets have to be pre-positioned so that 
the composition of its set is preserved.  Therefore, at the new Syntegration the optimization 
of participant preferences for ‘topic allocation’ needs to be done at the level of the 
orthogonal composition of the participant groups with a second tier of optimization of topic 
allocations done within each of those orthogonal sets.  On the other hand, the choice is for 
the usual participant ‘topic optimization’ to occur across participants as individuals which 
means new permutations of participants will form the orthogonal sets in the new 
Syntegration (TS9).  This type of ‘process’ consideration is a matter for the ‘Pre-Talks 
Process Negotiations’ to address.   
 
Having sorted out the logistics, the question is - what criteria inform the decision upon 
which to compose the orthogonal sets of the new Syntegration?  Applying variety 
engineering thinking the solution lies in understanding the way the reporting back 
information is utilized by the recipient.  For example, if each of the recipients is to utilize 
the information in other Syntegrations (let us call them TS7a, TS7b, …) and require its 
original orthogonal set to be participants without outsiders (from other groups) involved in 
the TS7 series of Syntegrations then it is required that the old orthogonal set (from TS8a, 
TS8b, …) be pre-positioned in the new Syntegration (TS9).  This decision concerning 
utilization of old orthogonal sets is a matter for the ‘follow-through’ on TS8x Syntegrations 
or those organising TS7x  Syntegrations to make and negotiate acceptance with the 
organizer of TS9 Syntegration if pre-positioned orthogonal sets are required.  There is no 
requirement that all orthogonal sets that go into a Syntegration be treated the same.  The 
Syntegration logistics are flexible enough to treat various orthogonal sets differently.  
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Let us now look at the next outer layer (from the centre) of Syntegrations on Figure 17.  
Their proposed use pertains to two types of systems, namely the systems belonging to R-1 
and R0 itself.  The purpose of each of these Syntegrations is for that system to figure out its 
consolidated position from which it will enter into negotiations. 
 
Thus for the Syntegration pertaining to R0 the GoSL as representative of that system would 
be expected to minimally address the consolidated position on matters of cohesion which it 
seeks to negotiate with its embedded autonomous systems.  To draw on that thinking, it 
may opt to hold a third and fourth tier of Syntegrations (or employ other participatory 
techniques) to ascertain positions as they pertain to different subject domains (e.g. finance, 
military, foreign policy, language, devolution, etc) or provincial geographical terrains.   
 
For the Syntegrations pertaining to each of the systems belonging to R-1 (i.e. Sinhalese, 
Tamils, Muslims, and Others) the objective is threefold.  One, to figure out its consolidated 
position on the autonomy it seeks in its relationship with R0 and its counterpart the 
cohesion it abides by.  The third objective is the cohesive relationship it seeks with its 
embedded systems (R-2).  This latter cohesive position (by R-1) is what it negotiates with 
its embedded systems (R-2).  In turn these embedded systems (R-2) are offered the 
opportunity to figure out their consolidate positions in a third layer of Syntegrations having 
been informed, if required, by a fourth layer of Syntegrations comprising representatives of 
the people (refer Figure 17). 
 
Overall, as part of the these negotiated positions, participants require an understanding of 
how things currently work as they pertain to various subject domains and require that once 
the principles have been agree upon, that the manner of their achievement be designed.  
The Syntegration process by the way it is structured offers the opportunity for participants 
to gain this knowledge and apply it to design considerations. 
 
As mentioned earlier the Syntegrations themselves are an iterative process.  To get this 
meaningfully started so that the representation of the people can be figured out, linkage 
needs to work from bottom up where participation includes voluntary participation besides 
acceptance of invitations.  Using the Syntegration protocol this is done via orthogonal sets  
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or a single person representation emanating from a Syntegration as indicated by the arrows 
in Figure 17.  
 
Let us pause to apply this to the concrete example for the Sinhalese where a consolidated 
position has so far been elusive and with the Tamils where despite the LTTE’s strong 
stance on its consolidated negotiation position there is a well recognised community 
amongst the Tamils who do not share secessionist aspirations.  Notable amongst this latter 
group are those referred to as the ‘moderate Tamils’ and those that agree with the position 
articulated by such political parties as the TULF, CWC and the emerging political wing of 
the Karuna faction.    
 
Having advocated the application of the principle of ‘Redundancy of Potential Command’ 
the objective is to bring a wider spectrum of players together to design and negotiate 
solutions.  The fourth layer (and if required further outer layers) of Syntegrations contained 
in Figure 17 is aimed at accommodating such numbers and variety so that segments of 
society (like civil, business, professional, religious, political, public service, diaspora, etc.) 
can participate.  Whilst none of these individual groups are expected to hold the solution, 
McCulloch’s ‘Redundancy of Potential Command’ suggests that various permutations of 
the groupings may hold the variety absorbing capacity to design various elements of the 
solution.  Since Team Syntegrity® is non-hierarchical it holds the potential to find such 
concatenations and upon its realisation have it deliberated upon and accepted by other 
groups.  This way, individual communities are afforded the opportunity to better 
understand their requirements and design what it takes for them to minimally survive in the 
environment in which they are situated.  This understanding then serves to inform them of 
their manoeuvrability when they are called upon to negotiate solutions to accommodate 
requirements from/with a set comprising more communities.  
 
The objective of the second tier of Syntegrations is to identify the solution space within 
which each of the systems belonging to R-1 has room to negotiate when it enters into the 
Syntegration at the centre.  Feeding into this second tier of Syntegrations is a linked set of 
Syntegrations spanning outer layers.   
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Using the example of the Sinhalese and given what is known as the ‘lack of southern 
consensus’ and the diversity of representatives of various Sinhalese communities, it is 
proposed to hold 30 Syntegrations as shown in tier five of Figure 17.  These 900 
participants will come from various groups and form Syntegration groupings of their own 
nomination.  Such groupings may include groupings of Buddhist Sinhalese, Sinhalese 
speaking Sinhalese, Sinhalese from the professional communities, Sinhalese from various 
Provinces, and various groupings of political parties.  These Syntegrations will serve to 
strengthen the focus of those communities, including the design of their own solutions.  
Each of these 30 Syntegrations will be invited to choose one representative to take the 
findings of their Syntegration into the next tier of Syntegrations and participate in 
understanding the amalgam of issues and then design solutions pertinent to that level of 
recursion.  If participant numbers are smaller then less Syntegrations can be held at tier five 
and more than one representative will be drawn from each tier five Syntegration.  If the 
numbers are still smaller another option is to start with five Syntegration which total 150 
participants.  A choice for some groups that are more consolidated in their position is to 
skip the fourth layer of Syntegrations and start at the third layer with a 30 person 
Syntegration.  An orthogonal set from the third layer feeds into the second layer of 
Syntegrations.  The permutations are many. 
 
Whilst the pattern of linked Syntegrations will be determined based on the number of 
participants wanting to participate, the essential objective being pursued here is for 
communities to be gradually built up so that they are positioned not just to solve their 
problems but to solve problems of the larger community – refer Figure 18.  The key to 
achieving this latter objective is the ‘orthogonal linkage, plus the ‘double topic’ position of 
each participant and the exposure to all topics that each participant is exposed to (so long as 
they actively participate).   
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It is very likely that individual Syntegrations will produce similar topics and yet different 
solutions.  To address such topics and develop a composite solution a new Syntegration 
comprising participants of the topic team members of the previous Syntegrations can be 
conducted.  To illustrate the power of this joint in-depth topic Syntegration refer Figure 19.  
For example, after the Syntegrations involving R-1 if each of them addressed the issue of 
finance a joint topic Syntegration could be conducted where the participants comprise the 
topic members from each of the four races and the State.  In addition the State could send 
an orthogonal set which by default includes one of the topic members.  The results of the 
fresh Syntegration could then feed back to each of the race communities via their topic 
members.  Additionally, there is the choice of sending an orthogonal set from the joint 
Syntegration to join another meta-level Syntegration.  The permutations are many.   
 
The important point of the joint Syntegration is that it brings the communities together to 
design a solution (in this instance addressing financial issues).  No longer is it a case of  
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proposing solutions to each other.  Rather the solution’s generative process has now been 
structurally positioned to be collaboratively designed.  
 
 
 
Incidentally, instead of using the ‘single orthogonal set’ those participants could instead be 
subject matter experts or users.  There is also scope for this type of Syntegration to be 
informed by what was referred to above as Citizen Juries or supplementary papers which 
are provided to the participants as background material as a prelude to a Syntegration. 
 
The value of this type of resultant solution from a new Syntegration is that it overcomes the 
more frequently employed process of consultation by a hub group which then chooses or 
develops a composite solution.  Whilst that hub group may submit the composite solution 
to those consulted or a higher ranking body for approval the fact remains the hub group is 
constrained by its variety absorbing power which is less than if those that were consulted 
could interact with each other and be part of the process that designs the composite  
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solution.  It is this type of diverse interaction unconstrained by everything having to be 
filtered by the hub (refer Figure 20) that is the great strength of Team Syntegrity®. 
 
Contextualising this to Sri Lanka, there are two solution design points to be made.  One 
concerns solution design in the context of hub groups and the other concerns in-depth 
exploration of an amalgam of similar topics. 
 
 
 
Hub group consultation is the protocol adopted by APRC where only political parties have 
the right of participation and to propose solution designs.  As De Silva states “The 
proceedings of the representatives of the All Party Conference as it meandered along for 
nearly a(n) year lacked any degree of transparency; except for occasional soliloquies by its 
Chairman; nor does it appear to have invited any representations from the public who were 
not called upon to make them known.” (De Silva, 2007)   
Given the complexity of issues facing Sri Lanka and warranting constitutional design, in-
depth exploration of topics is likely to be required on many fronts.  One of the most 
obvious is whether the architecture of governance is to be based on the principles of a  
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unitary or devolved style of government and in the latter context whether it is to be a 
federal or confederal model.  Before continuing further, a point should be made regarding 
the distinction between federal and confederal which is sometimes not well known.   
The traditional definition of a confederation is a body whose laws are binding only on 
sovereigns.  This means that confederate legislation has to be transformed into internal 
legislation in each member state in order to be binding on that state's citizens and court 
system. … (In contrast) federal legislation may extend rights and obligations directly 
on individuals in each member state.  … It is the force to coerce and compel, rather 
than propose and persuade that is the distinguishing characteristic between a federation 
and a confederation. (Knutsen, 2004) 
One would certainly expect that Syntegrations involving R-1 systems (the second tier of 
Syntegrations from the centre) would have, as one of their topics, addressed the topic of the 
mode of governance they desire with R0 and their peer systems.  Syntegrations emanating 
from the lower levels of recursion may also find different solutions of modes of 
government that they propose for the relationship with R0.  For example, from within the 
Sinhalese community it would not be surprising to find them articulate a unitary state of 
government and caution against devolution.  De Silva, an exponent of a unitary style of 
government for Sri Lanka, writing on federalism says –  
After the Thirteenth Amendment had been in operation for over a decade in the seven 
provinces outside the North and East, manned by elected councils that were not hostile 
to the centre, devolution was not viewed with the same degree of suspicion and 
disfavour and was not seen as obstructing central government policies or as being in 
competition with the centre, but in many cases as a supplementary arm of the center.  
The possibility of disastrous consequences arising from a hostile administration as that 
of the maverick Chief Minister Varadharaja Perumal ( as protégé of the RAW) in the 
North-Eastern Province in 1989 and his declaration of UDI, leading to its dissolution do 
not seem to have been fully appreciated, despite their ominous significance for the 
future. (De Silva, 2007) 
On the other hand, in more recent years both the UNP and the SLFP have been receptive 
and proposed constitutional solutions based on a federal model.    
Moving to the separatist Tamils, the expectation there is for proposals to include anything 
but a unitary model.  At the 2002 Oslo Peace Talks a federal model was proposed and 
seemed to gain a favourable reception by the GoSL and the LTTE.  However, it was a 
confederal model that was implied in the ISGA proposal by the LTTE.  From within the 
Muslim community indications are that those located in the Eastern Province have a  
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marked interest in devolution, particularly if it holds the option of a merger of the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces for it would mean that the Muslims are the minority in the South and 
in the North.  Even more important is the contrast to the current state of play where there is 
much evidence to suggest the Muslims have benefited from the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict.  
For example, the GoSL have found it beneficial to grant benefits to the Muslims to show 
that minorities are not disadvantaged.  In the early years of conflict, the Tamils also sought 
the approval of Muslims and thus were receptive to granting Muslim privileges.  That 
however has changed since the 1989 forced evacuations of Muslims by the LTTE.  
 
Faced with the need to agree upon the principles and architecture upon which the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka is designed, the situation moves beyond decrying each others’ 
solutions to designing a mutually acceptable solution.  There are two points worthy of 
recognition here.  Firstly, if resolution cannot be reached then the matter has the potential 
to go to the UN for resolution should the Tamil separatists formally apply for recognition 
of their Statehood and most importantly for their ISO 3166 status which is the prelude to 
participating, in their own right as opposed to under proxy, in the international interchange 
systems.  This carries ramifications to both those seeking preservation of the current island-
wide territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and for those seeking separation in the absence of 
meaningful autonomy.  Common to both is the requirement of evidence of equal rights in 
the conduct of negotiations and proposals. Secondly in the bid to drive homemade solutions 
it does require the understanding of the plethora of issues and concerns that the various 
sides perceive.   
 
The proposal is that coming from the outer layers of recursion and working towards R-1 
are Syntegrations aimed at understanding positions and solutions offered from those layers.  
This builds a solid foundation of understanding of the gradients of requirements of each 
community.  Signals from within each community indicate its potential to manoeuvre when 
it comes to the time of negotiations with peer communities at R-1 and/or R0.  As far as I 
am aware no process in Sri Lanka has to date been conducted to elicit this type of 
‘community based foundation’
126
                                                 
126 Rather what has happened is a community is brought into negotiation with another community and from 
there is sought to design a mutually acceptable solution.  Should by chance such solution materialise or 
.  With each R-1 community having gained this  
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understanding of requirements, concerns and solution prospects, its representatives can 
then be brought together to explore the topic in depth both from a technical viewpoint (e.g. 
aided by subject matter experts from various countries) and from a perspective of designing 
a mutually agreeable solution.   
 
One would expect that this joint community devoted to in-depth exploration of a topic 
comprising all five topic members from each of the communities (plus possibly the meta-
level system Sri Lanka) aided by subject matter experts may be consumed by the initial 
airing of grievances, concerns and requirements during a Syntegration.  This should be 
encouraged for it serves to clarify the issues, to communicate understanding to others and 
by doing works reciprocally and fosters two outcomes.  Firstly, it serves to break down 
barriers as they communicate with each other about their situations.  Secondly, Team 
Syntegrity® being non-hierarchical and given its protocol of structurally positioning 
participants on four issues (two topics as team members and two topics as critics) begins to 
move the opportunity from partisan airing to designing solutions in the context of 
recognising concurrent relationships.  All of this may not be achieved in the first 
Syntegration between the systems embedded within R-1  or for that matter  in the first 
Syntegration between R0 and its embedded systems.  It may take a few Syntegrations to 
absorb the variety sufficient to produce a mutually agreed upon solution.  The important 
purpose of the Team Syntegration negotiations is they have moved from traditional 
acceptance/decline of proposals to joint design of solutions where participants are no 
longer positioned in enclaves of their communities or responsible for designing single topic 
solutions.  
 
5.3.2  Other Matters 
 
There are many other matters that need to be addressed in a bid to return to and sustain 
negotiations to the point of resolution of the strong, weak and conceptual signals of crisis.  
From amongst these I want to make two observations which warrant research.  They 
pertain to international facilitatory type assistance and domestic decision making. 
                                                                                                                                                    
aspects of solution materialise, it inevitably generates resistance from within the community.  Such has been 
the case many times with the Sinhalese community.  
Chapter Five  333 
 
Undoubtedly there is an interaction between the recursive layers within the domestic 
systems and the environment in which they are situated.  In this regard, there is an 
interactive role that the international community plays in the process of what is sometimes 
categorized as peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping.  This thesis, coming from an 
organizational cybernetic perspective, has deliberated upon what it takes to build peace and 
processes useful for peacemaking.   
 
In Sri Lanka, the task of initiating peacebuilding has mostly been taken up by the 
diplomatic community.  This initiative has largely been prompted by the atrocities of war 
and the international campaign, in recent years by the  LTTE and GoSL, to get the 
international community to exert their influence to initiate and sustain peace efforts.  
 
Research is required to understand from a variety absorbing perspective the functionality of 
facilitation, mediation and monitoring which has fallen, exclusively to date, to the 
international community in one way or another.  Particularly important is the relationship 
between these roles.  For example - what is the relationship between monitoring and the 
mediation role when the monitoring of results shows clear non-compliance with agreed 
parameters?  Also - what is the difference between having a sovereign State as the single 
facilitator compared to and/or working with persons of international stature as was the case 
with Northern Ireland?  Chilcott described this as the –  
Fifth lesson: international mediation by a person of stature to chair the talks was crucial. 
Senator Mitchell, a very accomplished American politician and a Catholic, was critical to 
the talks' success.  He was supported by a Canadian general (who enjoyed the Protestants' 
confidence) and an ex-PM of Finland (for Nordic balance).  Senator Mitchell's role was 
hands-on throughout. (Chilcott, 2007) 
 
Today Norway, and in the past India, being a single entity facilitating the peace process, 
gets slated from time to time by different protagonists as being biased.  What difference 
could it make if there were multiple outsiders who worked individually with the various 
protagonists, as was the case with Northern Ireland?  In what way will it contribute towards 
absorbing the issue of neutrality and allegations of external interference? 
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Research is warranted in the area of making a distinction between the process of designing 
peace solutions and their acceptance.  To date, the primary people permitted to design the 
peace solutions have been political parties, based presumably on the assumption that they 
are the representatives of the people.  In the case of the LTTE, the self-nominated 
representatives of the Tamil people, who have taken the leadership initiative to wage war 
on their behalf and run a civil administrative system in the geographical terrain they 
control. 
 
Yet this thesis has proposed a process for designing peace solutions where a wider 
spectrum of the community is involved.  The design of those solutions will need to be 
negotiated and this has been factored into the protocol.  There is however, a difference 
between designers negotiating solutions and the people or their representatives approving 
of those solutions.  Based on understanding the distinction between the power of authority 
(of the people) and power of delegation (by the people to their representative) research is 
warranted as to the way decision making is to be conducted in the context of various issues.  
Ironically, here we are back to the well known issue of cohesion and autonomy.  It is 
pervasive. 
 
5.3.3  Tying the Threads Together 
 
Unlike in earlier years, Sri Lanka is now particularly well placed to enter into the phase of 
solution design taking into account a wide spectrum of interacting issues.  This is not only 
because the gravity and multiplicity of crises have presented themselves, but because there 
has been a climate to find out how others have overcome or avoided or contained the types 
of crises encountered in Sri Lanka.   
 
The revival of Peace Talks in 2002 gave occasion to more experts being invited to visit Sri 
Lanka to advise of their experiences, particularly from South Africa and Northern Ireland 
where they have been involved in conflict resolution and Constitution making.  Many Sri 
Lankan delegations have also been invited to many countries (e.g. Switzerland, South 
Africa, Germany, India, Australia, Canada, etc) to study their governance structures, 
particularly their constitutions.  Various subject matter experts from those countries have  
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been invited to speak in Sri Lanka.  Matters of media freedom, humanitarian rights, and 
anti-corruption have also been the focus at various forums.  Thus Sri Lanka has been 
exposed to a plethora of ideas and is knowledgeable of many options exercised in other 
countries and situations.   
 
Segments of society active in the peace process or politically influential with protagonists 
have been naturally privy to more detailed talks by foreign experts on various subjects and 
participated in workshops.  They have been mostly conducted on the popular ‘hub and 
spoke’ basis where formal interaction is via the filter of what the ‘head table’ or facilitator 
is willing to entertain.  Another valuable on-going capacity building activity, funded by 
foreign agencies, are grassroots workshops aimed at bridging the gap between 
communities.  Yet both these types of workshops are mostly stand-alone with little or no 
connection to interrelated topics, or higher levels of recursion.  
 
The discussion notably absent in Sri Lanka is bringing topics into interaction with each 
other and understanding their impact across multiple layers of recursion and the systems 
which comprise them.  It is this very complex void that the protocol of Team Syntegrity® 
and its interlinked and iterative architecture seek to fill. 
 
The proposal is to conduct three types of Syntegrations -  pertaining to Meta-Level 
Negotiations, Pre-Talks Process Negotiations and Peace Talks Negotiations.  An outline of 
the profile of these Syntegrations is provided in Table 10.  The sequence of the portfolio of 
Peace Talks Syntegrations is provided in Figure 21. 
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Table 10 - Profile of Syntegrations 
Syntegration involving  Starting purpose …  Participants  Comments 
Meta-Level Negotiations 
 
 
 
 
Promoting  Peace Talks  and the 
principles upon which resolution is 
to be architected by Sri Lanka and 
its embedded systems.   
 
Identification of the systems within 
each of the levels of recursion 
pertinent to resolution based on 
internal self-determination. 
 
To guide the Meta-Level 
Negotiations between the State and 
aggrieved non-state actor in 
working out the outline of the broad 
parameters of Peace Negotiations.  
Participation from the triadic 
recursion levels comprising 
representation from the:- 
•  Aspiring secessionists Tamils 
(R-1).   
•  GoSL representing Sri Lanka 
the Parent State (R0).  
•  Five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council (R+1).     
If Peace Talks fail and it is not due 
to sabotage by the secessionist then 
a prima facie  case for secession 
exists if all three aspects of equality 
(namely, evidence of historical 
inequality pertaining to substantive 
matters, and non-achievement of 
their rectification in negotiations, 
plus evidence of equality in the 
manner of governance proposed by 
the secessionist) can be 
substantiated.    
 
Pre-Talks Negotiations – Design of 
the Process of Negotiations 
Designing the processes for Peace 
Talks which pertain to negotiation, 
monitoring, feedback, verification, 
etc.   
Six participants (with process 
design skills) each from R0 and R-
1systems (Sinhalese, Tamils, 
Muslims and Other) with few of 
them specifically representing R-2 
systems (e.g. a provincial or 
religious system). 
 
 
The orthogonal set forming the 
‘multi-system representative’ Peace 
Secretariat would report to each of 
the orthogonal sets of the ‘Meta-
Level  Negotiations’ team.  This 
way, the communications channel is 
formalized so that the influence of 
the meta-level negotiators can be 
harnessed when it is required to 
correct anomalies.  
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Syntegration involving  Starting purpose …  Participants  Comments 
Peace Talks Negotiations       
1.  R-3 systems (light green 
Syntegrations) of each of 
the embedded systems 
within each of the R-2 
systems. 
What issues need to be addressed in Sri 
Lanka and solutions proposed?   
Voluntary and by invitation of 
those known to have shown 
interest in the issues facing Sri 
Lanka. 
Representatives of R-2 systems are 
chosen from these Syntegrations.  They 
can be either single participants or 
orthogonal sets from the R-3 
Syntegrations.  
 
Content issues are likely to be more 
orientated towards matters of everyday 
living.  Example, cost of living, 
employment, school admissions, 
education, transport, return of land of 
IDPs, corruption, business climate like 
FX parity values and interest rates, 
subsidies, incentives. 
2.  Negotiation between R-2 
and R-3 (dark green 
Syntegrations) 
e.g. Western Province Sinhalese 
R-2 and from R-3 such 
systems as monolingual 
Sinhala speaking 
community, Buddhist- 
Sinhalese community, 
Christian-Sinhalese 
community,  Professional 
Sinhalese community, etc. 
• Gaining an understanding of the 
relationship between issues as 
identified by the R-3 systems within 
that R-2 community. 
 
• Forming a consolidated view of the 
issues that need to be addressed in 
Sri Lanka and solutions proposed. 
 
Representatives from 
Syntegrations involving R-3 and 
those invited to attend, particularly 
those having experience with 
governing (political) or 
administrating (public service) the 
Provinces (or what comprises the 
identity of the particular R-2 
system) 
Provides an avenue for each 
community to consolidate on its 
requirements and understand its trade-
off capabilities. 
 
Addresses issues of cohesion-
autonomy and seeks resolution of 
residual variety from R-3 
Syntegrations.  
3.  Each R-2 System (dark 
green Syntegrations). 
e.g. Estate Tamil Community or 
Western Province Sinhalese 
Community, or Eastern 
Province Muslim 
Community. 
• Forming a consolidated view of the 
issues that need to be addressed and 
solutions proposed. 
 
• What is the design of the 
autonomous-cohesive relationship 
between the R-2 systems and its R-1 
system? 
 
• What is the future identity of R-
1systems and in what way is it 
sought to be different? 
Orthogonal set representatives 
from each ‘R-3 and R-2 
Syntegration’ and experienced 
political and if desired public 
servants including military 
representatives. 
This Syntegration could form part of 
the ‘R-2 and R-3 Syntegrations’ 
referred to earlier.  The choice is a 
matter for the ‘process designers’ to 
negotiate.  
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Syntegration involving  Starting purpose …  Participants  Comments 
4.  Negotiations between R-1 
per community and its 
embedded R-2 Systems 
(red Syntegrations) 
o  Gaining an understanding of the 
relationship between issues as 
identified by the R-2 systems within 
that R-1 community. 
 
o  What is the design of the 
autonomous-cohesive relationship 
between the R-2 systems and their R-
1 system? 
 
Orthogonal representatives from 
Syntegrations involving R-2 and 
those invited to attend, particularly 
those having experience with 
governing (political) or 
administrating (public service) the 
Provinces (or what comprises the 
identity of the particular R-
1system) 
It is important to monitor (by the Peace 
Secretariat) the principles and 
architecture of the equality relationship 
between the cohesive R-1and the 
autonomous R-2 systems and compare 
that against the principles and 
architecture that is agreed upon 
concerning the cohesive-autonomous 
relationship/s between R0 and R-1 
systems.   
 
The results should be reported to each of 
the orthogonal sets belonging to the 
Meta-Level Negotiations. 
 
Addresses issues of cohesion-autonomy 
and seeks resolution of residual variety 
from R-3 Syntegrations. 
5.  Each R-1 system (red 
Syntegrations)  
•  Forming a consolidated view of the 
issues that need to be addressed and 
solutions proposed. 
 
•  What is the desired design of the 
autonomous-cohesive relationship 
between the R-2 systems and its R-1 
system? 
 
•  What is the future identity of R-1 
systems and in what way is it sought 
to be different? 
Orthogonal set representatives of 
the Syntegration pertaining to 
‘Negotiations between R-1 per 
community & its embedded R-2 
Systems’ and experienced political 
and if desired public servants 
including military representatives. 
 
The results of these Syntegrations may 
warrant follow-up Topic Syntegrations 
which then report back to an 
orthogonal set of its emanating 
Syntegration.  Or resulting Topic 
Syntegration may feed into a fresh 
Syntegration of the type from which 
the Topic Syntegration emanated. 
Topic Syntegrations 
 
These in-depth explorations 
could be chosen as a 
consequence of any of the 
Syntegrations. 
 
•  Gaining an in-depth understanding of 
the topic as it pertains to Sri Lanka 
and aided by subject matter experts  
Five members of the topic from the 
emanating Syntegration. 
These Syntegrations are likely to 
emanate from Syntegrations involving 
each of the R-1 systems and each of the 
R-2 systems.   
 
The results of these topic Syntegrations 
need to feed back into a repeat of the 
type of Syntegration from which they 
emanated.  
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Syntegration involving  Starting purpose …  Participants  Comments 
6.  Negotiation between the 
various R-1 Systems and 
R0 
•  Gaining an understanding of the 
relationship between issues as 
identified by the various R-1 
systems and the cohesive issues 
facing R0. 
 
•  What is the design of the 
autonomous-cohesive relationship 
between the R-1 systems and their 
R0 system? 
 
What is the future identity of R-1 
systems and in what way is it sought 
to be different? 
Orthogonal set representatives of 
the ‘R-1 Syntegration’ and the R0 
set of Syntegrations as shown on 
Figure 20. 
 
Substantive issues which do not result 
in mutual agreement need to be 
referred to the lower levels of recursion 
where re-negotiation may result in a 
change of position and thus resolution.   
 
An important issue here is the Tamil 
requirement for autonomy as distinct 
from equality.  
7.  Verification & 
Modification  
 
These Syntegrations seek 
verification and/or modification 
of requirements from their 
predecessor Syntegration 
 
 
 
•  Seeking to absorb substantive 
domains of residual variety 
particularly those that do not gain 
resolution at the negotiations 
between R0 and R-1. 
 
 
The new Syntegration involving a 
lower level of recursion needs to 
comprise at least one orthogonal 
set from the Syntegration from the 
recursion level above and one 
orthogonal set of participants from 
the Syntegration that is the same as 
this new Syntegration. 
 
For example, let’s use the new 
‘verification and mediation’ 
Syntegration as emanating from a 
‘negotiations between the various 
R-1 and R0’ Syntegration.  
Additionally, let us assume this 
new Syntegration pertains to the 
system of ‘R-1 Tamils’.  To 
achieve linkage of the flow and 
interpretation of information the 
participants for the new 
Syntegration would minimally 
include an orthogonal set from R0 
and another from the old R-1 
Tamil Syntegration. 
The results from this new Syntegration 
would then feed into an even newer 
generation of a Syntegration.  To 
establish linkage, once again the 
orthogonal sets would be utilized.   
 
Using the same example mentioned in 
the column to the left, the new 
‘verification and Modification’ R-1 
Syntegration would provide an 
orthogonal set of participants to 
participate at the new ‘R-1 and R0 
negotiation’.  This new Syntegration 
would also be provided with 
participants from the old ‘R-1and R0 
negotiation’. 
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The important point of Figure 9 and such Figures as 18 and 21 is not the names of the 
recursive embedments and topics but the linkage of the way negotiations are built ground-
up thus giving the opportunity for various segments of society to raise their issues and very 
importantly for them to join in the process of designing solutions that are not one-sided.  
This one-sidedness is overcome by the multiple topic positioning that a participant holds in 
the Team Syntegrity® process plus by the ‘Peace Talks’ negotiations not being a 
standalone process.  The latter is achieved by the recursive linkage of ‘Peace Talks’ 
negotiations involving R0 and R-1 being clearly linked to the ‘Meta-Level’ negotiations 
through the commonality of systems’ represented.  At the Meta-Level negotiations the 
issue of the principle of equal rights in terms of its interpretation for preserving territorial 
integrity or secession is expected to be part of the deliberations.  If so, no longer will it be 
adequate for protagonists to merely state that territorial integrity or secession is the goal.  
Clarity needs to be sought, minimally concerning the principle of equal rights, as to what 
achieving those goals entails with the representatives of the UN Security Council
127
 
 acting 
as a sounding board.  Furthermore, this proposal does away with the practice of laying the 
onus on one side or the other to propose solutions.  This has happened many times, ranging 
from the ISGA proposal, to the 2000 constitutional proposals and the latest 2007 APRC 
proposal.  Certainly they have been designed with the (semblance of the) other side in 
mind.  However, the other side has not been involved in the design of the solution. 
The important distinction of this proposal is that the design of solutions is a collaborative 
effort which brings together the systems in their recursive relationships.  In that capacity 
their gravitation towards cohesion and autonomy will influence the co-design of the 
solution.  As Beer (1994g) was known to say, data itself does not supply cohesion, it is the 
interpretation between individuals that procures cohesion and this is another aspect that is 
sought to be harnessed in co-designing solutions.  In turn, amongst other matters, the VSM 
informs us that this calls for anti-oscillatory processes to be set in place and the need for 
functionality which addresses matters of communication channels, homeostasis, 
monitoring, auditing, co-ordination, and future positioning to adapt one’s identity to ensure 
survival.  As discussed in Chapter Three, the consistency of the application of principles is 
                                                 
127 The Security Council has been selected in recognition of the power vested in it by virtue of Article 25 of 
the UN Charter which requires that Members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council.    
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part of the solution proposed in terms of functionality.  Through the linkage of recursive 
systems in designing solutions the consistency of principles can be monitored.  In this 
regard, the outcomes of Syntegrations (or any other process aiding the generation of 
requirements, solution designs and negotiations thereof) need to be mapped (by the multi-
representative Peace Secretariat) both in terms of content and functionality so that gaps in 
the design of solutions can be identified.  
 
It is pertinent to point out something that Beer stated. –  
Recursive embedments are not objectively given, however.  We choose them, by 
recognizing processes that have special meaning for us, because they give meaning to 
our own human experience.  Structure is attention to process.  The structure of 
embedments now advanced is my choice, and the terms that are chosen to denote the 
embedded systems need the support of the connotations provided for them in this 
Chapter.  Thus it is the validity of the processes that are discussed as creating the 
architecture of consciousness that is truly in question, not whether the processes that are 
the structure have been given the best (still less the ‘correct’) available names. (Beer, 
1994e, brackets in source)   
Whilst the interpretations argued in this thesis enable me to take a position on the identity 
of these recursive embedments the process design proposed here keeps it open to the Meta-
Level Negotiations to mutually agree upon these systems.  In this regard, it is important to 
realise that the ‘process’ proposed can accommodate the negotiations to be conducted by a 
certain combination of systems and for that combination of systems to design a change in 
the recursive position of the systems and the way they govern themselves in the context of 
their relationships with each other.  An example of this transition may turn out to be a 
change from systems belonging to R-1 moving from being communally-based to 
geographically-based or some hybrid thereof.    
 
Another potentially critical consideration is the distinction between autonomy and equality.  
Does the granting and implementation of equality in terms of substantive matters like race, 
language, religion and culture do away with the need for a devolved system of governance 
and thus autonomy?  On the surface it appears the Tamil argument for autonomy is based 
on the inequality interpretation of their experiences.  Thus the question arises - if such 
inequality can be eradicated does that mean that the demand for autonomy evaporates?  
The findings of Organizational Cybernetics suggest not.  Embedded systems need 
autonomy so that they are positioned to generate their own variety to absorb the variety  
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required to ensure the survival of their identity.  Thus, the demand for autonomy remains 
and so too the meta-level identity requirement which relies on cohesion.  As Stokes states, 
and as mentioned in Chapter Three –  
 
By means of identity discrete and separate elements are brought into common or shared 
arrangement one with the other.  Identity is the pattern that connects.  Another way to 
say this is that identity is the mode of integration of otherwise heterogeneous elements 
under the aegis of a single sign complex.  A failure of integration  means that the 
identity project has failed or has come unstuck. (Stokes, 2004) 
Yet the question of autonomy is not an overarching one, in the sense of it applying to 
everything.  If it was there would be no way of achieving the integration at the higher level 
of recursion.  Rather the question from a cybernetic perspective is -  to maintain that 
identity of that mode of integration what cohesive requirements need to prevail as they 
pertain to which variables?  It is these variables which can be described as subject domains 
and/or functionality that need to be identified and scoped in terms of the way it is to apply 
to cohesion and autonomy in the context of the various levels of recursion.  As the Indian 
Constitution has shown it is not the labelling of the Constitution as unitary or devolved that 
matters and with which Organizational Cybernetics concurs - cohesion and autonomy co-
exist in the relationship between different levels of recursion.  The question is – to which 
subject domains and functions does which form of governance apply?  This was attempted 
in the 13
th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, but its weaknesses are legendary 
and require remedy.  In saying this, it is fair to recognize that the phase space within which 
a remedy lies is probably very limited given the requirements of the various systems within 
the various levels of recursion.  It is understanding what propels those requirements that 
hold hope for an acceptable solution to be designed.  Ironically, as it involves itself in such 
design so grows cohesion.  
 
I propose that what brought people into cohesive groups was the shared information that 
had changed them into purposive individuals.  Date themselves do not supply this 
cohesion.  It is the interpretation between individuals that procures group cohesion. (Beer, 
1994g). 
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The permutation and sequence of the portfolio of Syntegrations will depend on the number 
of participants and the outcome of Syntegrations.  Like the architecture of the Team 
Syntegrity® protocol which follows an iterative pattern of three sets of meetings, a set of 
three iterations is proposed to link the various Peace Talks Syntegrations thus forming a 
looped and reverberating informational flow.  The design of the Syntegration portfolio, 
which needs to be dynamically designed based on the outcomes of the progressive 
Syntegrations, is a matter for the multi-system represented Peace Secretariat to design. 
 
Absorbing the variety associated with designing peace solutions will almost certainly take 
time given the plethora of content that will emerge when wider participation is permitted 
which itself was advocated so that a dynamic concatenation of reliability is available.  The 
question is whether like full-time Military Generals, Defence Ministers and their staff, the 
equivalent will be appointed to ‘wage’ peace. 
 
Whilst Team Syntegrity® has been employed in the corporate world and for Peace 
Negotiations involving opposing protagonists, as far as I am aware Team Syntegrity® with 
bi-directional linkage across multiple levels of recursion has not been previously applied  
 
Future Research 
 
To aid a cybernetic diagnosis of the Sri Lanka Peace Talks a language is required which is 
capable of distinguishing the relationships between various stakeholders and the 
components that each stakeholder represents.   
 
To meet this purpose, a narrative of Sri Lanka is provided which is then translated to a 
contextualised VSM.  For example - how does the VSM capture a merger negotiation 
where an entity’s identity appears in multiple domains, albeit with different nuances?  How 
does the VSM capture a merger negotiation given there is minimally at least four phases?   
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These are:- 
1.  Gaining agreement of (warring) parties to enter into negotiation,  
2.  Being in the negotiation phase, where once dormant stakeholders get affected by the 
negotiations taking place and thus need to participate and negotiate the nature of the 
evolving relationships,  
3.  After negotiation when the merger is taking place since it does not happen in an instant, 
and  
4.  After merger.   
The objective is to discuss the art and science of the way the VSM operation itself is 
applied and in particular to:- 
 
•  Gauge  the appropriateness of the way the VSM is applied in this instance given the 
rigour and coherence of what the VSM enables, 6 
•  Consider the traps and quandaries encountered, and 
•  Canvass improvements, etc.   
 
Such is the variety that S4 has to model if serious attention is to be given to the design of 
the negotiation phases, especially given the lag times involved in creating the channels that 
reach across to connect the parties to dialogue and the capacities entailed.   
 
The value of this Sri Lankan case study is that wedged in the negotiation is the prospect to 
consider options for how Sri Lanka wants to govern itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this final stretch of this thesis the imperative in correspondence with the reality facing 
Sri Lanka is not only to return to Peace Talks but to sustain them to the point of conclusion 
where the terms of peaceful co-existence are mutually agreed upon.  Thus the question that 
has been addressed is what would be the environment that could support the most variety 
for Peace Talks outcomes. 
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Concerning styles of governance, this mapping brings to focus the need for the S1s to 
employ consultation with embedded and peer entities and to address cohesion issues which 
to date has been conspicuously missing in the negotiation process.  Note, whilst it makes 
political sense that the LTTE given its autocratic mode of governance would not engage in 
consultation with its embedded entities, this is a requirement that emerges under a merged 
SL.  This opens a twofold question pertaining to (1) embedded entities, and (2) peer 
entities.   
 
Concerning embedded entities, it poses the question whether an S1 under a merged Sri 
Lanka, can operate its lower level of recursions on autocratic (let’s call it benevolent) 
rather than democratic ‘resource bargaining’ principles.  Whilst cybernetically we may 
advocate otherwise, it is an option open to an S1 to exercise and thus gives the right to that 
S1 (e.g. LTTE representing Tamils) to obviate consultation with its embedded entities.  
However, resource bargaining will still be called upon among peer LTTE entities which is 
indeed what will provide the avenue to consider how the S1s cohere into a merged Sri 
Lankan identity.   
 
For this reason, an option is for the GoSL to extricate itself from being reduced to 
representing the Sinhalese, and get to thinking and acting with meta-level consciousness.  
On the other hand, given that the majority in the GoSL is Sinhalese, an alternative is to 
recognise the GoSL as representing the Sinhalese, and allow other race representation (e.g. 
Muslims) in the negotiation process which together then considers the meta-level identity 
and institution that will represent the race merged Sri Lank.  This is the critical closure that 
identity provides that has been missing from the Peace Negotiations, and which will 
provide the logic for autonomous demands to close in on itself.  Currently the architecture 
of the negotiations has called upon no such meta-level identity to be framed and what we 
have is autonomous demands (e.g. as specified in the 2003 ISGA and the 1976 
Vaddukkoddai Resolution) which earns rejection from the GoSL and results in an impasse. 
 
The inherent value in the ‘consultative cohesive’ process proposed is that in the embedded 
instance it provides each S1 the experience of negotiating identity as a meta-level entity 
which principles it can then apply in its negotiations for designing the meta-level identity 
which forms the merged Sri Lanka.  On the other hand, if it does not engage in the  
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‘consultative cohesive’ process and opts for unilateral imposition, then it is reasonable to 
argue reciprocity and expect those unilateral principles to be imposed by the meta-level 
institution of the merged Sri Lanka.  Now this is a powerful reciprocity argument to 
encourage the S1s to consult with their embedded entities and in so doing provides the 
opportunity to overcome unilateral decisions that negatively impact on subsumed entities 
and provides the variety to generate workable solutions.    
 
As Blay says, post-decolonization is uncharted territory where each makes its own 
interpretation and pursues it.  The entrée into negotiations has been the need for ISO 3166 
accreditation.  Mandatory/Monopoly enlisting representation from the five Permanent 
Members of the UN Security Council is unique.  So too is the application design of the bi-
directional linkage of TS across multiple levels of recursion.  Once the wide spectrum of 
participants are invited to overcome the unreliability of the political and public service 
system, it opens the conversation to a plethora of content, well beyond the immediacy of 
peace/conflict, to everyday living issues like cost of leaving, the economic balance between 
self sufficiency and globalization, the effectiveness of the public service, language issues in 
the context of employment, civil administration, schooling and race identity.   
 
Whilst Peace Talks is the trigger that initiates the dialogue, they are inextricably linked to 
the multiplicity of intertwined crises that beset Sri Lanka.  The ‘process design’ and meta-
level logic proposed in this thesis offers the prospect, if employed, for Sri Lankans to 
design encompassing solutions,  which after all is part and parcel of designing a new 
structure of governance.   
 
As Antonio Machado once said “Traveller, there is no path.  Paths are made by walking”. 
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  Chapter Six 
Concluding Contribution 
 
 
The world is round and the place  
that might seem like the end 
may also be the beginning.  
-  Ivy Baker Priest 
 
 
This final chapter ties together the various strands of this thesis to show the manner in 
which the chapters cohere and to substantiate the conceptual contribution of the findings.  
 
Through the lens of Organizational Cybernetics and in the context of my comprehension of 
Sri Lanka’s history, this thesis addresses crises from the perspective of those prevailing and 
those potentially developing in Sri Lanka.   Whilst matters of Sri Lankan content pervade 
this dissertation, the contribution of this thesis pertains to matters of process, both in terms 
of diagnosis and solution proposed.  Whilst the diagnosis (addressed in Chapter Three) 
pertains to matters of history, the solution proposed (presented in Chapter Five) has sought 
to cater for weak signals (covered in Chapter Four) which given time may develop strength 
and require resolution in the quest for harmonious relationships across the ethnic 
communities and a more even distribution of wealth across the population of Sri Lanka. 
 
To achieve the objective of systemically diagnosing key aspects of what ails Sri Lanka and 
to provide design intervention processes, this thesis progressively introduces the reader to a 
multi-disciplinary  working understanding of Organizational Cybernetics, Sri Lankan 
history and touches on matters of philosophy, international law, finance and politics.  By 
doing so, it caters for a knowledgeable cybernetic readership or an audience conversant 
with Sri Lankan matters, but not both.    
 
Having taken the reader through this interwoven terrain and established the language and 
appreciation of the multi-disciplinary filters applied to formulate the thinking that produced 
the diagnosis and solution proposed in this thesis, this chapter discusses in: -  
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•  Part I a summary of the findings of this thesis.  This can then be used in terms of 
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety to conceptually evaluate the extent of additional 
variety absorbed by the findings of this thesis as compared to what has taken place and 
currently takes place in the quest for peace in Sri Lanka.  It can also be used in terms of 
probability to evaluate the abductive based hypothesis which was proposed in Chapter 
One.   
 
 
•  Part II a hidden thread which is applicable in general for sovereignty based conflicts 
where secession is threatened.  By doing so, it also opens the thesis to a readership who 
are neither conversant with Organizational Cybernetics nor Sri Lanka’s conflict, but 
who are interested in addressing sovereignty based conflicts.  
 
Overall the uniqueness of this thesis is the application of Organizational Cybernetics to a 
national level of recursion where the contribution is the quest to transition from war to the 
heuristic experience of peace. 
 
 
Part I – Summary of Thesis Findings 
 
To date negotiations, whether war or Peace Talks, have been contained to two parties - the 
GoSL and those who have asserted themselves as representatives of the aggrieved Tamil 
community.  In contrast, this thesis proposes that participation at Peace Talks be extended 
beyond two party negotiations to involve representatives from multiple layers of recursion.  
In specific, recognising that pro-active negotiators negotiate a primary position whilst 
keeping an attractive ‘contingency’  option  exercisable, it is posited that internal self-
determination  is  negotiated taking into consideration the option of external self-
determination.  Thus, the Parent State seeking to preserve the territorial integrity of its 
borders would seek in its internal self-determination negotiations to position itself so as to 
ensure it averts external self-determination.  In contrast, the representatives of the 
aggrieved embedded system would position itself to keep the options open so that it can 
secure external self-determination should internal self-determination negotiations not 
produce the desired results, in principle or in practice.      
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Additionally, despite the on-going and varied types of negotiations the right of territorial 
integrity versus the right of self-determination has to date presented as an undecidable 
proposition in Sri Lanka.  In a bid to resolve that proposition this thesis searched for a 
meta-level logic that was capable of absorbing the residual variety given the objective of 
restoring island-wide ethnic harmony.  Applying the concept of operational viability as 
would be required by the new State, such meta-level logic was found at the UN level of 
recursion due to UN State Membership being the gateway predominately used to  gain 
access to the international interchange systems.    This thesis posits that the need to 
participate in the international interchange systems, which is a contingency requirement, 
draws the aspiring secessionist to comply with UN requirements of peace and equality.  In 
turn to absorb the resultant UN driven variety this draws the Parent State to respond and 
stake its counterclaim with evidence of equality on substantive matters.  To the extent the 
Parent State does not, it acts as an incentive for it to return to Peace Talks and design 
equality into its rules of governance and thereby ensure the  territorial  integrity of its 
borders.  
 
To absorb this complex set of residual issues  and  focusing on ‘process’ design 
considerations  this thesis proposes  a  three  pronged set of interrelated  internal self-
determination negotiations, viz: 
a)  Meta-Level Negotiations   
b)  Pre-Talks Negotiations - Design of the Process of Negotiations   
c)  Peace Talks Negotiations 
 
Recognising the need to absorb residual variety and the way ‘contingency’ positioning is 
used in negotiations, the participants proposed for the Meta-Level Negotiations comprise 
representatives from the Parent State, namely the GoSL (R0), the aspiring secessionist 
Tamils (R-1) and those from the UN, particularly the Security Council veto powers (R+1).   
The focus of this negotiation, which could be characterised as setting the framework for 
supervising internal self-determination negotiations, is to determine which systems will 
have the right of representation at the Peace Talk Negotiations and agree on the principles 
which will apply at the other two prongs of the negotiations.   
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Those called upon to participate in the Pre-Talks  Negotiations, whose objective is to 
negotiate and agree upon the design of the negotiation processes that will be employed for 
Peace Talk Negotiations,  are those seeking cohesion and autonomy  in the context of 
internal self-determination.  Chapter Five proposed  such participation  include 
representation from the State (R0) and each of its embedded ethnic systems (R-1) and in 
turn what each R-1 system perceives at this early stage as its embedded systems (R-2).  
Additionally, a segment representative of the diversity of participants of those involved in 
Pre-Talk Negotiations can potentially form the nucleus of what could be aptly described as 
a Development Directorate that keeps track of and maps the interrelation of content that is 
addressed at the Peace Talks Negotiations.  These results could be used to dynamically 
adapt  plans for on-going  phases of Peace Talks and to inform those involved with 
supervising the negotiations (i.e. the triadic participants of the Meta-Level Negotiations) so 
that they are positioned to influence corrective action where required. 
 
Overall, the protocol of Team Syntegrity was advocated as the process for negotiations 
where the objective of the negotiations was to propose design solutions.  In this regard, it is 
important to make a distinction between proposing solutions and the process of decision 
making which accepts or rejects the proposed solution design/s.  This thesis addressed the 
former.  Decision making is considered to be a matter for the Head of State, parliament, 
and referendums by the people.  
 
Sri Lankans have long held the view that the quest for peace is a domestic matter for them 
to negotiate and achieve.  Thus the objective of Peace Talks Negotiations is for Sri Lankans 
to address whatever comprises that content.   This thesis proposes interlocking negotiations 
(refer Figure 9) thus enabling pivotal systems to be positioned both in their cohesive and 
autonomous roles and by so doing positions embedded systems to exercise their autonomy 
to design the nature of the way they cohere to their meta-level system, which in the context 
of internal self-determination is ultimately Sri Lanka.  
 
Building from the periphery of people to the centre of power and wanting to invoke the 
ability to verify and/or contest negotiated propositions, a cascade of interlocking and bi-
directional set of negotiations using the protocol of Team Syntegrity was proposed (refer 
Figure 21).  Realising that no group, whatever their specialisation, would be able to provide  
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the requisite variety to address the diversity and depth of interrelated issues that need to be 
addressed, and recognising the inherent unreliability of components which are alerted to 
and resolved by McCulloch’s  Redundancy of Potential  Command,  Team Syntegrity’s 
orthogonal set is used as a way of figuring out who will represent the various systems at the 
negotiations devoted to designing solutions.  In doing so, the dependence on exclusivity of 
representation at Peace Talks being accorded to politicians has also been overcome.   
 
The proposal for representation from the multiple systems embedded within the Sri Lankan 
layer of recursion is more than that Muslims warrant a place at the negotiations table 
alongside Tamils.   What this thesis argues is that the Sinhalese also warrant a place and 
this system must not be conflated with the meta-level system, Sri Lanka.  To combine them 
into one is to walk into the trap of fulfilling the accusation that the GoSL who is the 
representative of Sri Lanka is also the representative of the Sinhalese.  The diagnosis 
conducted in Chapter Three evidences this architectural flaw in the composition of the 
2002-2003 Peace Talks, the ISGA, PTOMS and the triple set of Peace Secretariats.  This 
untangling of systems is a critical finding of Chapter Three and arose as a consequence of 
applying the concept of recursion and understanding the principle of cohesion and 
autonomy.  It also distinguishes the LTTE in internal self-determination negotiations as 
representing the Tamils, or more specifically that segment of aspiring secessionists in the 
absence of equality.   
 
What the interrelated three-pronged set of proposed negotiations achieves is room for 
multiple representations from each of the communities and by so doing overcomes the 
exclusivity accorded to the LTTE, and provides for representation by the GoSL to be 
distinguished from representatives of the Sinhalese.  Additionally, the composition of the 
Meta-Level Negotiations gives  recognition to what has been referred to  as the 
‘contingency’ position where the aspiring secessionist sees itself on par with the GoSL.  
Concurrently and in contrast, the Peace Talks Negotiations position the GoSL as a state 
actor with the LTTE as one of the representatives of the Tamil embedded system.  
 
By so doing, what the three-pronged negotiation set has achieved is designed negotiations 
so that it obviates the question as to whether negotiations between the GoSL and LTTE is a 
peer-to-peer negotiation or a negotiation between a supervening system and an embedded  
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system.  In my view, the latter relationship pertains to internal self-determination and the 
former to secession.  However, what the three-pronged negotiations achieve is that they 
factor in elements of the ‘contingency’ of external self-determination whilst focusing on 
internal self-determination negotiations. 
 
Additionally Chapter Three proposed the concept of Principle Based Negotiations of the 
calibre that lends itself for use by oneself and others thereby evidencing equality/fairness.  
A set of principles, borrowed from Organizational Cybernetics, was accordingly proposed 
for the negotiations and these very principles were also proposed to be used to diagnose 
and propose solutions in this thesis.   
 
What Chapter Four achieves is it brings focus on the type of content that internal self-
determination negotiations will be called upon to address.  Here there was an extensive 
discussion on the unit of devolution  in the context of internal self-determination (its 
relationship to viability and fiscal equalization) and external self-determination (its pre-
architected boundaries).  Thus understanding ‘contingency’ positioning it was held that 
those opting to preserve territorial integrity will argue for small geographical units of 
devolution so that should external self-determination result, pockets of landmass can be 
saved so a large tract of contiguous landmass is not risked to secession.   In contrast, those 
wanting to keep the contingency of secession open will opt for devolution built on large 
contiguous landmasses.  Indeed, examination of the proposals put forward by the various 
protagonists  evidences  this pattern, which pragmatically substantiates the parallel 
‘contingency’ negotiations theory put forward in this thesis.   
 
Reflection on the connection of Chapter Four and Two, shows that in the ubiquitous quest 
for requisite variety Bhaskar’s philosophical framework in the Domain of the Real and the 
Domain of the Actual whilst it may not always empirically evidence itself (refer Table 2) 
are vital elements of variety which need to be addressed in designing robust systems for 
they may exercise themselves in the future.  Thus it heeds one to consider the constitutional 
issues discussed in Chapter Four under the caption of designing ultrastable systems, from 
the perspective of the philosophy which was introduced in Chapter Two which there was 
presented from the viewpoint of what constitutes proof and what is reality.   
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The significance of this thesis from an Organization Cybernetics perspective is that besides 
using that framework for diagnostic purposes, it has been heavily used to design a solution.  
From a peace perspective, what commenced as a journey to understand Sri Lankan crises 
has begun to traverse a more general path of ‘process’ solution proposals that are relevant 
to the broader context of sovereignty based conflicts.  This is discussed next. 
 
 
Part II – Assessment to Gauge Preparedness for Secession and its 
Aversion 
 
This thesis has grappled with the complex terrain of the quest for peace in an ethnically 
triggered conflict where Sri Lanka’s sovereignty is perceived to be threatened.  I say 
‘perceived’ because one interpretation is that the threat is just that and no more.  It is a 
posturing or a position that is made known to gain leverage so as to achieve a different 
result in which they are interested.  Another is that such threat and the wish to achieve it is 
an extremist view which moderates do not share.  Another is that prospects for peace are 
realistically only possible via negotiations with moderates (from each side) and thus the 
extremists need to be annihilated, particularly when associated with terrorism.   
 
This perceived generalisation is applicable whether the context is Sri Lanka or another 
facing the heat of the threat of secession.  
 
What this array of perceptions shows, particularly the last, is that the opposing protagonists 
(i.e.  Parent State  or aspiring secessionist) does factor the threat of secession and/or 
terrorism into their response strategy - one side to achieve secession and the other to avert 
it.  The variety employed to absorb the bid (or aversion) for secession is mostly done in the 
theatre of war whether by the military or terrorist/freedom fighters.  The heavy toll paid by 
each side is evidenced in death, injury and the harshness of monumental financial debt as 
the years of war mount.  It is to avert that toll that Peace Talks are proposed.   
 
The evidence of war indicates it is attractive both rationally and emotively.  Each side is so 
convinced of their ability to avert or achieve secession, as the case may be, that they go to  
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war on it.  Certainly, there are other reasons for war, like cordoning off territory, handsome 
profit margins for ‘war purchasing’ decision makers and a leverage tool at peace talks.  Yet 
the threat of secession does play a particularly significant emotional role in what drives the 
war. 
     
To the Parent State emotionally charged with the need to preserve territorial integrity, the 
threat of secession is like a red flag to a bull upon which rests the argument for war.  
Equally  the aggrieved community aspiring and denied equal status respond emotively, 
convinced of their right to secede.  Each community slants its propaganda to convince its 
younger generation to join the war to uphold the rights of their community.    
 
It is this emotional appeal that I want to address as the findings of this thesis show that 
secession from the perspective of operational viability is a matter for the international 
community to decide.  Certainly, that international position is one of the many facets of the 
decision that has to be taken.  Yet the point remains it is a matter for the international 
community and thus is an arena for action where the bid (or aversion) for secession must 
compulsorily take place.   
 
Thus, the vehemence of bloodshed of war alone is not enough.  Indeed I would go as far as 
to state that international approval is mandatory.  If recognition of secession is achieved or 
averted in the international arena the domestic solution is almost immaterial.  
 
Whilst the international position will not be known until a domestic actor takes an overt 
position (e.g. declaration of independence), the international positioning at any one time 
can be assessed.   
 
That assessment in turn can be used for two very valuable purposes - one, as leverage into 
Peace Talks and the other as a means to counter the propaganda that is directed at the 
warrior potential of the younger, or any, generation. 
 
For example, if the Parent State can show in its assessment that it can with a high degree of 
confidence count on one of the permanent representatives on the UN Security Council 
exercising its veto power, then it obviates or at least substantially reduces the need for war.   
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On the other hand, to the extent the aspiring secessionist can indicate its strength in its 
gaining UN Security Council approval for its bid for secession it likewise reduces the need 
for war.  Here the need is to avoid the exercise of veto power and to gain the approval of 
nine of the fifteen Security Council members - Article 26 (3) of the UN Charter. 
 
The significance of this type of assessment is a little recognised but significant variable is 
found that warrants amplification in order to counteract the attraction of war, particularly 
the rationale for its intensity.  Equally important is that this assessment can be done by 
institutions competent in the politics of international relations.  Such institutions could 
range from civil society organisations, to political organizations, to the Parent State, to the 
aspiring secessionist,  to international donors, to the UN itself.  Certainly, each 
organisation’s assessment findings would be different.   
 
Reputable organisations conducting such assessment and publishing the results, has the 
distinct potential to change the dependence on war in the way it is used as leverage into and 
at Peace Talks.   
 
Likewise, such assessment would be useful to counteract propaganda.  It would serve to 
build an understanding not only of geo-political-economic interests but to come to terms 
with the process and procedures of what it takes to achieve secession and viability.  To the 
extent such amplification succeeds it will be evidenced in reduced numbers who opt for 
war as their countervailing strategy.   
 
Future research is required to address this ‘assessment’ proposal.  In particular, it requires 
research into what it takes to achieve operational viability for a new State and as a different 
issue it needs to figure out the different means by which international recognition of 
statehood is achieved.  In terms of variety absorption, it also requires that each case of 
threatened sovereignty be assessed based on the distinction between gaining operational 
viability (as for example Taiwan has achieved) compared to gaining operational viability in 
the capacity of a fully recognised sovereign State (as for example Montenegro has 
achieved).   
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 Another Beginning 
 
A distinction is warranted between conceptualising a solution, securing agreement to 
pursue its implementation, implementing the design of the solution and as a still different 
distinction dynamically adapting the design so as to achieve the objective  
 
What this thesis has achieved is the uniqueness of applying Organizational Cybernetics to 
conceptually design a solution to transform sovereign based conflicts to a more peaceful 
environment.   
 
Having conceptualised the many facets of the solution, which is the contribution of this 
thesis, the next phase is to move the thesis from its obvious status on a bookshelf to the 
minds of influencers so that decision makers can make informed choices in the journey for 
peace.   
 
As this conceptualised thesis closes it forms a bridge to another beginning - the journey for 
the quest of application. 
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Appendix 1 - The Atlantic Charter 
The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain 
common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a 
better future for the world. 
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; 
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the 
peoples concerned; 
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and 
they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of 
them; 
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all 
States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of 
the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; 
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the 
object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security; 
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to 
all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that 
all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; 
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance; 
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to 
the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments 
continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, 
they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the 
disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures 
which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Winston S. Churchill 
Source: Samuel Rosenman, ed., Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol.10 (1938-1950), 
314 Available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm [accessed 25 January 2007] 
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Appendix 2 - The Thimpu Declaration 
At Thimpu, in July 1985, all six Tamil Liberation Organisations, consisting of the Eelam 
Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation 
(EROS), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Peoples Liberation 
Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), 
and the Parliamentary Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), jointly and unanimously 
declared:  
"It is our considered view that any meaningful solution to the Tamil national question must 
be based on the following four cardinal principles -  
1. recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nation  
2. recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in the island of Sri 
Lanka  
3. recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation  
4. recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils who look 
upon the island as their country.  
"Different countries have fashioned different systems of governments to ensure these 
principles. We have demanded and struggled for an independent Tamil state as the answer 
to this problem arising out of the denial of these basic rights of our people... However, in 
view of our earnest desire for peace, we are prepared to give consideration to any set of 
proposals, in keeping with the above-mentioned principles, that the Sri Lankan government 
may place before us."  
Available at: http://www.tamilnation.org/saty/870215pathofreason.htm [accessed 3 November 2006] 
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